M.N. Rao, J.
1. This appeal, filed Under Section 12-G of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce & Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 (for short 'the Act'), is from the revisional order dated 8-11-1993 passed by the Director of Marketing, Government of Andhra Pradesh Under Section 12-F of the Act in R.P.No. 23 of 1993 affirming the appellate order of the Joint Director of Marketing in Appeal No. l of 1989 dated 11-12-1989 upholding the assessment order dated 2-3-989 passed by the Assistant Secretary, Hyderabad Agricultural Market Committee in regard to levy of market fees for the period from 1-4-1985 to 31-12-1988 in respect of the appellant. The turnover involved is Rs. 23,72,16,997.90 and the market fee liable to be paid was: at the rate of one percent of the turnover.
2. Common orders were passed by the appellate as well as the revisional authorities in respect of the appellant herein and another trader - M/s. Rajathgiri Oil lndustries-whose appeal-CMA No. 1218 of l995-was also heard along with this appeal and that appeal was dismissed by us on 12-4-1996 as withdrawn in view of the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for that appellant.
3. The appellant is a trader in coconut oil and it obtained licence Under Section 7(1) of the Act from the Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad. It imports 'copra' (dried coconut kernel) from different places in the State of Kerala, extracts coconut oil from the same and exports it to places outside the State of Andhra Pradesh. The coconut oil extracted by it is not sold any where in the State of Andhra Pradesh and about this, there is no controversy. 'Copra' is a notified agricultural produce Under Section 7(1) of the Act, but not coconut oil.
4. Although the Market Committee is empowered, Under Section 12(1) of the Act, to levy market fee on any notified agricultural produce at such rate not exceeding 2% of the aggregate amount for which the produce is purchased or sold, in the entire State of Andhra Pradesh, all the Market Committees are levying fees uniformly at 1% of the aggregate amount. The market fee is liable to be paid by every trader in the notified area in whose favour licence is issued by the Market Committee and a statutory duty is cast by Section 12-A of the Act upon every such trader to submit returns relating to his turnover in the manner and within the period specified by the Market Committee in its bye-laws. Turnover is defined by explanation (ii) of Section 12-A as the aggregate amount for which the notified agricultural produce is purchased or sold whether for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration. If the return submitted by the trader is correct and complete, the Market Committee shall make an assessment Under Section 12-B of the Act, but if the return appears to be incorrect or incomplete., the Market Committee has power to make best judgment assessment after giving an opportunity to the trader. Sub-section (3) of Section 12-B empowers the Market Committee, while making best judgment assessment, to levy, in addition to the market fee, penalty equal to two times the market fees due on the turnover not disclosed by the trader in the return. Sub-section (4) lays down that if any trader liable to pay the market fee (i) fails to submit the return within the specified date, or (ii) produces accounts, registers and documents after inspection, or (iii) submits the return subsequent to the date of inspection, the assessing authority may, at any time within a period of three years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates, make a best judgment assessment after issuing notice to the trader and may also levy penalty equal to two times the market fees due. Sub-section (5) concerns with escaped assessment, under-assessment or assessment at a rate lower than the correct rate. Section 12-E of the Act provides for appeal to the Regional joint Director of Marketing against an order of assessment. The Director of Marketing exercises revisional jurisdiction Under Section 12-F of the Act only for the purpose of satisfying the legality, propriety or regularity of any proceedings questioned before him. Section 12-G of the Act provides for appeal to the High Court against an order 'relating to assessment passed by the Director of Marketing in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction Under Section 12-F of the Act.'
5. The assessment by the Market Committee is made Under Section 12-B of the Act. It is appealable Under Section 12-E to the Regional Joint Director of Marketing whose orders are revisable Under Section 12-F by the Director of Marketing. Under Section 12-G, an appeal lies to the High Court against a revisional order.
