Umesh Chandra Banerjee, C.J.
1. The interference of the writ Court and availability of the doctrine of judicial review are now well settled since the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakub v. K.S. Radhakrishnan : [1964]5SCR64 . A recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India : AIR1996SC11 . categorically lays down that interference can be had only in the event the decision making process is otherwise not in accordance with law. Similar was the trend of the Supreme Court in the case of H.B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 312. that judicial review cannot be and is not directed against the decision itself, but it is directed against the decision making process. Let us, therefore, in the contextual facts, analyse and see for ourselves whether there is any infraction of law in the matter of decision making process. The contextual facts have been taken care of by the learned single Judge who came to a definite conclusion that intervention of the writ Court is not called for and as such, dismissed the writ applications.
2. The contextual facts depict that the petitioners in this batch of writ petitions claimed grant of ryotwari pattas under Section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Ryotwari Settlement Regulation, 1970 (for short being 'Regulation 2 of 1970') before the Settlement Officer, Bhadrachalam, Khammam District. Their claims have been rejected by the fourth respondent and being aggrieved by the orders of the fourth respondent, the petitioners and others preferred appeals to the Director of Settlements, Government of Andhra Pradesh under Section 9 (3) of Regulation 2 of 1970. The factual score further reveals that the appeals, however, were dismissed. Second Appeals to the Commissioner of Survey, Settlement and Land Records, Government of Andhra Pradesh were also dismissed by an order dated 8-4-1993 and it is against the dismissal of the second appeals that this batch of writ petitions were moved before the learned single Judge, who by a common order dismissed the writ petitions and hence the present appeals.
3. The land measuring Ac. 917.00 in Original Survey No. 17 situate at Purushothapatnam village, Bhadrachalam Mandal, which land is hereinafter shortly referred to as 'the subject land' was purchased in a public auction by one late Sri Somaraju Purushothamadas in the year 1870 from the Secretary of State for India through the Deputy Commissioner, Upper Godavari Central Province, free of land revenue. The said Purushothamadas gifted the subject land in favour of Sri Seetharama chandraswamy Vari Devasthanam, the first respondent-Devasthanam under a registered gift deed dated 12-10-1878. Incidentally, be it noted that the first respondent-Devasthanam was, then, under the Trusteeship of H.E.H. The Nizam of Hyderabad and the Trusteeship came to an end in 1948-49 when the State of Hyderabad formed part of India by an instrument of accession signed between the Nizam and the Government of India.
4. During the period, as the facts depict, the Nizam of Hyderabad was the Trustee of the temple, the property in question was under the administrative control of the Subedar, Warangal, who in a public auction sold away the leasehold rights of the subject land in favour of late Sri Abdul Hussain on 24-8-1912. After the death of the auction purchaser, his widow Smt. Rashida Fathima Begum succeeded to the leasehold rights of the subject land and the succession was recognised by the Subedar, Warangal in 1926. In 1938 Smt. Rashida Fathima Begum sold away the said lease-hold rights under a registered document in favour of Majety Ramachandraiah and Repaka Venkataratnam. Some time later, some of the petitioners herein or their predecessors appeared to have entered into this land unauthorisedly. According to the petitioners, in the year 1940, some of the petitioners took the subject land on lease from Majety Ramachandraiah and Repaka Venkataratnam. A civil suit being O.S.No. 81 of 1948 was filed by Majety Ramachandraiah and Repaka Venkataratnam in the Sub-Court at Rajahmundry for declaration of title and for recovery of possession from some of the petitioners. In the said suit, the petitioners, as the records depict, and their predecessors set up the plea that the first respondent-Devasthanam is the owner of the property. The first respondent-Devasthanam, was, however, not made a party. The Subordinate Judge, Rajahmundry decreed the suit against the defendants in 1950 and subsequently there appears to be some settlement between the parties to the suit and an unregistered agreement of sale appears to have been entered into on 14-3-1957 between the lessors and the petitioners wherein a separate clause was inserted under which a sum of Rs. 246/- was to be paid annually to the first respondent-Devasthanam which was hitherto being paid by Majety Ramachandraiah and Repaka Venkataratnam.
5. The records depict that one Sri S. Purushothama Dass, grandson of the original donor also filed a suit being O.S. No. 9 of 1946 on the file of the Special Assistant Agent, Bhadrachalam which suit was subsequently transferred to the District Court, Rajahmundry and renumbered as O.S. No. 62 of 1948 wherein the plaintiff prayed for a decree to set aside the permanent lease granted in favour of Majety Ramachandraiah and Repaka Venkataratnam. The said suit was dismissed for default. Incidentally, the first respondent temple was not made a party and at the time of institution of the suit, the trusteeship of the temple however retained with the Nizam of Hyderabad.
