G. Bikshapathy, J.
1. The important question that arises for consideration in the Civil Revision Petition is with regard to the interpretation of Article 6(B) of Schedule-I-A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as amended by A.P. Act 21 of 1995.
2. Before we delve into the legal aspects of the case we shall refer to the facts of the case on hand.
3. The revision petitioner is the defendant in the suit. Plaintiff-respondent filed a suit in O.S.NO. 19 of 2000 before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Nandigama for specific performance of Agreement of Sale dated: 18.2.1997. The said agreement was drafted on a stamp paper of the value of Rs. 100/-. Under the said agreement, an extent of Ac.6-95 cents of agricultural land was sought to be sold to the plaintiff for a total sum of Rs. 2,43,250/-. Out of the said amount, the defendants have received a sum of Rs. 1,25,000/- towards the advance and balance was agreed to be paid on or before 20.3.1997. Since the transaction did not come through the plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of the aforesaid Agreement of Sale. The matter was being contested by the defendant. The lower Court also framed the issue basing on the respective pleadings. While so, the defendant filed I.A.No. 545 of 2002 under Section 151 C.P.C. to decide the second issue in the suit as a preliminary issue and accordingly the lower Court heard the matter. The Court took up the following issue as preliminary issue for consideration:
'Whether the sale agreement is properly stamped as per amended Stamp Act and the plaintiff is not entitled to pay deficit stamp duty and penalty?'
4. The lower Court after considering the A.P. Act 21 of 1995, held that the suit agreement is not covered by Article 6(B) of Indian Stamp Act and accordingly held against the defendant by an Order dated: 11.12.2002 against which the present Civil Revision Petition has been filed.
5. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner-defendant submits that the Order of the lower Court is wholly illegal and contrary to law. He submits that the Article 6(B) embraces not only the nature of the properties referred to therein, but all the transactions relating to sale of any other immovable property. The very intention of the amendment is to avoid loss of revenue to the State and to ensure the valid title to the vendee in respect of the property. Therefore, Andhra Pradesh State brought into effect amendment to the Stamp Act and hence the Order passed by the lower Court is not sustainable in law.
6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff submits that the amendment is very clear. It covers the property relating to the construction of house building including a multi unit house or building or unit of apartment/flat/portion of a multi-storied building or development/sale of any other immovable property. The amendment did not cover the agricultural lands and therefore, strict interpretation has to be given to the fiscal statues in asmuch as amendment was never intended to be applied in case of a transaction relating to the agricultural lands.
7. The learned Government Pleader also submits that Article 6(B) of Schedule-I-A of the Act should be interpreted so as to include any immovable property which is in tune with the objects of the amendment and therefore, the suit agreement is liable to be stamped in accordance with Article 6(B) of the Act.
8. For proper appreciation of the case, it is necessary to refer to the Schedule-I-A of the Stamp Act. Schedule-I-A of the Stamp Act prescribes the stamp duty on certain instruments. Article 6 of the Stamp Act and the stamp duty required is as follows:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------Description of the instrument proper stamp duty -----------------------------------------------------------------------Art.6: Agreement or Memorandum of agreement Five rupees (under Act XIX of 1959) not otherwise provided for.Rs. 1.50 increased to Rs. 2.30 by A.P. Act X of 1967 with effect from 20-10-1967 forming the subject of Article 5, Cl.(c). Article 6 has been amended by the State Act 21 of 1995, which reads thus:
'6. Agreement or Memorandum of an Agreement not otherwise providedfor:(A) Where the value-(i) does not exceed Rs. 5,000/-.................................................10-00(ii) exceeds Rs. 5,000/- but does not exceed Rs. 20,000/-................................................20-00(iii) exceeds Rs. 20,000/- but does not exceed Rs. 50,000/-................................................50-00(iv) exceeds Rs. 50,000/-...............................................100-00(B) (i) If relating to construction of a Five Rupees for everyone hundredhouse or building including a rupees or part thereof on the marketmulti-unit house or building or value or the estimated cost of the unit of apartment/flat/portion proposed construction/development of a multi-storied building of such property as the case may beor for development/sale of any as mentioned in the agreement or theother immovable property. Value arrived at, in accordance with the schedule of rates prescribed by the Public Works Department authorities, whichever is higher.(C) In any other cases............................100-00'
9. The contention of revision petitioner is that the instrument Agreement of Sale falls under Article 6(B) and therefore, the stamp duty has to be paid as prescribed under that Article. In this regard it is necessary to consider the statement of objects and reasons, which reads thus:
'The rates of Stamp duty chargeable in respect of certain documents are governed by Schedule 1-A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. On a review of the said rates with reference to the rates obtaining in the neighbouring States, it is felt that the rates of stamp duty on certain instruments like sales, etc. require rationalisation.