6. The appeallate jurisdiction conferred on this Court Under Section 12-G against a revisional order of the Director of Marketing is an oddity. We have not come a cross any enactment conferring appellate jurisdiction against exercise of revisional power. The revisional jurisdiction of the Director of Marketing Under Section 12-F is confined to his satisfaction as to the legality, propriety or regularity of any proceeding recorded by any authority or officer subordinate to him or by any Market Committee or any person authorised by it under the provisions of the Act. A second revision to the High Court is a common feature in many enactments but not an appeal against a revisional order. As we wanted to lay down the precise parameters as to the scope and ambit of the appellate power of the High Court Under Section 12-G of the Act, we issued notice to the learned Additional Advocate-General, Sri Chalameshwar. According to him, the revisional power conferred on the Director of Marketing Under Section 12-F of the Act is itself an appellate power and he seeks to draw support for this view from the decision of the Supreme Court in Babulal Nagar v. Shree Synthetics Ltd., : [1984]3SCR772 .
7. Sri M.V. Ramana Reddy, learned senior counsel, has urged that the appellate power Under Section 12-G is of wider amplitude encompassing all the powers which an appellate Court enjoys - both on questions of law and fact. The contentions urged by both sides converge on this aspect.
8. To appreciate the aforesaid contentions, it is necessary to notice the relevant statutory provisions:
'Section 12-E: Appeals: (1) Any trader objecting to an order of assessment passed, or proceedings recorded by the assessing authority, under the provisions of this Act may, within, thirty days from the date on which the order or proceeding was served on him appeal to the Regional Joint Director of Marketing having jurisdiction over the notified area concerned.
(2) ................
(3) ................
(4) ................
(5) ................
(6) ................
Section 12-F. Revision by the Director of Marketing:- (1) The Director of Marketing may suo motu or on an application made to him call for and examine the record of any order passed or proceeding recorded by any authority or officer subordinate to him or by any market committee or any authority or person authorised by it, under the provisions of this Act for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such orders as as to the regularity of such proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit:
Provided that every application for the exercise of the powers under this Section shall be preferred within thirty days from the date on which the order or proceedings was communicated to the applicant.
(2) .....................
(3) .......:.............
12-G. Appeal to High Court: - (1) Any trader objecting to an order relating to assessment passed by the Director of Marketing under Sub-section (1) of Section 12-F, may appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date on which the order was served to him;
Provided that the High Court may admit an appeal preferred after the period of sixty days mentioned in Sub-section (1) if it is satisfied that the trader has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period.
(2) ................
(3) ................
(4) ................
(5) ................'
9. A comparison of the revisional jurisdiction Under Section 12-F of the Act with that of Section 115 C.P.C, makes it very clear that the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction under the former is much wider than the latter; that is because the former provides for interference even on the ground of propriety which is not provided for Under Section 115 C.P.C. The line of demarcation between appellate and revisional jurisdiction is clear and sharp. Ordinarily, revisional jurisdiction is analogous to the power of judicial review of administrative action. Legality and regularity, which, normally, are the grounds for exercise of revisional jurisdiction are akin to substantive due process and procedural due process respectively in the realm of judicial review of administrative action. A statute may also include propriety also as a ground for exercising revisional jurisdiction. Such a power is wider than the power of judicial review of administrative action. In this branch of administrative law, the legal position in England and India is same. According to Prof. Wade:
'An appeal means that some superior Court or tribunal has power to reconsider the decision of a lower tribunal on its merits. Some times any aspect of the lower decision is open to appeal, but sometimes there is only an appeal on a point of law (as opposed to a question of fact). Rights of appeal are given by statute, and unless some statute confers the right, it does not exist.......................the Courts of law have no inherent jurisdiction to act as Courts of appeal from administrative authorities and tribunals. Review, on the other hand, is based not on the merits but on the legality of the lower authority's proceedings.', Wade - Administrative Law, Second Edn., P.48.
10. There is no uniform pattern as to the scope of a statutory appeal:
Statutory rights of appeal follow no set pattern; they depend for their existence on the terms of the particular statute, and there are comparatively few common features.', Garher-Administrative Law, 5th Edn., P.98
11. Speaking for the majority, Hidayatullah, J., (as he then was ) in Hari Shankar v. Girdhari lal, AIR 1963 SC 698 stated the difference between the two - an appeal and a revision - very precisely:
'The distinction between an appeal and a revision is a real one. A right of appeal carries with it a right of rehearing on law as well as fact, unless the statute conferring the right of appeal limits the rehearing in some way as, we find, has been done in second appeals arising under the Code of Civil Procedure. The power to hear a revision is generally given to a superior Court so that it may satisfy itself that a particular case has been decided according to law. Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court's powers are limited to see whether in a case decided, there has been an assumption of jurisdiction where none existed, or a refusal of jurisdiction where it did, or there has been material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of that jurisdiction.'
