Dubagunta Subrahmanyam, J.
1. This appeal is filed against the Award dated 1-6-2001 in W.C. Case No. 13 of 1999 on the file of Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation-cum-Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Ongole.
2. It is not now in dispute that the deceased P. Srinivasarao was a worker in the establishment of the appellant as on 8-1-1998. According to the respondents, the said Srinivasarao was proceeding from his residence to the factory of the appellant to attend evening shift duty. Outside the premises of the appellant- factory, there is a trade union office belonging to some workers of the appellant. The deceased Srinivasarao reached the said union office. There was a flag post outside the premises of trade union office. Some persons were attending the work of removal of the flag post. The deceased joined them and was assisting them. While he was holding the flag post, the pole had come into contact with live electric wire. The deceased sustained injuries. He was removed to the hospital. He died later. The wife and parents of deceased filed claim application seeking a total compensation of Rs. 2,50,000/-. The appellant contested the claim application. They pleaded that the deceased was not a workman under them. They also pleaded that the deceased did not sustain any injury in the course of and out of his employment and therefore, the appellant is not liable to pay compensation to the claimants. On a consideration of evidence adduced before him, the Commissioner held that the deceased was a workman and he died as a result of the injury sustained by him in the course of and out of his employment. He, accordingly, awarded a compensation of Rs. 2,08,496/-. Aggrieved by that order, the appellant preferred the present appeal. As mentioned at the out set itself, at the time of hearing of this appeal, it is not disputed that the deceased was a workman working under the appellant as on 8-1-1998.
3. The Commissioner in paragraph No. 6 of his Award held that at the time of accident the deceased was not doing any work connected to the work of the establishment of the appellant. He also held that deceased himself invited death due to his negligence. He also held that the act of the deceased holding the flag post, is totally unconnected with the establishment of the appellant. He also held that the accident occurred outside the premises of the establishment of the appellant and it is at a distance of 200 yards from his workplace. However, applying the principle of doctrine of Notional Extension, he held that the deceased died in an accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment and the claimants are entitled for compensation.
4. According to the claimants-respondents, the deceased left his house to attend his duties under the appellant and during the course of his journey from his residence to the place of his employment, he met with unnatural death on the way and his dependents are entitled for compensation,
5. The learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon some decisions regarding the doctrine of notional extension. This Court would consider those decisions one after another.
6. In a decision of Karnataka High Court reported in Assistant Executive Engineer v. Sunanda, : ILR1994KAR515 , and a decision of Kerala High Court reported in Kerala Balagram v. Kochumon, : (1998)ILLJ744Ker , it was held that even a casual labourer is to be treated as workman under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. There is no need to narrate the facts and the principle of law laid down in these two decisions, inasmuch as the learned Counsel for the appellant did not question that the deceased was a workman under the establishment of the appellant on the date of accident.
7. The learned Counsel for respondents relied upon two decisions of Madras High Court reported in Management of Pannimedu Estate, Tata Tea Ltd. v. Chandra, : (1998)IIIMLJ275 , and T.N.C.S. Corporation Ltd. v. Poomalai, . The facts of the decision in Management to Pannimedu Estate, Tata Tea Limited, case (supra) are that; the claimant left her child at the creche and while she was going to attend work near the muster, another worker due to personal animosity stabbed her and caused her injuries. It is contended that the said injury is in no way connected with her employment as the assault was due to personal animosity. The Madras High Court held in the above decision Management of Pannimedu Estate, Tata Tea Ltd. (supra) that the reason or cause for assault does not really matter; what matters is the place and point of time when the incident occurred and proximity of the same to need for her presence at the time alone that is relevant
8. In another decision of Madras High Court reported in T.N.C.S. Corporation Ltd.'s case (supra), the facts are that; the workman was proceeding to the mill for attending to his duty. He was murdered on the way in a communal riot, it was contended that there is no connection between the murder and employment and the incident did not arise out of and in the course of employment It was held that the deceased employee, met with his death while he was going to his place of work and the death has arisen during the course of employment. To arrive at such a conclusion, Madras High Court relied upon a judgment of a Division Bench of Bombay High Court reported in Bhacubai v. Central Railway, (1994) 2 LLJ 403. The Madras High Court extracted the following passage in its judgment from the decision of Bombay High Court. The passage reads as follows:
'It is clear that there must be a casual connection between the accident and the employment in order that it could be said that the accident arose out of the employment of the concerned workman and the cause contemplated is the proximate cause and not any remote cause.