During the recent past, it is noticed that the parties are resorting to evasion of stamp duty on a large scale by executing Powers of Attorney and Agreements to sell without going for regular sale deeds. This practice is resulting in loss of revenue to the State, while the vendees are left without any valid title. It is therefore, necessary to check this unhealthy procedure.
It is also noticed that in cities like Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam, Vijayawada etc. multi-storied buildings consisting of several apartments are coming up. In order to facilitate registration of flats and to confer a valid title on the purchaser it is felt desirable to rationalise stamp duty payable on apartments.'
The said amendment came into effect from 1.4.1995. The Supreme Court in a recent case reported in UNION OF INDIA Vs . ELPHINSTONE SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY LTD., : [2001]1SCR221 , the Supreme Court observed thus:
'While examining a particular statute for finding out the legislative intent it is the attitude of judges in arriving at a solution by striking a balance between the letter and spirit of the statute without acknowledging, that they have in any way supplement the statute would be the proper criteria. The duty of judges is to expound and not to legislate is a fundamental rule. There is no doubt a marginal area in which the Courts mould or creatively interpret legislation and they are thus finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to them in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing . But by no stretch of imagination a Judge is entitled to add something more than what is there in the Statute by way of a supposed intention of the legislature. It is, therefore, a cardinal principle of construction of statute that the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed. Courts are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation and they must avoid the danger of determining the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somehow fitted. Caution is all the more necessary in dealing with a legislation enacted to give effect to policies that are subject to bitter public and parliamentary controversy for in controversial matters there is room for differences of opinion as to what is expedient, which is just and what is morally justifiable, it is the Parliament's opinion in these matters that is paramount. . When the question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision in a statute it is not only legitimate but proper to read that provision in its context. The context means; the statute as a whole, the previous state of law, other statutes in pari materia, the general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to remedy. An Act consists of a long title which precedes the preamble and the said long title is a part of an Act itself and is admissible as an aid to its construction. It has been held in several cases that a long title along with preamble or even in its absence is a good guide regarding the object, scope or purpose of the Act whereas the preamble being only an abbreviation for purposes of reference is not a useful aid to construction. The preamble of an Act, no doubt can also be read along with other provisions of the Act to find out the meaning of the words in enacting provisions to decide whether they are clear or ambiguous but the preamble in itself not being an enacting provision is not of the same weight as an aid to construction of a Section of the Act as are other relevant enacting words to be found elsewhere in the Act. The utility of the preamble diminishes on a conclusion as to clarity of enacting provisions. It is therefore said that the preamble is not to influence the meaning otherwise ascribable to the enacting parts unless there is a compelling reason for it. If in an Act the preamble is general or brief statement of the main purpose, it may well be of little value. Mudholkar, J. had observed in Burakar Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, : [1962]1SCR44 , 'It is one of the cardinal principles of construction that where the language of an Act is clear, the preamble must be disregarded though, where the object meaning of an enactment is not clear the preamble may be resorted to explain it. Again where very general language is used in an enactment which, it is clear must be intended to have a limited application, the preamble may be used to indicate to what particular instances, the enactment is intended to apply. We cannot, therefore, start with the preamble for construing the provisions of an Act though we could be justified in resorting to it nay we will be required to do so if we find that the language used by Parliament is ambiguous or is too general though in point of fact Parliament intended that it should have a limited application.'
However, for the purpose of ascertaining whether any enacting provision is clear or ambiguous, the Act including the preamble must be read as a whole.
10. It is also trite to say that it is contrary to all Rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do and the language of the statute should be read as it is. The words of a statute are first understood in their natural or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that it reads to absurdity or something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary.
