ORDER
Umesh Chandra Banerjee, C.J.
1. The concept of locus standi has had a steady refinement by the law Courts over the years. With the changing staicturc of the society and complexities in life, mere was matter of fact an ardent effort on the part of the judiciary to liberalise the concept of locus standi. On the wake of 21st Century, probably a rigid insistence on the strict rules of the concept of the locus standi cannot but be termed to be opposed to the present day concept of justice. Needless to record, however, that with the changing structure of the society, the concept of justice has also had a very wide change. The observations of the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Gupta and others v. Union of India, : [1982]2SCR365 , lend support to the view expressed above. Bhagwaihi, J., (as His Lordship then was) very succinctly observed:
'Today a vast revolution is taking place in the judicial process; the theatre of the law is fast changing and the problems of the poor are coming to the forefront. The Court has to innovate new methods and devise new strategies for the purpose of providing access to justice to large masses of people who are denied their basic human rights and to whom freedom and liberty has no meaning. The only way in which this can be done is by entertaining writ petitions and even letters from public spirited individuals seeking judicial redress for the benefit of persons who have suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury or whose constitutional or legal right has been violated but who by reason of their poverty or socially economically disadvantaged position arc unable to approach the Court for relief. It is in this spirit that the Court has been entertaining letters for judicial redress and treating them as writ petitions and we hope and trust that the High Courtsof the country will also adopt this pro-active, goal-oriented approach.''
Btiagwathi, J., went on to observe :
'If the State or any public authority acts beyond the scope of its power and thereby causes a specific legal injury to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, it would be a case of private injury actionable in the manner discussed in the preceding paragraphs. So also if the duty is owed by the State or any public authority to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons, it would give rise to a corresponding right in such person or determinate class or group of persons and they would be entitled to maintain an action for judicial redress. But if no specific legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class or group of persons by the act or omission of the State or any public authority and the injury is caused only to public interest, the question arises as to who can maintain an action for vindicating the rule of law and setting aside the unlawful action or enforcing the performance of the public duty if no one can maintain an action for redress of such public wrong or public injury, it would be disastrous for the rule of law. for it would be open to the State or a public authority to act with impunity beyond the scope of its power or in breach of a public duty owed by it. The Courts cannot countenance such a situation where the observance of the law is left to the sweet will of the authority bound by it, without any redress if die law is contravened. The view has therefore been taken by the Courts in many decisions that whenever there is a public wrong or public injury caused by an act or omission of the State or a public authority which is contrary to the Constitution or the law, any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest can maintain an action for redressal of such public wrong or public injury. The strict rule of standing which insists that only a person who has suffered a specific legalinjury can maintain an action for judicial redress is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives standing to any member of the public who is not a mere busy body or a meddle some interloper but who has sufficient interest in the proceeding. There can be no doubt that the risk of legal action against the State or a public authority by any citizen will induce the State or such public authority to act with greater responsibility and care thereby improving the administration of justice.'
2. Incidentally, the observations of the high powered Committee constituted by the Government of India, which included two very distinguished Judges of the Supreme Court of India, viz., Justice P.N. Bhagwati and Justice V.R. Krishna lyer ought also to be noted here. The Committee observed:
'We have injustice, inherited and acquired.... The victims are large numbers of the community... The Community suffers the hardships.... In our expensive Court system, it is impossible for the lower income groups and the poor to enforce rights.... The power people of a village may be prevented from walking along a public pathway by a feudal chief, Harijan workers may be denied fair wages, women workers as a class may be refused equal wages. Collective wrongs like this call for class action.... There may be representative suits necessary when one man's wrong is typical (of many like consumer interests). Each one being driven to Court on his separate cause of action is itself a public wrong.... The rule of locus standi requires to be broad-based and any organisation (or individual) must be able to start such legal action.... Community proceedings, public interest litigation, class action and the like before Courts, Tribunals and other authorities must be financed and/or undertaken by legal aid organisations and public interest lawyers. (Report on National Juridicare (1977) Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India,p. 61).'
