S.R. Nayak, J.
1. The only question that arises for our consideration and decision in these Writ Appeals and Writ Petitions is whether cancellation of admission of the petitioners/appellants to B.Ed, course during the Academic year 1999-2000 by the Principal, Government Institute of Advanced Study in Education (for short, 'IASE'), Masab Tank, Hydrabad, the common 4th respondent in these writ appeals and writ petitions, is legal and justified in the facts and circumstances of the case.
2. Writ Appeal No. 19 of 2000 is directed against the interim order dated 29-12-2000 passed by the learned single Judge of this Court in WPMP No. 33525 of 2000 filed in W.P. No. 26348 of 2000 refusing to suspend the proceedings of the 4th respondent dated 23-12-2000, whereby and whereunder the admissions of the petitioners/appellants are cancelled. Writ Appeal No. 6 of 2000 is directed against the interim order passed by the learned single Judge dated 29-12-2000 in WPMP No. 33620 of 2000 filed in WP No. 26432 of 2000 declining to suspend the above proceedings of the 4th respondent. In W.P. No. 26348 of 2000 and W.P. No. 26432 of 2000, the validity and legality of the proceedings of the 4th respondent issued in Re. No. 522/310/IASE-WC-Hyd/2000, dated 23-12-2000 cancelling the admission of the petitioners to the B.Ed. course is assailed while praying for consequential direction to the respondents to permit the petitioners to complete the B.Ed. course and take examination.
3. Since the issue that arise for our consideration and decision relates to the validity of admission of the petitioners-students to the B.Ed. course and cancellation thereof and since there is urgency to decide the main writ petitions expeditiously, we thought it appropriate to hear and dispose of the main writ petitions themselves. Accordingly, with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for all the parties in these writ petitions and writ appeals, the main writ petitions were heard together alongwith thewrit appeals and all of them are being disposed of by this common order.
4. The relevant facts of the case may briefly be stated as under : the Citizens Education Society represented by one Sri Y. Sanjeeva Reddy, Secretary and Correspondent of the Society, illegally started a B.Ed. College in the year 1998-99 in the name and style of Noble College of Education at Narketpalli, Nalgonda District without 'No Objection Certificate' from the Government of Andhra Pradesh and without requisite permission from the National Council of Teachers Education, Bangalore and without affilation from the Osmania University as required under law and admitted 160 students unauthorisedly. In the absence of 'No Objection Certificate' from the Government and without requisite permission from the National Council of Teachers Education, Bangalore and without affiliation from the Osmania University, the college was compelled to close down. However, the Government in response to several representations made by the affected students and taking sympathetic view of the matter and keeping in mind the wellbeing of the students who were admitted to the college issued G.O. Ms. No. 127, Education (SE. TRG. II) Department, dated 30-9-2000 and decided that students admitted by Noble College of Education should be allotted to other Colleges of Education in the State to enable them to complete the course during the academic year 1999-2000, the Government vide the above order directed that 160 student admitted by the Noble College of Education should be allotted to (i) Ghulam Ahmed College of Education, Banjara Hills, Hyderbad and (ii) IASE, Masab Tank, Hyderbad. 74 candidates were allotted to Ghulam Ahmed College of Education, whereas 86 candidates were allotted to IASE, Masab Tank, Hyderabad. It appears that in pursuance of the above G.O., the allotted students joined the respective colleges and the instruction commenced on 16-10-2000. When the matter stood thus, on receipt of certain complaints alleging that the Correspondent of Noble College of Education has included the names of certain bogus candidates in place of the genuine candidates in the list of 160 students annexed to the G.O. Ms. 127 by collecting huge sums of money from them, the Government directed the Regional Joint Director of School Education, Hyderabad to conduct a detailed enquiry and submit report through the Director of School Education, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. Accordingly, the Regional Joint Director of School Education conducted enquiry and submitted his report recording the finding that as many as 107 candidates out of 160 candidates allotted to the aforementioned colleges are not bonafide candidates. The Government on examination of the said report directed the Director of