If the employee in the course of his employment has to be in a particular place and by the reason of his being in that particular place he has to face a peril and the accident is caused by reason of that peril which he has to face then a casual connection is established between the accident and employment. The fact that the employee shares the peril with other members of the public is an irrelevant consideration. It is true that the peril which he faces must not be personal to him; the peril must be incidental to his employment and he must not by his own act add to the peril or extend the peril. But if the peril which he faces has nothing to do with his own action or his own conduct, but it is a peril which would have been faced by any other employee or any other member of the public, then if the accident arose out of such peril, a casual connection is established between the employment and accident. So, when a workman was stabbed on his way to work and when there was no evidence to prove that there was any motive behind the murder, it was held that the accident must be held to be one arising out of the employment.
Once the applicant has established that the deceased was at a particular place and he was there because he had to be there by reason of his employment and the applicant further establishes that because the deceased was there he met with an accident, the applicant has discharged the burden which the law places upon him. The law does not place an additional burden upon the applicant to prove that the peril which the employee faced and the accident which arose due to that peril was not personal to him but was shared by all the employees or the members of the public. Once the peril is established, it is for the employer then to establish that the peril was brought about by the employee himself, that he added or extended the peril or that the peril was not a general peril but a peril personal to the employee.'
The underlining is made by this Court to lay emphasis on the passage concerned.
9. In my considered opinion, this principle of law laid down by Bombay High Court and followed by Madras High Court clinches the issue against the respondents. It is true that the office of the workers' union is situated nearer to the establishment of the appellant. It is true that the deceased left his house with the intention of attending his work in the establishment of the appellant. It may even be assumed that he has to go near his workers' union office to reach his place of work in the establishment of the appellant. Still his attending any work purely connected with the workers' union office has no even casual connection with his work in the establishment of the appellant. While proceeding to his work place, there was no need for him to assist others in the workers' union office removing the flag post. Undisputedly while he was removing the flag post, the pole came into contact with live electric wire and as a result he sustained electric shock and died later. The said conduct shows that the peril he faced is not incidental to his employment. By his own act he invited the peril he faced. Therefore, applying the principle of law laid down by Bombay High Court, it is very clear that there is not even casual connection between the accident and the employment of the deceased in the establishment of the appellant. It cannot, therefore, be held that the accident arose out of employment of the concerned workman and the cause contemplated is the proximate cause and not any remote cause.
10. In the decision of Madras High Court reported in the case of Management of Pannimedu Estate, Tata Tea Ltd.'s case (supra) a reference was made to two decisions of Apex Court reported in the case of Rajanna v. Union of India, 1995 (2) LLJ 824 and Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Company v. Bai Valu Raja and Ors., 1958 (2) LLJ 249. In Rajanna's case (supra), the injured was on VIP security duty and there was a circular issued by Union of India on 13-6-1986 regarding payment of ex gratia for sustaining injuries. The injured was proceeding from his residence in the official vehicle provided by his master to South Block, New Delhi to attend his work. On the way the vehicle met with an accident. He sustained injuries. He was denied ex gratia payment on the ground that he was not in actual VIP security duty. The Apex Court applying the principle of notional extension, held that as the deceased was proceeding to his work place in a vehicle officially provided by his master, the injury sustained by him is an injury sustained in the course of employment and he is entitled to ex gratia payment. The principle of law laid down in this decision has no application to the facts of the present appeal, inasmuch as the accident has no casual connection with his employment under the appellant.
11. In the decision reported in Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Company's case (supra), the Apex Court laid down the theory of notional extension. The relevant passage at pages 251 and 252 reads as under:
'It is well settled that when a workman is on a public road or a public place or on a public transport he is there as any other member of the public and is not there in the course of his employment unless the very nature of his employment makes it necessary for him to be there. A workman is not in the course of his employment from the moment he leaves his home and is on his way to his work. He certainly is in the course of his employment if he reaches the place of work or a point or an area which comes within the theory of notional extension, outside of which the employer is not liable to pay compensation for any accident happening to him.'
12. The theory of notional extension does not apply to the facts of the present case, as the deceased was of his own accord attending a work unconnected to his employment under the appellant and he invited the peril in question even though the said place of accident is not far away from the place of his work. It is, therefore, clear that the appellant is not liable to pay compensation to the claimants under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act, as the deceased did not sustain any injury in any accident arising out of and in the course of employment under the appellant. The impugned Award is bad in law and is liable to be set aside.
13. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The Award of the Commissioner in WC Case No. 13 of 1999 is set aside. The said claim application is dismissed. No costs.