ORDER
V.V.S. Rao, J.
Introduction
1. The writ petition is filed challenging the order/proceedings of the District Collector in Rc.No. 5213/96/A10, dated 3-2-1997 passed by the respondent herein. The petitioner seeks a declaration that the impugned proceedings insofar as the same restricts his right to sell the land admeasuring Acs. 4.04 cents in Sy.No. 294/2 of Madhuravada Village in Visakhapatnam Rural Mandal (hereafter called 'subject land') and insofar as the same declares that he is deemed to be assignee of the subject land as viontive of the provisions of the A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 (hereafter called, 'the Act') as illegal and non-est. Though the impugned order was passed more than six years ago, having regard to the interesting question raised in the writ petition and also having regard to the fact that no prejudice would be caused to anybody by entertaining the writ petition after a long delay, this Court entertained the writ petition. Lengthy arguments were advanced at the admission stage by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for Revenue (Assignment).
Question for consideration
2. Whether a landless poor person who is permitted to purchase assigned land from the original assignee can treat the said land as not an assigned land and whether such person can claim absolute right of alienation over the said land? This is the question that falls for consideration in this writ petition. To appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to refer to the facts which are not in dispute.
Background Facts
3. The subject land is a Government land. It was assigned to one Soola Peda Suryanarayana. The petitioner purchased the same from Suryanarayana under an agreement of sale dated 7-5-1969. He was cultivating the land since then. He made an application to the respondent on 8-1-1996 to grant permission under Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act for registration of the sale deed by the original assignee in his favour. When the same was not disposed of, he filed a writ petition being W.P. No. 13719 of 1996. The same was disposed of by this Court directing the respondents to consider the application of the petitioner dated 8-1-1996 under Section 5 of the Act within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the said order. Thereafter, the respondent conducted an enquiry. He also summoned the wife and children of the original assignee. They deposed that Suryanarayana and the petitioner were in joint possession of the land for about ten years. The respondent also obtained a report from the Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO), Visakhapatnam (Rural) and the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO). Based on the same, the respondent came to the conclusion that the petitioner is a landless poor person as defined in Sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act and that the transaction between the petitioner and the original assignee is genuine, in good faith and for valuable consideration and that the petitioner has been in continuous possession of the land from the date of commencement of the Act. In view of this conclusion, the respondent granted permission under Section 3(5) of the Act for effecting registration of sale in favour of the petitioner. He, however, observed that the petitioner would be deemed to be assignee of the Government land and that the petitioner being a landless poor person would not have any further right to sell the land. The petitioner was also informed that any violation of the conditions of assignment of the land would attract the provisions of the Act.
4. In the affidavit accompanying the writ petition, the petitioner states that pursuant to the orders of the District Collector dated 3-2-1997, sale deed was registered in his favour and he became the absolute owner of the land. He further alleges that he has incurred loss every year in cultivation of the land as the same became non-remunerative due to frequent droughts in the area. He became seriously ill and he has no other land and no means of livelihood. When he wanted to borrow money from others for medical treatment, nobody is prepared to lend money. He is not able to raise money in view of the restriction imposed by the District Collector. Therefore, he filed the writ petition.
Submissions
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri C. Ramachandra Raju, submits that when the Collector gives permission under Section 5 of the Act exempting the land from the provisions of the Act, the land ceases to be assigned land. A person who purchased the land from the assignee after obtaining permission from the Collector under Section 5 becomes absolute owner and, therefore, there cannot be any restriction on the right to sell the land to any intending purchaser whether or not he is a landless poor person. The learned Counsel vehemently contended that where the land is sold by an assignee to a landless poor person with the permission of the authority, the Act has no application as the land permitted to be sold loses its character of being assigned land. He placed reliance on various decisions of this Court in K.Gopal Reddy v. District Collector, 1993 ALT Supp. (1) 792, Abdul Khayoom v. M.R.O., : 1996(1)ALT209 and K. Sriramachandra Murthy Raju v. State of A.P., : 1997(1)ALT185 (DB).
