1. The common question that arises for decision in this batch of writ petitions is whether the NTR University of Health Sciences, one of the respondents in the writ petitions, is justified in refusing to permit the petitioner-students to appear for the first year MBBS Examinations scheduled to be conducted between 7.10.2002 and 16.10.2002 merely on the ground that the petitioner-students were admitted to the first year MBBS Course after 12.11.2001.
2. Facts of W.P.Nos.16805, 15905, 16339 and 17120 of 2002:
All the petitioners-students had appeared for EAMCET examination and they are fully qualified to be considered for admission to the first year MBBS course during the academic year 2001-2002 by securing the required ranks in the merit list. However, the petitioners were not selected for admission to the first year MBBS course in the 1st and 2nd phases of admissions in respect of which counseling was held in the month of September, 2001 and November, 2001 respectively. The admissions of the petitioners were not undertaken by the respondent University in the 1st and 2nd phase of admissions because of the pendency of W.P.No.24204 of 2000 and batch in this Court and in view of the interim orders granted by this Court in those writ petitions not to fill up the vacancies on the ground that sliding method adopted by the University is not permissible. At this stage, it is relevant to mention that during the academic year 2000-2001, certain students had filed W.P.No.25974 of 2000 and batch questioning the procedure for admission into MBBS courses for payment category seats on the ground that the sliding from payment to free category is not permissible and also to exclude the creamy layer in backward classes from claiming the seats under payment category and to make available the seats so vacated to the open category candidates.A learned single Judge of this Court on 16.7.2001 dismissed the above batch of writ petitions.During the pendency of those writ petitions, the Court directed the University by way of interim orders not to fill up 37 consequential seats during the pendency of the cases. The petitioners therein being aggrieved by the above final order of the learned single Judge dated 16.7.2001 preferred W.A.No.1222 of 2001 and Batch.Those writ appeals were finally heard by a Full Bench of this Court and they were dismissed confirming the order of the learned single Judge by judgment and order dated 13.11.2001. After the disposal of the above writ appeals, counselling was conducted on 12.12.2001 and 13.12.2001 and the petitioners were given admissions to the first year MBBS course during the academic year 2001-2002 in various colleges and the classes for them were commenced on 19.12.2001.
3. Facts of W.P.No. 14653 of 2002 :
The petitioner in this writ petition appeared for EAMCET 2000 examination and secured 2121 rank. She belongs to BC-A, a reserved category. However, she was not granted admission as a BC-A student on the ground that the caste certificate granted by the prescribed authority in her favour is not valid.Aggrieved by the said action, the petitioner, represented by her father and natural guardian, filed W.P. No. 18817 of 2001 in this Court and secured an interim order to reserve one seat in the first year MBBS course in her favour in the event of she succeeding in the writ petition. Subsequently, this Court by its Judgment and order dated 1.11.2001 allowed the said writ petition directing the respondent-University to grant admission to the petitioner on the basis of the rank obtained by her and treating her as BC-A candidate for S.V.U. region or any other region in accordance with rules. In the meanwhile, counselling for selection of candidates for admission into free seats and payment seats in the Alluri Seetharamaraju College of Medical Sciences, Eluru, the 2nd respondent in the writ petition, was held between 3.11.2001 and 5.11.2001. In compliance with the Judgment of this Court in W.P.No. 18817 of 2001, the University allotted the petitioner to the 2nd respondent-College vide its letter dated 27.11.2001, in pursuance of which the petitioner was admitted into the 2nd respondent-College on 30.11.2001 to the first year MBBS course. Since the admission of the petitioner, she has attended all the classes regularly and has put in more than 85% of attendance.
4. It is the case of all the petitioners that all of them have put in more than 80% of attendance, which is more than the prescribed attendance under the Regulations and they have attended the prescribed teaching days in all the subjects i.e., Anatomy, Bio-Chemistry, Physiology and Community Medicine. In W.P.No.16339 of 2002, it is stated that the teaching programme to the first year MBBS course was scheduled to be closed on 10.9.2002. It is also stated that all the petitioner-students and similarly circumstanced other students were permitted to appear in the three Internal examinations conducted by the concerned colleges and all of them have passed in all the three internal examinations.
5. When the matter stood thus, the Registrar of the NTR University of Health Sciences, Hyderabad, issued Notification dated 2.8.2002 directing that only those students who were admitted to the first year MBBS course before 12.11.2001 would be permitted to appear for the first year MBBS course examinations scheduled to be held between 7.10.2002 and 16.10.2002.Since the petitioner-students were admitted to the first year MBBS course only in the month of December 2001, being aggrieved by the above direction of the University, they have filed the above writ petitions seeking declaration that the action of the University in fixing 12-11-2001 as the cut-off date for allowing candidates for first year MBBS examination as arbitrary, illegal and for a consequential direction to the respondent-University to permit the petitioners to prosecute MBBS course along with the regular batch of students of the academic year 2001-2002 and to declare that the petitioners are also eligible and qualified to appear for the first year MBBS examination along with the regular batch of students of the academic year 2001-2002 to be held from 7.10.2002.
