ORDER
P.S. Narayana, J.
1. The unsuccessful tenant both before the learned Rent Controller and the appellate authority in R.C. No. 130 of 1990 and R.A. No. 1 19 of 1996 preferred the civil revision petition under Section 22 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter for short referred to as 'Act' for the purpose of convenience).
2. The respondent in the CRP-landlord filed R.C. No. 130 of 1990 on the file of the II Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad, praying for eviction on the ground of additional accommodation. The learned Rent Controller recorded the evidence of PW1 and RW1, marked Exs.P1 to P11 and Exs.R1 to R.136 and after recording findings, ultimately ordered eviction. Aggrieved by the same, the tenant carried the matter by way of appeal R.A. No. 119 of 1996 on the file of the Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, at Hyderabad and before the appellate authority, the eviction petition was amended by taking yet another plea of the tenant securing alternative accommodation and the tenant and filed a counter denying the allegations. Before the appellate authority, on behalf of the tenant, the landlord of the other premises, on the ground of securing alternative accommodation was examined as RW2. Exs.R137 to 139 also were marked. The appellate authority at Para '9' framed two points for consideration.
(1) Whether the petitioner/landlord requires the suit premises for additional accommodation for running his business ?
(2) Whether the respondent/tenant has secured alternative accommodation ?
3. The appellate authority recorded the reasons at Paras 10 and 11 and ultimately dismissed the appeal confirming the order of eviction. Aggrieved by the same, the present civil revision petition is preferred under Section 22 of the Act.
Submissions of Sri T. Sreenivasa Murthy:
Sri T. Sreenivasa Murthy, learned Counsel representing the revision petitioner-tenant made the following submissions:
The learned Counsel would comment that in the light of the evidence of both the landlord and tenant, the premises in question cannot be said to be forming one building as such and they are different and hence, the ground of requirement of the landlord by way of additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act would not be applicable. The learned Counsel placed strong reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Gangaram v. N. Shankar Reddy, : AIR1989SC302 , in this regard. The learned Counsel also had further taken this Court through the findings recorded both by the learned Rent Controller and the appellate authority and would comment that both the Courts below had not appreciated the evidence in proper perspective and in view of the wider powers conferred on this Court as revisional Court under Section 22 of the Act, the said findings can definitely be disturbed. The learned Counsel also pointed out that the findings recorded in relation to securing alternative accommodation also cannot be sustained, in the light of the clear evidence of RW2. The learned Counsel also placed reliance on Bulaki Dass v. Suraj Bhan, : AIR1982Delhi117 , Sistla Ramalakshmamma v. Lakshmi General Stores, represented by its Managing Partner, Sistla Lakshmipathy Sastry, 1974 (2) An.WR 209 and P. Murali Rao and Anr. v. Raghunatha Rao Ghatge, : 2005(2)ALD395 . The learned Counsel also while further elaborating his submissions had pointed out to the subsequent event, which had been specified in C.M.P.No. 2536 of 2005 and would contend that even in the light of the said stand taken by the tenant, the order of eviction cannot be sustained.
4. Contentions of Sri Vilas V. Afzul Purkar:
Sri Vilas V. Afzul Purkar, learned Counsel representing the respondent/landlord had pointed out to the findings recorded by both the learned Rent Controller and the appellate authority on the ground of additional accommodation and also pointed out that relative hardship of both the landlord and tenant also had been taken into consideration and concurrent findings had been recorded by both the Courts below. The learned Counsel also had taken this Court through Paras 5 to 9 of the eviction petition, which were introduced by way of amendment during the pendency of the appeal, wherein the other ground of the tenant securing alternative accommodation was specifically pleaded. The learned Counsel pointed out that proper opportunity was given to the parties and in fact, before the appellate authority, RW2 was examined and certain documents also were marked and in view of the same, the said findings also are to be confirmed. While explaining about the aspect whether the premises to be treated as different and distinct or forming part and parcel of the same building, the findings recorded by the Rent Controller and also the appellate authority had been pointed out and the learned Counsel would contend that inasmuch as these are concurrent findings relating to a fact, the decision of the Apex Court relied upon by the other side need not be made applicable to the facts of the case. The learned Counsel also pointed out that counter had been filed to C.M.P. No. 2536 of 2005, wherein the ground raised by way of subsequent event had been specifically answered and hence, in the light of the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below, the said findings need not be disturbed by this Court.
5. Heard the learned Counsel on record and perused the findings recorded both by the learned Rent Controller and also the appellate authority and the contents of the affidavit filed in support of the application C.M.P. No. 2536 of 2005 and the averments made in the counter-affidavit filed by the other side resisting the same.