3. Public interest litigation constitutes in die present-day judicial system a significant step. While it is true that this new concept has provided the law Courts with much greater responsibility for rendering the concept of justice available to the disadvantaged section of the society, but this new phenomenon has overloaded the law Courts rendering the ordinary litigants to wait for a further period of time. Law's delay is not unknown, specially in the Indian sub-continent and this additional responsibility of the law Courts will render the burden more awesome. As such, in the fitness of things, the law Courts, though should normally entertain these litigations, but great care and caution ought to be exercised 91 the matter of exercise of jurisdiction under this new phenomenon in our jurisprudential system. The oppressed and the depressed peoples' interest ought to be looked into with care and caution by the law Courts so that justice is made available to the one who cannot afford the luxury of litigation inspite of violations of his rights as guaranteed under the Constitution. It is, here however, that Chief Justice Mukharji in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umedh Ram, : [1986]1SCR251 , did administer a very serious caution. Chief Justice Mukharji observed:
'In public interest litigation cases the most crucial question for die Court is to measure the seriousness of the petitioner and to see whether he is actually the champion of the cause of the persons or groups he is representing. The effect of a public interest litigation should go beyond the sphere of the parties present in the proceedings and it is to be noted that public interest litigation must be accompanied by adequate judicial control so as to prevent this technique from being used as an instrument of coercion, blackmail or for other oblique motive.'
4. It, therefore, should not be the act of a busybody or an interloper or with motive, but only genuine ones so as to afford relief to the society at large.
5. As a matter of fact, the recent trend of judicial pronouncements is that public interest litigation lias traversed beyond the original objective of providing access to the judicial process to the poor and disadvantaged section of the community. But with the passage of time, a movement to secure better access to the doctrine of judicial review so far as the under-privileged arc concerned has crossed over into the realm of policy making and implementation. The caution exercised by Rhagwathi, I, as noted above, is applicable in its entirety in the present context. Extreme care and caution ought to be mere in the matter of entertaining a petition. Be it noted that this concept of public interest litigation has gained momentum in the country for the purpose of making available the doctrine of judicial review to the poor and oppressed class of the society, who are not in a position to afford high-cost involved litigation. It is not for private gain and motive, but for the general redress to the public at large.
6. This Court in the case of K. Prabhakar Reddy v. Slate of A.P., : 1998(2)ALD282 , observed :
'Individual disputes ought not to gain momentum in a Court of law under the coverage of public interest litigation and attempts to mat effect ought always to be decided by the law Courts and as a matter of fact, there should be a positive discouragement to such an individualistic litigation in the garb of a public interest litigation and it is only in the clearest of cases of general affectation of right of the community at large or a wide variety of cross-section of the people, the law Court would extend its assistance, so as to avoid any social or general mischief having due regard to the concept of justice.'
This Court further in the cases of B. Kistaiah v. Government of India, : 1998(5)ALD135 observed:
'It is not as if any person can walk into the portals of the Court and lodge a complaint making irresponsible allegations against anyofficers or the authority concerned. We would like to observe that in public interest litigation, cases of this nature the Court would have to make a very strict scrutiny of the pleadings at the threshold itself. The Court has to satisfy to itself about the bona fides of the petitioner in filing the public interest litigation. The petitioners in public interest litigation are bound to disclose their full particulars, details about their avocation and the effort made and methods adopted by them in obtaining and collecting the data and information for filing the public interest litigation. Credibility of the person initiating public interest litigation is an important aspect which requires the* attention of the Court at the threshold, otherwise the unscrupulous litigants would hijack the system and use it as an instrument of blackmail. Liberalising the rule relating to standing is no licence granted to one and all for filing cases of their choice in the name of public interest litigation. Relaxation is meant to seek judicial redress by public spirited citizens on behalf of unorganised, poor, weaker sections of the society. Public interest litigation cases initiated by social and democratic organisations, academicians, social scientists, human rights activists gained a growing acceptance and judiciary recognised them as representatives espousing the cause of community's interest.