11. The Supreme Court in M/s VIKRANT TYRES LTD. v. THE FIRST INCOME TAX OFFICER, MYSORE, : (2001)166CTR(SC)1 , observed thus:
'It is a settled principle in law that the Courts while construing Revenue Acts have to give a fair and reasonable construction to the language of a Statute without leaning to one side or the other, meaning thereby that no tax or levy can be imposed on a subject by an Act of Parliament without the words of the Statute clearly showing an intention to lay the burden on the subject. In this process, the Courts must adhere to the words of the Statute and the so-called equitable construction of those words of the Statute is not permissible. The task of the Court is to construe the provisions of the taxing enactments according to the ordinary and natural meaning of the language used and then to apply that meaning to the facts of the case and in that process if the taxpayer is brought within the net he is caught, otherwise he has to go free. This principle in law is settled by this Court in India Carbon Ltd. v. State of Assam : AIR1997SC3054 , wherein this Court held 'Interest can be levied and charged on delayed payment of tax only if the statute that levies and charges the tax makes a substantive provision in this behalf.' A Constitution Bench of this Court speaking through one of us (Hon. Bharucha, J.) in the Case of V.V.S. Sugars v. Government of A.P. : [1999]2SCR925 reiterated the proposition laid down in the India Carbon Ltd.'s case (supra) in the following words: 'The Act in question is a taxing statute and, therefore, must be interpreted as it reads, with no additions and no subtractions, on the ground of legislative intendment or otherwise.'
12. It has to be borne in mind that the Act with which we are concerned is an Act imposing liability on the subject stamp duty. The Act is fiscal in nature. The Act must, therefore, be strictly construed in order to find out whether a liability is fastened on a particular subject. The subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose; and also that every Act of Parliament must be read according to its natural construction of words. Justice Rowlatt of England said a long time ago, that in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One has to look fairly at the language used. (See the observations in CAPE BRANDY SYNDICATE v. I.R.C.(1921)1 K.B. 64, 71).
13. The proper course in construing the Revenue Acts is to give fair and reasonable construction to their language without leaning to one side or the other that no tax can be imposed on a subject by an Act of Parliament without words in it clearly showing an intention to lay the burden on him and that the words of the statute must be adhered to and that socalled equitable constructions of them are not permissible. (Per LORD ATKINSON in ORMOND INVESTMENT COMPANY v. BETTS (1928) All.E.R. 709)
14. The Supreme Court in GURSHAI SAIGAL v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, PUNJAB, : [1963]1ITR48(SC) , stated thus:
'IT is well recognised that the rule of construction that if a case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter applies only to a taxing provision and has no application to all provisions in a taxing statute. It does not apply to a provision not creating a charge for the tax but laying down the machinery for its calculation or procedure for its collection. The provisions in a taxing statute dealing with machinery for assessment have to be construed by the ordinary rules of construction, that is to say, in accordance with the clear intention of the legislature, which is to make a charge levied effective.'
15. In the words of BHAGAWATI, J., in construing the fiscal statutes and in determining the liability of a subject to tax one must have regard to the strict letter of the law. If the revenue satisfies the Court that the case falls strictly within the provisions of the law, the subject can be taxed. If, on the other hand, the case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of the taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the Legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter. (See: A.V. FERNANDEZ v. STATE OF KERALA : [1957]1SCR837 , See also observations of Lord Russel of Killowen in INLAND REVENUE COMMISSIONER v. DUKE OF WEST MINISTER (1936) A.C. 1) which were approved by the Privy Council in BANK OF CHETTINAD v. I.T. COMMISSIONER (AIR 1940) S.C. 183).
16. In the words of SHAH, J., speaking for majority in interpreting a taxing statute, equitable considerations are entirely out of place. Nor can taxing statutes be interpreted on any presumptions or assumptions. The Court must look strictly at the words of the statute and interpret them. It must interpret a taxing statute in the light of what is clearly expressed, it cannot imply anything, which is not expressed, it cannot import provisions in the statute so as to supply any assumed deficiency. (See: SALES TAX COMMISSIONER v. MODI SUGAR MILLS : [1961]2SCR189 ,
17. Yet in the words of KRISHNA IYER, J., taxation consideration may stem from administrative experience and other factors of life and not artistic visualisation or neat logic and so the literal, though pedestrian interpretation must prevail. (See: MARTAND DAIRY AND FARM v. UNION OF INDIA : AIR1975SC1492 .