12. In respect of decisions rendered by regular civil Courts, the decisional law lays down the proposition that even in respect of revisional matters, the High Court is considered to be an appellate Court 'in the ordinary acceptation of that expression'. The Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey, AIR 1932 PC 165 at 167 stated the rule:
'There is no definition of appeal in the Code of Civil Procedure but their Lord ships have no doubt that any application by a party to an Appellate Court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a Subordinate Court, is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term..............'
Citing the precedents on this aspect, the Supreme Court in Shankar v. Krishna, : [1970]1SCR322 expressed the view as to the true nature of a right of appeal:
'Such a right was one of entering a superior Court and invoking it said and interposition to redress the error of the Court below. Two things which were required to constitute appellate jurisdiction were the existence of the relation of superior and inferior Court and the power on the part of the former to review decisions of the latter.'
Considering the jurisdiction Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court also held:
'.................the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense.'
13. The statutory authority - Directory of Marketing - whose orders are appealable to this Court Under Section 12-G of the Act, is not an inferior Court considered from the point of view of the hierarchical structure of the Court system and so, at the first sight, although it appears that the above statement of law has no relevance, still we think, in view of the specific coneferral of appellate jurisdiction by the Statute on this Court, the extent of the appellate jurisdiction cannot go beyond and farther than the jurisdiction of the authority against whose orders, appeal is provided to this Court. In other words, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is circumscribed to the same extent to which the jurisdiction of the Director of Marketing, the revisional authority, is limited by Section 12-F viz., enquiry into the legality regularity or propriety of any order or proceeding.
14. Whether, on this score, this Court can re-appreciate the entire evidence for the purpose of coming to a different conclusion other than what has been arrived at by the joint Director of Marketing exercising appellate jurisdiction over the assessing authority, merely on the ground that the appellate power conferred on this Court Under Section 12-G is the same as the appellate power of the Joint Director of Marketing Under Section 12-E of the Act? What does the expression 'propriety' mean? According to the learned Additional Advocate-General, when power is conferred under an enactment to interfere with an order on the ground of propriety, the Court doing so can re-appreciate the entire evidence in order to come to a different conclusion totally at variance with what has been arrived at by the Court or the authority whose orders are sought to be revised.
15. We do not think so. The authority cited by the learned Additional Advocate-General -Babulal Nagar (supra)-, it is true, supports this contention. Babulal Nagar (1 supra) arose under the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960. The Labour Court, in respect of a domestic enquiry for mis-conduct held by an employer under Standing Order 12(1)(f) of the Certified Standing Orders, had power, Under Section 61, to examine the 'propriety or legality of an order passed or action taken by an employer acting or purporting to act under the Standing Orders.' The five workmen involved in that case, after a domestic enquiry, were dismissed from service. That order was affirmed by the Labour Court taking the view that there was evidence in support of the alleged mis-conduct and, therefore, the management was justified in imposing the punishment of dismissal from service. On a revision to the Industrial Court, Under Section 66, - the provisions of which are in pari materia with Section 115 C.P.C., - the findings of the Labour Court were reversed on the view that the enquiry officer appeared to have been biased and he was also unfair in reaching the conclusions as to the alleged misconduct. Setting aside the award of the Labour Court the matter was remitted for fresh disposal by the Industrial Court. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh set aside the order of the Industrial Court on the ground: 'the labour Court can only interfere with the decision of the inquiry officer, if the findings arrived at by him were perverse...........that if the finding of the misconduct is a plausible conclusion flowing from the evidence adduced at the enquiry, the labour tribunals have no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer, as an appellate body'. Describing that this view betrays complete lack of understanding of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, a two member Bench of the Supreme Court went into the question as to the extent of the power of interference under the head 'propriety' and held:
'If, therefore, the justice or the justness in relation to a legal proceeding where evidence is led is questioned and the authority is conferred with jurisdiction to examine the propriety of the order of decision that authority will have the same jurisdiction as the original authority to come to a different conclusion on the same set of facts. If any other view is taken, the expression 'propriety' would lose all significance.'
