ORDER
Umesh Chandra Banerjee, CJ
1. Since the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakub v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, : [1964]5SCR64 , the law is well settled pertaining to the assumption of jurisdiction by the writ Court. The Supreme Court in no uncertain terms held that a writ can be issued where, in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it, the lower Court or the tribunal gives a decision illegally or improperly, as for example, violation of the principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court also laid down:
'There is however no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court which necessarily means that findings of fact by inferior Court or tribunal as a result of an appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in any writ proceeding. An error of law which is apparent on the face of record can be an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. If a finding of fact is based on no evidence or if the tribunal had admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the finding that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of Certiorari. Adequacy or sufficiency of evidence laid on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn to the said point are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal and the same cannot be agitated before a writ Court and it is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 226 to issue a writ of Certiorari can be ultimately exercised.'
2. The Patna High Court in the caseof Bihar Khadi Gram Udyog Samity, Muzaffarpur v. State of Bihar, 1977 LAB IC 466, observed that assuming for the sake of argument that there has been a wrong appraisal of evidence by the Labour Court, the Court shall not be justified in weighing the evidence for itself as if it were sitting in appeal against the order of the Labour Court. In an earlier decision, the Patna High Court in the case of Management of Junkundar Colliery of Messrs,B. Mondal and Co., v. Sahadeo Thakur, 1974 Lab IC 417, observed that even if the Court can reasonably arrive at a conclusion different from that of the Labour Court but that cannot clothe the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with the power to interfere with the findings of the Labour Court. Same is the view expressed by one of us (Hon'ble the Chief Justice) in Tollygunge Club Ltd v. Fifth Industrial Tribunal 1985 (1) LLJ 258. Not long ago, however, the Supreme Court set at rest this particular issue in Tata Cellular's case - Tata Cellular v. Union of India, : AIR1996SC11 . The Supreme Court in paragraph 93 of the report categorically observed that the duty of the Court is confined itself to the question of legality and its concern should be whether the decision making authority exceeded its powers; committed an error of law; committed breach of the rules of natural justice; reached a decision which no reasonable Tribunal would have reached or abused its powers.
3. The Supreme Court in the decision noted above, further observed that it is not for the Court to determine whether a particular policy or a particular decision taken in the fulfilment of the policy is fair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary from case to case. The Supreme Court observed:
'Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under:
(i) Illegality :-- This means the decision maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision making power and must give effect to it.
(ii) Irrationality namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness.
(iii) Procedural impropriety.'
4. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court while referring to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex Parte Brind, (1991) 1 AC 696, and the observations of Lord Diplock, observed in paragraph 95 of the report:
'In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the Court should consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires itsintervention'.
5. In paragraph 96, the Supreme Court did in fact go into the issue of Wednesbury unreasonableness and noted the decision of R v. Askew, (1768) 4 Burr 2186, wherein Lord Mansfield considered the question whether a mandamus should be granted against the College of Physicians and he expressed the relevant principles in two eloquent sentences as under:
'It is true, that the judgment and discretion of determining upon this skill, ability, learning and sufficiency to exercise and practise this profession is trusted to the College of Physicians; and this Court will not take it from them, nor interrupt them in the due and proper exercise of it. But their conduct in the exercise of this trust thus committed to them ought to be fair, candid and unprejudiced; not arbitrary, capricious, or biased, much less, warped by resentment or personal dislike.'
6. In the decision noted above, the Supreme Court further, upon a summary of the English law as well, in paragraph 97 stated the law in the manner following:
'The modem statement of the principles is found in a passage in the speech of Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 (1) AC 374:
By irrationality I mean what can now be succinctly referred to as Wednesbury unreasonableness (Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 233. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards tliatno sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at.
At this stage, the Supreme Court Practice 1993 Volume I, pages 849-850 may be quoted:
4. Wednesbury principle - A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial review proceedings where tlie Court concludes tliat the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it.
Two other facets of irrationality may be mentioned.
(1) It is open to the Court to review the decision maker's evaluation of the focts. The Court will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision maker. If the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision the other way cannot be upheld. Thus, in Emma Hotels Ltd., v. Secretary of the Slate of Environment, (1980) 41 P&CR; 255, the Secretary of State referred to a number of factors which led him to the conclusion that a non-resident's bar in a hotel was operated in such a way that the bar was not an incident of the hotel use for planning purposes, but constituted a separate use. The Divisional Court analysed the factors which led the Secretary of State to that conclusion and, having done so, set it aside. Donaldson LJ said that he could not see on what basis the Secretary of State had reached his conclusion.
(2) A decision would be regarded as unreasonable if it is impartial (partial?) and unequal in its operation as between different classes. On this basis in R v. Barnet London Borough Council, ex p. Johnson, (1989) 88 LGR 73, the condition imposed by a local authorityprohibiting participation by those affiliated with political parties at events to be held in the authority's parks was struck down.'