6. Opposing the writ petitions, the respondent-University has filed counter-affidavits. Substantially similar contentions are raised in all the counter affidavits. In brief, the contentions raised by the respondent-University are the following: The respondent-University issued notification on 16.7.2002 calling for applications from eligible students to appear for the first year MBBS course examination to be held from 7.10.2002. In the meanwhile, the respondent-University notified that only those students who joined the first year MBBS course on or before 12.11.2001 during the academic year 2001-2002 are eligible to appear for the examination. The classes for the academic year 2001-2002 were commenced from 29.1.2001 to the regular batch of students. The respondent-University has fixed 12.11.2001 as the cut-off date taking into consideration of the last date of joining of the candidates selected during the second phase of admissions made in the month of November 2001. Since the petitioner-students were admitted to the first year MBBS course only in the month of December 2001 and classes to them commenced only from 19.12.2001, they have not completed the 12 month duration of the course as on the cut-off date, and, hence, as per the Regulations framed by the Medical Council of India they are not entitled to appear for the examination. The delay in admitting the petitioner-students to the first year MBBS course occasioned on account of pendency of the writ petitions and the writ appeals referred to above and the interim orders obtained by the petitioners therein and, therefore, the respondent-University is not responsible for the delay. The respondent-University is left with no discretionary power under the Regulations framed by it as well as by the Medical Council of India to grant any exemption to the petitioner-students or to cut short their duration of the course on any grounds whatsoever. If the writ petitioners are permitted to appear for the examinations scheduled to commence from 7.10.2002, it would tantamount to the University reducing the duration of the course prescribed by the Medical Council of India by 3 months and, therefore, such a course is ex-facie impermissible in law. The decision taken by the University in fixing 12.11.2001 as the cut-off date is in the domain of academic matter and such a decision is not justiciable. No valid ground is made out by the petitioners to assail the impugned decision taken by the University. In order to qualify for appearance in the examinations, it is not enough if the petitioner-students have earned the prescribed 75% of the minimum attendance, but such attendance should have been earned by them in the whole of the academic year and not in a part of the academic year, and since the petitioners have not completed the whole of the academic year after their admissions to the 1st year MBBS course, they cannot claim, as a matter of right, that they should be permitted to appear for the examinations solely on the ground that they have earned the prescribed minimum percentage of attendance. None of the legal rights of the writ petitioners are violated and, therefore, issuance of mandamus would not arise.
7. On behalf of the petitioners, Sri Nooty Ram Mohan Rao, learned counsel, led the arguments. Sri Nooty Ram Mohan Rao contended that the cut-off date 12.11.2001 fixed by the respondent-University for the purpose of permitting the students of the first year MBBS course to appear for the examinations to be held from 7.10.2002 is totally arbitrary, irrational and violative of statutory regulations and it cannot be sustained on the touchstone of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. Sri Nooty Ram Mohan Rao contended that the artificial classification sought to be made by the respondent-University between the students who are admitted on or before 12.11.2001 and the others who are admitted after 12.11.2001 is whimsical and fanciful and such a classification cannot be regarded as a reasonable classification and, therefore, it cannot be sustained. Sri Nooty Ram Mohan Rao contended that all the students admitted to the first year MBBS course during the academic year 2001-2002, regardless of the actual date of admission or the date of commencement of their studies in the concerned college would constitute a 'well-defined' group and, therefore, all of them should be treated alike as mandated by Art. 14 of the Constitution. Sri Nooty Ram Mohan Rao contended that after the admission of the petitioners and similarly circumstanced other students in the month of December 2001, all of them have been attending the classes regularly and they have earned more than the prescribed minimum attendance in all the subjects. Sri Nooty Ram Mohan Rao highlighted that the petitioners had no part to play in contributing for the delay in admitting the petitioner-students to the first year MBBS course in the month of December 2001 and the delay in admitting the petitioner-students is mainly attributable to the University and, secondly, to the pendency of the writ petition Nos. 24204 of 2000 and batch and W.A.No. 1222 of 2000 and batch in this Court. Sri Nooty Ram Mohan Rao contended that the reasons stated by the University for not allowing the petitioner-students to appear for the first year MBBS examinations is that they fall short of the prescribed duration of the course by one month. The learned Counsel further contended that in the notification dated 5.12.2001, itself the respondent-University has clearly mentioned that the selected candidates would be able to appear for the University examination only on undergoing the prescribed period of course under the Medical Council of India Regulations and that since the petitioners have undergone the prescribed period of course, and have earned the required attendance, they are entitled to appear for the examinations to be held in the month of October, 2002 and, therefore, the action of the respondent-University in excluding the petitioners from appearing for the examinations is totally arbitrary and unfair. M/s.S.Sri Ram, Pratap Narayan Sanghi and K.Vasudeva Reddy, learned counsel for other petitioners adopted the arguments of Sri Nooty Ram Mohan Rao. Sri Sriram, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P.No.15903 of 2002 and W.P.No.14653 of 2002, while supplementing the contentions put-forth by Sri Nooty Ram Mohan Rao, contended that the classification of the students who are admitted to the first year MBBS Course during the academic year 2001-2002 by fixing 12.11.2001 as the cut-off date, is devoid of any rationale and that classification cannot be regarded as a reasonable classification permissible under Article 14 of the Constitution. Sri Sriram, would maintain that what is relevant to decide the question whether a candidate should be permitted to appear for the examination or not is the percentage of attendance earned by the student during the concerned academic year as a qualifying criterion and not whether the student has completed one complete year in the first year MBBS course after the classes were commenced.