This strategic arm of legal aid movement was never intended to resolve and settle personal scores. It was never intended to confer any respectability upon busybodies, and meddle some interlopers.'
7. Before adverting to the contextual cts, at this juncture, it would be convenient note a recent decision of the Supreme Court the case of Slate of H.P. v. Ganesh Wood Products, : AIR1996SC149 , wherein the Supreme Court observed:
'We must say that in the tight of the above considerations, the High Court was notright in observing that Shri Yogendra Chandra cannot be accepted as a public-spirited citizen approaching the Court to protect public interest - more so, when it has recorded a simultaneous finding that there is no evidence of collusion between him and Shankar Trading Company (Mahesh Udyog). The credentials of Shri Yogendra Chandra appear to be impeccable. He is not only a member of the Himachal Pradesh Legislative but also the Convenor of the Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage. He is also the President of the Himalayan Wild Life and Environment Preservation Society. The said organisations may be big or small, may be well-established ones or recently started ones - that is immaterial. Once it is found that he was not acting at the instance of or at the behest of or for protecting the interests of Shankar Trading Company, there was no reason to hold that he was not acting hona fide in approaching the Court to preserve the forest wealth of the State in the interest of environment and ecology. His inability to produce material in support of his allegation of illicit felling in the State does not tell upon his bona fides.'
8. It is on this backdrop that a petition dcr Article 226 of the Constitution as filedby the appellant herein shall have to be nsidered. The appellant said to be working a Sub-Inspector of Police in Kurnool sought direction by way of writ of mandamusdirecting respondent No.4; being the National Commission for SC and ST, Government of India, to enquire into the allegation of Production of false certificate of social statusby respondent Nos.7 and 8, being Sri S.V. Prasad, IAS, Principal Secretary to the Chief inister, Government of Andhra Pradcsh and i S. V. Ramarta Murthy, IPS, DIG of Police, Kurnool Range, Kurnool respectively, and obtaining selection to IAS and IPS cadre and also directing respondent No. 1, being the Union India, to take appropriate action against the iove noted two respondents. The appellantalso prayed that pending enquiry into the matter, the two noted respondents be placed under suspension for production of false certification of social status. It has been the appellant's definite case that both respondents, being respondents 7 and 8, were selected to their respective cadres under the quota reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, though they do not belong to any one of the Castes or Tribes enumerated in the respective Schedules in the Constitution of India. The appellant contended that bom of them belong to Kapu Caste which is not listed either as Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in relation to the State of Andhra Pradcsh and as a matter of fact, they cannot possibly be termed to be belonging to the specified category but they ought to be treated upon open category. The appellant contended that the selection of these respondents in the respective cadres have been effected under reserved quota which is utterly illegal and unconstitutional and by reason of a deliberate fraud practised upon the Union Government. Hence the writ.
9. At the initial stages of hearing of the matter for admission, Mr. Advocate-General very strongly commented upon the maintainability of the writ since the writ petition, it has been contended, cannot possibly be treated as public interest litigation and it does not in any way satisfy the norms as declared by this Court, as also by the Supreme Court, in regard to public interest litigation. The decisions noted above, in fact, lay down the principles on the basis of which the Courts ought to entertain petitions as and by way of pro bono pnblico. The last of the cases of the Supreme Court noted above State of H.P, v. Gamsh Wood Products, (supra), the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms held that once it is found that he was not acting at the instance of or at the behest of or for protecting the interests of any particular community, there is no reason to hold that the petitioner was not acting bona fide in approaching the Court. The issue, therefore, arises as to whether he was acting bona fide and to subserve the interest of justice.The appellant is a Sub-Inspector of Police in the State of Andhra Pradesh, but the petition is delightfully silent on the score of ventilating a public cause or grievance. In any event, Mr. Advocate-General contended that while it is true that both the respondents