Judgment:
S.B. Sinha, C.J.
1. This application is directed a Judgment dated 25.1.2000 passed by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad whereby and whereunder the Original Application filed by the petitioner herein questioning the proceedings Rc. No. 4521/98/H.4 dated 30.10.1999 was dismissed.
2. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. The petitioner belongs to Scheduled Tribe. So are the other concerned candidates viz., Smt. Savithri Devi and Smt. Sugali Siva Bai. According to the petitioner she fulfils all the conditions laid down by the Government for limited recruitment to fill up back log vacancies of SC and ST as per G.O. Ms. No. 238 issued by the GAD dated 26.5.1999 and G.O. Ms. No. 71 Finance Department dated 26.5.1999. Her name was also sponsored by the Employment Exchange. She and other candidates were interviewed where after she was appointed as an attender with effect from 29.6.1999 by the 4th respondent. She reported for duty on the same date. It appears that the 4th respondent, pursuant to the directions of the 3rd respondent, under the aforementioned proceedings terminated her services with effect from 30.9.1999 on the ground that her appointment was not in accordance with the government instructions and also that her performance as attender was not satisfactory.
3. The learned Tribunal upon considering the materials placed before it by the parties had arrived at the following findings of fact:
'...According to G.O. Ms. No. 238, the marks secured by the candidates in the qualifying examination is the criteria for appointment against the backlog vacancies reserved for S. Cs., and S. Ts. It is however admitted by the respondents in the counter that the applicant was appointed on consideration of age and not on the basis of the marks secured by her in VII Class and she did not produce her marks list of VII Class at the time of interview and she secured less marks than the candidates S. Savithri Devi and Sugali Siva Bai. On receipt of a complaint the Conservator of Forests, Kurnool directed the authorities to appoint candidates in accordance with the Rules issued by the Government and not by any other method. Following the directions of Conservator of Forests, the Divisional Forest Officer, Kurnool issued the impugned orders terminating the services of the Applicant. Admittedly the applicant did not secure more marks in the qualifying examination than the candidates who appeared for interview. The Applicant was appointed only on consideration of age which is not the criteria prescribed under G.O. Ms. No. 238.'
4. It is not in dispute that the upper age limit prescribed for such appointment was 39 whereas the age of the petitioner at the time of her appointment was 38. The learned Tribunal, therefore, in our opinion was not correct in arriving at a finding of fact, solely on the basis of the statements made in the counter affidavit, that the petitioner was appointed on the basis of her age alone.
5. It is true that in the counter affidavit it has been averred that the aforementioned Savithri Devi and Sugali Siva Bai had secured more marks in VII Class examination. The aforementioned finding of fact together with the finding that the performance of the petitioner as attender has not been found satisfactory were arrived at by the 4th respondent, without giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. We now really fail to understand as to how within a short period the question as to whether the services of the petitioner was satisfactory or not fell for consideration.
6. We may note that in paragraph 6 of the affidavit, it has been contended-
'I also submit that on verification and enquiries, I came to know the following facts. In fact Savithri Devi got less number of marks i.e.,. 217 in the VII Class examination, whereas I got 293 marks. Hence the contention that Savithri Devi got more number of marks is totally an unsustainable plea. I also submit that she is more than my sister. Further Siva Bai has not studied in Parishad High School, Kodumuru, Kurnool District, but surprisingly it is alleged that a certificate has been produced by her as though she studied in the said school and a marks certificate had been produced for 349 marks. Evidently it is a bogus certificate.'
7. Had opportunity been granted to the petitioner, she could have produced all the documents to show that she was the only eligible candidate for appointment and in fact the grounds on the basis on which her services were terminated were really non-existent. In any event, having regard to the fact that the petitioner's services are not found to be satisfactory despite the fact that the same was a temporary one, her services could be terminated only upon giving an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner having regard to the fact that by reason of the order impugned before the learned Tribunal, a stigma was cast upon her. Even assuming that the respondents herein wanted to rectify their mistake, the same also required compliance of the principles of natural justice.
8. In Bhagwan Shukla v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 2480, which has been followed by several High Courts in a number of cases, the Apex Court held-
'The justification furnished by the respondents for reducing the basic pay was that the same had been 'wrongly' fixed initially and that the position had continued due to 'administrative lapses' for about twenty years, when it was decided to rectify the mistake. The petition filed by the appellant was dismissed by the Tribunal on 17.9.1993.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. That the petitioner's basic pay had been fixed since 1970 at Rs.190/- p.m. is not disputed. There is also no dispute that the basic pay of the appellant was reduced to Rs.181/- p.m. from Rs.190/- p.m. in 1991 retrospectively w.e.f. 18.12.1970. The appellant has obviously been visited with civil consequences but he had been granted no opportunity to show cause against the reduction of his basic pay. He was not even put on notice before his pay was reduced by the department and the order came to be made behind his back without following any procedure known to law. There, has, thus been a flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice and the appellant has been made to suffer huge financial loss without being heard. Fair play in action warrants that no such order which has the effect of an employee suffering civil consequences should be passed without putting the concerned to notice and giving him a hearing in the matter. Since, that was not done, the order (memorandum) dated 25.7.1991, which was impugned before the Tribunal could not certainly be sustained and the Central Administrative Tribunal fell in error in dismissing the petition of the appellant.'
9. In a recent pronouncement in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Limited v. Girja Shankar Pant, AIR 2001 SC 24, the Apex Court held-
'While it is true that over the years there has been a steady refinement as regards this particular doctrine, but no attempt has been made and if we may say so, cannot be made to define the doctrine in a specific manner or method. Straight-jacket formula cannot be made applicable but compliance of the doctrine is solely dependant upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The totality of the situation ought to be taken note of and if on examination of such totality, it comes to light that the executive action suffers from the vice of non-compliance of the doctrine, the law courts in that event ought to set right the wrong inflicted upon the concerned person and to do so would be a plain exercise of judicial power. As a matter of fact the doctrine is now termed as a synonym of fairness in the concept of justice and stands as the most accepted methodology of a governmental action.'
10. Having regard to the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court, we are of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be sustained. The order passed by the learned Tribunal as also the order dated 30.10.1999 of the 4th respondent are hereby set aside and the respondents are directed to pass appropriate order afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
11. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.