ORDER
N.V. Ramana, J.
1. The Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, Hyderabad, acquired an extent of Ac.14-16 guntas of land comprised in Sy.Nos. 63, 64, 66/U, 66/5, 66/7, 66/9, 66/ 12, 66/14, 67 and 68 of Mansodrabad Village, Hyderabad East, Ranga Reddy District, belonging to several persons, for the purpose of formation of Inner Ring Road from Tarnaka to Uppal Junction to join National Highway No. 9. The petitioners herein own three plots bearing Nos. 39, 49 and 50 in an extent of 1100 Sq. yds., situated in Sy.No. 64. Even before issuance of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') on 18-5-1978. the Land Acquisition Officer, took possession of the acquired land on 6-11-1977. Thereafter, enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was conducted on 5-6-1978 and Declaration under Section 6 of the Act, was made on 14-6-1979. When proceedings under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act were initiated and notices dated 17-9-1979 issued, one Smt. G. Veena Devi and three others, who own an extent of Ac.2-26 guntas of land in Sy. No. 64, filed writ petition in W.P. No.6625 of 1979 questioning the said notices before this Court, and this Court by an order dated 10-10-1979, passed in W.P. M.P. No. 8948 of 1979, stayed all further proceedings pursuant to the said notices. Subsequently, the said writ petition, by order dated 15-7-1982, was dismissed as having become infructuous. During the pendency of the said writ petition, save to the extent of the land covered by Sy. No. 64, in respect whereof there was stay granted by this Court, the Land Acquisition Officer completed the award proceedings. Though the petitioners own three plots in an extent of 1100 Sq. yds. of land in Sy. No. 64, they have not questioned the land acquisition proceedings, and there was no stay in respect of the said land. The Land Acquisition Officer, however, has not passed any award in respect of the land of the petitioners. According to the petitioners, as per the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (for short 'the amended Act'), especially the provisions of Section 11-A, the Land Acquisition Officer, is required to complete the land acquisition proceedings within a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration, and inasmuch as no award has been passed by the Land Acquisition Officer within the time stipulated, in respect of the land of the petitioners, despite lapse of more than 20 years from the date of publication of declaration, the petitioners contend that the land acquisition proceedings in respect of their land, should be declared to have lapsed. So contending, the petitioners invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the following relief:
To declare the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondent and the Notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquisition of the land belonging to the petitioners, as having lapsed, and consequently to direct the respondent to initiate land acquisition proceedings afresh for acquisition of the said land and conclude the same expeditiously and to pay them compensation as per the prevailing market rate.
2. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition.
3. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners would contend that having regard to the provisions of the amended Act, particularly Section 11-A thereof, which came into effect from 24-9-1984, the land acquisition proceedings are required to be completed within two years from the date of publication of declaration, and in case where the publication of declaration has been made prior to the commencement of the amended Act, the award shall be made within two years from the date of commencement of the amended Act, and the period of stay granted by the Court, if any, shall stand excluded, from computation of the two years period. The learned Counsel further submits that in the instant case the publication of declaration was made on 14-6-1979 i.e., much prior to the amended Act coming into force on 24-9-1984, and this Court in the writ petition W.P.No.6625 of 1979, filed by one Smt. G. Veena Devi and three others, passed an order on 10-10-1979, granting stay of the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the land covered by Sy. No. 64, and the said order of stay continued till 15-7-1982, the date on which the said writ petition was dismissed as having become infructuous, and even though the petitioners are not party to the said writ petition proceedings, and even if the said period of stay granted by this Court in the said writ petition, is excluded from computing the period of two years, the respondent was required to conclude the acquisition proceedings by 14-7-1984. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that inasmuch as no award has been passed by the respondent within a period of two years, having regard to the provisions of the amended Act, the 'land acquisition proceedings should be declared as having lapsed, and directions should go to the Land Acquisition Officer to initiate fresh land acquisition proceedings in respect of the land of the petitioners.