6. As already referred to supra, the landlord filed RC. No. 130 of 1990 for eviction on the ground of additional accommodation. It was pleaded by the landlord that he is the owner of the double storied building bearing M.No. 5-2-438/1 and 5-2-438, Risala Abdullah, Hyderabad and originally, the A.P. Automobile Dealers' Association was the owner of the premises and the landlord purchased the same under registered sale deed, dated 5-2-1988. The tenant has been in occupation of a part of the premises bearing M.No. 5-2-438/1 on a monthly rent of Rs. 180/- excluding electricity charges. It is also stated that the landlord has been carrying on business under the name and style of Hindusthan Trade Agency in a premises taken on rent in Mukaramjahi Road, Hyderabad and the landlord requires the premises for additional accommodation, since the premises in which he has been carrying on business is highly insufficient. It is also stated that the landlord had started another firm under the name and style of Srinath Marketing Private Limited, dealing with wholesale tea products and he has also started Hindustan Trade Agency and by efflux of time, his business had grown up by leaps and bounds and he had constructed a residential house on the rear side of the suit premises and had been residing with his family members in the said premises. The accommodation being insufficient, he requires the same by way of additional accommodation. The same was resisted by the tenant and specific plea was taken that if the eviction is ordered, he would be put to serious hardship and further, specific stand was taken that the premises was separate and distinct and hence, the requirement of the landlord on the ground of additional accommodation does not arise. The tenant also had narrated certain details relating to his business, the good will and other aspects. PW1 is the landlord and RW1 is the tenant. Ex.P1 to P-11 and R-1 to R-136 are also marked apart from the oral evidence. The learned Rent Controller appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on record and had recorded a positive finding that the stand taken by the tenant that the premises are separate and distinct, cannot be accepted and also had recorded specific finding that even if the relative hardship to be taken into consideration, in the light of the facts of the case, the landlord requires the premises for additional accommodation and his hardship would outweigh the hardship of the tenant and ordered eviction. The same was carried by way of an appeal R.A.No. 119 of 1996 on the file of the Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad and during the pendency of the appeal, I.A.No. 404 of 2000 and LA. No. 1162 of 1997 were allowed, Ex.R-137 to R-139 were marked and the evidence of RW2 also was recorded. Before the appellate authority, yet another ground was taken by amending the eviction petition. The tenant secured alternative accommodation. It is no doubt true that this ground was taken before the appellate authority, the evidence of RW2 was recorded and Ex.R137 to 139 also were marked. The evidence of RW2 was let in only to show that the premises, which is sought to be in the occupation of the tenant cannot be said to be alternative accommodation, since he has not been carrying on any business whatsoever in the said portion. Both the Courts appreciated the evidence of PW1 and RW1 and also the documentary evidence-Ex.P1 to P11 and Ex. Rl to R136, which was relied upon by both the parties before the learned Rent Controller. Strong reliance was placed on the decision Gangaram v. N. Shankar Reddy, (supra) and P. Murali Rao and Anr. v. Raghunatha Rao Ghatge (supra). So as to substantiate the stand of the tenant that the premises cannot be said to be one and the same building, but they are separate and distinct, the topography of the building also had been taken into consideration and concurrent findings had been recorded by both the Courts that the premises in question cannot be said to be distinct and separate. It is needless to say that it is a question of fact and inasmuch as concurrent findings had been recorded by both the Courts below, the said stand taken by the tenant cannot be accepted, especially for the reason that the selfsame question had been agitated in elaboration both before the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority and the said point did not find favour before both the Courts below. Reliance also was placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Sistla Ramalakshmamma v. Lakshmi General Stores, represented by its Managing Partner, Sistla Lakshmipathy Sastry (supra) and P. Murali Rao and Anr. v. Raghunatha Rao Ghatge (supra). The Division Bench of this Court on the aspect of alternative building in Sistla Ramalakshmamma v. Lakshmi General Stores, represented by its Managing Partner, Sistla Lakshmipathy Sastry (supra) observed at Para 24 as follows:
what follows from what is considered above is that there is implicit in this conception of alternative existence of two buildings similarly circumstanced or so situated as to render a choice between the two fairly probable. The 'alternative building' within the meaning of Section 10(2)(v) of the Act would mean a building alternative to the one from which the eviction of the tenant is sought under the Act. While considering the question as to whether the building secured by the tenant can be said to be alternative to the building from which he is sought to be evicted, the Court could properly take into account not only the physical character of the two buildings but also environmental matters, either as a consideration affecting its suitability to the needs of the tenant.
