ORDER
M. Narayana Reddy, J.
1. This judgment, in C.M.A. No. 1151 of 2001, arises out of a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, filed by the sole appellant, against R-1 to R-5, under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, questioning certain parts of the adjudications made by and set forth in para 3, infra.
2. The Orders in the Cross-Objections filed in the CMA by the Cross-Objectors arise out of the same, being filed under Rule 22 of Order XLI, C.P.C. questioning certain parts of the said same Orders, set forth in para 3, infra.
3. Orders, dated 23-4-2000, of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Rajahmundry, made in W.C. No. 37 of 1998, of his file.
4. Perused the material papers of the Record.
5. Arguments were heard of learned Counsel for the sole appellant, and the learned Counsel for the cross-objectors, corresponding to R-1 to R-4 in the C.M.A.
6. The sole appellant in the CMA corresponds to R-1 in the Cross-Objections, and Opposite Party No. 2 in the said W.C. No. 37 of 1998 on the file of the said Commissioner. R-1 to R-4 in the CMA correspond to the Cross-Objectors 1 to 4 in the Cross-objections, and applicants 1 to 4 in the said W.C. R-5 in the CMA corresponds to R-1 in the Cross-Objections, and also, Opposite Party No. 1 in the said W.C.
7. The parties are, here-in-after, referred to with reference to their respective descriptions in the said W.C. 37 of 1998, unless, otherwise, so specified.
8. The applicants filed the said W.C. 37 of 1998, before the said Commissioner, under Section 22 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, (enactment of 1923), for recovery of total compensation of Rs. 1,22,310/-, with interest thereon, at 12% per annum, and costs, in respect of the death of the deceased, by name, Dasari Appa Rao, around 10-30 p.m., on 5-8-1996, in an accident, at Vutada work-spot, belonging to Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), out of and in the course of, his employment, as a worker, under Opposite Party No. 1 as the Contractor, in respect of the said work, which was insured with Opposite Party No. 2, etc., etc., etc.
9. Opposite Party No. 1 filed a written statement in the said W.C. 37 of 1998, inter alia, admitting the material averments made by the applicants, in the W.C., but, however, urging, that, because, he (Opposite Party No. 1) obtained an insurance policy from Opposite Party No. 2, in respect of the said works, it is only Opposite Party No. 2, which is liable to pay, the compensation, in respect of the said death of the deceased worker, together with interest and costs, etc., etc., etc.
10. Opposite Party No. 2 filed written statement in the said W.C. No. 37 of 1998, inter alia, denying all the material averments in the said W.C., and putting the applicants, to strict proof thereof and also, denying its liability to pay any compensation, whatever, in respect of the said death of the deceased worker, and also, denying its liability to pay any interest and costs, claimed in the said W.C. and hence urging for dismissal thereof, in toto, etc., etc., etc.
11. The said Commissioner, after due settlement of the issues therein, enquired into the said W.C. 37 of 1998, in the process whereof he recorded the oral evidence of A.W.1 and D.Ws.1 and 2, and exhibited the documentary evidence, by way of Exs.P-1 to P-5 and Exs.D-1 to D-14, and, later after due arguments there-into, finally, adjudicated thereupon, by his now impugned Orders, dated 23-4-2000, set forth in para 2, supra, as under;
(i) Awarded total compensation of Rs. 1,06,002/-, as against the maximum W.C. claimed compensation of Rs. 1,22,310/-.
(ii) Awarded a sum of Rs. 245/-towards Stamp Duty paid on the W.C. and
(iii) Directed Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2, to pay the monies, covered by Clauses (i) and (ii) jointly and severally, etc., etc., etc.
12. Aggrieved thereby, and, hence, questioning the, validity and legality, thereof, but, only, insofar as, the same fixed liability upon Opposite Party No. 2, also, jointly and severally, with Opposite Party No. 1, to pay the monies, covered by sub-paras (i) and (ii), of the immediately preceding paragraph. Opposite Party No. 2 filed the present C.M.A., as set forth in para 1, supra, read with para 3 supra.
13. After receiving notice of the said C.M.A., the applicants filed the Cross-Objections, questioning the impugned Orders, set forth in para 3, supra, but, only insofar as the same did not award any interest, whatsoever, on the compensation awarded, and set forth in para 2, supra, notwithstanding, the claim made in respect thereof by the applicants in their W.C. etc.
14. At the very outset, the learned Counsel for Opposite Party No. 2, vehemently urged, that, even though it issued a policy, in favour of Opposite Party No. 1, exhibited as Ex.D-12, dated 5-8-1996, still, notwithstanding, it is not liable to pay any compensation, whatsoever, thereunder, as directed in the impugned Orders, etc.