4. The Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, Hyderabad, filed counter, refuting the allegations made by the petitioners. The learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition while reiterating the averments made by the respondent in the counter, submitted that even before issuance of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, the Land Acquisition Officer has taken over possession of an extent of Ac.14-16 gts., on 6-11-1977, including the land of the petitioners comprised in three plots in an extent of 1100 Sq. yds., for formation of Inner Ring Road from Tarnaka Uppal Junction to join National Highway No. 9. And after obtaining approval from the Government, Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published on 18-5-1978, Enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was held on 5-6-1978 and declaration under Section 6 thereof, was published on 14-6-1979. Thereafter, notices under Sections 9(1) and 10 of the Act were issued on 17-9-1979, and after conducting enquiry on 4-10-1979, award was passed on 29-2-1980. It is the contention of the Land Acquisition Officer that he could not complete the land acquisition proceedings within the period of two years, in respect of the land of the petitioners as he was under the bona fide impression that the petitioners were also party to the proceedings in W.P. No. 6625 of 1979, which was ultimately dismissed as having become infructuous, and that there was stay granted by this Court even in respect of the land of the petitioners comprised in Sy.No. 64. The learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition submits that after completion of land acquisition proceedings and passing of the award in respect of the land where there was no stay granted by this Court, compensation was also paid to the landowners, and at their instance, the matter was even referred to the civil Court, which enhanced the compensation from Rs. 9,000/-per acre to Rs. 51,000/-per acre,
5. The learned Government Pleader submits that had the fact of dismissal of the above writ petition as having become infructuous, been brought to the notice of the Land Acquisition Officer, the Land Acquisition Officer, would have passed the award in respect of the lands of the petitioners immediately. Be that as it may, the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition submits that once possession of the land is taken over by the Government, the question of land acquisition proceedings getting lapsed, and the question of the Land Acquisition Officer issuing fresh notification for acquisition of the land of the petitioners, does not arise, and more so when the acquired land stood absolutely vested in the Government without any encumbrance whatsoever. The learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition contends that merely because the Land Acquisition Officer has not passed the award within the stipulated time, the whole of the land acquisition proceedings do not get vitiated, and indeed it cannot be a ground to declare the land acquisition proceedings as having lapsed, and to initiate fresh land acquisition proceedings, particularly when the Government had also made use of the acquired land. The learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition submits that the petitioners are at liberty to claim benefits in accordance with the provisions of the amended Act, but they are not entitled to claim initiation of fresh land acquisition proceedings.
6. On 8-9-2003, upon hearing the learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition for some time, this Court while adjourning the matter by a week, directed the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition to produce the relevant record. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned on three occasions, and at last, the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition expressed her inability to produce the record on the ground that the record has been lost, and the Land Acquisition Officer has also filed an affidavit to that effect.
7. The facts, which stand admitted and undisputed by the Land Acquisition Officer, are that the petitioners are owners of three plots in an extent of 1100 Sq. yds. of land, comprised in Sy.No. 64, which they have acquired for formation of Inner Ring Road, along with the land of other persons comprised in different survey numbers. That though there was an order of stay granted by this Court on 10-10-1979 in the writ petition W.P. No. 6625 of 1979, filed by one Smt, G. Veena Devi and three others, in respect of the land covered by Sy.No. 64, and though the Land Acquisition Officer in his counter has taken a stand that even petitioners are party to the said writ petition, but the fact remains that the petitioners are not party to the said writ proceedings nor have they filed any separate writ petition and obtained any stay of the land acquisition proceedings. Except to the extent of the land of the petitioners, there was stay granted by this Court in W.P. No. 6625 of 1979, in respect of the entire land covered by Sy. No. 64. The Land Acquisition Officer fairly admits that he did not pass the award in respect of the land of the petitioners, within the period of two years, as required under the provisions of the amended Act, especially Section 11-A thereof, for the reason that he was under the bonafide impression that even the petitioners were party to the proceedings in W.P. No. 6625 of 1979, and that the stay granted by this Court on 10-10-1979 in respect of the land in Sy. No. 64, covers even the land of the petitioners.
8. In the context of the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and the admissions made by the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition, the short question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether by reason of failure of the respondent to pass an award in accordance with the provisions of Section 11 of the amended Act, within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, the entire land acquisition proceedings would lapse or whether by reason of possession of the acquired land having been taken over and vested with the Government, enables the respondent to pass an award on 17-9-2003, i.e., after more than twenty four years after publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act, only 14-6-1979.
9. To consider this question, it is apposite to make a reference to the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act, which reads as follows:
11-A: Period within which an Award shall be made ;--The Collector shall make an Award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration and if no Award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the Award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement.
Explanation:--In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court, shall be excluded.