School Education through its Memo No. 22824/Trg/99-1, Education, dated 7-12-2000 to take further steps to cancel the admission of those 107 candidates from the respective colleges. Accordingly and in pursuance of the directions issued by the Director of School Education, the Principals of the respective colleges issued show-cause notices on 11-12-2000 to all the 107 candidates including the 29 petitioners in these two writ petitions alleging that they are not the bonafide students of the B.Ed. course for the reason that when the enquiry was conducted by the Regional Joint Director of School Education, the petitioners and others similarly circumstanced gave statements admitting that they did not attend teaching practice in recognized schools as prescribed for the B.Ed. course and there were certain discrepancies in the statements made by them. The affected students submitted their replies to the show-cause notices in which they commonly claimed that the entire batch of 160 students of Noble College of Education were divided into two batches for the purpose of teaching practice and all of them belonged to the second batch and therefore they could not undergo teaching practice due to elections that intervened and for some other reasons. The petitioners also furnished photostat copies of 'School Fee' receipts and copies of the 'bonafide certificates' issued by the Correspondent of the Noble College of Education in support of their claim that they are bonafide students. The replies of the petitioners and the documents produced by them were cross-checked and verified with reference to the statements they made before the Regional Joint Director of School Education, Hyderabad, during the enquiry conducted in the month of November, 2000 and the relevant records and it was found that the above claim of the petitioners was unsubstantiated. In fact, it was found that the claim of the petitioners that the entire batch of 160 students were divided into two batches was factually incorrect and base-less. Further, it was noticed, that in the month of September, 2000, Noble College of Education was not in existence for it was already closed by that time and the 'bonafide certificates' produced by the petitioners stated to have been obtained by them in the month of September, 2000. It was also noticed that 'bonafide certificates' had to be issued by the Principal of the College and not by the Correspondent of the College. It was also seen that though the 'bonafide certificates' 'produced by the petitioners were claimed to have been obtained in the month of September, 2000, they were not produced before the Regional Joint Director of School Education, when he conducted the enquiry on 4-11-2000. For all these reasons and in the public interest, the admissions of the petitioners were cancelled and they were removed from the colleges with effect from 23-12-2000 by the impugned proceedings of the 4th respondent. Hence, these two writ petitions by 29 affected students.
5. Although several grounds are taken by the petitioners in the affidavits filed in support of the writ petitions to assail the validity and legality of the impugned proceedings of the 4th respondent dated 23-12-2000, at the time of hearing, Sri D. V. Seetharama Murthy, learned counsel who appeared for the petitioners in W.P. No. 23648 of 2000 and Sri Nooty Ram Mohan Rao, learned counsel who appeared for the petitioners in W.P. No. 26432 of 2000 did not urge or argue all those points taken in the affidavits, according to us quite fairly, but restricted their attack of the impugned proceedings of the 4th respondent to violation of principles of natural justice and the hardship that may be caused to the petitioners-students if the Court were to decline the relief sought in the writ petitions. In that view of the matter, there is no necessity for us to deal with all the grounds and contentions raised in the writ petitions except the ones urged before us.
6. Arguing in support of the writ petitions, learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that the petitioners were not furnished the copies of the alleged complaints and the report of the Regional Joint Director of School Education, Hyderabad, and other materials on the basis of which the show-cause notices were issued and for want of these materials, the petitioners were deprived of a reasonable opportunity to have their effective say/defence in the matter.Learned counsel would maintain that the above serious lapse on the part of the 4th respondent infringed principles of natural justice and fair play in action and therefore the impugned action taken by the 4th respondent in cancelling the admissions of the petitioners and expelling them from the colleges cannot be sustained and is ex facie illegal.