15. To substantiate his versions, the learned Counsel for Opposite Party No. 2, relied upon certain contents of the said insurance policy, exhibited as Ex.D-12, as well as, a letter, dated 1-7-1999, addressed by the said O.N.G.C., Rajahmundry, to Opposite Party No. 2, exhibited as Ex. D-13.
16. As can be seen from the F.I.R. exhibited as Ex.P-1, registered in respect of the said death of the deceased, the accident, and the death, occurred, at 10-30 p.m. on 5-8-1996, at the work-spot, described as Ootada work-spot, belonging to O.N.G.C. The same averments were made by the applicants in their W.C.
17. A direct examination of the said Ex.D-12, policy, will, inter alia, disclose the material particulars thereof, as that, it was issued in the name of the said Opposite Party No. 1 by name M. Kaniki Reddy, etc., on 5-8-1996, in respect of one Operator and five Labourers. Its contents, as can directly be seen therefrom, also disclose and, so to say, prove that the policy will be in force for a period of only one month, commencing from 11.00 a.m., on 5-8-1996 till 4-9-1996, etc.
18. The last column of the schedule of that Ex.D-12, shown as 'Place or Places of Employment', described the same, as 'Providing 500 MM Dia Cast-in-Situ piles and pile Cap at 'ELAC' Drill site near Palakol, West Godavari District.'
19. Column Nos. 4 and 9 to 12 of the said, Ex.D-13, dated 1-7-1999, referred to in para 115 supra, will disclose, that, the date of approval is 31-7-1996. The period of agreement, between Opposite Party No. 1 and Opposite Party No. 2, is 40 days, and, that, the site for work is Drill site 'ELAC' Ootada, and the same was handed over to Opposite Party No. 1, on 9-8-1996, and that the work has to be commenced on 9-8-1996.
20. Basing on the contents of the said Ex.D-12, as to work spot, and the said columns of Ex. D-13, referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph, the learned Counsel for Opposite Party No,2, vehemently urged that Ex.D-12 is a specific policy in respect of specific work, and that, because as the contract work covered by the policy was not in force, as on the date of the accident, it is not liable to pay any compensation, etc.
21. However, a direct examination of the contents of the said Ex.D-12, and Ex.D-13, will make it manifest, and beyond doubt, that the death of the said deceased worker by name, Dasari Appa Rao, occurred on 5-8-1996, around 10,30 p.m., i.e., during the course of the said Ex.D-12, policy, being very much in force and also that the said deceased died at the prescribed work spot.
22. The contents of the said Ex.D-12, policy do not anywhere mention therein that it will be effective and that the liability of the Opposite Party No. 2, will commence only and only on and from the date of delivery of the site, by O.N.G.C., to Opposite Party No. 1.
23. Hence, even though, the site was handed over, on 9-8-1996, as disclosed by Ex.D-13, or the work was commenced on 9-8-1996, as disclosed thereby, still, notwithstanding I am of the opinion, that Opposite Party No. 2 will be liable to pay the compensation, for the said death.
24. The insurance got made by Opposite Party No. 1, was in respect of one Operator and five Labourers, in respect of the same work and the work spot where the deceased, died.
25. Hence, when, undoubtedly, the policy was very much in force, as on the date of the death of the deceased worker, then it can't be said that because the site was not handed over to Opposite Party No. 1, on the date of the death of deceased worker, on 5-8-1996, but that it was handed over 4 days thereafter on 9-8-1996 and that, the work was also commenced on that day, for that reason, Opposite Party No. 2 cannot urge its non-liability to pay any compensation, in respect of such death even if it is a specific policy.
26. Again, as already observed the policy was very much in force, on all the relevant dates, being the date of the death of deceased, as well as on the date of handing over of the site, on 9-8-1996, as well as on the date of commencement of the work, on 9-8-1996.
27. As set forth in para 17 supra the period of the policy is for only one month, from 11.00 a.m., on 5-8-1996 to 4-9-1996.
28. In between this period, on the first day itself on 5-84996, around 10-30 p.m., the said death occurred.
29. Hence, the said Commissioner, rightly fixed the liability on Opposite Party No. 2, also jointly and severally, with Opposite Party No. 1.
30. There are no limits, or limitations or qualifications in the said Ex.D-12 policy in respect of liability of Opposite Party No. 2, to pay compensation in case of the death etc., that occurred during the period during which the policy was in force in respect inter alia of the death inter alia of a labourer at the same work spot.
