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Borra Gopalaswamy S/O. Venkatasubbaiah Vs. Kontam Seetharavamma W/O. Venkata Basava Manikya Rao - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided On
Case NumberSecond Appeal No. 594 of 1996
Judge
Reported in2007(3)ALD501; 2007(4)ALT37
ActsAndhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938 - Sections 13; Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Indebtedness (Relief) Act, 1977; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) , 1908 - Sections 34 - Order 7, Rule 1 - Order 20, Rules 9 to 19 - Order 41, Rule 31
AppellantBorra Gopalaswamy S/O. Venkatasubbaiah
RespondentKontam Seetharavamma W/O. Venkata Basava Manikya Rao
Advocates:Dharma Rao, Adv.
Excerpt:
.....and precision. the trial court merely observing in the operative part of the judgment that the suit is decreed or an appellate court disposing of an appeal against dismissal of suit observing the appeal is allowed, and then staying short at that, without specifying the reliefs to which the successful party has been found entitled tantamounts to a failure on the part of the author of the judgment to discharge obligation cast on the judge by the provisions of the code of civil procedure. 10. further, strong reliance was placed on the decision of the madras high court referred (2) supra wherein at para-4 the it was held: therefore, i am of the opinion that the contention of the revision petitioner that the decree is not in accordance with the judgment of the court and therefore it has..........the points for determination, the decision thereon, the reasons for the decision and when the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. if the suit was dismissed by the trial court and in appeal the decree of dismissal is reversed, the operative part of the judgment should be so precise and clear as it would have been if the suit was decreed by the trial court to enable a self-contained decree being drawn up in conformity therewith. the plaintiff, being dominus litus, enjoys a free hand in couching the relief clause in the manner he pleases and cases are not wanting where the plaintiff makes full use of the liberty given to him. it is for the court, decreeing the suit, to examine the reliefs and then construct the operative part of.....
Judgment:

P.S. Narayana, J.

1. Heard Sri Dharma Rao, Counsel representing the appellant.

2. The unsuccessful defendant in both the Courts below had preferred the present Second Appeal. The respondent/plaintiff filed the suit O.S. No. 106/83 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Tenali for recovery of an amount of Rs. 10,200/- and the same was decreed. Aggrieved by the same, appeal A.S. No. 90/89 on the file of I Additional District Judge, Guntur was filed wherein the Judgment and decree of the trial Court had been confirmed. As against the same the present Second Appeal is preferred.

3. On 24-12-1996 this Court admitted the Second Appeal on the strength of ground Nos. 7 and 8 of the Memorandum of Second Appeal which read as hereunder:

Ground No. 7: Whether the Courts below erred in granting 12% interest to the respondent and whether is it opposed to Section 13 of A.P.(A.A.)Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938 ?

Ground No. 8: The Courts below ought to have held that the appellant is a small farmer and whether the provisions of A.P. Agricultural Indebtedness (Relief) Act, 1977 will be applicable to the appellant ?

4. The learned Counsel representing the appellant/defendant had taken this Court to the relief granted by the Court of first instance viz., 'In the result the suit is decreed with costs as prayed for', and would point out that there is omission relating to the payment of interest. The Counsel also would point out that in the Appeal also the same was confirmed and the Appeal was dismissed. The Counsel also placed reliance on Lakshmi Ram Bhuyan v. Hari Prasad Bhuyan and Ors. 2003(1) SCC 197 and T.R. Sivaprakasa Mudaliar and Anr. v. Sethuramdas Maheshkumar AIR 1996 Madras 176.

5. The suit was filed for recovery of Rs. 10,200/-, being the principal and interest and for costs, by the plaintiff. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant, in order to meet the cultivation expenses, borrowed an amount of Rs. 7500/- from the plaintiff on 22-7-1980 and executed a promissory note agreeing to repay the same with interest at 12% per annum on demand, but he had not paid anything in spite of several demands and through mediators. It is also stated that a notice also had been issued in this regard. In the written statement, the defendant admitted the execution of the suit promissory note, but however had taken a defence that one Jaladi Narasimha Rao, r/o.Kuchinapudi and Viyyanka of the plaintiff is a commission agent in paddy and pulses and is a money lender also and the defendant is a resident of Borravaripalem, hamlet of Kuchinapudi and the defendant used to borrow money from the said Narasimha Rao and repay it in cash at times. It was also pleaded that the said Narasimha Rao was taking promotes either in his name or in the names of the nominees to avoid troubles from Income-tax authorities and thus he had certain transactions. Several other factual details also had been narrated in this regard in the written statement.