8. Sri K.G.K. Prasad, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-University, on the other hand, contended that the Medical Council of India has framed 'Regulations on Graduate Medical Education, 1997', in exercise of the powers conferred under Sections 19 and 33 of Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and in terms of Regulation 7(1), the petitioners have not fulfilled the prescribed eligibilities to appear for the first year MBBS examination scheduled to be held in the month of October, 2002. The learned Standing Counsel pointed out that the classes to those students who were admitted to the first year MBBS course in the first phase of admissions during the academic year 2001-2002 commenced from 21.9.2001 and since the classes for the petitioner-students commenced only with effect from 19.12.2001, it is reasonable and permissible for the University to group the students of the first year MBBS course into two categories, i.e., those students who were admitted before 12.11.2001 and the remaining were students who were admitted after 12.11.2001 and both the groups of students cannot be regarded as equals within the contemplation of Article 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, no exception can be taken to the notification dated 2.8.2001 fixing 12.11.2001 as cut-off date for the purpose of permitting the first year MBBS students to appear for the first year MBBS examination scheduled to be held in the month of October, 2002. The learned Standing Counsel contended that merely because the petitioner-students have earned 75% of attendance after joining the first year MBBS course, they are not entitled to appear for the examination regardless of the fact whether they have completed the whole of the academic year or not. According to the learned Standing Counsel, computation of attendance would arise only when a student attends and completes the whole of the academic year.The learned Standing Counsel contended that if the reliefs sought by the petitioners are granted, it would violate the mandatory provisions of the Regulations framed by the Medical Council of India.The learned Standing Counsel also contended that the respondent-University is left with no discretionary power to reduce the duration of the course on any grounds and since admittedly none of the petitioners and similarly circumstanced students who are admitted to the 1st year MBBS course in the month of December 2001 have undergone the course of instruction in terms of the prescribed duration under the Regulation, they cannot claim, as a matter of right, that despite deficiency in the duration of the course, they should be permitted to appear for the examination. The learned counsel contended that under no circumstance mandamus will issue to the respondent-University to permit the petitioner-students to appear for the examinations in breach of the mandatory regulations framed by the Medical Council of India. The learned Standing Counsel in support of his submission placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Dr. S. Suryanarayana v. University of Health Sciences,1 T.Vamsi Charan v. The University of Health Sciences rep. by its Registrar, Vijayawada and another,2 M.Rupesh and others v. The N.T.R. University of Health Sciences, rep. by its Registrar, Vijayawada and others3 and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Medical Council of India v. Sarang and others.
9. The Medical Council of India in exercise of powers conferred under Sections 19 and 33 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 has framed 'Regulations on Graduate Medical Education, 1997' for short 'the Regulations.' These regulations provide for eligibility of a student for admission into MBBS course, the duration of study, the prescribed study sessions and the required percentage of attendance to be eligible for appearance in the examination etc. In regard to the duration of the course, Regulation 7 provides -
'7. Training Period and Time Distribution (1) Every student shall undergo a period of certified study extending over 4 1/2 academic years divided into 9 semesters (i.e., of 6 months each) from the date of commencement of his study for the subjects comprising the medical curriculum to the date of completion of examination and followed by one year compulsory rotating internship. Each semester will consist of approximately 120 teaching days of 8 hours each college working time, including one hour of lunch.
10. The first year MBBS course consists of two semesters. The period of duration of the MBBS course is 4 1/2 years and as per Regulation 7(1), each semester consists of approximately 120 teaching days of 8 hours each college working time, including one hour of lunch. Therefore, in terms of Regulation 7(1), there should be approximately and not exactly 240 teaching days in an academic year.
11. The eligibility of the student to appear for the examination is prescribed under Regulation 12(1). It reads as follows :
'12. Examination RegulationsEssentialities for qualifying to appear in professional examinations.
The performance in essential components of training are to be assessed, based on :
(1) Attendance :
75% of attendance in a subject for appearing in the examination is compulsory provided he/she has 80% attendance in non lecture teaching i.e., seminars, group discussions, tutorials, demonstrations, practicals, Hospital (Tertiary, Secondary, Primary) postings and bed side clinics etc.'
12. If we read the provisions of Regulation 7(1) and 12(1) together harmoniously, it makes very clear that out of the minimum prescribed teaching session of 240 days a year, a student to qualify for examination would have to obtain 75% of the attendance in classes to be eligible for an appearance in the examination. There is no controversy between the parties as regards this position. But the contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the University is that a student in order to be eligible for appearance in the examination should earn the prescribed minimum percentage of attendance in the whole of the academic year and not in a part of the academic year. This contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the University, in our considered opinion, is not well-founded.There is no warrant to place such interpretation on the provisions of Regulation 7(1) read with Regulation 12(1) as well as the regulations for MBBS degree course framed by the respondent-University itself.The revised regulations for the MBBS course of the NTR University of Health Sciences, Vijayawada dealing with duration of the course provides as under :
V. DURATION OF THE COURSE : The duration of the certified study of the Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery course shall be 4 1/2 Academic Years followed by one year compulsory rotating internship. Normally the MBBS course shall commence on the 1st July of an Academic Year.
13. The period of 4 1/2 years is divided into (9 semesters each semester of 6 months) three phases as follows :
Phase Distributing and Timing of Examination :
6 Months6 Months6 Months
121st ProfessionalExamination(during SecondSemester)
3452nd ProfessionalExamination(duringFifth Semester)
673rd Professional Part I(during 7th Semester)
893rd Professional part II(final professional)during 9th Semester
a) Passing in 1st professionals is compulsory before proceeding to phase II training.
14. Further, the same regulations dealing with attendance provides as follows :
VIII. Attendance : 75% of attendance in a subject is compulsory provided the student has 80% attendance in non lecture teaching i.e., seminars, group of discussion, tutorials, demonstrations, practicals, hospital postings, bed side clinics, failing which the student will not be permitted to appear for the University exam with his batch of students.
15. Regulation 12(1) framed by the Medical Council of India and Regulation VIII framed by the NTR University of Health Sciences prescribe that a candidate should have 75% of attendance in a subject failing which such student will not be permitted to appear for the University examination with his batch of students. These Regulations do not insist that a student in order to qualify himself to appear for the University examinations should earn the prescribed 75% of attendance in the whole of the academic year by attending classes during the whole of the academic year, that is to say, from the date of commencement of the course to the date of end of the course.What is material and necessary is that regardless of the actual date of admission of a student to a course, such student should earn the prescribed attendance during the concerned academic year and if he earns such prescribed minimum attendance in terms of the Regulation framed by the University, such student is entitled to appear for the University examination with his batch of students. All the students in their pleadings have categorically stated that after they joined the MBBS course, they have regularly attended the theory and practical classes and they have earned more than 80 to 90% of attendance. In para (4) of the affidavit filed in W.P.No.16339 of 2002, it is stated thus :
'Be that as it may, for all the writ petitioners who fought the legal battle for which the 2nd respondent university who was under an obligation to conduct counseling for the students who fought the legal battle and who appeared in the entrance examination in the year 2000-2001 was held on 12.12.2001 and we were allowed to attend the classes and participate in the studies along with the students who were admitted to the respective MBBS/BDS courses in the academic year 2001-2002 i.e., along with the students who were admitted on 21.9.2001 and 12.11.2001. It is respectfully submitted that in fact special classes were also conducted for us by the respective college mainly to bring us on par with the other students and in fact the complete portion is covered.It is also relevant to submit that we appeared in all the internal examinations.'