10. By a reading of the above provision, it becomes clear that the Collector is under an obligation to make an award under Section 11 of the Act within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration, and if he fails to make the award within the stipulated time, the entire land acquisition proceedings would stand lapsed. The proviso appended to Section 11-A, however, saves the land acquisition proceedings from being lapsed, and it provides that in a case where the declaration had been made prior to the commencement of the amended Act, the award shall be made within two years from such commencement, and for computing the period of two years, the period during which any action or proceeding taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of the Court, the said period shall stand excluded from computation of the period of two years. In the instant case, in W.P. No. 6625 of 1979, an order was passed by this Court on 10-10-1979 staying the land acquisition proceedings, in respect of Sy.No. 64, in which admittedly, even the land of the petitioners is comprised, and it may be noticed that the petitioners are not party to the said writ petition and there was no stay granted in respect of the land of the petitioners. The said order of stay continued upto 15-7-1982, on which date, the writ petition was dismissed as having become infructuous. Even assuming that the said order of stay is applicable to the land of the petitioners also, and the period intervening between 10-10-1979 and 15-7-1982, namely, the date on which this Court granted stay of the land acquisition proceedings and the date on which the writ petition was dismissed as having become infructuous, is excluded from computing the period of two years, for passing of a valid award, the award should have been passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on or before 15-3-1984, and admittedly, in respect of the land of the petitioners, the Land Acquisition Officer has passed the award on 17-9-2003 i.e., nearly after lapse of twenty four years from the date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act on 14-6-1979. In that view of the matter, the land acquisition proceedings must be held to have lapsed.
11. Be that as it may, it may be noted that the amendment Act came into force on 24-9-1984, and in the instant case, declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 14-6-1979 i.e., much prior to the amended Act coming into operation, and if one goes by the language employed in the proviso appended to Section 11-A of the Act, and the date on which the amended Act came into force is taken into consideration for the purpose of computing the period of two years for passing of the award enumerated thereunder, the Land Acquisition Officer was required to pass the award on or before 24-9-1986. Admittedly the Land Acquisition Officer has not passed the award on 24-9-1986, but has passed the award only on 17-9-2003, i.e., seventeen years after the expiry of two years period prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act. In this context, reference be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Yusufbhai Noormohmed v. State of Gujarat, : AIR1991SC2153 , wherein it was held that Section 11 A is intended to confer a benefit on the landholder whose land is acquired and the benefit is that the Award must be made within a period of two years of the declaration, failing which the acquisition proceedings would lapse and the land would revert to the land holder. Inasmuch as in the instant case the Award was not passed prior to 24-9-1986, the entire land acquisition proceedings, commencing with the issuance of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act on 18-5-1978, must be held to have lapsed.
12. The learned Government Pleader for' Land Acquisition placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad v. State of UP., : AIR1993SC2517 , and the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Government of A.P. v. Mohd. Moinuddin Hussan, : 1998(5)ALD73 , to contend that since possession of the land has been taken over by the Government on 6-11-1997, the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act have no application and the award passed by the respondent on 17-9-2003, even though belated, is legal and valid.
13. In Satendra Prasad v. State of UP., the Supreme Court considering the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act held thus:
Ordinarily the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made under Section 11. Upon the taking of possession the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. That is what Section 16 states. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case therefore, when Government fails to make an Award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A lapse. When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land, which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisition under Section 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner.
Further, Section 17(3-A) postulates that the owner will be offered an amount equivalent to 80 per cent of the estimated compensation for the land before the Government takes possession of it under Section 17(1). Section 11-A cannot be so construed as to leave the Government holding title to the land without the obligation to determine compensation, make an award and pay to the owner the difference between the amount of the award and the amount of 80 per cent of the estimated compensation.
14. From the law laid down by the Apex Court in the abovementioned case, it becomes clear that Section 11-A of the Act, will have no application to cases where land has been acquired under the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. Further, a Division Bench of this Court in Government of A.P. v. Mohd. Moinuddin Hussan following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad v. State of U.P., held that acquisition proceedings cannot lapse at any time after possession was taken over under Section 17(1) of the Act and the land stood vested in the Government as a consequence thereof.
15. It thus becomes necessary for this Court to consider the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act. The said section is in the following terms:
Section 17: Special powers in cases of urgency:--In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, Sub-section (1) take possession of any land needed for a public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances.
16. From a reading of the above provision of law, the following requirements emerge for invocation of special powers in cases of urgency :
(a) There must be existence of urgency.
(b) There must be a direction from the Government to the Collector.
(c) The Collector must have caused public notice to be given under Section 9(1) of the Act stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land.
(d) On expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice under Section 9(1) of the Act, the Collector may take possession of the land.
17. After compliance of the aforementioned requirements, the acquired land shall stand absolutely vested in the Government free from all encumbrances.