7. Having dealt with the law on the subject, let us advert ourselves to the factual score briefly. The writ petitioner claims himself to be a lessee of late Mohammed Nurruddin Asrari son of Mohd. Vaziruddin alias Wajihullah Hussaini, who is alleged to be a successor to the Maqta Naimatullah Shah and has occupied the suit land in the year 1958 or so. He also raised a building thereon known as Jala Drushyam. The plaintiff, however, being the Government of Andhra Pradesh and represented by the Collector, Hyderabad District, the records depict, on coming to know of the occupation of the suit land by the defendant-writ petitioner caused issuance of a notice by the then Tahsildar, Hyderabad Urban Taluk on 12th May, 1976 under Section 6 of the Andhra Pradcsh Land Encroachment Act, 1905 for eviction of the writ petitioner. The factum of the issuance of this notice, however, prompted the writ petitioner to approach this Court and he subsequently obtained a stay of eviction in WPMP No.2086 of 1977 filed in WP No.1414 of 1977. The ad-interim order to stay granted in the miscellaneous petition as noticed above was made absolute and the writ was allowed by Chinnappa Reddy, J., as his Lordship then was. hi the judgment, it was categorically observed by the learned single Judge that it was open to the Government to establish its claim to the suit land by filing an appropriate action in the ordinary civil Court of original jurisdiction. The judgment of the learned single Judge was, however, challenged, as appears from the records, by way of writ appeal being WA No.61 of 1978 by the State Government but the same was eventually dismissed by a common judgment of a Division Bench on 14th November, 1983 and thereby the judgment of the learned single Judge stood affirmed. It is in pursuance of the said order of dismissal that the civil Court was approachedby the Government of Andhra Pradesh in OS No. 1497 of 1985 before the IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, inter alia, for the following reliefs:
'(a) the 'plaintiff be declared the owner of the plaint schedule land;
(b) the plaintiff be delivered possession of the plaint schedule land by evicting the defendant from it;
(c) the plaintiff be granted such other relief or reliefs as it is found entitled to under the law; and(d) to award costs of the suit.'
8. During the pendency of the civil suit as above, being OS No.1497 of 1985, the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was enacted by the State Legislature and the matter was directed to be referred to the Special Court in terms of the provisions of the Act. As against such an attempt, a civil revision petition was filed in this Court with an interim prayer. Such prayer, however, did not find favour with this Court. Subsequently, when the matter came up finally in October, 1992, the revision petitioner did not press the matter any further and accordingly, the same was dismissed. Incidentally, be it noted that by reason of the factum of the applicant in the civil revision petition not being able to obtain any order of stay of hearing before the Special Court, the latter proceeded with the matter in detail, examined several witnesses and passed a final order on 16th April, 1993 directing:
'Hence, there shall be a decree of possession directing the respondent to restore possession to the petitioner of the suit land. However, we direct that the land on which the building was constructed along with the necessary passage to reach the building from the main road shall be restored to the petitioner on or before six. months from today giving opportunity to the respondent to remove the structures during that period. The rest of the vacant land shall be restored to the petitioner within one month from today'
9. The Special Court further directed that it would, however, be open to the petitioner-Government to retain the building by compensating the respondent if they so choose.
10. It is against this order that this writ petition is filed, inter alia, contending that as a matter of fact, no reasonable man could have come to such a conclusion on the wake of the available documentary evidence and in any event, the Special Court, by reason of the express language used in the Statute, does not have any authority in law to go into the same since there is no act of grabbing of any land involving ownership and title thereto or lawful possession of the land grabbed.
11. Mr. Pratap Reddy, learned advocate appearing in support of the writ petition strenuously contended that the sine qua non for taking cognizance of the matter by the Special Court under the Act is that there must be an activity of grabbing the land and since there is no grabbing or illegal possession of land by the petitioner, question of the Special Court entertaining the matter or having any authority or jurisdiction does not and cannot arise. The factual score noticed above clearly depict that this issue was raised before this Court on an earlier occasion by way of a civil revision petition but the same was not pressed and has been given a go-bye without obtaining any opinion from this Court. As such, exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal, in our view, cannot be questioned at this stage more so, by reason of the facts as noticed above.
12. Let us now turn onto the other aspect of the matter viz., whether the decision making process stands vitiated in any way whatsoever as has been laid down and settled by the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular's case (supra). It is on this perspective, however, that theorder of the Special Court ought to be noticed with some amount of elaboration. The Special Court, while dealing with the matter, at first, framed eight issues for a proper and effective adjudication of the disputes. Subsequently, however, on 12th March, 1993, the Special Court framed the following issues by way of recasting the same:
'(1) Whether the petitioner is the owner of the petition schedule property (plaint schedule property)?
(2) Whether the rival title set up by the respondent is true and valid?
(3) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit as it raises bona fide dispute of title?
(4) Whether this Court can retransfer the case to the civil Court if the case is not entertainable by it?
(5) Whether the respondent perfected title by adverse possession?
(6) Whether the respondent is a land grabber within the meaning of the Act?
(7) To what relief?'
13. The Special Court did notice the entire evidence available on record as adduced by both the parties in support of their respective contentions. With regard to the issues raised, the Special Court came to the following conclusions:
As regards issue No. 1 the Special Court observed:
'Even if the suit land is not part of 49 bhigas excluded from the grant covering S. No.38 and the land east to it, it is clearly covered by the land directed to be reserved by the Sarfekhas Minister and Moaziz Committee under Exs.A26 to A27. The lands so directed to be reserved under Exs.A26 and A27 cannot be included in the regrant in the absence of positive orders by Moaziz Committee directing those lands also to be granted and hence they must be deemed to have been excluded from the regrant to be made to the successor in interest of this inam.