16. With great respect, we think, this view is very greatly shaken to the extent that atleast in respect of matters not concerned with industrial law, the same could no longer be considered as holding the field, in view of the latest judgment of a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Rukmini Amma v. Kalyani Sulochana, : AIR1993SC1616 . Interpreting Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act by which revisional jurisdiction was conferred on the High Court to examine the legality regularity or propriety of an appellate order passed by the District Court under the Act, Mohan, J., speaking for the Bench, while repelling the contention that the High Court was empowered to re-appreciate the evidence to come to a different conclusion in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction Under Section 20, stated the legal position in clear terms:
'Even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report (Exs.C.1 and C.2 Mahazar). In our considered view, the High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word 'propriety', it cannot mean that there could be a reappreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional Court can come to a different conclusion but not on a reappreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it.'
Babulal Nagar (1 supra) was not cited in Rukmini Amma, : AIR1993SC1616 . But on this ground, we are forbidden from taking up a theoritical analysis as to which of the two views is correct; we are bound by the later decision rendered by a larger Bench, Union of India v. Raghubir Singh: : [1989]178ITR548(SC) .
17. There may not be serious objection to confining the view expressed in Babulal Nagar (1 supra) as to the scope of 'propriety' to industrial law. Under the industrial law, a Court or tribunal having seisin, after setting aside the order of discharge or dismissal on the ground that the same was not justified, can go into the question as to what punishment would be appropriate. The principle of proportionality is thus recognised in this branch of law and even the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of matters covered by industrial law can have resort to the principle of proportionality, Union of India v. Paramanand: : (1989)IILLJ57SC ; State of Orissa v. Vidyabhushan: : (1963)ILLJ239SC . When the Labour Court acts as an appellate Court for the purpose of application of the principle of proportionality, the same power this Court also can exercise while reviewing the orders of the industrial Court or tribunal in exercise of its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. The power of a revisional Court under the industrial law, while considering the question of propriety, to reappreciate the evidence for the purpose of coming to a different conclusion, thus remains unaffected and, therefore, viewed from this angle, the ruling in Babulal Nagar (1 supra) can be reconciled as being applicable to cases arising under the industrial law.
18. We, therefore, hold that though statutorily labelled as 'appellate jurisdiction', the power this Court can exercise Under Section 12-G of the Act is no wider than the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon the Director of Marketing Under Section 12-F of the Act, which empowers interference only on grounds of legality, regularity or propriety. But this power is notakin to regular appellate jurisdiction which carries with it a right of re-hearing on law as well as facts.
19. As already noticed supra, coconut oil is not a notified agricultural produce unlike 'copra', its raw material. The undisputed facts are that the appellant imports 'copra' from the State of Kerala, the purchases having been effected by commission agents and transported through public carriers, and takes delivery of the same in Hyderabad. Sometimes, the stocks, before taken delivery of, are subjected to weighment. The Head Office of the appellant is located in Calcutta. The invoices are set through bank and after payment of money, delivery is obtained at Hyderabad.
20. The entire controversy centres around the question: whether the purchase was effected by the appellant in the State of Kerala from where the raw material - Copra - originated or in Hyderabad where delivery was taken? The assessing authority, based upon the explanation to Bye-Law No. 24(5) of the Bye-Laws of the Market Committee and Rule 74(2) of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce & Livestock) Markets Rules, 1969 (for short 'the Rules'), came to the conclusion that the purchases were in fact made in Hyderabad and, therefore, the same was liable to market-fees. The appellate as well as the revisional authority agreed with that view.
21. Market fee is leviable, Under Section 12 of the Act, on any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock 'purchased or sold in the notified market area'. Explanation I to Section 12 (1) lays down that for the purposes of levy of market fee, agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock taken out of a notified market area shall be presumed to have been purchased or sold within such area until the contrary is proved. Rule 74(2)of the Rules, which is relevant, is in the following terms:
'74(2): Such fees shall be leviable as soon as the notified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock is purchased or sold by a licensee. The notified agricultural produce livestock or products of livestock shall be deemed to have been purchased or sold after the notified commodity has been weighed or measured or counted or when it is taken out of the notified market area.'