16. The petitioners have also stated that they were permitted to appear in the three internal examinations conducted by the concerned colleges in terms of the University Regulations, because, they have undergone the prescribed curricula and instructions and all of them have passed in the internal examinations with some petitioners securing even ranks. These factual assertions made by the petitioner-students on oath are not denied by the University in its counter affidavits. Even at the time of arguments on behalf of the University, this assertion made by the petitioners was not denied nor any contra materials are placed before the Court to doubt the integrity of the statements of the petitioner-students made on oath.
17. If the provisions of Regulation 7(1) and 12(1) are read together harmoniously, it is reasonable to hold that out of the minimum prescribed teaching session of 240 days a year, the student would have to obtain 75% of the attendance in classes in order to qualify himself or herself for an appearance in the examination.Appendix C to the Regulations prescribes the minimum teaching hours for various disciplines in the first year MBBS course. As per this prescription, 650 hours are allotted to the subject of Anatomy, 480 hours to the subject of Physiology, 240 hours to the subject of Bio-Chemistry and 60 hours to the subject of Community Medicine. Therefore, it is reasonable and fair for the University to insist that the students in order to be eligible for appearance for the examination should possess the minimum prescribed 75% attendance in each of the subjects and that minimum attendance should have been earned by the students during the academic year 2001-2002. Instead, the University, as reflected in the counters, is insisting that it is not enough if the petitioners have earned 75% of attendance after their admissions into the first year MBBS course in the month of December, 2001 during the academic year 2001-2002, but they should have also undergone the training during the whole of the academic year. According to the University, the academic year 2001-2002 for the first year MBBS course commenced on 21.9.2001 when classes were commenced to the students who are admitted to the 1st year MBBS course in the 1st phase of admissions. This stand of the University, in our considered opinion, is totally arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair apart from being fanciful. Before stating our reasons in support of the above opinion, it is pertinent to state that even the respondent University does not stand by its own professed norms stated above in fixing 12.11.2001 as the cut-of date. It is trite even those students who were admitted to the course in the 2nd phase of admission and in respect of whom classes commenced on 12.11.2001 should also be reckoned not to complete a year of study. However, in respect of such students, the attendance percentage is taken into account for considering the eligibility of the students to appear in the examination.The same standard is not applied in the case of the petitioners by fixing the cut-off date. It is needless to state that the percentage of attendance alone is the proper criteria for writing the examination and fixation of the cut-off date as qualifying criteria to appear in the examination has neither rationale nor any legal or statutory support.
18. If the object of the University is to ensure that the students have the requisite attendance percentage, which seems to be the case as brought out in the impugned notification itself, the date on which admission was taken by the student becomes irrelevant. Any prescription of cut-off date, can be legally valid if fixed having regard to the last admission made, which for the academic year 2001-2002, it was stated before us, went on till January, 2002. Such students by reason of lesser attendance would automatically be disabled from appearing in the examination. Such is not the case in the case of the petitioners.It is not the case of the University that the petitioner-students have not earned or would not earn 75% of attendance during the academic year 2001-2002 before the teaching sessions end. On the other hand, it is the case of the petitioners that they would earn more than the required percentage of attendance before the teaching sessions for the batch end. In the writ affidavit filed in W.P.No.15903 of 2002, it is stated thus :
'... Further, it is respectfully submitted that with effect from 12.11.2001, the 2nd respondent would conduct the teaching session for 253 days ending 5.10.2002 and I would attend a total number of 223 working days until that date. Thus effectively, I have lost out on 30 working days by reason of delayed admission though, I would still possess the required eligibility percentage of attendance, if calculated on the total number of the teaching days.'
19. The classification sought to be made by the University by fixing the cut-off date among the students admitted to the first year MBBS course during the academic year 2001-2002, in our considered opinion, cannot be regarded as a reasonable classification. We do not find any rationale behind the classification of the students into two categories i.e., those who were admitted to the course before 12.11.2001 and others were admitted to the course on or after 12.11.2001.
20. It is trite, the statutory and administrative powers vested in the statutory authorities and the executive/administrative authorities have to be exercised reasonably, fairly and justly and in accordance with the postulates of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The postulates of Article 14 mandate that the statutory and administrative powers vested in the public and statutory authorities should be exercised reasonably, fairly and in the public interest and in keeping in mind the objective behind the power. Since the guarantee of equal protection enshrined in Article 14 embraces the entire realm of `State action', it would extend not only when an individual is discriminated against in the matter of exercise of his rights or in the matter of imposing liabilities upon him, but also in the matter of granting privileges, for example, granting licenses for entering into any business, inviting tenders for entering into a contract relating to government business, or issuing quotas, giving jobs, granting exemptions or relaxations etc. This position is well settled by the binding pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. IAAI,5 Kasturilal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J & K6. One facet of Article 14 is that when a Statute confers too broad and unregulated discretionary power on an authority, the Statute itself may be held void under Article 14. That is not the question that arises in the present case. The third dimension of the equality clause developed by the courts over a period of time starting from E.P.Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu,7 R.D.Setty v. International Airport Authority,8 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,9 H.D.Vora v. State of Maharashtra10, to cite a few, illegalises the discriminatory or arbitrary action by the administration and the statutory authorities. Article 14 mandates that the authority entrusted with the discretionary power under the Statute should not act in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner and could not treat equals differently and it should follow the policy or the principle laid down in the Statute to regulate its discretion. In other words, Article 14 embodies a guarantee against the administrative/statutory arbitrariness.Therefore any action of the administrative or the statutory authority which may be regarded as arbitrary, discriminatory or unequal, may be challenged under Article 14 of the Constitution. In Bachan Singh v. Punjab,11 Bhagwati, J., has emphasized that Rule of Law which permeates the entire fabric of the Constitution of India and indeed forms one of its basic features excludes arbitrariness. The learned Judge has said: 'Whenever we find arbitrariness or unreasonableness there is denial of rule of law.' Arbitrariness is antithetical to equality. In A.L.Kalra v. P & E Corpn. of India Ltd.,12 the Supreme Court has observed :
'Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in executive/administrative action because any action that is arbitrary must necessarily involve the negation of equality. One need not confine the denial of equality to a comparative evaluation between two persons to arrive at a conclusion of discriminatory treatment. An action per se arbitrary itself denies equality of protection by law'.