6. Before the Court of first instance, the following Issues were settled:

1. Whether the suit pronote was executed in renewal of earlier pronotes and the debt is to be traced back and scaled down ?

2. Whether the discharge pleaded is true ?

3. To what relief ?

On behalf of the plaintiff P.W.1 to P.W.3 were examined and Exs.A-1 and A-2 were marked. On behalf of defendant D.W.1 was examined and Exs.B-1 to B-3 were marked. The Court of first instance negatived the stand taken by way of defence and ultimately decreed the suit, but as already referred to supra, specifically the interest was not mentioned. Aggrieved by the same,A.S. No. 90/89 was filed and the learned I Additional District Judge, Guntur, after framing the Point for consideration at para-7 discussed the evidence available on record and dismissed the Appeal.

7. It is pertinent to note that the appellate Court also had not modified the Judgment and decree of the trial court by specifying that the plaintiff would be entitled for some interest. The omission made in this regard is made a ground of attack in the Second Appeal. Though the Second Appeal was admitted on certain substantial questions of law referred to supra, the substantial questions of law which had been argued in elaboration are as hereunder:

1. Whether there can be claiming of interest when the Judgment does not specify any interest at all ?

2. Whether the decree can be drawn specifying the interest when the Judgment does not speak of granting of interest at all ?

3. In such circumstances what would be the just and reasonable interest ?

8. Reliance was placed on the decision referred (1) supra wherein at paras 10 and 11 the Apex Court observed:

The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be noticed. Order VII Rule 1 CPC requires the plaintiff to give sufficient particulars of the relief, which the plaintiff claims. Order XX requires a judgment to contain all the issues and findings or decision thereon with the reasons therefore. The judgment has to state the relief allowed to a party. The preparation of decree follows the judgment. The decree shall agree with the judgment. The decree shall contain, inter alia, particulars of the claim and shall specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit. The decree shall also state the amount of costs incurred in the suit and by whom or out of what property and in what proportions such costs are to be paid. Rules 9 to 19 of Order XX are illustrative of contents of decrees in certain specified categories of suits. The very obligation cast by the Code that the decree shall agree with the judgment spells out an obligation on the part of the author of the judgment to clearly indicate the relief or reliefs to which a party, in his opinion, has been found entitled to enable decree being framed in such a manner that it agrees with the judgment and specifies clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit. The operative part of the judgment should be so clear and precise that in the event of an objection being laid, it should not be difficult to find out by a bare reading of the judgment and decree whether the latter agrees with the former and is in conformity therewith. A self-contained decree drawn up in conformity with the judgment would exclude objections and complexities arising at the stage of execution.

The obligation is cast not only on the trial Court but also on the appellate Court. In the event of the suit having been decreed by the trial Court if the appellate Court interferes with the judgment of the trial court, the judgment of the appellate Court should precisely and specifically set out the reliefs granted and the modifications, if any, made in the original decree explicitly and with particularity and precision. Order XLI Rule 31 CPC casts an obligation on the author of the appellate judgment to state the points for determination, the decision thereon, the reasons for the decision and when the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. If the suit was dismissed by the trial Court and in appeal the decree of dismissal is reversed, the operative part of the judgment should be so precise and clear as it would have been if the suit was decreed by the trial Court to enable a self-contained decree being drawn up in conformity therewith. The plaintiff, being dominus litus, enjoys a free hand in couching the relief clause in the manner he pleases and cases are not wanting where the plaintiff makes full use of the liberty given to him. It is for the court, decreeing the suit, to examine the reliefs and then construct the operative part of the judgment in such manner as to bring the reliefs granted in conformity with the findings arrived at on different issues and also the admitted facts. The trial Court merely observing in the operative part of the judgment that the suit is decreed or an appellate Court disposing of an appeal against dismissal of suit observing the appeal is allowed, and then staying short at that, without specifying the reliefs to which the successful party has been found entitled tantamounts to a failure on the part of the author of the judgment to discharge obligation cast on the Judge by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