18. In the instant case, from the facts narrated above, it becomes abundantly clear that possession of the land was taken on 6-11-1977 even before Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was issued on 18-5-1978. It is not the case of the Land Acquisition Officer that they have acquired the land by invoking the special powers having regard to the urgency after following the procedure enumerated under Section 17(1) of the Act. Had the Land Acquisition Officer taken possession of the land invoking any of the urgencies mentioned in Section 17(1) of the Act, he would been justified in contending that once possession of the acquired land is taken over by the Government the same shall stand vested in the Government free from all encumbrances, but that is not the case before me. In that view of the matter, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad v. State of U.P. and the judgment of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Government ofA.P. v. Mohd. Moinuddin Hussan, have no application to the facts of the present case.
19. The learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition, however, sought to place reliance on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Jaladi Sitarama Koteswara Rao v. Government of A.P., : 1998(6)ALD18 , wherein it was held that where possession of land was handed over on the assumption that acquisition proceedings would be initiated under the Act and the same was occupied by the Government, and subsequently notifications were issued proposing to acquire the land, the land should be held as having vested with the Government under Section 17 of the Act, though the Government did not invoke the urgency provision under Section 17(1) of the Act. In the case on hand, as observed already, possession of the land was taken even before issuance of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, and none of the requirements of Section 17(1) of the Act, as enumerated supra, have been satisfied. With due respect, the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Jaladi Sitarama Koteswara Rao v. Government of A.P. runs contrary to the plain and unambiguous provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act, and is per incuriam, and cannot be made applicable to the present case.
20. In Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamilnadu, : [2002]255ITR147(SC) , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held as follows:....It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision, which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said 'Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid', Judge Learned Hand said but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them...
21. It may be noticed that before the learned single Judge of this Court in Jaladi Sitarama Koteswara Rao v. Government of A.P., the judgments of the apex Court in Yusufbhai Noormohmed v. State of Gujarat wherein it was held that if the Award is not made within a period of two years of the declaration, the acquisition proceedings would lapse and land would revert to the land holder, and Union of India v. Budh Singh, : (1995)6SCC233 , wherein it was held that the parameter for initiation of land acquisition proceedings is the publication of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act which would give legitimacy to the State to take possession of the land in accordance with the provisions of the Act and any possession otherwise, would not be considered to be possession taken under the Act, were not brought to the notice, and as a result, the learned single Judge had not the benefit of going through the said judgments.
22. Inasmuch as, in the present case, possession of land was admittedly taken on 6-11-1977 even prior to the issuance of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act on 18-5-1978, the possession of land cannot be said to have been taken in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 including the provisions of Section 17(1) thereof. Since the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act have no application to the facts of the present case, the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act, squarely apply, and inasmuch as the Award was not passed within the period of two years prescribed in Section 11-A of the Act, the entire land acquisition proceedings must lapse, and they are accordingly held to have lapsed.
23. Reliance was placed by the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Council Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, : AIR2000SC671 , to contend that writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. In the said ease, the Apex Court held that the equitable doctrine namely 'delay defeats equity' has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution and that after passing of the award, no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice issued under the Act or against any proceedings initiated thereunder.
24. Article 300A of the Constitution of India mandates that no person can be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The Land Acquisition Officer having acted in flagrant violation of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and having deprived the petitioners of their property without authority of law, cannot be allowed to contend that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches, and more so when they have acted with inordinate delay. Further, though the present writ petition was filed in the year 1994, no award had been passed, and it is only after repeated requests of adjournments that the Land Acquisition Officer passed the award on 17-9-2003. Therefore, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Council Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig has no application to the facts of the present case.
25. In view of my findings that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed, the question that now crops up for consideration is what relief can be granted to the petitioners. Inasmuch as the entire land acquisition proceedings have lapsed, normally, as a corollary, the acquired land should revert to the petitioners. But, in the instant case, this Court, cannot, ignore the fact that the acquired land of the petitioners now forms part and parcel of the Inner Ring Road, which has already come into existence, and therefore, the petitioners cannot be put back into possession of the said land. This Court is quite well aware of its limitations under Article 226 of the Constitution, and shall not normally issue any mandamus directing the State to exercise its powers of eminent domain to acquire a particular piece or extent of land. Having regard to the fact that the acquired land has since become part and parcel of the Inner Ring Road, which had already come into existence, I am of the considered opinion that any direction to the Land Acquisition Officer to handover possession of the acquired land to the petitioners, at this stage, would not be in the interest of the larger general public. In that view of the matter, a direction has necessarily to be given to the Land Acquisition Officer to acquire the land of the petitioners in an extent of 1100 Sq. yds. comprised in Sy. No. 64 of Mansoorabad Village of Hyderabad East (Saroornagar Mandal), Ranga Reddy District, by issuing Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act once again afresh, and pass award at the earliest, and in any case, not later than six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
26. In the above premises, the writ petition is allowed, but in the circumstances, without awarding any costs.