6. Per contra, learned Government Pleader for Revenue (Assignment) submits that once the Government land is characterized as assigned land, the same continues and remains to be assigned land. Subsequent landless poor person who purchased the land cannot have a better right than the original assignee and that even the landless poor person who is a subsequent purchaser is bound by the provisions of the Act and any sale by the subsequent alienee in favour of a person is void under the provisions of Section 3 of the Act and it is competent to the MRO to resume the land if it is transferred by way of sale, gift, lease, mortgage, unless such transfer is permitted by Section 6 of the Act. He placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in Majjari Pullanna v. Sub-Collector, Nandyal, 1987 (2) ALT 253, K. Narayana Swami Naidu v. State of A.P., : 1997(5)ALT276 (DB), an un-reported judgment of this Court in W.P.No. 219 of 2001 dated 13-11-2001 and an un-reported judgment of a Division Bench dated 18-12-2001 in W.A. No. 1920 of 2001, which affirmed the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 219 of 2001 in support of his contentions.
7. In his reply to the arguments of the learned Government Pleader, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the method of purposive construction adopted by this Court in the decisions cited by the learned Government Pleader is not warranted. He submits that when the meaning is plain, it is not permissible to the Court to resort to purposive construction and read the provisions of the statute by introducing words to give different meaning. He invited the attention of the Court to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, : [1955]2SCR603 . He further submits that when once the Collector grants permission under Section 5 of the Act and exempts the land under Section 3(5), it becomes zirayiti land and it ceases to be assigned land. The sale of assigned land approved by the authority cannot continue to be assigned land under the provisions of the Act.
Legal Position
8. 'Assigned land'' is defined in Section 2(1) of the Act as under:
'Assigned land' means lands assigned by the Government to landless poor persons under the rules for the time being in force, subject to the condition of non-alienation and includes lands allotted or transferred to landless poor persons under the relevant law for the time being in force relating to land ceilings; and the word 'assigned' shall be construed accordingly.
9. 'Landless poor person' and the term 'transfer' are defined in Sections 2(3) and 2(6) respectively as under:
'Landless poor person 'means a person who owns an extent of land not more than 1.011715 hectares (two and half acres) of wet land or 2.023430 hectares (five acres) 6f dry land or such other extent of land as has been or may be specified by the Government in this behalf; from time to time and who has no other means of livelihood;
'Transfer' means any sale, gift, exchange, mortgage with or without possession, lease or any other transaction with assigned lands, not being a testamentary disposition and includes a charge on such property or a contract relating to assigned lands in respect of such sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or other transaction.
10. A plain reading of the above provisions would show that three types of land are treated as assigned lands for the purpose of the Act: (i) the land assigned by the Government to a landless poor person under the rules for the time being in force; (ii) the land allotted/transferred to the landless poor person under relevant law relating to land ceilings; (iii) the land which is allotted or transferred subject to the condition of non-alienation. Any person who owns an extent of less than 1.011715 hectares (Acs.2.50) of wet land or 2.023430 hectares (Acs.5.00) of dry land is a landless poor person. Assigned land is heritable and it can be transferred by testamentary disposition. However, any sale, gift, exchange, lease, or any other transaction in relation to assigned land is treated as transfer and Section 3(1) declares that such land shall not be transferred and shall be deemed never to have been transferred. Any such transfer of assigned land shall not confer any right on the purchaser of such assigned land and the land shall not vest in any person acquiring the land by any such transaction.
11. Section 3(2) of the Act declares that no landless poor person shall transfer any assigned land and no person shall acquire any assigned land. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 declares that any transfer or acquisition made in contravention of the provisions of Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) shall be deemed to be null and void. Sub-section (5) carves out an exception and a plain reading of Sub-section (5) would show that nothing in Sub-sections (1) to (4) of Section 3 shall apply to the assigned land which was purchased by a landless poor person in good faith and for valuable consideration from the original assignee or his transferee prior to the commencement of the Act provided that such person is in possession of the land 'as a person cultivating the land or uses it as a house-site' on the date of such commencement.