7. While dealing with the relevant provisions under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the learned Judge of the Delhi High Court in Bulaki Dass v. Suraj Bhan (supra) held as follows:
No doubt, mere assertion of the landlord that he requires for his use the premises in the tenancy of the respondents raises no presumption that he is genuinely in need of the same and the landlord has to satisfy the Court on well-recognised objective tests that his claim for additional accommodation is genuine and he does not want to evict the tenants out of mala fide intention or for extraneous reason. To put it otherwise, it is for the Court to determine objectively on the basis of the material on the record whether in a given case the requirement of the landlord is genuine or not, having regard, of course, to all relevant factors, for instance, the size of the landlord's family, the financial position of the landlord and members of his family, social customs, conventions and usages etc. The whole problem, to say the least, has to be approached from the point of view of a reasonable man and not that of a whimsical landlord. Thus, all that has to be seen in the instant case is that having regard to the foregoing circumstances, the existing accommodation with the petitioner-landlord can be said to be reasonably suitable for him and members of his family. As at present, the eldest son of the petitioner has got four children, eldest of them is 22 years old by now, while his daughters are aged 15, 12 and 10. Naturally, therefore, he will require one room for himself and his wife, another room for his eldest son who is evidently of marriageable age and at least one room for three daughters, even though he can legitimately claim a separate room for each of them having regard to the fact that they are fairly grown up and are studying. Likewise, the second son of the petitioner needs at least three rooms, one for himself and his wife, one for his son and one for his daughters who are, of course, of tender age, being between the ages of 3 to 9 years. Surely, the landlord is not excepted to huddle his sons and daughters together in one room. On a parity of reasoning, the third son of the petitioner will need two rooms, one for himself and his wife and the other for his son. Of course, the fourth son, who has children of tender age, may for the present, be able to live in one room although one cannot be oblivious to his growing need for additional accommodation in near future. That besides it is beyond the pale of controversy that the three married daughters of the petitioner keep on visiting. So, the petitioner requires at least one additional room for being used as a guest-room. It cannot be gainsaid that sometimes his daughters may be visiting the house of the petitioner at one and the same time, e.g., on festive occasions like Raksha Bandhan and sometimes they may even stay overnight. At least, the landlord is entitled to make provision for the same. He is not expected to sacrifice his own comfort for the sake of the tenant.
8. Specific stand taken by the tenant is that this ground of additional accommodation is only fanciful and whimsical and not bonafide and hence, on that ground, eviction cannot be ordered. Alt the aspects had been taken into consideration by both the Courts below inclusive of the relative hardship, the topography, the nature of the premises and the location thereof and in view of the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by both the Courts below, this Court is not inclined to disturb the said findings in this revision. As far as the other ground of securing alternative accommodation is concerned, the appellate authority at Para 11 while deciding point No. 2 in relation to the evidence of PW1 and RW1 also appreciated the evidence of RW2 and also Ex.R139, a bunch of rent receipts containing 1985 receipts and the other documentary evidence. The relevant question and the answer given by RW2 also had been narrated in detail by the appellate authority. Inasmuch as sufficient opportunity had been given in relation to this ground also, the said findings recorded by the appellate authority cannot be found fault with. In C.M.P. No. 2536 of 2005, at Para 13, it was specifically pleaded that the first flour of the building bearing No. 5-2-438/1 and 5-2-438, at Risala Abdullah, Hyderabad in occupation of landlord had been fallen vacant and the total area of the aforesaid first floor would be 2500 square feet and in view of the subsequent event, the requirement of landlord ceases.
9. A counter-affidavit in detail had been filed. At Para 11 of the counter-affidavit, the contents in Para 13 were denied. It was also averred as hereunder:
The contents of Para 13 of the affidavit are misconceived and misrepresented. The petitioner has protracted the matter when the matter is posted for final hearing, the petitioner has come up with the application. It is respectably submitted that the property, which has been referred by the petitioner i.e., 2500 sft, a residential house on the rear side on 1st floor premises bearing M.No. 5-2-438, situated at Risala Abdullah, Hyderabad. It is submitted that in Para 4 of the eviction petition, I have stated that it is a residential house and later it has come on record in the evidence. It is submitted that the said property has not fallen vacant as alleged by the petitioner. I submit that all our family members were residing in the said house since the purchase of the property. I have recently performed the marriage of my son Hitesh in the year 2004 and after marriage, my son and daughter-in-law are residing in the said house. Actually the said property being a residential house and it is not a non-residential premises. The requirement of additional accommodation remains the same. It is submitted that it is not a subsequent event that will eclipse the requirement for additional accommodation for which the eviction was sought of the petitioner. It is submitted that already there is evidence on record and also there is a pleading in the eviction petition i.e., Para 4. As such, the application filed by the petitioner seeking on record a subsequent event does not arise.
10. In the light of the specific stand taken in the counter-affidavit filed, this Court is of the considered opinion that this cannot be taken as a subsequent event which would alter the situation in any way, so as to annul the order of eviction made by both the Courts below. Viewed from any angle, this Court is of the considered opinion that the civil revision petition is devoid of merit and accordingly the same shall stand dismissed. It is stated that inasmuch as the tenant is running some business, it would be just to give reasonable time. In view of the same, the tenant is granted six months time to vacate the premises. No costs.