18. Even if the words used are ambiguous and reasonably open to two interpretations, benefit of interpretation should be given to the subject.
19. Article 6(B) is very clear in its expression that in case of any transactions relating to construction of a house etc. as mentioned in descriptive column of the instrument, the stamp duty required is Rs. 5/- for every hundred or part thereof, of the market value or the estimated cost of proposed construction or development of such property as the case may be. Therefore, the question that calls for consideration is whether the said Article covers the agricultural land also. It is a cardinal principle of the interpretation that the provision interpreted with reference to the words contained in the provisions and by interpretative process, it is neither to be expanded nor constricted. When the Legislature has specifically referred to the document relating to construction of house, apartment, flat, portion of multi-storied building etc and the stamp duty is payable on the market value or the estimated cost of the said property, it has to be confined only to houses, multi unit houses or apartment etc. Even the valuation was sought to be arrived at on the basis of the rates prescribed by the Public Works Department authorities. Further it is noticed that the transactions left over by Article 6(B) are covered by Article 6(C). Therefore, it cannot also be said that there was vacuum in the Article. In the instant case, the agreement is after 1.4.1995, but it relates to the agricultural land. Taking the clue from the last expression in the document namely 'sale of any other immovable property' it was contended that it would embrace in its fold other immovable property including the agricultural property and therefore, the stamp duty has to be paid on that basis. But, that contention cannot be accepted, in asmuch as the expression the sale of any other immovable property has to be interpreted keeping in view the principles of ejusdam generis namely where general words fallow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or classes as specifically mentioned. Otherwise, the other provisions become otiose. An identical issue came up before the ld. Brother P.S. Narayana J in PECHITTI RAMAKRISHNA v. NEKKANTI VENKATA MANOHARA RAO, : 2004(1)ALD557 and after referring to the amendments has observed as follows:
'A careful reading of Article 6(B) of Schedule 1-A of the Act goes to show that it is applicable if the agreement relates to construction of a house or building including a multi-unit house or building or unit of apartment/flat/portion of a multi-storied building or for development/sale of any other immovable property. A further reading of the stamp duty payable specified in column No.2 also makes it clear that this provision was introduced in relation to the construction agreements or agreements of the like nature. No doubt, emphasis was laid on the language 'sale of any other immovable property'. These words 'sale of any other immovable property' in Article 6(B) of Schedule I-A of the Act may have to be read along with the rest of the provision and also with column No.2. As far as any other case specified in Article 6(C) of Schedule I-A of the Act is concerned, it should be construed to be a case not falling under either A or B of Schedule I-A of the Act. It is needless to say that Article 6(A) of Schedule I-A of the Act is a general provision. It is no doubt true that in the present case, the sale consideration recited in the agreement of sale is Rs. 42,500/- and it is in relation to the sale of a vacant site. On a careful reading of the language employed in Article 6(A, B & C) of Schedule I-A of the Act and also the stamp duty payable specified in column No.2 and taking into consideration the object of introducing B by A.P. Act 21 of 1995, I am of the considered opinion that Article 6(B) of Schedule I-A of the Act would be applicable only in such specified cases and the same cannot override the general provision of Article 6(A) of Schedule I-A of the Act and agreement in question would definitely fall under the general provision of Article 6(A)(iii) of Schedule I-A of the Act and hence, the stamp duty already paid is sufficient. It is also clarified that in the light of the nature of the document Article 6(B) of Schedule I-A of the Act is not applicable to the present case. Hence, the impugned Order holding that the stamp duty and penalty relating to the document in question is liable to be paid under Article 6(B) of Schedule I-A of the Act cannot be sustained.'
Therefore, we are in agreement with the principle laid down in the aforesaid decision. The provision has to be interpreted harmoniously keeping in view the objects of the amendment. More over, the present amendment is fiscal in nature and it has to be construed strictly in accordance with law. In asmuch as the agricultural lands are not covered and it covered only specific items of property, it cannot have universal application of all transactions covering immovable properties. Under those circumstances, the suit Agreement of Sale cannot be said to be covered by Article 6(B) of the Schedule I-A of the Act and hence we are of the considered view that the Order of the lower Court is in consonance with the Article 6(B) of the Stamp Act as amended by A.P. Act 21 of 1995.
20. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. The lower Court is directed to proceed with the suit and dispose of the same within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order.
21. No costs.