The succession proceedings under Ex.B1 had to be continued under Ex.B6 and the order passed under succession proceedings under Ex.B6 (Ex.B8) dated 15-2-1359 F recommending the grant including the suit is not valid and binding on the State for the following reasons: (i) Ex.B6 is only succession proceedings but not inam proceedings wherein no determination of the extent of inam lands or the reserved land was made.
(ii) The proceedings recommending succession under Ex.B6 were not
confirmed by any competent authority under Section 13(2) of the Atiyat Enquiry Act, 1952 and hence there is no valid regrant in their favour;
(iii) When the Sarfekhas Merger Regulation, 1359 F came into force on 5-2-1949 the land directed to be reserved under the orders of Sarfekhas Minister and the Moaziz Committee as per Exs.A26 and A27 have become part of Diwani lands (Government lands) and vested in the Government absolutely.
Further the subsequent succession proceedings under Ex.B9 (Ex.B10) based on Ex.B6 (Ex.B8) and also the inclusion of the lands directed to be reserved by the Sarfekhas Minister under Ex,A26 in Ex.B9 (Ex.B 10) are equally invalid as inoperative not binding on the State Government. For the above reasons, we have to record a finding on issue (1) in the affirmative holding that the Government is the owner of the property in question.''
14. As regards issue No.2 the Special Court observed:
'The respondent having purchased property from the inamdar claiming title under Ex.B9, whose grant is invalid as the succession was traced to Ex.B6 from persons who arc not holding any valid atiyat grant by the date Act X of 1952 came intoforce, no title has passed to him under Ex.B40, and consequently we hold the rival title set up by him is not true and valid and we record the finding in negative on Issue(2).'
15. In paragraph 91 of the order, the Special Court recorded its finding as regards the issue of adverse possession to the following effect:
'So, for the foregoing reasons, and in the absence of even an assertion of his claim of adverse possession in his evidence we are clearly of the opinion that the plea of adverse possession is not sustainable and accordingly we record a finding on this issue in the negative.'
The reasoning of the Special Court appears from paragrapli 85 of the order, which records:
'It is well settled that possession of a vacant piece of land is presumed to follow title. In such cases, the person who asserts adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his act was hostile to the real owner and amounts to denial of owner's title to the property claimed vide Ram Das v. Mangat Rai, : AIR1967Delhi70 .'
16. As regards the issue Nos.3 and 6 as to whether the Special Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit which raises bona fide dispute of title or whether the respondent is a land grabber within the meaning of the Act and that being the principal contention, it would be convenient to note rather exhaustively the observations of the Special Court on this score.
'It is seen that the two essential requirements of land grabbing are want of lawful title and design i.e., with a view to take possession illegally. We have held that there is no valid confirmation of grant by the civil administrator under Ex.B6 and consequently no title had passed under Ex.B9 to the vendor of the respondents and hence no title could be obtained by the respondent under Ex.B40. Once we hold that the respondent has no title the other question is a design on the part of the respondent in obtaining these documents and resisting possession has to be examined.
First we shall notice the events chronologically after the respondent entered the scene. It is stated that he has obtained the agreement to lease under Ex.B39 on 28-11-1954. Ex.B41, dated 18-7-1955 is the permission obtained for raising fence. Ex.B35 dated 29-11-1955 is a petition by one of the sharers of Niyamathuttah Shah Maktha showing all sharers. OS No.13 of 1958 was filed impleading the respondent and his vendor on 30-4-1956. An injunction order was passed on 5-5-1956. Ex.B36 is the order of the civil Court in the above suit permitting the respondent to purchase the property. Thereupon, the deed, Ex.A40 dated 11-12-1957 was obtained by the respondent. Ex.B51 is the notification issued by the Government proposing to acquire S No.9/18 and 9/19 on 30-1-1958. Ex.B60 is the letter of the Commissioner dated 26-3-1958 with respect to the building permission. Ex.B61 dated 15-5-1958 was on the same subject. Under Ex.B43 dated 7-8-1958, the Court permitted the respondent to erect the building provided he executed a personal bond that he will hand over the building in good condition without any compensation if the plaintiff gets a decree in respect of the land. On the same day, he also obtained sanction of the municipality under Ex.B42, dated 9-8-1958 for the the construction of the building. Under Ex.B62 dated 9-8-1958 which is the letter of the respondent to the Commissioner it is stated that he will not 'claim any compensation towards the house, if permitted to be constructed on his land between the fisheries and the boat club if the Government acquires the said land.' On 14-9-1959 under Ex.B35, Deputy Secretary, GeneralAdministration Department, wrote to the Collector to investigate the title of the land occupied by the respondent. Then under Ex. A14 dated 5-10-1959, the Collector passed an order holding that the lands in S.Nos.9/15 paiki, 9/16 to 9/19 are the vacant and unoccupied land declared them as the Government land. Under Ex.B34 dated 12-10-1959, the Collector in the letter to the Chief Secretary stated that the lands referred in Ex.A14 are the Government lands and should be handed over to the PWD. Then we come to Exs.A42 to A45 of 1960 showing the demand of siwai Jamana by the Government and payment of the same by the respondent and Ex.B37 is the subsequent notice issued under Section 7 of the Land Encroachment Act to the respondent on 22-11-1963. Thereafter, we have got only Ex.A38 dated 5-11-1971 where the Deputy Secretary to the Government directed that the order passed in the year 1952 relating to the entries in faisal partis require to be revised under Section 166-B of the AP Telangana Area Land Revenue Act. Ex.B44 is again a notice issued under Section 7 of the Land Encroachment Act to the respondent on 12-9-1973. The civil Court delivered judgment on 11-11-1975 marked as Ex.A1 holding that the Government is the owner of the property and both the plaintiff and also the vendor of the respondent. D2 are not the owners. The