21. Further, in Sudhir Chandra v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd,13 the Supreme Court has observed as follows :
'.... Our Constitution envisages a society governed by rule of law. Absolute discretion uncontrolled by guidelines which may permit denial of equality before law is the anti-thesis of rule of law. Absolute discretion not judicially reviewable inheres the pernicious tendency to be arbitrary and is therefore violative of Article 14. Equality before law and absolute discretion to grant or deny benefit of the law are diametrically opposed to each other and cannot co-exist.'
22. The third dimension of Article 14 transcends the classificatory principle. Article 14 after Royappa (supra 12) is not equated with the principle of classification and by virtue of dynamic and liberal construction placed on its postulates, the scope of Article 14 has become much broader. Therefore, if a law is arbitrary or irrational, it would fall foul of Article 14. Therefore, when an applicant under Article 226 of the Constitution complains that his claim made to a statutory authority has been rejected arbitrarily, and without taking into account the circumstances and the factors germane to the decision-making, it becomes the duty of the Court to see whether the claim of the petitioner has been treated by the statutory authority fairly, reasonably and keeping in mind the statutory objectives or the objects behind the grant of discretionary power.
23. In the present case, we are of the considered opinion that it is not permissible for the respondent-University to classify the students who are admitted to the first year MBBS course during the academic year 2001-2001, at the threshold itself, without reference to the attendance earned by them but only on the basis of the actual date of admissions into the course, because all of them belong to a 'well defined' class of students who are admitted to a particular course during a particular academic year. Therefore, initial classification of such students by the University by fixing 12.11.2001 as cut-off date is prohibited under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, such a classification should be termed as arbitrary and unreasonable by applying the third dimension of Article 14.
24. It is true what Article 14 prohibits is class legislation and not reasonable classification. If the University were to reasonably classify the students admitted into the first year MBBS course during the academic year 2001-2002 for the purpose of permitting the students to appear for the examination scheduled to be held in the month of October, 2002 and if it were to deal equally with all students belonging to a well defined class, it would not be open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that the prohibition does not apply to other students. The question is whether the classification made by the University classifying the students into two categories is a permissible classification under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is well settled that in order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, viz., (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differential which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that that differential must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification made by the University, in the first place, is not founded on any intelligible differential and secondly, the 'cut-off date criterion' would not achieve any object sought to be achieved under Regulation 7 framed by the Medical Council of India. We say this because, Regulation 7(1), read with Regulation 12(1) and also Regulation V framed by the University itself, if read together harmoniously, would show that the object behind the prescriptions contained in these regulations is that only a student admitted to a course who earns a minimum prescribed 75% of attendance would qualify himself or herself to appear for the examination after the end of the course and not others. From these provisions, it cannot be said that a student in order to qualify himself or herself to appear for examination should complete the entire duration of the course. Be that as it may, in the facts and circumstances of this case, such insistence on the part of the University would be totally irrational and arbitrary, and tantamount to asking the petitioner-students to perform something impossible. We say this because, under Regulation V, though it is stated that normally MBBS course shall commence on the 1st July of an academic year, the University did not adhere to this schedule and according to the University, even the 1st phase of admissions were done only in the month of September, 2001. Regulation V provides that the 1st professional examination will be held during second semester. This prescription was also not adhered to by the University because admittedly the examination is scheduled to be held commencing from 7th October, 2002. Thirdly, the University in fixing the cut-off date does not seem to enforce its own norms in the case of those students who were admitted to the first year MBBS course during the 2nd phase of admissions in the month of November, 2001, because, those students admittedly would not complete one full academic year when the teaching sessions will end. If the University were to admit all the students to the first year MBBS course during the academic year 2001-2002 in one phase and commence classes for all of them with effect from 21.9.2001, perhaps, there would have some element of rationality in insisting that all those students should have completed the whole academic year of instructions and teaching. For varieties of reasons, as noticed earlier, all the students of the first year MBBS course during the academic year 2001-2002 could not be admitted in the month of September, 20001, much less on or before 1st July, 2001 as provided under Regulation V of the University.
25. Further, in the instant case, there was a delay in admitting the petitioner-students in the first year MBBS course and the petitioner- students were not responsible for the delay. Delay occurred partly on account of the pendency of the writ petition and writ appeals in this Court and the interim orders made therein and partly because the delay caused by the University itself after the disposal of the writ appeals. In the affidavit filed in W.P.No.16339 of 2002, it is stated that after the disposal of the writ appeals, the petitioner-students as well as their parents repeatedly made representation to the University authorities to conduct the counselling without any further loss of time, but the University did not conduct counselling forthwith. The University conducted the counselling for the petitioner-students only on 12.12.2001 and 13.12.2001, that is to say, roughly one month after the writ appeals were dismissed by the Full Bench of this Court on 13.11.2001.