7. The contention is that the impugned action was taken in utter violation of principles of natural justice. It is true that the Courts are increasingly insisting that the administration acts according to the principles of natural justice/ fairness. Natural justice has two main limbs: (i) the right to a fair hearing, also known as the audi alteram partem rule which means that no one is to be condemned unheard; and (ii) the rule against bias, or, nemo judex in causa sua, i.e., no one may be a judge in his own cause. These two concepts reflect and guards the values of fairness and impartiality. These two concepts are twin formidable pillars supporting natural justice. In order to decide whether in the instant case, fair hearing was given to the petitioners before the impugned adverse action was taken against them, it becomes necessary to know what does fair hearing, or, audi alteram partem envisage What procedural safeguards are necessary so that hearing is not Just a sham, but meaningful and fair What are the norms or components of a fair hearing? Lord Bridge of Harwich in Lloyds v. McMohan (1987) 1 All ER 1118, has observed that '.......the so-called rules of natural justice are not engraved on tablets of stone'. The Supreme Court in Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, : (1993)IILLJ549SC opined that natural justice is not a fixed but a flexible concept, that there is no invariable standard of fair hearing and that each case has to be decided on its own merits. Further, in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner : [1978]2SCR272 , the Supreme Court has emphasized that the standards of natural justice vary with situations 'contracting into a brief even post-decisional opportunity, or expanding into trial-type trappings'. The principles of natural justice are not embodied rules and, therefore, it is not possible nor practicable to precisely define the parameters of natural justice; that the aim of these rules is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice and not to thwart justice; that there is no invariable standard of reasonableness in thematter of hearing and whether in a particular case natural justice has been contravened or not is ultimately for the Courts to decide. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. J. N. Sinha, : (1970)IILLJ284SC and C. B. Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore, : (1970)IILLJ403SC opined that each case has to be decided on its own merits. In Mineral Development Ltd. v. State of Bihar, : [1960]2SCR609 , the Supreme Court observed that concept of fair hearing is 'an elastic one and 'is not susceptible of easy and precise definition'. Again, the Supreme Court in FEDCO v. S. N. Bilgrami, : [1960]2SCR408 , observed that there can be no invariable standard for reasonableness in such matters except that the Court's conscience must be satisfied that the person against whom an action is proposed has had a fair chance of convincing the authority who proposes to take action against him and that the ground on which the action is proposed are either nonexistent, or even if they exist, they do not justify the proposed action. The Court decision on this question will necessarily and inveriably depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, including the nature of the decision making body, the nature of the action proposed, the grounds on which the action is proposed, the materials on which the allegations are based, the attitude of the party against whom the action is proposed in showing cause against such proposed action, the nature of the plea raised by him, his admissions by conduct or otherwise of some or all the allegations, the effect of the ruling made and all other matters which help the mind of the authority in coming to a fair conclusion on the question. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, : [1978]2SCR621 , the Supreme Court was pleased to observe : (Para 61)
'The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rules of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice has been contravened the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of the case.'
In A.K. Roy v. Union of India, : 1982CriLJ340 , the Supreme Court talking of natural justice in the context of preventive detention has emphasized that rules of natural justice 'are not rigid norms of unchanging context' and the ambit of those rules must vary according to the context and 'they have to be tailored to suit the nature of the proceedings in relation to which the particular right is claimed as a component of natural justice.'
In K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India, : (1984)ILLJ2SC , the Supreme Court has again emphasized that whether any particular principle of natural justice would applicable to a particular situation, or the question whether there has been any infraction of the application of that principle, has to be judged, in the facts and circumstances of each case. The basic requirement is that there must be fair play in action and the decision must be arrived at in a just, fair and objective manner with regard to the relevance of the materials and reasons. Fair hearing does not stipulate that proceedings be as formal as in a Court. Undoubtedly natural justice is elementary justice, as distinct from complex or technical justice. Natural justice is not a replica of Court procedure; it only sets certain standards of procedural fairness. In A Treatise on Administrative Law by M.P. Jain (1996 Edition) at page 306, it is observed thus :
'.............It is regarded unwise to fullyjudicialize hearing procedures followed by adjudicatory bodies. Many a time, adjudicatory functions are cast on administrators. Their working will be very adversely affected if they are required to follow an elaborate and formal procedure and much of the retionale and justification of having adjudicatory bodies outside the normal Court system will evaporate in thin air if they are saddled with too judicial a procedure. Also, costs of administration will increase enormously. Therefore, the attempt is to keep the hearing procedure less formal consistent, however, with the minimal fundamental concepts of procedural due process so as to promote justice and fair play'.
8. In the premise of the above noticed principles, let us now proceed to consider whether in the instant case there is any infraction of principles of natural justice which would invalidate the impugned action of the 4th respondent in canceling the admission of the petitioners students.
9. At the time of hearing, the learned Government Pleader for Education madeavailable to us the original records of the case as directed by us and we have perused the same.