appellate Court judgment is marked as Ex.A2 dated 13-4-1977 in CCCA No.8 of 1976 and other appeals holding that the judgment delivered under Ex.Al does not operate as res judicata against the appellants-defendants before them and respondent obtained stay in that appeal on 7-6-1976. Then Ex.B63 is the notice issued by the Tahsildar under the Inams Abolition Act on 21-1-1976. Under Ex.B38, again a notice was issued under Section 6 of the Land Encroachment Act dated 17-5-1976 and possession was demanded under Ex.B45 dated 17-5-1976. A reply was given to him by the respondent setting up his title on 11-6-1976 under Ex.B46. When the Government wanted to take action against the respondents in view of the judgment in Ex.Al, the jurisdiction of the High Court was involved under Article 226 and the judgment is Ex.A3 dated 20-1-1978. Exs.B58, B59, B52 and B53 dated 28-5-1977, 28-5-1977, 10-6-1977 and 28-6-1977 respectively are the correspondence between the respondent and the revenue authorities demanding the respondent to deliver possession and refusal to conduct survey as the matter was pending in the Courts. We can complete the narration saying that the judgment of the learned single Judge interdicting the land encroachment proceedings was upheld in a writ appeal under Ex.A4 on 14-11-1983. Thereafter, the present suit was filed on 25-11-1985. Ex.B54 to B57 is the correspondence of the respondent and Deputy Director to conduct survey and the refusal during the year 1986-87 after the suit was filed.
Now it is enough if we notice some of the circumstances and a few pieces of evidence in this regard. The earliest document in which he asserted bona fide title is Ex.B46. This he reiterated in the written statement showing a list of documents in para 16. When he was examined as RW1, he affirmed them at page 6 of his evidence. These documents, so far they relate to title, pertains to succession proceedings, phodi proceedings, mutation proceedings, faisal partis and also attachment proceedings. They were already examined by us in detail. He admitted at page 6 of the evidence that the sethwar implemented underEx,B47 in 1353 Fasli was set aside under Ex.B28 in 1357 Fasli. At page 10 he admitted that the Jamabandi Officer corrected the entries and he filed an appeal against Ex.A30. When appeal against A30 was pending, again Ex.B49 was secured by the inamdar. A perusal of Ex.B49, faisal patti of 1952 shows that the respondent is purchasing litigation but not property. He also admitted at page 10 that the entries were againcorrected in Ex.A37 in the year 1960. When mutation proceedings went against the inamdar, he purchased the property to the full knowledge of those orders and obtained Ex.B40. Further, OS No. 13 of 1958 was filed by one Shapur G. Chinnai on the file of the Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against the respondents and his vendor. The suit was filed on 13-4-1956 and the Government is made a party as D1 who denied the title of the plaintiff and also the title of the vendor of the respondents. After the suit was filed he obtained Ex.B40 on 11-10-1957 seeking permission from the Court. He also obtained permission from the same Court under Ex.B45 dated 7-8-1958 to erect the building- The suit was decreed holding that the plaintiff and also D2, the vendor of the present respondent have no title and the Government is the owner of the property. Now the contention raised by the respondent is that the undertaking given by him relates to the claim of the plaintiff only, but not the defendants and he is not bound by the undertaking given before the Court in these proceedings. Apart from the tenability of his contentions, can he claim to be a bona fide purchaser when in the very suit, the title of his vendor was raised? Can he still contend that he purchased innocently without knowing the defect of title? Against the judgment and decree in the above suit, an appeal was filed by him and his vendor contending that even though the issues relating to their claim were deleted, the Court recorded a finding against them and it has to be vacated. The High Court held that the suit was dismissed and the appeal not maintainable, but however, observed that the findings were not binding on the appellants before them as it was unnecessary for the trial Court to decide the question of title of the defendants while dismissing the suit. We have already adverted to this and stated that it is incorrect to state that the trial Court in the above judgment marked as Ex.Al recorded a finding against the respondent and his vendor having deleted the issues relating to them. On the other hand, the Court in that judgment found the issues relating to this defendant and his vendor are necessary and recorded a finding on those issues. The State was prevented from taking possession under the Land Encroachment Act by seeking stay from the High Court invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by filing a writ petition as is evidenced in Ex.A3 dated 20-1-1978. The appeal filed by the Government against that judgment was dismissed on 14-11-1983 under Ex.A4. The Counsel fortlic petitioner contended that all the documents filed in this case were filed in OS No. 13 of 1958 and the Court recorded a finding that the Government is the owner of the property and no reason was shown how that judgment is incorrect. We have already noticed that the assertion that the Court recorded a finding against them having deleted the issues relating to the defence is incorrect. Hence, the respondents against whom a clear finding was recorded on 11-11-1975 successfully prevented the Government for a full period of a decade and finally forced the State to file a separate suit even though nothing can be said on merits in his favour and that suit is the present one filed on 25-11-1975. These proceedings clearly show a design on the part of the respondent. The respondent is an advocate and a member-of State Executive and occupied post of Deputy Speaker and he is fully aware of the legality of the succession proceedings for want of confirmation by the Competent Authority under Section 13(2) of Atiyat Enquiry Act. hi this connection it is necessary to notice the prevaricative statements he made. He stated that Ex.B6 succession proceedings, were confirmed by the Civil Administrator at page 2 of the evidence. When we drew his attention at the time of argument he has to correct himself stating that he was under the impression that everything done during the administration of the Civil Administrator was under his directions.'