26. After the admission, it is stated in the writ affidavits that the petitioner-students were permitted to participate in the teaching programmes along with the students who were admitted on 21.9.2001 and 12.11.2001. It is also stated that the special classes were conducted for the petitioner-students by the respective colleges to bring them on par with other students and in that process, the entire syllabus prescribed for the first year MBBS course students is covered. When this is the factual position, it will be totally unfair and irrational for the University to make the petitioners to lose one valuable academic year, which if it is lost, would have perilous consequences on the careers of the petitioner-students. Although in the counters of the University, it is stated that the impugned norm is evolved in order to see that unless a candidate acquires the knowledge, skill and proficiency, he/she may not be able to pursue the second and subsequent phases of MBBS course, we are at a loss to understand how that objective is achieved by prescribing the impugned cut-off date. As pointed out supra, the above objective stated by the University in the counter affidavits could be achieved by insisting that a candidate in order to qualify himself or herself to appear for examination should earn minimum prescribed 75% of attendance. Insistence on attendance ensures a student would be exposed to required standard of knowledge, skill and proficiency in the professional course. Mere length of the course regardless of percentage of attendance is totally irrelevant, because, it may so happen that a student might have been admitted to the course in the first phase of admissions, but he might not have attended any classes in the whole of the academic year.Therefore, it is crystal-clear that the objective discernible behind the Regulation 7(1) read with Regulation 12(1) framed by the Medical Council of India and the relevant Regulations framed by the University itself could be achieved only by insisting that a candidate, in order to qualify for appearing in the examinations, should earn the prescribed minimum percentage of attendance in each discipline. Therefore, if the writ petitioner-students are permitted to appear for the examinations scheduled to be held in the month of October, 2002 provided they have earned minimum percentage of 75% of attendance, the objective sought to be achieved by the Regulation and the University would not be sacrificed.
27. In Kum. Sunita Prashanti v. University of Health Sciences,14 the appellant therein was admitted to the B.Sc., Nursing course on 25.11.1992 and she actually started attending the classes from 26.11.1992. But in that case, the first year of B.Sc., Nursing curse started on 17th July, 1992 and the academic year ended on 18.4.1993. The appellant was denied admission to the examination on the ground that during the first year course her requisite attendance, which should have been 75% in the concerned subjects, fall short and was found to be only 52%. The appellant challenged the said decision of the University by filing the writ petition. In the writ petition, it was contended by the appellant that she had already applied for being admitted to the said course on 6th July, 1992 i.e., prior to the date of starting of the course, but she was denied admission. However, a learned single Judge of this Court, on 26.8.1992, dismissed the said writ petition. Thereupon, the appellant filed Writ Appeal in this Court on 24th September, 1992. A Division Bench of this Court allowed the said Writ Appeal on 3rd November, 1992 directing the authorities to admit the appellant to the first year Nursing course. Accordingly, the appellant was admitted to the first year Nursing course on 25.11.1992 and she actually started attending the classes from 26.11.1992. Since the University refused permission to appear for the examination on the ground that she has not earned 75% of attendance in the concerned subjects, the appellant filed W.P.No.4535 of 1993 and the same was dismissed by a learned single Judge on 15.6.1993. Thereupon, the appellant preferred Writ Appeal No.633 of 1993. In that case, it was established that the percentage of attendance earned by the appellant therein, if calculated from 26th November, 1992 when she was admitted to the first year Nursing course till 19th April, 1993 when the course ended comes to 97% in the subjects. But the contention of the University was that the percentage of attendance, as per rules, had to be calculated from the actual starting of the course i.e., 17th July, 1992 and that if the starting point is taken as 17th July, 1992, then the appellant's attendance from that date till 18.4.1993 when the course ended, would be shorter than the prescribed minimum percentage of attendance. In the above factual matrix of that case, the Division Bench while allowing the writ appeal was pleased to hold :
'A mere look at the above rule shows that if a candidate is in a position to attend the classes and is permitted to attend the classes during the relevant time, but still the candidate does not attend the classes and falls short of 75% attendance in each subject, the eligibility for examination would be lost.But on the facts of the present case, it is difficult to appreciate how the appellant could have been permitted to attend the classes from 17th July, 1992 itself. The authorities had rejected her admission to the course, for the first time, they allowed the appellant to attend the classes from 26th November, 1992 when the writ appeal was allowed. Till that time, even though the appellant would have tried to attend the classes, she would not have been permitted to attend the classes. Therefore, this period cannot be said to be a period which was available to the appellant to attend classes and still on her own she did not attend the classes for reasons which might have been available to her.Therefore, 75% of attendance as required by the rule would be the attendance during the period a candidate is permitted to attend but does not attend the classes for any reason. The rule cannot be read to mean that even though a candidate is not admitted at all to the course during that period, his liability to attend the classes would start functioning and he would be treated to have not attended the classes during that period. That would be asking the candidates to do the impossible. We may however, make it clear that regular attendance at classes and practicals is absolutely essential for enabling a candidate to appear at the examination. But, on the facts of this case, we find that from 26.11.1992, appellant had almost five months to get requisite attendance in classes and practicals. Hence, she could not be told off the gates at the stage of examination after the academic year had run out.
Therefore, on the facts of this case, it must be held that the operation of Rule 6 will be confined to the period from 25th November, 1992 till 18th April, 1993. If it is so confined, then for that period admittedly the appellant's attendance is 97% in the concerned subjects, meaning thereby she had more than 65% which is the requisite attendance.Therefore, it must be held that the appellant was eligible to appear at the examinations in question and she was wrongly refused such permission to appear at the examinations. Once that conclusion is reached, the result becomes obvious - the writ appeal will have to be allowed. The order dismissing the writ petition is set aside and the writ petition is allowed.The respondents are now directed to declare the result of the appellant for the first year B.Sc., Nursing Course examination at which she had appeared. The suit of the appellant to be declared along with the result of other candidates in accordance with law.