12. Section 4 deals with consequences of breach of provisions of Section 3 and mandates that the District Collector or any other officer not below the rank of MRO can take possession of the land after evicting the person in possession when provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 are contravened. Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 requires the Revenue Officer to restore the assigned land to the original assignee or his legal heirs and/or where it is not reasonably practicable, the same can be resumed for assignment to landless poor persons in accordance with the rules which are in force. Such restoration of land from the original assignee after resumption from the purchaser shall not be more than once. Even after restoration if the land is transferred, again it shall be resumed to the Government for assignment to any other landless poor person. Sub-section (3) of Section 4 throws the burden on the person who is in possession of the assigned land to show that he has not contravened the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Act. It is also necessary to notice that Section 7 prescribes imprisonment upto six months and fine up to Rs. 2,000/- in case when there is contravention of the provisions of Section 3(2) of the Act. Two other provisions of the Act namely, Sections 5 and 6 are also relevant for appreciating the question raised in this writ petition and read as under:
5. Prohibition of registration of assigned lands :--Notwithstanding anything in the Registration Act, 1908 (Central Act 16 of 1908) on or after the commencement of this Act, no registering officer shall accept for registration any document relating to the transfer of, or the creation of any interest in any assigned land included in a list of assigned lands in the district which shall be prepared by the District Collector and furnished to the registering officer except after, obtaining prior permission of the District Collector concerned for such registration.
6. Exemption:--Nothing in this Act shall apply to the assigned lands held on mortgage by the State or Central Government, any local authority, a Co-operative Society, a scheduled bank or such other financial institution owned, controlled or managed by a State Government or the Central Government, as may be notified by the Government in this behalf.
13. Section 5 contains a non-obstante clause. It lays down that notwithstanding anything in the Registration Act, 1908, after coming into force of the Act, no registering officer shall accept registration of any document relating to transfer of any assigned land. Nonetheless, as per second part of Section 5, if the transfer of assigned land is effected after obtaining prior permission of the District Collector concerned for registration, it is open for any registering officer to accept any document for registration relating to transfer of assigned land. Section 6 enables the assignee to mortgage the assigned land to a Co-operative Society, scheduled bank and any financial institution owned, controlled or managed by the State Government or the Central Government as may be notified by the State Government.
14. The Act nowhere specifically declares that when a transfer of assigned land by the assignee to a landless poor person and such land is registered in the name of transferee after obtaining permission under Section 5, such land ceases to be assigned land. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that Sub-section (5) of Section 3 read with Section 5 carves out an exception and when once the law declares the transfer of assigned land in favour of a landless poor person as not being null and void, the land loses the characteristics of assigned land. This submission is misconceived. On a plain reading of Section 5, it is clear that the rigor of Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 3 are not made applicable only to the transfer of assigned land purchased by a landless poor person in good faith and for valuable consideration for the purpose of cultivation. Another exception is Section 6 which enables the assignee to raise agricultural loan by mortgaging the assigned land to the State, local authority or any scheduled bank. Further, all transfers of assigned land by the original assignee in favour of landless poor person are not exempted from the provisions of Sections 3(1) to 3(4). A transfer of assigned land and a purchase of assigned land by a landless poor person for the purpose of cultivation only or for the purpose of house site only, as the case may be, are exempted. If the assigned land is purchased by a landless poor person for a purpose other than for the purpose of cultivation, Sub-section (5) of Section 3 has no application. Though Sub-section (5) makes other sub-sections of Section 3 not applicable, the same does not specifically declare that such transferred land ceases to be assigned land. On true construction of Section 3 read with Sections 4, 5 and 6, it is clear that purchase of assigned land by a landless poor person in good faith and for valuable consideration for the purpose of cultivation (in case of agricultural land) alone is exempted from the other sub-sections of Section 3. The land still continues to be assigned land. This is further clear in view of Section 4 of the Act.
15. As already observed by me, when the assigned land is transferred by way of sale, lease, mortgage etc., the contravention of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 and Section 4(1)(b) enables the District Collector or the MRO or authorised officer to take possession of the assigned land after evicting the person in possession and restore the same not to anybody else but only to the original assignee. That is the purport of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 4. Furthermore, in case, the original assignee from whom the land was purchased by the transferee in contravention of Section 3(1), cannot be traced and it is not reasonably practicable to restore the land to the original assignee, the Government has to assign the land to another landless poor person. The land cannot be assigned to any other person who is not a landless poor person. This clinchingly shows that when once the land is assigned land, the same continues to be assigned land. This view is also supported by the decision of this Court to which I shall make a reference presently.