17. The learned Special Court in paragraph 96 has observed that Ex.A20 being the munthakab is silent about the boundaries of the inam land or the reserve land but the respondent's witness No. 1 in his evidence asserted that he can identify the maktha land as if he has got personal knowledge. When indisputably a large extent of Ac. 122 of land was shown in succession proceedings, Exs.B6 and B9 contrary to the munthakab, the Special Court observed that the respondent justified it and denied that there was any tampering while issuing those proceedings. The Special Court reiterated his evidence and stated that RW1 has applied to the Collector to enter his name in the Revenue Records stating that he has taken possession on 20-11-1954 but at no point of time, his name was entered in the Revenue Records. In paragraph Nos.100 and 101 finally the Special Court answers the issue that this is not a case where bona fide title is involved so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Special Court in the manner following:
'Further it is seen that decree in Ex.A1 was passed on 11-11-1975 and the respondents possession was clearly motivated without any ostensible or acceptable title.
Thus we are satisfied that the respondent is fully aware of the infirmity of the title of the vendor for want of confirmation of the grant by the civil administrator and subsequent mutation proceedings and willingly suffered siwai jama assessment and paid the same and also purchased property, raised structures when a suit was pending. In view of the foregoing we find the respondent is a land grabber within the meaning of the Act and all the requirements of the Act are satisfied. We hold this is not a case where bona fide title is involved so as to oust the jurisdiction of this Court. On issues 3 and 6 we hold that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the respondent is land grabber within the meaning of the Act.'
For the reliefs, the Special Court stated:
'We have held that the petitioner is the owner of the suit land and the rival title set up by the respondent is not true and valid. We have also held that the respondent is a land grabber within the meaning of the Act. The evidence discloses that there is a residential building in the suit land. However, the facts of the case do not warrant any exception to be made in this case to advance the cause of justice.'
18. The observations of the Special Court in paragraph No.104 of its judgment also seen to be pertinent and important and as such, the same are set out hereunder:
'The respondent had purchased the property after a suit (OS No. 13 of 1958 on the file of the Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad) was filed impleading him and his vendor and also the petitioner-Government wherein the title of his vendor was challenged, and he constructed therein a building with an undertaking that he will hand over the buildings to the plaintiff in good condition without any compensation as per Ex.B43. He has also given the similar undertaking to the Municipality as per Ex.B62 while securing permission for building construction that he will not claim any compensation towards the house if the Government acquires that land as proposed by them under Ex.BSl. We arc not referring to this evidence to enforce the terms of undertaking given by him, but to point out mat no equity would arise in his favour in view of these undertakings. Further in view of the location of the site in the heart of the city, considering its importance for public and also taking into account the conduct of the respondent, which is wanton and deliberate in raising the building, taking the challenge of defeat in the event of the proceedings going against him, we think that the normal rule of restoring possession to the petitioner should follow. If not, it would be placing premiumon land grabbing permitting the land grabbers to think that once a building is raised, the Court would readily substitute a decree for compensation instead of a decree for possession.'
19. It is this order and finding of the Special Court which is under challenge in this writ petition as noticed above.
20. On a perusal of the records, it appears that upto August, 1958, there was no iota of evidence of title so far as the petitioner is concerned and as a matter of fact in the suit being OS No. 13 of 1958 filed by one Shapur G. Chinnai against the Government and the petitioner, permission was granted by the Civil Court to allow the petitioner to make the construction expressly on the condition that the petitioner would execute a bond undertaking to hand over the building in good condition if the plaintiffs suit was decreed and furnishing of such an undertaking negates the assertion of a right or title. It is on this perspective that the matter shall have to be dealt with and decided by the Court as to whether there is any title paramount so far as the land in question is concerned. The Special Court while dealing with the matter in no mistakeable language observed that no direct or even indirect evidence is placed before the Court so as to establish a title paramount over and in respect of this particular piece of land. Would it lie at this juncture to contend as a matter of fact that there is existing a right to own and possess the disputed land? The answer, we are afraid, cannot but be in the negative. Even in the case of a claim for adverse title, some evidence has to be adduced before the Court or the adjudicating authority, without which question of proof of adverse title would not arise and this is exactly what the learned Special Court concluded as regards the issue of adverse possession.