9. It is no doubt true that when the Judgment does not specify the rate of interest inasmuch as the decree may have to be drawn in accordance with the Judgment only, such omission in the Judgment cannot be modified by introducing the same in the decree. The Judgment as such may have to be suitably amended in one of the modes recognized by Law. Till then what had not been specified in the Judgment cannot be incorporated in the decree. It is needless to say that the decree to be drawn in accordance with the Judgment only.

10. Further, strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Madras High Court referred (2) supra wherein at para-4 the it was held:

The learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner would argue that in the judgments nothing has been stated against the payment of interest from the date of filing of the suit or from the date of decree and therefore, awarding interest at two rates from these two dates is erroneous and the decree is therefore liable to be amended. It may be noted that in the judgment, it is not stated that apart from the amount, mentioned in the judgment, the rest of the claim of the plaintiff in the plaint has been either rejected or dismissed. If it has been specifically mentioned that the rest of the claim is dismissed, there may be substance in the contention of the revision petitioner that the decree is not in accordance with the judgment and therefore requires amendment. There cannot be any dispute over the proposition a decree shall agree with the judgment and if the decree is not in the harmony with the judgment, the Court has no alternative but to rectify the mistake which has been committed. The question whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest when the judgment is silent, has been considered by this Court in the decision reported in Union of India v. A. Venkataiah : AIR1975Mad119 wherein it has been held as follows:

The jurisdiction to provide interest in the decree notwithstanding the fact that there is no reference to it in the judgment, is one which is peculiar to money decrees, and the Courts are vested with such jurisdiction under Section 34, Civil Procedure Code. In the decree in a suit for payment of money, the Court can as its discretion, provide for the payment of reasonable interest on the principal adjudged (a) from the date of suit to the date of decree; (b) in addition direct the payment of any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit; and (c) may also direct the payment of further interest at such rate not exceeding 6 per cent as the Court deems reasonable on such principal sum from the date of the decree to the date of payment of or such earlier date as the court thinks fit.

In the present case also, the judgment is silent with regard to the payment of interest either from the date of plaint or from the date of decree. Therefore, as per the above decision, there is nothing wrong in awarding interest to the amount decreed from the date of suit to the date of decree and future interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of decree till the date of realization. The decree drafted only provides for such interest and it does not provide for any interest for any period prior to the institution of the suit. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the contention of the revision petitioner that the decree is not in accordance with the judgment of the Court and therefore it has to be amended, and the dismissal of the memo filed by the defendant for that purpose is a failure to exercise the powers vested with the court, is not a tenable one. The Civil Revision Petition is therefore liable to be dismissed.

11. On the strength of the decision referred to supra of the Madras High Court, submissions at length were made to the effect that it would be just and proper if interest at 6% be granted in the facts and circumstances of the case. This is a simple money claim and concurrent findings had been recorded relating to the borrowal of the amount and other aspects. It is only a just omission by the Court while granting the relief. Normally in such money suits the interest would follow while granting the relief on the principal amount.

12. However, in the light of the facts and circumstances and also taking into consideration that the borrowal itself was for cultivation expenses, this Court is of the considered opinion that it would be just and proper to award interest of 9% from the date of suit till the date of decree and 6% per annum from the date of decree till the date of realisation. Accordingly, as far as the granting of interest is concerned, the same is modified and it is needless to say that the respondent/plaintiff would be entitled to the decretal amount with interest of 9% per annum from the date of suit till the date of decree and 6% per annum thereafter from the date of decree till the date of realisation. It is stated that certain amounts had been paid already by the appellant/defendant. It is needless to say that the said amounts, if any paid, are to be given the due credit.

13. The Second Appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above by clarifying and modifying the Judgments and decrees of the Courts below. No order as to costs.


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