6. The administrative control of the Devasthanam was under the Endowment Department of the Hyderabad State till the formation of State of Andhra Pradesh and the day-to-day administration of the temple was carried out by an Amin and after the formation of the State of Andhra Pradesh, a paid Trustee was appointed and later replaced by the appointment of the Executive Officer under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. The Executive Officer found that the petitioners were in possession of the subject land and that they were in arrears of rent and hence issued notices immediately after his appointment. There was some sort of a compromise, as the records depict, between the petitioners and the Executive Officer of the first respondent-Devasthanam on 9-8-1960 where under the petitioners agreed to pay Rs. 3/- per acre and also agreed to execute the lease deeds renewable at an interval of five years. But the records depict that there was no payment ever in spite of several demands by reason where for the Executive Officer did file an application under Section 18 read with Section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 before the competent authority, namely the Deputy Commissioner, Viiayawada for grant of a certificate to enable him to take delivery of possession of the subject land in O.A. No. 32 of 1963. The factual backdrop further records that at a later stage, the petitioners filed a memo on 16-2-1965 recording therein that they recognised the first respondent temple as the absolute owner of the subject land and that they had no objection if a certificate is issued as prayed for and that they intend to pay arrears and withdraw their contest. This particular memo was signed by all the petitioners as well as their Advocates and in terms therewith, the Deputy Commissioner, Vijayawada issued a certificate by his order dated 3-3-1965 in O.A. No. 32 of 1963. Incidentally, be it noted that in spite of such an assurance and the recording as above, the petitioners did not pay any rent and by reason therefor, the Executive Officer in order to obtain delivery of possession, initiated certain steps and the petitioners at that juncture entered into a second compromise on 22-10-1966 where under the petitioners agreed to clear all outstanding arrears and also agreed to pay Rs. 12.60 per acre for wet land, Rs. 7/- per acre for dry land and Rs. 3/- per acre towards pasturage. The petitioners, did not, however, make any payment whatsoever.
7. After Regulation 2 of 1970 came into force, the fourth respondent-Settlement Officer initiated suo motu enquiries on the basis of the cases built up by the survey party and issued notices to the petitioners as also to the first respondent-Devasthanam in all the enquiries and upon enquiry, ryotwari pattas were granted under Section 9 of Regulation 2 of 1970 in favour of the first respondent-Devasthanam and the petitioners' claim for ryotwari pattas was negatived. The order of the Settlement Officer, however, stands confirmed by the first and second appellate authorities as noted above. It is on this score that the learned single Judge observed:
'.........as many as 88 persons claimed grant of ryotwari pattas in respect of the same subject land. No where it is established that all the petitioners have paid all rents from the date of first compromise i.e. 9-8-1960. Even assuming that some of the petitioners chose to pay the rents after they suffered adverse order in O.A. No. 32 of 1963 that fact itself will not enure to the benefit of the petitioners to establish that they are the tenants of the subject lands. The order made by the Deputy Commissioner in O.A. No. 32 of 1963 became final with the dismissal of the writ petition and the writ appeal by this Court, and the certificate issued in O.A. No. 32/63 was executed by filing C.M.P. No. 1/71 before the First Class Magistrate, Badrachalam and the petitioners themselves voluntarily surrendered possession of the subject land in favour of the temple and executed two letters of surrender on 23-11-1972 and 2441-1972. These facts cumulatively prove that the petitioners were never treated by the temple as tenants at any point of time and on the other hand the petitioners throughout have been treated as trespassers.'
The learned single Judge further observed that since respondents 2 to 4 in their respective orders delved into the factual score and the findings are based on substantive evidence and a 'well-presented reasoning', question of interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution does not and cannot arise.
8. As noticed above, law is well settled on this score and we need not dilate much in that regard, save that the review ability is restrictive in nature, more so by reason of the fact that the High Court cannot sit as an appellate Court or collate evidence or even appreciate evidence. It is only in the event of a gross error of law or a total miscarriage of justice, the High Court should rise up to the occasion and interfere and not otherwise. In the contextual facts, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the learned single Judge and the law being so well settled, we do not see any merit in these appeals.
9. These appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed. No order as to costs.