21. While it is true that a writ of Certiorari would lie for correcting the errors of jurisdiction and the law is well settled on this score, and we need not dilate much in regard thereto, but the fact remains as to whether in fact there was any error of jurisdiction committed by the Special Court? Incidentally be it noted and as well settled by the Patna High Court in Sahadeo Thakur's case (supra) that even if the High Court could reasonably arrive at a conclusion different from that of the inferior Court, that by itself will not clothe the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the power to interfere with the findings of the inferior Court. The law, therefore, is settled to this effect that in the event of there being any miscarriage of justice, so to say the writ Court is within its limits or jurisdiction to intervene or interfere with flic order of the inferior Court or tribunal. It is not the decision by itself but the decision making process which can be challenged, leading to manifest injustice. Be it noted however, here that in the event the writ Court comes to the conclusion that there has been a total miscarriage of justice or it would be the plain exercise of judicial power to deal with the matter and grant relief to a person seeking justice but it should not fell below that standard as otherwise, the writ Court would be asked to deal with the vindication of grievances or rights over and above the tribunals set up for that purpose. There might be some infirmities in the appraisal of the evidence but the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not authorised to appraise the evidence or collate them and the law is so well settled that we need not reiterate the same principle once again.
22. Mr. Pratap Reddy, learned advocate appearing in support of the petitioner contended that as a matter of fact, there is no categorical finding of the Special Court as regards the issue whether the land is an inam land and if not whether it forms part of the excluded 42 bighas or whether it was a part of the land allegedly reserved by the Sarfekhas minister and Moaziz Committee. As noted above, the details of evidentiary value cannot be gone into by the writ Court. It is not the appellate authority but as noticed above, its jurisdiction is restrictive in the matter of decision makingprocess and not the decision itself. Minor discrepancies in the matter of appreciation of evidence or failure to notice one particular piece of evidence would not entail declaration of the entire order as bad by the writ Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Judicial review is permissible but that is not an unlimited one but restrictive. The jurisdiction is supervisory in nature. The power of judicial review is not directed, as noticed above, against a decision but it is confined to the decision making process. Judicial review, in short, as is permissible under Article 226 of the Constitution is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is taken and the Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 is not authorised to go into tlie issue of the correctness of the decision. The observations of the Supreme Court in H.B. Gandhi v. Gopinath and Sons, 1992 Suppl. (2) SCC 312, lends support to the above.
23. Another redeeming feature as regards the exercise of jurisdiction by the writ Court ought also to be noted. The powers of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary and while it is true that no limits can be placed upon the user of the discretion but that by itself does not mean and imply that the same may be exercised irrespective of any guideline. The exercise of jurisdiction is to be effected only along the recognised principles and on certain self imposed limitations. In this context, reference may be made to the case of K. Chinna Rajanna v. Vice-Chancellor, 1988 (3) ALD 753, wherein this Court observed:
'While it is true that the decision-making process may be subjected to judicial review or scrutiny, but it cannot also be an unrestricted and unlimited one. The Court cannot substitute its judgment over the final decision taken in respect of selection of persons for those posts. In this context, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Harpal Singh Chauhan v. State of UP., : 1993CriLJ3140 . In paragraph 17 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed:
'It is true that none of the appellants can claim, as a matter of right, that their terms should have been extended or that they should be appointed against the existing vacancies, but certainly they can make a grievance that either they have not received the fair treatment by the appointing authority or that the procedure prescribed in the Code and in the manual aforesaid have not been followed. While exercising the power of judicial review even in respect of appointment of members of the legal profession as District Government Counsel, the Court can examine whether there was any infirmity in the decision making process. Of course, while doing so, the Court cannot substitute its own judgment over the final decision taken in respect of selection of persons for those posts. It was said in the case of Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, 1982 (3) All ER 141:
'The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court.'
Judicial reviewability has certaininherent limitations as detailed above more fully and in that perspective, a right balance between the administrative discretion to decide matters shall have to be struck so as to see that no unfairness exists and unfairness, if any, is set right by judicial review.'
24. It is further to be noted that jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief or as an appeal or revisionto correct mere errors of law or fact since this jurisdiction is only supervisory in nature. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. C. Venkata Rao, : (1976)ILLJ21SC , as also the decision of the Supreme Court in M. Naina Mohammed v. K.A. Natarajan, : [1976]1SCR102 . In paragraph 2 of the last noted decision (Naina Mohammed's case), the Supreme Court observed:
'The boundaries of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 are clearly and strongly built and cannot be breached without risking jurisprudential confusion, Sri Rama Vilas Service (P) Ltd, v. C. Chandrasekharan. : [1964]5SCR869 . The power is supervisory in nature although the Judges at both the tiers in the instant case, have unwittingly slipped into the subtle but fatal error of exercising a kind of appellate review,'
25. Another redeeming feature of the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ought also to be noticed here, to wit, that the Court would not interfere with the determination made by an authority invested with statutory powers unless there are exceptional circumstances, as for example: (i) the determination is mala fide; (ii) prompted by extraneous considerations and (iii) made in contravention of the principle of natural justice and any constitutional provision. The question of existence of the above situations does not arise in the contextual facts.
26. The words 'any other purpose' as used in Article 226 of the Constitution means any purpose for which any of the writs as provided under the Article could be issued. The words used as above (any other purpose) is available and a writ would be available only in the event an aggrieved party has a legal right which entitles him to a writ and such right has been infringed. 'Any other purpose' in short, means enforcement of any legal right and the decision of the Supreme Court in Cal. Gas Co. (Prop) Ltd. v. State of W.B., : AIR1962SC1044 , lends support to suchobservations.