above named were recruited to the respective services under the quota reserved for Scheduled Castes, but the fact remains that their Caste and status was enquired into by the Government and it was found that both of them belonged to Scheduled Caste. Incidentally, be it noted that the appellant lodged a complaint to respondent No.4, being the Commission, and the latter did seek necessary information from the State Government by letter dated 24-12-1997. The State Government after conducting enquiry did submit necessary information to the Commission through its letter dated 5-2-1998 and upon receipt of the same, respondent No.4 has closed the matter as has been communicated by letter dated 17-4-1998. The contextual facts further depict that as early as June, 1980, the President of Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes' Welfare Association represented to the then Chief Secretary of the Andhra Pradesh stating that Sri S. V. Prasad got selection to IAS by producing false Scheduled Caste Certificate claiming to belong to Scheduled Caste and requested for immediate enquiry. The State Government did take cognizance of the same and requested the Collector in July, 1980 to conduct an enquiry into the complaint since native village of Sri S. V. Prasad, respondent No.7 herein lies within the East Godavari District. The Collector in accordance with the direction of the State Government did enquire into the matter and sent a detailed report on 29-8-1981. The Government did examine the report and on the basis of the various documentary evidence came to the conclusion that Sri S. V. Prasad belonged to 'Dandasi' Community which is a Scheduled Caste Community and the Government in its turn by a letter dated 2-2-1984 informed the General Secretary of the Scheduled Castes, Welfare Association that Sri S. V. Prasad belonged to Scheduled Caste Community. In the same letter, by reason of asimilar complaint, the Government also informed that Sri S. V. Ramana Murthy, IPS, being respondent No.8, is son of Sri Naryan Rao, whose Caste has been declared by the Court as Scheduled Caste and Sri Narayan Rao is the maternal uncle of Sri S. V. Prasad. The Central Bureau of Investigation, as a matter of fact, enquired into this complaint and filed a case before the I Class Magistrate of Saldah District in West Bengal. The Magistrate dismissed the case of the Central Bureau of Investigation and the latter went in appeal to the High Court of Calcutta against Sri Namyan Rao. The High Court of Calcutta dismissed the appeal of the Central Bureau of Investigation and thereby confirmed that Sri Narayan Rao belonged to Scheduled Caste. On a similar complaint made by one Sri Ch. Thirupalu of Guntur District on 28-11-1984 about the false Caste Certificate produced by Sri S. V. Ramana Murhy, the Government have entrusted the matter to CID and the State CID sent report to the Government stating that both Sri S.V. Prasad and Sri S.V. Ramana Murthy belonged to Scheduled Caste. The facts reveal that from time to time and under different political regimes this issue has been raised by one or the other and every time there was an enquiry and the enquiry went in favour of respondent Nos.7 and 8.
10. Mr. Adinarayan Rao appearing for the Union of India contended that Union Public Service Commission recommends reserved category candidates for appointment only after it is satisfied as regards the genuineness of the Caste Certificates produced by them. In case of there being any doubt, the Public Service Commission advises the Government to verify further the veracity of the Caste Certificate before making the offer of appointment. Incidentally, be it noted that the Civil Services Examination is conducted by the Union Public Service Commission every year for recruitment of IAS, IPS, IPS and Central Services Group A and B. Reservations in the posts and the services are made to the extent of reservation prescribed for each community and the reserved cateaory candidates are required tosubmit their Caste Certificates in the prescribed profoma and the original to the Union Public Service Commission for verification. As noted above, in the event of there being any doubt, the matter is sent to Central Government for scrutiny before offer of appointment and such cases arc then referred to the State Government for verification. The Caste Certificate is accepted by the Central Government only on receipt of a report in the matter from State Government and only then appointment letters arc issued. The only channel for verification of Caste Certificate is through the State Government in accordance with the procedure prescribed. Incidentally, both these respondents have joined their respective cadres prior to July, 1980. The State Government being the authority in question was otherwise satisfied as regards the declaration of social status so far as two respondents arc concerned.