Unless there is a purchase of sale in the notified market area of any agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock, the Market Committee shall have no power to levy market fee. If any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock is taken out of a notified market, the presumption is that the same has been purchased or sold within such area. But this is a rebuttable presumption. The Act does not define the expression 'sale' or 'purchase'. Even Explanation I to Section 12, which incorporates the presumption, goes to the extent of laying down that only if a notified agricultural produce is taken out of the market area, the presumption is attracted but not otherwise. It, therefore, follows that if a particular transaction is in effect not a sale or purchase and if it falls outside the ambit of Explanation I to Section 12 (1), the same cannot, by a deeming provision either under the Rules or the Bye-Laws, be subjected to market fee.
22. What is forbidden by the Act cannot be permitted by a rule or a bye-faw is a well settled legal principle. But the deeming provision contained in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 74 travels far beyond what is permitted by the principal Section by laying down inter alia, that after a notified commodity has been 'weiged or measured or counted', it shall be deemed to have been purchased or sold. The acts of weighing or measuring or counting shall not by themselves by independently construed as acts of sale of purchase. If they are to be so construed, the Sub-rule will have to be struck down as running counter to Section 12(1). The only harmonious way of interpreting the Sub-rule is by construing that the acts of weighing or measuring or counting referred to therein must be integrally connected with the transaction of sale or purchase. The same interpretation holds good so far as bye-law No. 24 (5) is concerned at It is couched in the language identical to Sub-rule (2) of Rule 74.
23. Explanation I to Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act has no application to the facts of the case. It is nobody's case that from the notified market area of Hyderabad, the appellant had taken out 'copra'. On the other hand, the Market Committee's case is that the appellant had brought into the market area, a notified agricultural produce. There is no dispute on this and so we need not discuss elaborately this aspect. The assessing authority's jurisdiction to assess market fee is founded upon the finding that there was in fact a sale or purchase. What appears to be a sale or purchase to the assessing authority cannot give jurisdiction for levy of market fee.
24. The appellate authority has referred to a copy of invoice No. 357 dated 16-5-85 for arriving at the conclusion that the purchase was effected by the appellant in Hyderabad. This invoice dt 16-5-85 shows that one Abdul Hameed despatched 200 bags of 'copra' through lorry No. MSQ 3971 from Alleppy in Kerala to Hyderabad and the demand draft for Rs. 1,39,000/- was forwarded to bank. The note to the invoice says that the despatch of the goods is made solely at the risk and responsibility of M/s. Shalimar Chemical Works, the appellant herein, and that Abdul Hameed takes 'no responsibility or liability as to delayed despatches, losses due to theft, pilferage, rain or damage, leakage, wear and tear etc. Column 1 of the accompanying Form X mentions the name of the person consigning the goods as Abdul Hameed. Clause 5 of Form X is in the following terms:
'If the consignor is transporting goods in pursuance of a sale for purpose of delivery to the buyer, the name and addresss of the person to whom the goods are sold, his registration certificate No under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. If he is a dealer, furnish bill number and date relating to the sale.'
Against this column No. 5, it is mentioned that the appellant here in is the person to whom the goods are sold. The consignor's name is mentioned in column No. 6 as Abdul Hameed of Alleppey. Column No. 7 is in the following terms:
'7. If the consignor is transporting the goods from one of his shops or godown to an Agent for sale or from one of his shops or godowns to another for the purpose of storage, the address of the Agent or of the shop or godowns to which the transport are made.'
Against this column, it was written 'For sale'. Because it was written in column No. 7 as 'for sale', the appellate authority held that this evidenced that the transport of 'copra' was only to enable the appellant to purchase the same and that the same was not sold in Alleppey.
25. The view taken by the appellate authority is totally unsustainable. As the expression 'sale' is not defined in the Act, we have to go by the definition of 'sale' in the Sale of Goods Act. The invoice as well as the columns in Form-X show that the transaction was not an agreement to sell but it is a concluded contract. The transportation of goods, it is clearly mentioned in column No. 5, was in pursuance of a sale for the purpose of delivery to the buyer. From the fact that the despatch was made solely at the risk of the appellant and that the consignor viz., Abdul Hameed had taken no responsibility or liability for losses it yet another circumstances clearly warranting the inference that the property in the goods was transferred from Abddul Hameed, the consignor, to the appellant herein and the transaction, therefore, is a sale falling within the ambit of Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the sale of Goods Act.