16. In Majjari Pullanna v. Sub-Collector, Nandyal (supra), it was contended that the land purchased by a landless poor person loses the characteristics of assigned land and that by reason of Sub-section (5) of Section 3, the purchaser acquires an absolute right to alienate the land. This Court did not accept it and answered the question in the negative observing thus:...... A literal reading of the section and more particularly the definition of the words 'assigned lands' in the operating provisions of Section 3 would show that the Act would apply only to those lands which were assigned by the Government subject to the condition of inalienability. That would show the condition in applying the Act is to that assignment made by the first transferee of these assigned lands. But clearly the implications of this interpretation, which were, I am sure, never present to the blind eye of a draftsman, would leave wide gaps open in the policy of the Act. Under this interpretation, the object of Section 3 could easily be frustrated by resorting to one permissible alienation by the original grantee in favour of a landless poor person. I am, therefore, led to close those gaps which are, no doubt, wide enough to shut by a proper legislative amendment. Keeping the purpose the Act in view I interpret Sub-section (5) of Section 3 to mean to restrain the transferee poor person from alienating the land and for keeping the land for his cultivation or as a house site. Such a land can be divisible or heritable but cannot be alienable. It follows that Taveri Naik's alienation in favour of the writ petitioner should be treated as void. I apply the same reasoning to the interpretation of Section 4 of the Act. Following the above I dismiss this writ petition but without costs.
17. In Papaiah v. State of Karnataka, : AIR1997SC2676 , the Supreme Court considered the provisions of Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978. The appellants therein purchased the assigned land under registered sale deed. The alienation by the assignee under the said Act was declared void and inoperative. The Act also provided for the procedure for restoration of the land to the assignees and resumption of land if assignees are not available. The assignees filed an application before the Government for restoration of land. The Competent Authority allowed the appeal which was confirmed by the Karnataka High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the appellants contended that the Act has no application to the land purchased by them as they have perfected their title by adverse possession. The Supreme Court while dismissing the appeal observed that the appellants never derived any valid title and, therefore, the question of title does not arise. It was also laid down that any transfer of assigned land will not only be constitutionally invalid and also violative of public policy. The following observations are relevant for the purpose of the case on hand................The right to economic justice to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections is a fundamental right to secure equality of status, opportunity and liberty. Economic justice is a facet of liberty without which equality of status and dignity of person are teasing illusions. In rural India, land provides economic status to the owner. The State, therefore, is under constitutional obligation to ensure to them opportunity giving its largess to the poor to augment their economic position. Assignment of land having been, made in furtherance, thereof, any alienation, in its contravention, would be not only, in violation of the constitutional policy but also opposed to public policy under Section 23 of the Contract Act. Thereby, any alienation made in violation thereof is void and the purchaser does not get any valid right, title or interest thereunder. It is seen that Rule 43(a) specifically prohibits alienation of assigned land. It does not prescribe any limitation of time as such.
18. In W.P. No. 219 of 2001 (un-reported), the petitioner purchased the land from the original assignee of Government land. The assignee along with her daughter made an application to the MRO for restoration of land. After conducting enquiry, the MRO ordered restoration of land. The original Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal. The second Appellate Authority i.e., Joint Collector reversed the order of the MRO and the RDO and accepted the contention of the purchaser that the applicant herself was a purchaser from the original assignee and in view of the regularisation of purchase by the Revenue Authorities, the land ceases to be assigned land to which provisions of the Act have no application. This finding was challenged before this Court in the writ petition. By a judgment and order dated 13-11-2001, my learned brother, Hon'ble Sri Justice S. Ananda Reddy, after referring to the provisions of the Act in detail and the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in K. Narayanaswami Naidu v. State of A.P. (supra) held that assigned land permitted to be purchased by a landless poor person from the original assignee does not cease to be assigned land. After referring to the Division Bench judgment in Narayanaswami Naidu's case, it was held:.............. In the light of the said decision of this Court, the lands which are originally assigned continues to be the assigned lands even assuming that there was a transfer in favour of the writ petitioner, who in turn executed the sale deeds in favour of the Respondents 3 and 4. In fact, the Apex Court in the case of Papaiah v. State of Karnataka (supra) held that such sales are opposed to public policy under Section 23 of the Contract Act and held that the plea of adverse possession against the State also does not arise. The Apex Court has even referred to the provisions of the Constitution of India and the purpose for which such enactments were brought. From the above it is clear that the assumption made by the Joint Collector that the land ceased to be an assigned land is baseless and is devoid of merit.
