Judgment:
ORDER
Dubagunta Subrahmanyam, J.
1. The appellant in R.A.No.774 of 1994 on the file of Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, filed this revision petition confirming the order of Additional Rent Controller, Secunderabad, in R.C.No.177 of 1992 on his file.
2. Brief facts for the disposal of this revision petition are as follows:
The revision petitioner is admittedly the landlord of the petition schedule premises. He filed the petition seeking eviction of the respondent-tenant on the ground that he is residing in a rented house and he requires the petition schedule premises for his personal occupation. It is also pleaded that he is about to retire from service and he is not in possession of any residential premises of his own in the twin cities and as his sons are being educated, they require additional accommodation for their stay. It is the plea of the respondent-tenant that the present residence of the petitioner is free of rent, the said premises belongs to charitable institution and there is no person to claim right or title whatsoever in respect of the said premises. It is his further plea that the landlord wants to sell the petition schedule premises, that the tenant also requested the landlord to sell the premises to him as per the market value and the landlord demanded him enhancement of rent and when he refused to enhance the rent, the eviction petition is filed on false grounds. On a consideration of oral and documentary evidence adduced by both the parties, the Rent Controller held that there is no satisfactory proof that the requirement of the petitioner is bona fide. He accordingly dismissed the tenancy petition. The appellate authority held that there are no compelling reasons forthcoming from the landlord for vacating the house in which he is residing for the last 40 years and accordingly held that the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide. He dismissed the appeal confirming the order of the Rent Controller.
3. It is the contention of the petitioner that the reasoning of the two courts below is based on surmises and assumptions and the orders of two courts below are liable to be set aside. In this connection it is to be stated that the Rent Controller in his order stated that before eviction proceedings are commenced, the landlord issued a notice Ex.P.3 to the tenant and in that notice, the landlord did not disclose the reasons put forth in the tenancy petition for his seeking the petition schedule premises for his personal occupation. It is to be stated that before seeking eviction, no notice is contemplated under the provisions of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960. Therefore, just because in the notice issued before commencement of eviction proceedings by the landlord detailed reasons for seeking eviction on the ground of requirement for personal occupation of the landlord are not disclosed, the said contention or plea of the landlord cannot be brushed aside.
4. One of the grounds mentioned in the petition is that the present entire premises of the landlord is not sufficient accommodation for occupation of his family members. It is also the evidence of the landlord that his sons require separate rooms for their study purposes. It is an admitted or undisputed fact that the tenant is residing in a rented premises and he has two college going sons. In this regard the tenancy court found that there is sufficient accommodation in the present rental premises of the landlord and therefore on the ground of insufficient accommodation, for study of his two sons, the landlord is not entitled to seek eviction of his tenant in his own building. In this regard the learned advocate for the petitioner relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in RAGAVENDRA KUMAR Vs . FIRM PREM MACHINERY & CO., : [2000]1SCR77 . The Supreme Court held that it is settled position of law that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purposes and he has got complete freedom in the matter.In that case the Supreme Court further held that in that case the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted. In the case on hand, the landlord has freedom and choice to decide whether his rental premises is sufficient accommodation for him or not and whether the disputed premises is sufficient accommodation for him or not. He is the best judge of the choice. His choice cannot be faulted with.