27. Mr. Pratap Reddy also contended that the finding of the Special Court that the suit land formed part of the land reserved by the Sarfekhas minister and Moaziz Comittee is entirely without any evidence and the same constitutes an error of law manifest on the facts of the record. We are however, unable to record our concurrence in regard thereto. The Special Court relied on Exs.A26 and A27 the order of the Minister of Sarfekhas and the Moaziz Committee respectively. Ex,A26 was passed in an appeal against the order ofthe Collector under Ex.A25 being the primary authority. The Special Court observed that Ex.A25 makes two things clear; (i) that the land which is adjacent to the present Secretariat cannot be claimed by the inamdar Shapurji as this land does not relate to Kharif Jama Inam and (ii) this land is mentioned in the Munthakab of Naimatulla Shah. As noticed by the Special Court, the order of the Minister under Ex.A26 reads thus:
'...that with regard to the Government land claimed, neither the successor of Nayamatulla Shah i.e., Wajhiulla Shah etc., have any connection in this respect nor Rashid Shapurji shall have any connection with regard to this land.....thelands towards the North of the road in the direction of the tank bed Hussain Sagar shall duly be under the protection of General Administration Department (Babe Hukumat). The revenue department shall use the particular land and keep it under its supervision. The claim of parties is not worthy of consideration'.
28. The Special Court then observed that against this order, both the inamdars filed appeals and the Moaziz Committee consisting of the Hon'ble Chief Justice and two other Judges confirmed the said order under Ex. A27 in the following words:
'Aggrieved by the decision, Rasheed Shapurji and Wajhillah Hussaini filed an appeal. After the consideration of thecontention of the appellants, there is no sufficient reason to disagree with the order of the Subordinate Department especially when no objection was submitted by the appellant till the issue of the Firman Mubarak. They could have established their rights during the pendency of the case with Diwani for collection of Nuzul. Further, the objections raised, therefore, are not worthy to be considered. On the other hand, the alleged sale transactions as stated by Rashid Shapurji is against the orders in the circular of 1282 F. Under these circumstances, the Judgment of the Subordinate Department cannot be disagreed to'.
29. Before arriving at this conclusion, the Moaziz Committee noticed the Firman of H.E.H. Nizam dated 25th Shawal 1352 Hizri. Therefore, the contention mat the finding of the Special Court that the suit land forms part of the land reserved by the Sarfekhas Minister and the Moaziz Committee, has no basis cannot be accepted. The Special Court on the basis of Ex.A26 and A27 fixed the location of the land with reference to Hussain Sagar lake, Secretariat Buildings Road etc., and accordingly recorded a finding that the land forms part of the larger extent of land reserved by Sarfekhas Minister and Moaziz Committee on a consideration of the entire evidence on record including Ex.A26 and Ex.A27 and as such, it cannot be dubbed as a finding based on no evidence.
30. While dealing with the matter, Mr. Pratap Reddy further contended that the Special Court committed an error of law in not considering the plea of adverse possession raised by the petitioner correctly. We are, however, also unable to record our concurrence in regard thereto for the reasons as noted above. ,
31. The principal thrust of Mr. Pratap Reddy's argument is that the Special Court wrongly put the burden of proof totally onto the petitioner-defendant and as such the Special Court has committed a grave error of law in putting the onus on the petitioner to prove his title. Mr. Pratap Reddy contended that the procedure adopted by the Special Court was in violation of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Evidence Act and Sections 101 to 104 thereof and as such, the writ Court would be within its jurisdiction to correct the error. Regrettably also, we arc unable to lend our concurrence to such a submission. The Act and in particular Section 10 thereof in no uncertain terms records that the burden of proving that the land has not been grabbed by him shall be on such a person who alleges the same. The general principles of Evidence Act as regards burden of proof is well settled and can be expressed simply to the effect: he who alleges must prove. There is a definite attempt on the part of Mr. Pratap Reddy's client before the Special Court to establish that he is not a land grabber, but he has title to his credit but there is not a single whisper nor there is any documentary evidence as regards this assertion of title. No document, was produced before the Special Court in respect of such an assertion and in that view of the matter, question of the burden of proof being thrust onto the petitioner by the Special Court does not and cannot arise since contra action would be inconsistent with the provisions of law as is laid down in terms of the provisions of Section 10 of the Act.
32. Mr. Pratap Reddy's further contention is that since a Bench decision of this Court has recorded a finding that there is no encroachment, question of there being a trial by the Special Court under the Act does not and cannot arise since the petitioner cannot be termed to be a land grabber. In support of his contention, Mr. Pratap Reddy contended that as a matter of fact, leave was given to the State Government to file a civil suit for declaration of title and as such, question of grabbing of government land does not and cannot arise and the finding of the Special Court is perverse to this effect. At the first blush, this submission seemed to have some relevance in the contextual facts.But on a close scrutiny of facts and law in the matter, we are unable to record our concurrence to such a situation. Section 8 of the Act, in particular sub-section (2) thereof provides;
'Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (Act 9 of 1972) any case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing or the determination of questions of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of any land grabbed under this Act shall subject to the provisions of this Act, be triable in the Special Court and the decision of the Special Court shall be final.'