10. We have already noticed above the circumstances leading to the Government directing the Regional Joint Director of School Education, Hyderabad, to conduct a detailed enquiry into the allegations received by the Government regarding inclusion of the names of bogus students in the list of 160 students annexed to the G.O. Ms. No. 127/dated 30-9-2000 by the management of Noble College of Education. The Regional Joint Director of School Education, Hyderabad, in the course of enquiry, in the first instance, issued questionnaries to the Correspondent of the Noble College of Education as well as all the allotted students in the above noted two colleges. In reply to the questionnaire, the Correspondent of the Noble College of Education admitted that a notification was issued in the newspaper calling for applications from the eligible candidates for the post of Lecturers during the year 1998-99; notification was not issued in the newspapers inviting applications for admission to the B.Ed. course, but local aspirants for the course who approached the Correspondent to find out the status of the college were admitted on assurance of the Correspondent that he has applied to National Council of Teachers Education (NCTE), Bangalore and Government of Andhra Pradesh for necessary permission; lecturers from local area were appointed on a contract basis and classes were conducted for a period of five months from March to July, 1999; students so admitted completed teaching practice in nearby 20 schools. In response to the questionnaires issued to the students, the petitioners and the like admitted that they did not attend the college and teaching practice for various reasons such as (i) college did not obtain permission from NCTE and the Government of Andhra Pradesh; (ii) on medical grounds (iii) personal family problems (iv) due to elections etc. The petitioners also admitted they do not know even the names of lecturers who handled the classes for B.Ed. students for a period of five months. They could not give satisfactory explanation or proof in support of the tution fee and other fees paid to the management of the college at the time of admission. The Regional Joint Director of School Education, on consideration of replies of the Correspondent and the concerned students, and after inspection ofavailable records maintained by and available with the management came to the prima facie conclusion that 107 students out of 160 students allotted to the two colleges were not genuine students. Accordingly, the Regional Joint Director of School Education submitted a report to the Government through the Director of School Education recommending action against the bogus candidates in order to facilitate the study of genuine students who were admitted by the management of the Noble College of Education. Of course, that report was the basis for issuing show cause notice dated 11-12-2000 to the petitioners. The following is the show-cause notice dated 11-12-2000 issued by the Principal of IASE, Masab Tank, Hyderabad to Ch. Anita, the 1st petitioner in W.P. No. 26348 of 2000:
'Proceedings of the Principal, Govt. I.A.S.E., Masab Tank, Hyderabad.
Re. No. 522/310/IASE-W.C.-Hyd/2000, D/- 11-12-2000.
SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE
Sub:-- Private Colleges of Education - Noble College of Education, Narketpalli, Nalgonda District
-- Espulsion of Bogus
-- Candidates - Show
-- Cause Notice - issued -Regarding.
Ref :-- Procs. Re. No. 2026/N2-2/1998. dt. 10-12-2000 of DSE, A.P., Hyd.
* * * * *
Whereas you were said to be a bonafide candidate of the Noble College of education, Narketpally, Nalgonda District, and consequent on a representation of the Correspondent of the said College, you were admitted into B.Ed. Course in Govt. IASE., Masab Tank, Hyderabad as per G.O. Ms. No. 127, Edn., dt. 30-9-2000.
Subsequently, certain complaints were received that some candidates in the list furnished by Sri Y. Sanjeeva Reddy, Correspondent of Noble College of education are not the bonafide students of that College.
When an enquiry was conducted about your bonafides, you have given a statement to the Regional Joint Director of School Education, Hyderabad by answering a questionnaire that you did not attend the teaching practice as prescribed in the course and attend the classes.
On the basis of the above, it is evident thatyou were not a bonafide student of the said college and you got your name included in the list through unfair means to get admission into the B.Ed. Course in this College.
You, Kum. C. Anitha, are, therefore, directed to show-cause before 18-12-2000 as to why you should not be expelled from this college by canceling your admission, If your reply is not received by 18-12-2000 further action as contemplated will be taken on the basis of the available records.
Receipt of this notice shall be acknowledged.
Principal
Institute of Advanced Study in
Education, Govt. of A.P., Hyderabad.
Welfare Centre, Masab Tank, Hyd.
To,
C. Anitha'
The following is the reply submitted by Ch. Anitha to the above show-cause notice :
'Ref : PN/GIASEC/01
Secunderabad, Dt/- 17-12-2000
To
The Principal,
Govt. I.A.S.E.,
Masab Tank, Hyderabad.
Sub :-- Show-cause notice
R. C. No. 522/310/IASE-W.C.-
HYD/2000, dt. 11-12-2000.
* * * * *
Dear Madam,
I have taken admission in B.Ed. course offered by Noble College, Narketpalli, Nalgonda District. I have paid fees of Rs. 4,130/- (Receipt enclosed). I am a bonafide student of this college (Bonafide Certificate enclosed.)