5. The Rent Controller observed in his order that from the disputed premises, the landlord is getting a monthly rent of Rs.150=00 and he is paying monthlyrent of Rs.18=00 only for his rental accommodation and it is preposterous to think that it would become financially burdensome for the petitioner to pay the rent after his retirement from service and the petitioner could enjoy the presentrental accommodation by just paying Rs.18=00 and it is unbelievable that he would vacate that house and occupy the schedule premises by losing Rs.150=00 per month, which is the rent paid by the respondent. He also observed that the possibility of the petitioner vacating his house in Bansilalpet (rented premises) is very remote, given that trust which was the owner of that house became defunct and the petitioner like other tenants put forward the claim for ownership over the property. In this regard the appellate court also observed that there are no compelling reasons for vacating the rented house in which he is residing for the last 40 years and there is no evidence to show that he is paying the rent to that house. The appellate court further observed that it cannot be of his own house, but he is residing in that house for the last 40 years with or without payment of rent. In my considered opinion these considerations of the two courts below are irrelevant considerations. The courts below should not have denied the possession of the suit premises to the landlord on surmises and assumptions. There is no dispute that the landlord is residing in rented premises. In the absence of the owner of that rented premises as a party to the present proceedings, it is not open for the courts below to assume and conclude that the present revision petitioner is almost the owner of the said premises. There is also no dispute that the revision petitioner has retired from service during the course of pendency of the eviction proceedings in the tenancy court. It may be that the landlord resided in a rented premises for a period of about 40 years. That circumstance is not a circumstance to negative in future the claim of the landlord to occupy his own premises. I do not find any justification in the orders of the two courts below to deny possession of the suit premises to the landlord for the reasons mentioned in the orders of the two courts below.
6. It is seriously contended on behalf of the respondent-tenant that the findings on the bona fide requirement of the landlord to occupy the suit premises for his personal occupation are concurrent findings of fact and those findings cannot be interfered with in a revision petition. Reliance was placed on two decisions by the learned advocate for the respondent-tenant. The first decision relied upon is a judgment of the Supreme Court in SRI RAJA LAKSHMI DYEING WORKS Vs . RANGASWAMY, : AIR1980SC1253 . The Supreme Court held that a concurrent finding, based on evidence, that the landlord did not bona fide require the premises for his own use and occupation is not a finding which can be touched by the High Courtexercising jurisdiction under Section 25 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.
7. The second decision relied upon by the learned advocate for the respondent-tenant is a decision of A.P. High Court in GRAND BAZAR PARTNERSHIP FIRM Vs . PADMASHALI SEVA SAMAJAM TRUST, : 2000(4)ALT435 . A learned single Judge of this High Court, following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works case (2nd supra) declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below.
8. In my considered opinion the above two decisions will not come to the aid of the respondent-tenant. In para 4 of its judgment (2nd supra), the Supreme Court stated some argument was advanced whether a finding as to the bona fide requirement of a landlord is or not a mixed question of fact and law and a reference was made before the Supreme Court to some decisions. The Supreme Court observed that ' we do not think it is necessary for the purposes of this case to enter into discussion on this question. Merely to hold that a question is a mixed question of fact and law is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of revisional power. It must, however, be shown that there was a taint of such unreasonableness resulting in a miscarriage of justice'. After making the above observation, in view of the facts of that case, the Supreme Court stated that the concurrent findings based on evidence given by the courts below should not have been interfered with by the High Court. In my considered opinion, when the two courts below took into consideration irrelevant circumstances and baseless assumptions for giving a finding on the requirement of the landlord for personal occupation, though such findings are concurrent findings on fact, the High Court can interfere with and disregard such concurrent findings. I rely upon a decision of the Supreme Court in VINOD KUMAR Vs . SMT. SURJIT KAUR, : [1987]3SCR552 . In that decision, the Supreme Court held as follows.
'The rule that when the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority have rendered concurrent findings of fact, the High Court is not entitled to disregard those findings and come to a different conclusion of its own would apply only where the findings have been rendered with reference to facts and not on the basis of non-existent material and baseless assumptions'.
Therefore, as the two courts below gave findings of fact on the requirement of the landlord to occupy the disputed premises for his own personal occupation on surmises and baseless assumptions, I feel satisfied that this court is entitled to interfere with and disregard the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the two courts below, exercising the revisional power of this court under Section 22 of the Act.
9. For the reasons stated above, I allow the revision petition. I set aside the orders of the appellate court and the tenancy court. I allow R.C.No.177 of 1992 and order eviction of the tenant-respondent from the petition schedule premises. The respondent-tenant is granted two months time to vacate the petition schedule premises. No costs.