19. The decision of the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.219 of 2001 dated 13-11-2001 was challenged in W.A. No. 1920 of 2001. The Division Bench (to which I was a member) affirmed the decision of the learned Single Judge holding thus:
In the instant case, the claim of the appellants is that the lands in question are not assigned lands and that they are the purchasers of the same, but the same was contested by the first respondent herein, who is the writ petitioner. According to the appellants, the lands were purchased by the writ petitioner - first respondent from the original assignee and from the wit petitioner, they had purchased them. Even assuming that the writ petitioner - first respondent herein is a purchaser of the assigned land, whose purchase was validated by the Mandal Revenue Officer, still the first respondent herein could continue to be an assignee of the land in terms of Section 3(5) of the Act. In the instant case, the appellants are, admittedly, the purchasers of the land in the year 1990 from the first respondent herein. But the said transfers are totally prohibited in terms of Section 3 of the Act and when once the transfer, in their favour is prohibited, the provisions of Section 4 of the Act come into operation and, therefore, the application made by the first respondent herein for resumption of the land is proper and just............
20. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court as well as the decision of the two Division Benches of this Court, there are no strong valid reasons to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The decisions relied on by him in K.Gopal Reddy v. District Collector, Abdul Khayoom v. M.R.O. and K. Sriramachandra Murthy Raju v. State of A.P. (supra) are not directly on the point. Further, the ratio laid down in these decisions does not support the petitioner. These decisions lay down that by reason of Section 3(5) of the Act, purchase of assigned land by a landless poor person is not declared void under Sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the Act. In this case, the petitioner purchased the land under agreement of sale in 1969. He himself approached the District Collector seeking permission under Section 5 for registering the land. After recording findings that he is a landless poor person, that he is in possession of the land from the date of commencement of the Act and that the transaction is in good faith, the Collector granted permission by making the impugned observation that the land shall continue to be assigned land and that the petitioner has no right insofar as the same. Even without there being such observation, the petitioner could not have alienated and transferred the land to any other person in contravention of the provisions of the Act.
21. Learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (supra) in support of the contention that plain meaning should be given to the provisions of Sections 3(1), 3(2) and 4(1) of the Act and that the law is to be interpreted and construed giving due importance to the true intention of the makers of the legislation. Therein, the principles in Heydon's case, (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a = (1976) ER 637, were quoted with approval as under:
It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when - 'Heydon's case', (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a was decided that-
'... for the sure and true interpretation at all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered:
1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide,
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth, and
4th. The true reason of the remedy and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and 'pro private commodo,' and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, 'pro bono publico.'
22. There cannot be any quarrel with the principle which is well settled. Indeed, the history of the A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act would show that even before the Act there were guidelines and instructions either under the A.P. Board Standing Orders or Telangana Assignment Rules or Laoni Rules prohibiting transfer by way of sale or otherwise of assigned lands. But all these statutes, statutory instruments and administrative guidelines/instructions treated the assigned lands as such even if they are transferred by the assignee to a landless poor person with permission.
23. Heydon 's principle is applied when the Act is obscure and it is necessary to know the true intention of the Legislature from the language used. If interpretation results in absurdity and results in a situation which is quite contrary to the objects and reasons for which the enactment is made, the Court must eschew literal or plain interpretation and find the true intention by purposively construing the statute. Let me briefly refer to this aspect of the matter.