The writ appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.'
28. In Harsh Pratap Sisodia v. Union of India,15 the petitioner had passed the Intermediate examination and subsequently appeared for the All India Pre-Medical Entrance examination and he was informed on 10.7.1988 that the allotment of medical college would be made by the Directorate General of Health Services. Later on, he was informed by the Assistant Director General, Health Services on 14.9.1988 that he had been allotted the seat for admission in MBBS at Dr.V.M. Medical College, Solapur.However, the said college on 20.9.1988 refused admission to the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner filed writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in the Supreme Court assailing the action of the college in refusing admission to him. It was held by the Supreme Court that the denial of admission to the petitioner was wholly illegal and unjustified. Consequently, writ petition was allowed.It was held by the Supreme Court that the petitioner was kept out of college on wholly unjustifiable grounds and illegal grounds and therefore, he would not be able to make up the attendance criteria. Therefore, the Supreme Court directed the authorities that the attendance of the petitioner should be counted from the date when the admission was granted to him pursuant to the directions to consider his eligibility for appearing the examinations. In para (7) of thejudgment, the Supreme Court observed :
'Since, the petitioner was kept out of the College, on wholly unjustified and illegal grounds, it is obvious that he would not be able to make up the attendance criteria, if the attendance is to be counted from the date when the session started. It, therefore, appears appropriate to us to direct that the attendance in the case of the petitioner, should be counted from the date when the admission is granted to him pursuant to the directions hereinabove made, by the Medical College, Solapur to consider his eligibility for appearing in the examinations.'
29. In the instant case, the situation of the petitioners is far better. It is the case of the petitioners that they have earned/would earn more than prescribed minimum percentage of attendance on or before the teaching sessions for the students admitted to the first year MBBS course during the academic year 2001-2002 comes to an end. Therefore, there could hardly be any valid objection for the University to permit the petitioner-students to appear for the examination scheduled to be held in the month of October, 2002.
30. In conclusion, we hold that the cut-off date fixed in the impugned notification dated 16.7.2002 wherein only such students who were granted admission by 12.11.2001 in the first year MBBS course are permitted is arbitrary. illegal and violative of the postulates of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
31. The unreported Judgments of this Court in T.Vamsi Charan (2 supra), and M. Rupesh and others (3 supra) do not support the impugned action of the respondent-University. In T. Vamsi Charan's case (2 supra), the appellant appeared for the EAMCET-92 and secured rank 1575. He belonged to BC-B category. Admittedly, since that rank did not entitle him in the first list published in December 1992, he was not admitted to the course which started on 4.1.1993. The second list was published only on 19.5.1993. The appellant's name was included in that list. He joined the second year regular course on 5.6.1993. When the matter stood thus, the University issued a Circular dated 28.7.1993 directing that the students who joined the course in the month of June, 1993 would not be allowed to take the examination along with the regular batch of the second year students. When that action was assailed in W.P. No. 16643 of 1993, a learned single Judge of this Court by his order dated 6.11.1993 dismissed the writ petition. The Division Bench, while dismissing the writ appeal preferred against the said order of the learned single Judge, has held-
'...We are not inquiring into the details why the delay occurred. It is true that the delay was not occasioned on account of the petitioner. Whatever be the reasons, a person who was admitted in June 1993 could not have completed the period of attendance so as to enable him to take the examination along with the regular candidates who were admitted in January, 1993. That is all the effect of the Circular dated 28.7.1993 and that is the effect of the judgment of the learned single Judge.We are not persuaded to take a different view.We, therefore, find no merit in the writ appeal. The same is hereby dismissed. No costs.'
32. In the context of the above case, the Court found that since the appellant was admitted in June 1993, he could not have completed the period of attendance, thereby meaning that he could not have earned the prescribed minimum percentage of attendance so as to enable him to take the examination along with the regular candidates who were admitted to the course in January 1993. That is not the situation obtaining in the present case. It is the specific case of the petitioners that after their admission in December 2001 they have been regularly attending to the classes and some of them have earned as high as 90-95% of attendance and they would be having 75% of attendance and more by the time the teaching session of the first year MBBS course comes to an end. As already pointed out supra, the correctness of these material averments made in the writ affidavits on oath has not been denied by the respondent-University.Therefore, the Judgment of the Division Bench in T.Vamsi Charan's case (2 supra) is of no help to the respondent-University.
33. Similarly, the Judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in M. Rupesh's case (3 supra) also does not support the impugned action of the respondent-University. In that case, the admissions to the MBBS course during the academic year 1998-99 were made by the appropriate authorities after conducting EAMCET examination and the academic session commenced on 11.1.1999. Thereafterwards, a notification was issued for filling up the seats in NRI/Foreign students in April 1999. The selection committee selected the students under the aforesaid quota on 20.4.1999. The petitioners in that case were the students selected out the aforementioned quota and classes to them started in various colleges in the first week of May 1999. When the matter stood thus, the University announced the dates for the first year MBBS course examination and they were scheduled to be held from 14.1.2000. The last date for submission of application and payment of fee was 31.12.1999. The petitioners therein submitted applications for appearing in the examination through the concerned Principals and those applications were forwarded to the University. However, those petitioners were informed by the concerned Principals that they would not be allowed to appear for the examination on the ground that they did not put in requisite attendance, thereby meaning 75% of attendance. The said action of the respondents in refusing to permit the petitioners to appear for the examination was assailed in the above batch of writ petitions. The learned single Judge on facts found-
'Admittedly, the petitioners did not complete the 75% of attendance and, therefore, they are ineligible to appear for the examinations.'