31. The date of handing over of the work spot on a later date, than the date on which work started do not ipso facto exonerate Opposite Party No. 2 when the policy was in force, on the crucial date admittedly as disclosed by Ex.D-12.
32. Even otherwise, as per Sl.No. 6 of the said Ex.D-13 dated 1-7-1999 the work of the Opposite Party No. 1, being the contractor was in fact approved on 31-7-1996, itself i.e., long prior to the death of the deceased. So, obviously soon he obtained that policy for his works.
33. Hence, the claim of Opposite Party No. 2 that it is not liable to pay any compensation under the said Ex.D-12 and that hence the, liability fixed upon Opposite Party No. 2 is unsustainable at Law, and has to be set aside etc., cannot be accepted.
34. Hence, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is devoid of all factual and legal merits.
35. Hence, the CMA is liable to be dismissed, in toto as being done at the end of this Judgment
36. In respect of the Cross-Objections, filed by the applicants, as set forth in para 3 supra, the learned Counsel for R-1 (Insurance Company-Opposite Party No. 2) argued, that the Cross-Objections filed by the applicants are not maintainable at Law, and hence, they are liable to be rejected, ipso facto etc., as such.
37. The learned Counsel also urged that in case the applicants are aggrieved by any part or parts of the impugned Orders, they ought to have filed an independent C.M.A. under Section 30 of the said Enactment of 1923, but not cross-Objections as they did in the case, on hand.
38. The said Enactment of 1923 being the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 is a self-contained Enactment.
39. Section 30 thereof deals with appeals to the High Court against the Orders of the Commissioner etc. It is only this Section 30 consisting of 3 sub-sections and 3 provisos deals with the appeals to be filed in the High Court. Out of them Sub-section (1) consists of 5 Clauses and the said 3 provisos.
40. The said Sub-section (1) of Section 30 deals with filing of appeals in the High Court, The 3 provisos thereof, and the other two Sub-sections (2) and (3), qualify the powers under the said Sub-section (1).
41. The present C.M.A. is filed under Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of that Act.
42. However, none of the provisions of that Section 30, anywhere therein even remotely provide for or otherwise authorize any of the aggrieved parties to file any Cross-Objections in a C.M.A. that will be filed by the another aggrieved party,
43. Hence because the said Enactment of 1923 is a self-contained enactment and when the same does not authorize or prescribe or provide for any Cross-Objections the same cannot be entertained much less adjudicated upon by the High Court and hence the same will be liable to be rejected and dismissed as such for want of relevant specific statutory provisions for preferring the same.
44. All the provisions of the C.P.C. cannot be applied and in fact will not apply to the proceedings under the said Enactment of 1923. Only prescribed provisions thereof, as provided by the Rules, framed under the said Enactment of 1923, only will apply,
45. Rule 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules 1924 framed under the said Enactment of 1923 prescribed or provided for as to what are the specific provisions of the C.P.C. that will apply to the proceedings under the said Enactment of 1923.
46. As can directly be seen therefrom, under that Rule 41, the provisions, inter alia of Order V and some of the provisions of the Order DC, Order XIII, etc., only will apply to the proceedings under the said Enactment of 1923.
47. The other provisions of the C.P.C. are not made applicable to such proceedings, in view of that specific Rule 41 of the said Rules of 1924.
48. So, therefore no other provision of C.P.C. can be applied to the proceedings under the said Enactment of Workmen's Compensation Act, except, as provided in the aforesaid Rule 41 of the said Rules of 1924.
49. So, therefore, because, the said Rule 41 does not provide for application of Order XLI, C.P.C. dealing with First Appeals, much less Rule 22 thereof which prescribes or provides for filing Cross-Objections by the Cross-Objectors, etc., it cannot be applied or taken recourse to in the proceedings under the said Enactment of 1923. So doing, will be exercising the authority, without statutory prescription or authority.
50. Hence, the Cross-Objections filed in the present C.M.A. by the applicants, are unsustainable at fact and Law, and this Court has no jurisdiction, to entertain or adjudicate thereupon for want of statutory jurisdiction and hence the Cross-Objections are liable to be rejected ipso facto out-right as such in toto without any further probing there-into and hence the Cross-Objections are accordingly hereby rejected.
51. Hence the High Court doth hereby adjudicate upon the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal and the Cross-Objections as under:
(I) Dismiss the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal in toto but with costs to none and
(II) Dismiss the Cross-Objections in toto but with costs to none.