26. Why weighing was done at Hyderabad was explained by Somnath Bhattacharya, the Director of the appellant company in his deposition before the appellate authority. He stated:
'After the material comes to Hyderabad, we will weigh the same for the purpose of verification regarding the quantity despached by the Kerala dealers. We have a running account with the dealers in Kerala State. The account of the dealers will be settled some times monthly and some times within two or three months from the date of despatch..............Very rarefy it is found on weighment at Hyderabad that the quantity despatched by the dealer at Kerala is less than the quantity mentioned in the concerned invoice and in such cases, the Hyderabad unit will send a report to our Head Office and the Head Office raises a debit note against the dealer for the shortage of copra.'
27. The weighment was done only for the satisfaction of the buyer and it was not a condition of the contract as could be seen from the invoice and the Form-X appended thereto. Where specific goods are sold in a deliverable condition, even if the entire price money is not paid, the contract is effective Under Section 20 of the Sale of Goods Act. One significant aspect to be noticed in this case is that after the stocks were loaded into the trucks, the seller in Kerala had absolutely no liability with regard to any future losses. That is the reason why the goods were insured and the insurance premia were paid by the appellant. Where goods have been delivered to a common carrier to be sent to the person, by whom they have been ordered, the carrier becomes the agent of the vendee and such a delivery amounts to delivery to the vendee Under Section 23(2) of the Sale of Goods Act. Marwar Tent Factory v. Union of India: . There was thus completed sale in Kerala State and no purchase in the State of Andhra Pradesh.
28. We do not agree with the contention of Sri Sethurama Reddy, learned Counsel for the Market Committee, that because of the fiction incorporated in Rule 74(2) and bye-law No. 24(5), no enquiry into the question whether there was actual sale or purchase is permissible. As already stated, a rule or bye-law cannot provide for what is not permitted by the Section. Introducing a fiction by delegated legislation is impermissible. Even with regard to statutory fictions, the normal rules of statutory interpretation are not by-passed but their aid is taken in discerning the fictitious intention of the legislature. In this regard, we think, logic and equity also have a role to play in the interpretative process. Market fee is levied on purchase or sale in the notified market area of any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock. Its width and amplitude ought to be limited to what Section 12(1) of the Act seeks to achieve. 'Legal fiction' as observed by the Supreme Court, 'is adopted in law for a limited and definite purpose only and there is no justification for expanding it beyond the purpose for which the legislature adopted it', Braithwaite & Co. v. E.S.I. Corporation, : (1968)ILLJ550SC .
29. All the three authorities - the original, appellate and revisional authority - have clearly mis-directed themselves as to the legal position. Reliance upon bye-law No. 24(5) and Sub-rule (2) of Rule 74 of the Rules was totally illegal since as already discussed above, weighment by itself, without anything more, would never by approximated to a transaction of sale. All the three authorities had taken into consideration matters which were irrelevant to what they had to consider. The conclusion reached by them on the basis of the irrelevant material viz., the factum of weighment, and column No. 7 in Form X we think, was undoubtedly so unreasonable that no reasonable body would ever come to such a conclusion.12 We, therefore, fault the conclusions arrived at by the three authorities on the principles laid down by Lord Green, M.R., in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd., Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) 1 All.E.R. 680.
30. By mis-constructing the scope of Section 12(1) of the Act with reference to Rule 74(2) and bye-law No. 24(5), all the three statutory authorities had mis-directed themselves in law by relying upon totally irrelevant matters viz., the factum of weighment and column 7 of Form X. Conclusions drawn from such a mis-direction in law would clearly be unsustainable, Padfield v. Min. of Agriculture: (1968) 1 All.E.R. 694. The error committed by the three authorities viz.' approaching the case on an entirely wrong footing' as regards the liability of the appellant, goes to the very root of the determination, rendering the decision illegal, R v. Paodington Valuation Officer: (1965) 2 All.E.R. 836.
31. For these reasons, the appeal is allowed. The impugned revisional order of the Director of Marketing into which the appellate and the original assessment order are merged, is set aside. The question of remitting the matter for fresh consideration to any of the statutory authorities would not arise as we found that the foundation for the levy of market fee in question by the assessing authority as affirmed by the appellate and revisional authority - weighment of 'copra' by the appellant in the notified market area -itself is unsustainable in law. No costs.