11. During the course of hearing, strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Fertilizer Corporation, Kamagar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344. In paragraphs 41 and 42, the Supreme Court observed :
'41. Law, as I conceive it, is a social auditor and this audit function can be put into action only when some one with real public interest ignites the jurisdiction. We cannot be scared by the fear that all sundry will be litigation-happy and waste their time and money and the time of the Court through false and frivolous cases. In a society where freedoms suffer from atrophy and activism is essential for participative public justice, sonic risks have to be taken and more opportunities opened for the public-minded citizen to rely on the legal process and not be repelled from it by narrow pendantry now surrounding locus standi.
42. Schwartz and H.W.R. Wade wrote in Legal Control of Government:
'Restrictive rules about standing are in general inimical to a healthy system ofadministrative law. If a plaintiff with a good case is turned away, merely because he is not sufficiently affected personally, that means that some Government agency is left free to violate the law, and that is contrary to the public interest. Litigants are unlikely to expend their time and money unless they have some real interest at stake. In the rare cases where they wish to sue merely out of public spirit, why should they be discouraged ?' (Professors Bernard Schwartz and H.W.R. Wade,O.C., in Legal Control of Government (1972) p. 291). They further observed :
'The problem of standing, or locus standi is inherent in all legal systems.... But in the United States, perhaps because of the constitutional basis which the subject has acquired in federal law it can be discussed as a single topic. In Britain, it is a thing of shreds and patches, made up of various differing rules which apply to various different remedies and procedures. It is a typical product of the untidy system of remedies, each with its own technicalities, which all British Administrative Lawyers would like to see reformed.' (Ibid)
We have no doubt that having regard to the conditions in Third World countries, Cappelletti is right in his stress on the importance of access:
'The right of effective access to justice has emerged with the new social rights. Indeed, it is of paramount importance among these new rights since, clearly, die enjoyment of traditional as well as new social rights presupposes mechanisms for their effective protection. Such protection, moreover, is best assured by a workable remedy within the framework of the judicial system. Effective access to justice can thus be seen as the most basic requirement -- the most basic human right - of a system which purports to guarantee legal rights.' (M. Cappelletti, Rabels Z(1976) 669 at 672.)
The need for a radical approach has been underscored in New Zealand by Black :
'...today it is unreal to suggest that a person looks to the law solely to protect his interests in a narrow sense. It is necessary to do no more than read the newspapers to see the breadth of the interests that today's citizen expects the law to protect - and he expects the Court where necessary to provide that protection. He is interested in results, not procedural interests.' (Black, 'The Right to be Heard', New Zealand U.,No.4, 1977,66).'
As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court concluded by recording that public interest litigation is a part of the process of participative justice and standing in civil litigation of that pattern must have liberal reception at the judicial doorsteps. Subsequently also the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms observed that a person has a locus to file a proceeding for redressal of a grievance which is public in nature without himself being a busy-body or a meddler and without being guided by any private motivation. What is it that has guided this particular appellant to move this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution as a public interest litigation The petition is delightfully vague on this score and excepting alleging that respondent Nos.7 and 8 have produced false certificates, there is no other material on record as to how he has interest or how the society would be better off without them. It is on this score, the observations of the learned single Judge, as appears from the judgment under appeal, seem to be rather significant. The learned single Judge observed:
'However, the allegations made by the petitioner in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, arc absolutely bald and vague, except stating that the petitioner reliably learnt that the respondents 7 and 8 belong to 'Kapu' community, the petitioner does not anywhere disclose the basis of such belief or the source of information by which he has come to believe so.
If persons holding a public office are to be exposed to such a litigation on the basis ofallegations which have no apparent basis or at any rate the basis of which it is not disclosed to the Court, no holder of a public office would be able to conduct the affairs of his office peacefully. Every time, somebody decides to entertain a doubt about the honesty, integrity of a holder of a public office without disclosing any basis to the Court for such a doubt, if this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, permits such litigation, in my view, it would only create speculative litigation, perhaps often motivated by personalvendetta.'