I have taken admission in this college presuming that the college has all the requisite permissions from a competent authority. And I started attending classes regularly.
As regards teaching practice stipulated for B.Ed. course, our class was divided into two batches, due to shortage of schools in Nalgonda District. I was allotted second batch. While the first batch candidates were undergoing teaching practice we came to know that the college has not got the permission.
I was shocked and we ran pillar to postseeking help. After undergoing a lot of agony and mental trauma and losing academic years finally the government has taken kind consideration of our plights and allowed us to pursue B.Ed. course at GOVT. I.A.S.E. Hyd.
I request you to show mercy upon us.
Thanking you.
Yours obediently,
C. Anitha Roll
No. 65
Enclosures :
(Xerox copies)
1. Noble College of Education -- fee receipt
2. Noble College of Education -- Bonafide Certificate
3. I.A.S.E. fee receipt'
Similar show cause notice were issued to the other petitioners also and the similarly circumstanced students and all of them filed sustantially similar replies to the show cause notices.
11. The show-cause notices issued to the petitioners dated 11-12-2000 specifically refer to the statements given by the petitioners to the Regional Joint Director of School Education, Hyderabad in response to questionnaires. Nowhere in the replies to the show cause notices, the petitioners have retracted from the statements made by them in response to questionnaires. The only stock defence of all these petitioners and similarly circumstanced students was that the entire B.Ed. class was divided into two batches on account of shortage of teaching schools in Nalgonda district and all of them allotted to second batch and that while the first batch of candidates were undergoing teaching practice, they came to know that Noble College of Education did not get the permission. That is the only explanation offered by the petitioners. Ultimately, as could be seen from the above extracted reply, they appeal to the mercy of the Principal of the college without seriously contesting the allegations levelled against them. At this stage itself, it may be noticed that when the petitioners received the show-cause notices, they did not demand from the Principal or other higher-ups in the Educational department to furnish copy of the enquiry report submitted by the Regional Joint Director of School Education or any other documents they might have thought them to be necessary in order to give effective relies to the show-cause notices. Itis also necessary to notice that the enquiry conducted by the Regional Joint Director of School Education is in the nature of a preliminary enquiry preceeding issuance of the show-cause notices on 11-12-2000. It is true that the Principal did not furnish copies of the preliminary enquiry report submitted by the Regional Joint Director of School Education to the petitioners. But, as pointed out supra, the show-causes notice specifically refer to the statements given by the petitioners in response to the questionnaires. The petitioners are the authors of the replies to the questionnaires. It is not the case of the petitioners that the replies to the questionnaires were obtained by the Principal against their will and volition or practising or exercising coercion or undue influence. Therefore, it is appropriate and reasonable that the petitioners should standby what they stated in their replies to the questionnaires. If the replies to the questionnaires given by the petitioners are taken into consideration, it goes without saying that the replies themselves probabalise that the petitioners did not attend the classes for a period of five months when classes were conducted by the Noble College of Education and that they are not genuine students. As could be seen from the original records placed before us, the petitioners could not remember even the names of lecturers who took classes for a period of five months. If the petitioners are bona fide students and if they had attended the college for a period of five months, common sense would tell us that such students would normally remember atleast names of their lecturers, if not lessons. In appreciating the above say of the petitioners to the questionnaires, the Judges cannot keep their common sense in cold storage and decide. It is also seen from the original records that the petitioners did not give satisfactory explanation as to whether they paid prescribed tuition and other fees at the time of admission and if so, to whom. The respondent authorities taking into account all the materials on record and attendant circumstances came to the conclusion that the petitioners-students are not the bona fide students who were admitted during the Academic year 1998-99 by the Noble College of Education and that their names were included in the list of 160 students annexed to G.O.Ms. No. 127, dated 30-9-2000 in connivance with the Correspondent of the Noble College of Education. This factual finding recorded bythe respondent authorities cannot be said to be perverse or based on no relevant materials. Should it be noticed that judicial review of the impugned action is sought in the field of education and academy. It is trite to state that the Courts normally do not interfere with the decisions taken by the educational authorities lightly unless in a given case the impugned action is found to violate provisions of the Constitution or mandatory provisions of any statute or is ex facie irrational.