24. From 1-11-1969, the Government of Andhra Pradesh launched a Special Crash Programme for assignment of Government waste lands to the landless poor persons by giving D-Form pattas. By that time, the assignment rules provided for incorporating conditions in D-Form pattas. These conditions inter alia prohibited alienation of such lands and for resumption as well as re-grant to eligible persons. The Government experienced that substantial extents of lands assigned to landless poor persons were actually alienated and are in possession of well-to-do persons. The law as it existed did not contain any provisions for punishment of such persons who purchased assigned lands. The effort made by the Government for assigning lands to landless poor persons was not yielding the desired result. Therefore, it was thought to bring in protective legislation to punish the purchasers of assigned lands and prohibit alienation of lands. Therefore, the State-Legislature undertook the legislation on the model of the then existing legislation with regard to Scheduled Tribes in scheduled areas of Andhra Pradesh. A reference to the statement of objects and reasons for which the Act was brought on the statute book would reveal all these. Looking at the provisions of Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the background of objects and reasons, it is not possible to accept the submission that we should adopt the method of literal construction. Any literal construction which make the assigned lands purchased by a landless poor person to escape from the rigor of the provisions of the Act would defeat the objects of the Act. Therefore, the Court has to adopt the method of purposive construction.
25. More often than not, literal interpretation of a statute or a provision of a statute results in absurdity. Therefore, while interpreting statutory provisions, the Courts should keep in mind the objectives or purpose for which statute has been enacted. Justice Frankfurter of U.S. Supreme Court in an article titled as Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes (47 Columbia Law Reports 527), observed that, 'legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an adequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of Government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evidenced in the language of the statutes, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose'. Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation described purposive interpretation as under:
'A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by--
(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose, or
(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose.
This principle of purposive and meaningful interpretation has been followed by the Supreme Court in a number of cases.
26. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Limited, : [1987]2SCR1 , it was held:
Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.
27. In Jt. Registrar of Co-operative Societies v. T.A. Kuttappan, : AIR2000SC2378 , while interpreting the provisions of Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, duties and functions of the Committee of Management of the society, the Supreme Court observed as under:
The duty of such a Committee or an administrator is to set right the default, if any, and to enable the society to carry on its functions as enjoined by law. Thus, the role of an administrator or a Committee appointed by the Registrar while the Committee of Management is under supersession, is as pointed out by this Court, only to bring on an even keel a ship which was in doldrums. If that is the objective and is borne in mind, the interpretation of these provisions will not be difficult.
28. In Associated Timber Industries v. Central Bank of India, : AIR2000SC2689 , upon purposive and meaningful interpretation, the Supreme Court held that banks do not come under the purview of the Assam Money Lenders Act.
29. In Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank, : [2000]2SCR1102 , interpreting the provisions of Recoveries of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, our Supreme Court held that the banks or financial institutions need not obtain leave of the Company Court to invoke the jurisdiction of Debts Recovery Tribunal for recovering the debts.
30. In K. Duraiswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, : [2001]1SCR489 , it was held that 'the mere use of the word 'reservation' per se does not have the consequence of ipso facto applying the entire mechanism underlying the constitutional concept of a protective reservation specially designed for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, to enable them to enter and adequately represent in various fields. The meaning, content and purport of the expression will necessarily depend upon the purpose and object with which it is used.'
31. The true construction of the various provisions of the Act under consideration require a purposive construction when one has to get to root of the matter and the reason for which legislation was made. It is always permissible to this Court as pointed out by the Supreme Court to resort to purposive construction to bring the legislation within the objects for which the Act was made. Therefore, interpreting the provisions in this method, it must be held that a landless poor person who purchased the lands after obtaining permission under Section 5 of the Act is not entitled to transfer the land ignoring Sections 3(1) to 3(6) treating the land as 'freehold' not subject to any restrictions. The land which is permitted to be sold under Section 3(5) to a landless poor person for the purpose of cultivation cannot be declared as null and void but by reason of the same, such assigned land cannot be purchased for any other purpose nor can it be transferred by the transferee who has purchased with permission of the District Collector. The petitioner himself obtained permission from the District Collector by the impugned order and he is bound to obey the law. He cannot be heard to contend that he can sell the land to any person for any other purpose. However, it is made clear that if the petitioner wants to raise a loan by mortgaging the same to the State, local authority and scheduled bank or any other financial institution, for the purpose of agriculture, he can do so.
32. The writ petition, for the above reasons, is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed subject to the observations made hereinabove. There shall be no order as to costs.