34. In that view of the finding, the learned single Judge refused the relief to the petitioners. We are at a loss to understand how that judgment of the learned single Judge would support the stand of the respondent-University in this case, because of the reasons stated by us supra. The petitioners in the present cases were not denied admission to appear for the examination scheduled to be held in the month of October 2002 on the ground that they have not earned/they will not earn 75% of the attendance. The reason to deny admission to the petitioner-students to appear for the examination, as reflected in the counter-affidavits, is that they would not be completing 240 teaching days of eight hours each college working time by the time the teaching sessions for the first year MBBS course comes to an end. We have already held supra that if a student admitted to the first year MBBS course secures 75% of attendance after his/her admission into the course by the time the teaching session comes to an end, such student is entitled to appear for the examination.
35. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Dr. S.Suryanarayana's case (1 supra) is also besides the point. In that case, the question that arose for consideration and decision was whether it is enough if a candidate earns 85% of attendance in the actual training period or he should earn 85% of attendance with reference to the whole period of training. Dealing with that question, in para 10 of the Judgment, the Division Bench held-
'The third contention of Mr. Chandrasekhara Rao is that the petitioner has completed 85% attendance in the training period and thus the condition for eligibility to take the examination is being fulfilled, so the petitioner cannot be prevented from taking the examination. We are afraid, we cannot accede to this contention. The insistence on 85% attendance in the period of training is one of the eligibility criteria to take P.G. examinations but 85% attendance has to be calculated with reference to the whole period of training.This rule has a rationale behind it. In any training, more so in a course of specialization, the maximum benefit can be derived by the students only when they undergo the training regularly and punctually.Absence up to a minimum of 15% of the training period is, however, considered by the University not detrimental to the training. A candidate cannot be permitted to claim, within a period of training, on completion of 85% of part of the training period that he is either entitled to take the examination which would be scheduled immediately thereafter or to join any other course as if the training period is over.Such an assumption will be erroneous. It is only when a candidate completes the whole period of training that he can request that his absence up to the maximum of 15% be condoned to enable him to take the examination held at the end of the period of training. We have taken the same view in our Judgment in W.P.Nos. 1855 and 10273 of 1995 dated 19.3.1997. Therefore, this contention also fails.'
36. It is quite clear from the above Judgment that in that case, the petitioner did not earn the minimum attendance of 85% with reference to the whole period of training.That is not the case of the respondent-University in the present case.
37. Before concluding, we may consider the last contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-University that in academic matters, the decision of the University cannot lightly be interfered with by the Courts.In other words, what the learned Standing Counsel contended is that since the expert autonomous body like the University, taking into account the totality of the facts and circumstances, has fixed 12.11.2001 as the cut-off date for the purpose of permitting the students admitted to the first year MBBS course during the academic year 2001-2002 for the examinations to be held in the month of October 2002, such decision is not liable to be nullified by this court in exercise of its power under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, the learned Standing Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sarang's case (4 supra). There cannot be any second opinion about the legal proposition that the decision taken by the University and its expert bodies cannot lightly be interfered with by the Courts. At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that since the guarantee of equal protection enshrined under Art. 14 of the Constitution embraces the entire realm of 'State action', it would extend not only when an individual is discriminated against in the matter of exercise of his rights or in the matter of imposing liabilities upon him, but also in the matter of granting privileges, relaxations and exemptions etc., It is trite that the respondent-University, being a 'State' within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution is bound by the postulates and Art. 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, its action can be and has to be tested on the touchstone of Art. 14 postulates. The respondent-University will not be justified in telling the Court not to interfere with its decision in fixing 12.11.2001 as the cut-off date in the impugned notification even where it is demonstrated that such decision of the respondent-University is in violation of the constitutional mandates and limitations.Universities, though autonomous, are also bound by the rule of law and they cannot be a law on to themselves. The self-imposed judicial restraints by the Constitutional Courts in reviewing the actions of the Universities, particularly in academic matters, does not mean that the Universities have licence to trample upon the constitutional and legal rights of the students and invade the constitutional limitations as despots. In Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. B.S.Mahajan16 the Supreme Court, in para 9, held-
'...It is needless to emphasise that it is not the function of the Court to hear appeals over the decisions of the Selection Committees and to scrutinize the relative merits of the candidates. Whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted Selection Committee which has the expertise on the subject. The court has no such expertise. The decision of the Selection Committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material irregularly in the constitution of the Committee or its procedure vitiating the selection or proved mala fides affecting the selection etc., It is not disputed that in the present case the University had constituted the Committee in due compliance with the relevant statutes. The Committee consisted of experts and it selected the candidates after going through all relevant material before it. In sitting in appeal over the selection so made and in setting it aside on the ground of the so-called comparative merits of the candidate as assessed by the court, the High Court went wrong and exceeded its jurisdiction.'
38. Since we are of the considered opinion that the exclusion of the petitioner-students from appearing for the examinations to be held in the month of October, 2002 by reason of fixing 12.11.2001 as the cut-off date in the impugned notification is totally arbitrary, illegal and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution, it is not appropriate for this Court to deny reliefs to the petitioner-students.
39. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we allow the writ petitions and quash the impugned notification Ref. No.1081/E1/2002 dated 2.8.2002 issued by the respondent-University and declare that the petitioner-students and similarly circumstanced other students are entitled to appear for the first year MBBS course examinations scheduled to be held from 7.10.2002 to 16.10.2002 subject to their earning 75% attendance during the teaching session fixed by the respondent-University for them during the academic year 2001-2002 and subject to fulfilling other legal formalities, if any. A direction shall issue to the N.T.R. University of Health Sciences, Gunadala, Vijayawada to receive the applications from the petitioner-students and similarly circumstanced other students who fulfil the above attendance requirement for appearing in the first year MBBS Course Examinations scheduled to be held in the month of October 2002. If such applications are submitted by the petitioner-students and similarly circumstanced other students on or before 28.9.2002, they shall be permitted to appear for the above examinations. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs in these writ petitions.