12. The facts stated supra will go to show that there was no violation of audi alteram partem rule. Fair hearing was given to the affected students before their admissions were cancelled. It is needless to state that any enquiry begins with issuance of show-cause notice and ends with the final order that may be made in pursuance of such show-cause notice. In the instant case, the issuance of show-cause notice was preceded by a preliminary enquiry, as directed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, by the Regional Joint Director of School Education. In the show-cause notice, the ground for the proposed action to cancel the admission was set-out precisely and clearly with reference to the replies given by the petitioners themselves in response to the questionnaires. After necessary reflection and thought, we are of the considered opinion that no prejudice was caused to the petitioners on account of non-furnishing of copy of the enquiry report.
13. In Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala, : [1969]1SCR317 , disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the university against a student on a charge of malpractice during the examination. The ultimate deciding authority was the Vice-Chancellor. An enquiry was conducted by a nominee of the Vice-Chancellor. At the inquiry, the student was allowed to cross-examine witnesses and adduce his own evidence. After the inquiry, the Vice-Chancellor issued a show-cause notice to the student and ultimately expelled him. The report of the inquiry was neither demanded by the student nor given to him. He later challenged the procedure on the ground of violation of natural justice as a copy of the report was not given to him. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge ruling that where the law provides for a show-cause notice, it does not follow that a copy of the report on the basis of which the notice is issued should be made available to the affected person, or another inquiry be held thereafter by the decision-maker himself. The Court also pointed out that the appellant never asked for a copy of the report. Further, in Satwant Singh v. Board of H.S. & I.E., : AIR1974All273 , the examination result of a candidate was cancelled by the examination committee after an inquiry by an inquiry committee. The candidate challenged the decision on the ground inter alia that a copy of the report of the inquiry committee was not supplied to him. The Allahabad High Court ruled that natural Justice did not require that a copy of the inquiry report must have been furnished to the candidate and that it was enough that charges were communicated to him and he was given an opportunity to meet them. In this connection, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hira Nath Mishra v. Principal Rajendra Medical College, 0044/1973 : (1973)IILLJ111SC , as per VNP, may also be cited in support of the above proposition.
14. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties in depth and after perusing the documents annexed to writ proceedings as well as the original records, we are satisfied that the petitioners have had a fair opportunity and chance of convincing the respondent authorities that they are the bonafide students of B.Ed. course, but they utterly failed to place any convincing material before the authorities or before this Court in support of their claim.
15. We do not find any merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that if the Court were to refuse relief to the petitioners, the petitioners would be subjected to untold misery and hardship and therefore the case of the petitioners be treated with a touch of sympathy and on humanitarian grounds. When the educational authorities find the petitioners-students to be bogus students for B.Ed. course and this Court finds that that finding recorded by the educational authorities that the petitioners are not genuine students is not baseless, this Court on the basis of misplaced sympathy and humanitarian grounds cannot direct the respondents to permit the petitioners to complete the course and to appear for the examinations, and if the Court were to grant such relief, undoubtedly the Court would be overstepping its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and violate sound self-imposedrestraints and limitaions on the power of judicial review. This view of ours is fully fortified by a catena of pronouncements of the Supreme Court in C.B.S.E. v. P. Sunil Kumar, : [1998]3SCR327 , A. P. Christians Medical Educational Society v. Govt. of A.P., : [1986]2SCR749 , State of Tamil Nadu v. St. Joseph Teachers Training Institute, : [1991]2SCR231 ,State of Maharashtra v. Vikas Sahebrao Roundale : [1992]3SCR792 , Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kr. Bansal, : AIR1993SC2412 , to cite a few. Further, the following observation of the Supreme Court in Central Board of Secondary Education v. Nikhil Gulati, : [1998]1SCR897 is quite appoiste in the context of this case and the request of the learned Counsel for the petitioners :
'1. Occasional aberrations such as these, whereby ineligible students are permitted, under Court orders, to undertake Board and/or University examinations, have caught the attention of this Court many a time. To add to it further, the Courts have almost always observed that the instance of such aberrations should not be treated as a precedent in future. Such casual discretions by the Court is nothing but an abuse of the process; more so when the High Court at its level itself becomes conscious that the decision was wrong and was not worth repeating as a precedent. And yet it is repeated time and again. Having said thus much, we hope and trust that unless the High Court can Justify its decision on principle and precept, it should better desist from passing such orders, for it puts the 'Rule of Law' to a mockery, and promotes rather the 'Rule of Man'.