33. The words used in sub-section (2) arc rather significant. To wit, notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure .... any case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing or the determination of questions of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of any land grabbed under this Act. The extent of jurisdiction as is permitted by the Statute, therefore, is rather wide in its application. Three several situations have been noted viz., (i) Jurisdiction can be had in regard to a case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing, (ii) jurisdiction can be had in a case where determination of question of title and ownership are involved and (iii) jurisdiction can be had where lawful possession of any land grabbed under the Act is involved. All these three specific situations as envisaged by and under the statute would be triable in the Special Court and the decision of the Special Court shall be final - this is the language and total import of Sections. The user of the expression 'or' is very significant and none of these three situations can be read in conjunction with each other but three specifically specified situations independent of the other are contemplated by reason of the user of the word 'or' and any other interpretation to sub-section (2) of Sections would do a violent injustice and departure from the legislative intent which is neither feasible nor practicable, in any event it is not permissible. So far as the law Courts are concerned, the legislative intent shall have to be given its priority and when the intends otherwise clear and categorical, question of haying any other meaning attributed to it does not and cannot arise. This aspect of the matter, however, cannot be ignored, neither any other, interpretation would subserve the ends of justice.
34. fn view of the above and the meaning attributed to the words used in sub-section (2) of Section 8, question of perverse finding by the Special Court does not and cannot arise. The statute is clear, unambiguous and categorical on that score and no exception can be taken by reason of the, fact. that validity of a statute is presumed unless the same stands invalidated and admittedly there is no invalidation of this particular statute of any provision thereof.
35. Mr. Subba Reddy, learned advocate appearing for the respondent-State, in no uncertain terms contended that as a matter of fact, there cannot possibly be any title paramount resting with the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner's predecessor-in-title has in fact made an attempt that the schedule land along with other lands should be mutated in the revenue records as the same is forming part of the inam lands. The District Collector by his order dated 30th September, 1950, Mr. Subba Reddy contended, categorically held that the property including the schedule land was the property of Nizam as declared by the Surfekhas. authorities as above and the suit land forms part of 49 bighas of land reserved for King's Palace. Mr. Subba Reddy submitted that there was in fact an appeal by the inamdars to the Board of Revenue and the Board of Revenue by its orders dated 30th December, 1952 dismissed the appeal and these orders being Exs.A30 and A31 are statutory orders issued under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Telangana Land Revenue Act, 1317 F, As such, question of having a challenge at this juncture as regards the orders as recorded inExs.A30 and A31 does not and cannot arise. Mr. Subba Reddy further contended that the writ petitioner mainly relies upon the alleged survey conducted in pursuance of the orders of Sadrul Moham but he admitted in his evidence before the Special Court that the survey proceedings were not filed before the Moaziz Committee saying that it is a Maktha land but not the government property. Relying thereon, Mr. Subba Reddy contended that no reliance as such, in view of the statement of the respondent's witness No.1 being the writ petitioner herein, can be placed on the survey proceedings. It was further contended that subsequently no attempt has been made to obtain orders from the Nizam to withdraw these lands from the Government's control or secure assignment of the same by passing orders to declare the property as part of Naimatullah Shah Maktha and as such the orders issued by the Surfekhas authorities, the Moaziz Committee and the proceedings of the District Collector, Hyderabad clearly establish that the petition schedule property is a government property and does not form part of Naimatullah Shah Maktha,
36. Incidentally, be it noted that Special Court held that by the time the inam enquiry was completed and consequent orders of regrant were passed, there was police action and subsequently the surfekhas estate got merged with the Government in the year 1949. The Special Court further recorded that no orders were passed admittedly by the Nizam before the said date. It is on this perspective that Mr. Subba Reddy contended that it is settled law as held by this Court in the case of Raja Pratap Karan v. State of A.P., 1966 (2) An.WR 17 (SN), that the Nizam alone as the sovereign was the competent authority to issue firmans granting inams and it is the prerogative of Nizam alone and this power, Mr. Subba Reddy contended, cannot be exercised by persons other than the Nizam and thus there is no valid regrant by the Nizam to the petitioner's predecessor-in-title.
37. On the factual score, though the writ Court is not to go into the same but we do find some justification by reason of the evidence recorded by the Special Court as appears from the order of the Special Court. We find, therefore, in the totality of the situation and in view of the specific provisions as laid down by the Act, the Special Court was within its jurisdiction to deal with the matter and to go into the case as to whether there is any title involved in favour of the writ petitioner. Incidentally, be it noted that the statute itself has equated the Special Court with that of a Civil Court with all the powers of the Civil Court. Elaborate and detailed enquiry has been conducted by way of a regular trial like any other civil suit and like any other civil suit, evidence has been recorded and considered and the Special Court came to a definite finding. Does it warrant intervention of the writ Court on the basis of the above? The answer cannot but be in the negative.
38. In that view of the matter, this writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.
39. At this juncture, Mr. Pratap Reddy, appearing in support of writ petition, prayed for leave to prefer an appeal before the Supreme Court. We are, however, unable to record our concurrence to the submission. As such, the prayer for leave stands rejected. To subserve the ends of justice, we do feel it convenient, however, to record that status quo as of date be maintained for a period of eight weeks from the date hereof.
40. We, however, feel it our obligation to record our appreciation for the assistance rendered in the matter by both the learned advocates appearing in the matter and we record the same accordingly.