12. In this context, the observations of bis Court in the case of K. Hanumantha Rao v. Prl. Sub-Judge, : 1997(4)ALT444 , ought also to be noted, in paragraph 14 of the judgment, this Court observed :
' 14. The petitioners do not even disclose their complete identity except stating that they are all permanent residents within the limits of Vijayawada Municipal Corporation and have been fighting forthe cause of general public. The idea, if any entertained by the public interest litigants that they need not disclose to the Court the complete details about them needs to be dispelled. They arc bound to disclose the full particulars about them including their status, avocation and Host of other details. The Court would be in a better position to appreciate the questions raised and the competency of the public interest litigants to raise such questions provided the required information is made available to the Court. It is not as if any person or body of persons can casually approach and invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by levelling unfounded allegations against the Government and its officers and other private individuals without any basis. The petitioners in public interest litigation are bound to reveal the complete facts and assist the Court in a dispassionate manner.The facts stated by the public interestlitigant should reveal that he is genuinely concerned in public interest and only then the Court would be satisfied and proceed further in the matter. No person in the name of public interest litigation can claim an automatic right of hearing and such hearing cannot be provided by the Court unless the Court is satisfied about the bona fides of the person approaching the Court. The Apex Court in a recent judgment in S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda, : AIR1997SC272 , observed : 'Before we part, we cannot help mentioning that on issues of constitutional law, litigants who can lay no claim to havc expert knowledge in that field should refrain from filing petitions, which if we may say so, are often drafted in a casual and cavalier fashion giving an extempore appearance not having had even a second look. This is the impression that one gets on reading the present petition. It is of utmost importance that those who invoke this Court's jurisdiction seeking a waiver of the locus standi rule must exercise restraint in moving the Court by not plunging in areas wherein they are not well-versed. Such a litigant must not succumb to spasmodic sentiments and behave like a knight-erant roaming at will in pursuit of issues providing publicity. He must remember that as a person seeking to espouse a public cause, he owes it to the public as well as to the Court that he does not rush to Court without undertaking a research, even if he is qualified or competent to raise the issue. Besides, it must be remembered that a good cause can be lost if petitions are filed on half-backed information without proper research or by persons who are not qualified and competent to raise such issues as the rejection of such a petition may affect third party rights. Lastly, it must also be borne in mind that no onehas a right to the waiver of the locus standi rule and the Court should permit it only when it is satisfied that the carriage of proceedings is in 'The competent hands of a person who is genuinely concerned in public interest and is not moved by other extraneous considerations. So also the Court must be careful to ensure that the process of the Court is not sought to be abused by a person who desires to persist with his point of view, almost carrying it to the point of obstinacy....'
13. It is on this factual backdrop mat the issue has to be decided as to whether, in Act, a public interest litigation can be maintained by the appellant-writ petitioner. The learned single Judge ascribed is to be speculative. It is true that the Courts have allowed public-spirited persons and organisations to invoke this extra-ordinary jurisdiction on behalf of the Society for vindication of their rights. But that does not, however, mean and imply that any busy-body would be able to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in the garb of public interest litigation, its personal grievance or vendetta. The factual matrix depict that the self-same issue has been looked into and considered by the appropriate agencies at all levels on more than one occasion. But the appellant without disclosing his specific interest in the matter and how the public at large would be bonefitted, has again moved this Court and invoked writ jurisdiction in the garb of public interest litigation. In adversorial litigation one can understand and appreciate, but not a public interest litigation being tainted with some motive, which the learned single Judge describes it as personal vendetta. We do find sufficient justification in the observations of the learned single Judge and me do also record our concurrence therewith. The writ petitioner lias no interest whatsoeve; neither a petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus is maintainable in the contextual facts. The writ petitioner has been indulging in utter frivolity and initiation of a proceeding underArticle 226 of the Constitution in the contextual facts is totally an abuse of the process of the Court.
14. While it is true that this recent phenomenon in Indian jurisprudence is not to keep the door closed but keep it ajar for the benefit of the Society but that by itself docs not and cannot mean and imply that even personal vendetta and individual motive need to be encouraged by the Law Courts in the form of a public interest litigation. The writ petitioner lias mis-applied and misconstrued such a latitude by the Law Courts.
15. In that view of the matter, this appeal fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.