16. In the result and for the foregoing reasons. Writ Petition Nos. 26348 of 2000 and 26432 of 2000 are dismissed. Consequently, Writ Appeal No. 19 of 2001 and Writ Appeal No. 6 of 2001 also stand dismissed. Since writ appeals and writ petitions are dismissed, WAMP No. 13 of 2001 in WA No. 6 of 2001 and WAMP No. 35 of 2001 in WA No. 19 of 2001 also stand dismissed. No order as to costs.
S.B. Sinha, C.J.
17. Although I agree with my learned brother S. R. Nayak, J., I would like to add a few words of mine.
18. The principle of natural justice does not have a rigid formula. Natural justice has different facets -- the requirement to comply with the principle of audi alteram partem and the extent thereof. The doctrine of natural justice does not contain any body of codified canons. As natural justice has a root in fairness the application thereof would certainly vary from case to case. When there are gross irregularities involving a large number of persons it may not be possible to give a personal hearing to each one of them particularly when the truth and substance of the matter can be found out from the record. Although natural justice to some of us is being considered to be part of Article 14, the concept has undergone a change. Although at one point of time non-compliance of the principles of natural justice was considered to be per se having a prejudicial effect, by and by the prejudice theory has been evolved by the Apex Court.
19. When a great deal of bungling is done by the appropriate authority and upon an enquiry made in that regard gross irregularities committed by them are detected, no further hearing is necessary to be given to each of the persons affected if such findings are supported by records.
20. Reference in this connection may be made to Bihar Public Service Commission v. State of Bihar, : AIR1997SC2280 .
21. In Khaitan (India) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1999) 2 Cal LJ 478 it was observed :
'10. Assuming for the sake of argument that violation of the principles of natural justice has taken place, and thus, this Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, a question would arise as to whether keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case it would entertain the writ application.
11. The concept of principles of natural Justice has undergone a radical change. It is not in every case, that the High Courts would entertain a writ application only on the ground that violation of principles of natural justice has been alleged. The Apex Court, in State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma, reported in : (1996)IILLJ296SC has clearly held that a person complaining about the violation of the principles of natural justice must show causation of a prejudice against him by reason of such violation. The Apex Court has held that the principles of natural justice, may be said to have been violated which require an intervention when no hearing, no opportunity or no notice has been given. Reference in this connection may also be made to Managing Director, E.C.I.L. v. B. Karunakar reported in : (1994)ILLJ162SC . The question as to the effect of non-grant of enough opportunity to the learned counsel for the appellant by the Commission to meet the allegations made in the supplementary affidavit requires investigation. As to what extent the appellant has suffered prejudice would be a question which would fall for a decision of a Higher Court. Where such a disputed question arises, in the considered opinion of this Court, a writ application will not be entertain only because violation of natural justice has been alleged and more so, in a case of this nature where such a contention can also be raised before the Highest Court of India. A distinction has to be borne in mind between a forum of appeal which is presided by an administrative Body and the Apex Court as an appellate Court.'
22. Yet again in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant, AIR 2001 SC 24 Banerjee, J. speaking for the Bench observed :
'1. Since the decision of this Court in Kraipak's case A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, : [1970]1SCR457 one golden rule that stands firmly established is that the doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. What, however, does this doctrine exactly mean? Lord Reid about four decades ago in Ridge v. Baldwin, (1964) AC 40 very succinctly described it as not being capable of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances -- who them is a reasonable man -- the man on the clapham omnibus? In India, however, a reasonable man cannot but be a common man similarly placed. The effort of Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin (supra) in not attributing a definite meaning to the doctrine but attributing it to be representing a fair procedure still holds goods even in the millennium year. As a matter of fact this Court in the case of Keshave Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, : [1973]3SCR22 upon reliance on the attributes of the doctrine as above stated as below (at pp. 393 and 394 of AIR) :
'8. The second question, however, as to what are the principles of natural justicethat should regulate an administrative act or order is a much more difficult one to answer. We do not think it either feasible or even desirable to lay down any fixed or rigorous yard-stick in this manner. The concept of natural justice cannot be put into a straight jacket. It is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. Where administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. See, for instance, the observations of Lord Parker in Re. H.R (an infant) (1967) 2 QB 617. It only means that such measure of natural justice should be applied as was described by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin case, (1964 AC 40) (supra) as 'insusceptible of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances'. However, even the application of the concept of fair-play requires real flexibility. Every thing will depend on the actual facts and circumstances of a case. As Tucker, LJ observed in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, (1949) 1 All ER 109 :
'The requirement of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being deal with and so forth.
2. While it is true that over the years there has been a steady refinement as regards this particular doctrine, but no attempt has been made and if we may say so, cannot be made to define the doctrine in a specific manner or method. Straight-jacket formula cannot be made applicable but compliance of the doctrine is solely dependant upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The totality of the situation ought to be taken note of and if on examination of such totality, it comes to light that the executive action suffers from the vice of non-compliance of the doctrine, the law Courts in that event ought to set right the wrong inflicted upon the concerned person and to do so would be a plain exercise of judicial power. As a matter of fact the doctrine is now termed as a synonym of fairness in the concept of justice and stands as the most accepted methodology of agovernmental action.'
23. The totality of circumstances, thus, if taken into consideration leave no manner of doubt that the principles of natural justice have been complied with and the petitioners herein had not been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever by non-supply of the copy of the report. Furthermore, the Court shall not exercise its writ jurisdiction which is equitable in nature when it is found that a student does not fulfill all the criteria for appearing at the examination or continuing his studies. The technical education which is governed by a statute mandates that statutory provisions be complied with before the student can be allowed to take his examination.
24. The appellants herein may be victims of circumstances. But that by itself does not entitle them to obtain a writ in the nature of mandamus as they have not been able to show existence of any legal right in themselves and a corresponding legal duty in the respondents.
25. Sympathy alone cannot be a ground for grant of relief which would be contrary to law. This aspect of the matter has been considered in Ashoke Saha v. State of West Bengal, (1999) 2 Cal LT 1 wherein it was held :
'14. The said decision therefore, is also distinguishable on facts. On the other hand there are series of decisions wherein the Supreme Court has clearly laid down the law that a pupil who is not entitled to appear in the examination should not be allowed to do so in violation of the statutory regulation. Reference in this connection, may be made to A.P. Christian Medical Educational Society v. Government of A.P. reported in : [1986]2SCR749 State of T.N. v. St. Joseph Teachers' Training Institute reported in : [1991]2SCR231 ; State of Maharashtra v. Vikas Sahebrao Roundale reported in : [1992]3SCR792 ; Central Board of Secondary Education v. Nikhil Gulati reported in : [1998]1SCR897 ; Central Board of Secondary Education v. P. Sunil Kumar, reported in : [1998]3SCR327 . In a decision reported in (1997) 1 Cal LJ 143, a Division Bench of this Court was considering a matter relating to the right of a person to take admission and not with the question raised therein. In this jurisdiction also a Division Bench of this Court in Central Board of Secondary Education v. AdarshKumar Sedhwarayar reported in (1998) 2 Cal HN 61 upon considering the aforementioned decision as also the decision of the Apex Court in Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kumar Bansal reported in : AIR1993SC2412 as also other decisions held :--
'It is beyond any dispute that the said Park Point School was not affiliated with the appellant. The writ petition might have taken admission under a misconception but it is beyond any cavil of doubt that unless the statute permits appearance of students as private candidates they cannot be permitted to do so.' 15. The Bench further noticed -
'In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Mrs. Asha Ramchandra Ambekar reported in, : (1994)IILLJ173SC , the law has been laid down in the following terms :
Thus apart from the directions as to appointment on compassionate grounds being against statutory provisions, such direction does not take note of this fact. Whatever it may be the Court should not have directed the appointment on compassionate grounds. The jurisdiction under mandamus cannot be exercised in that fashion.'
26. In G. Kalyan Sundaram v. U. CO Bank, (1995) 2 Cal LT 201 one of us (S.B. Sinha. C.J.) had observed that in the fact of that case even sympathy has no role to play.
27. In Latham v. Richard Johnson & Nephew Ltd., (1911-1913) All ER 117 (Reprint), Farwell L.J. observed-
'We must be careful not to allow our sympathy with the infant plaintiff to affect our judgment. Sentiment is a dangerous will of the wisp to take as a guide in the search for legal principles.'
28. In the State of Tamil Nadu v. St. Joseph Teachers Training College, : [1991]2SCR231 reported in the Apex Court observed that Court cannot grant relief on humanitarian ground contrary to law.
29. For the reasons aforementioned the Writ Petitions and the Writ Appeals are dismissed.