ORDER
1. The writ petition is filed seeking writ of mandamus declaring the action of the 2nd respondent on the complaint filed by the 4th respondent culminating in the Fax message dated 8-2-1997 to the Chairman and Managing Director of the 1st petitioner as illegal and consequential direction to respondents No.2 and 3 to refrain from acting on the complaint filed by the 4th respondent as the ingredients of the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and Section 506 read with Section 34 IPC are not attracted to the facts of the case.
2. Necessary facts which are relevant to the point in issue are referred hereunder:
The 1st petitioner is the Bharat Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter called as 'Corporation'). Petitioners Nos.2 to 4 are working as Officers in the 1st petitioner-Corporation, The 4th respondent is also working in 1st petitioner-Corporation in the Officer category. At his instance the proceedings were initiated against petitioners Nos.2 to 4. The 4th respondent was appointed as Officer in 1st petitioner-Corporation on 26-6-1995. He was put on probation for a period of one year from 27-5-1995 to 26-5-1996. However, the Officers were not satisfied with the duties by the 4th respondent, his probation was extended for six more months. Ultimately, the authorities found that he had not improved the performance and therefore, his probation was terminated by an Order dated 3-1-1997 4th respondent filed a complaint before the police alleging petitioners 2 to 4 committed an offencepunishable under Section 3(1)(x) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short the 'Act') read with Section 506 IPC. Upon such complaint, the police authorities-respondent No.3 has registered the complaint in First Information Report noting the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act read with Section 506 IPC and motion was set in for investigating the complaint. At this point of time, the writ petition was filed. During the pendency of the writ petition, it was brought to the notice of this Court that the 4th respondent had withdrawn the complaint and he was re-appointed in the Corporation. Therefore, taking these events, this Court disposed of the writ petition by an Order dated 20-3-1998 directing the 3rd respondent-S.H.O. Malakpuram P.S. Visakhapatnam or the Investigating Officer of Cr. No.3 of 1997 of the same Police Station to bear the aforesaid facts in mind and take necessary measures/ steps to put an end to the controversy between the parties. However, subsequently, the matter was pursued by the authorities and charge-sheet was filed before the Court of competent jurisdiction. Thereupon, Miscellaneous petition was moved by the petitioner to recall the Order dated 20-3-1998. Accordingly the order was recalled on 1-10-1998 and thus the entire matter is reheard afresh on merits.
3. The learned senior Counsel for the petitioners submits that the ingredients as set out in Section 3(1)(x) of the Act are not present in the complaint given by the 4th respondent and therefore, the authorities have no jurisdiction to proceed with the investigation of the case. He further submits that the alleged incident took place in the Chambers of the Officers which was not within the public view and thus the provisions of sub-section (x) of Section 3(1) are not attracted. Hence, if a prima facie case is not made out, this Court is empowered to interdict the proceedingsunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kwnar Guha, : 1982CriLJ819 , M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd v. Special Judicial Magistrate, : 1998CriLJ1 . He also refers to the judgments reported in Cliandra Poojari v. State of Karnataka, 1998 Crl.U 53. Karansingh v. State of M.P., 1992 Crl.LJ 3054. He submits that the sequence of events and the fact that the complaint was withdrawn by the 4th respondent itself establishes the fact that there are no bona fides in the complaint. and that only it was filed to harass the officers of the Corporation. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader submits that the police have already filed a charge-sheet in the competent criminal Court and the 4th respondent has not amended the prayer so as to quash the charge-sheet. Therefore, the writ petition itself has to be dismissed for not seeking proper relief. He further submits that it is not always for this Court to quash the FIRs., it is only in the rarest of rarest cases, this power has to be invoked by this Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India. He relies on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, : 1992CriLJ527 , wherein sufficient guidelines were indicated by the Supreme Court as to under what circumstances this Court should interfere. Therefore, he submits that it is not a case where this Court should exercise the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He refers to the instance narrated by the 4th respondent in the complaint and submits that it constitutes an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act and even in the charge-sheet it was also brought out that the witnesses have viewed the incident as spoken to by the 4th respondent in his complaint. Therefore, he submits that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
4, The important issue that calls for consideration in the writ petition is whetherthe FIR registered by the police authorities on the complaint given by the 4th respondent can be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? Or whether the proceedings should be initiated under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure for such a relief?
5. The matter is no more res Integra. In S.K. Guha's case (supra), the Supreme Court has considered similar identical situations and held that if an offence is disclosed, the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not normally interfere with an investigation of the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. It observed that justice requires that a person who commits an offence has to be brought to book and must be punished for the same. The Supreme Court also held that FIR which does not allege or disclose that the essential requirements of the penal provisions are prima facie satisfied, cannot form the foundation or constitute the starting point of a lawful investigation. An investigation can be quashed if no cognizable offence is disclosed by the FIR. It is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into a Report (FIR) which did not disclose the commission of cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty or inquiry in such cases. Therefore, the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that this Court should interfere under Article 226 of Constitution of India and quash the FIR if it did not disclose the essential requirements of the penal provisions are prima facie satisfied. It can quash the proceedings if no cognizable offence is disclosed by the FIR. In Pepsi Foods Limited's case (supra), the Supreme Court again reiterated almost the principles as set out in S.K. Guha 's case (supra) and observed as follows:
'The questions which arise for consideration are if in the circumstancesof the case, the appellants rightly approached the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and if so, was the High Court justified in refusing to grant any relief to the appellants because of the view which it took of the law and facts of the case. We have, thus, to examine the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code.
It is settled that High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court examined the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution and also the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which it said could be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down certain guidelines where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under these provisions, it was also stated that these guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One of such guideline is where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This Article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior Courts @ page-SC 135 and to see that the stream ofadministration of justice remains clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised invoking these powers. When the exercise of powers could be under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of Article 226. Some of the decisions of this Court laying down principles for the exercise of powers by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 may be referred to'.
6. The issue that arises for consideration in the present writ petition is whether prima facie case has been made out in the FIR so as to proceed with the investigation of the complaint?
7. For this purpose, it is necessary to refer to Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, for proper appreciation of the case, which reads thus:
'3. Punishment for offences of atrocities:-- (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,--
(i) to (ix) xxxx xxxx xxxx (x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Schedule Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view.'
8. The learned Counsel referring to this provision submits that any offence committed in any place within the public view is an offence under the said provision. But, if the offence is committed not within the public view would not fall within the parameters of this provision. He relies on the decision of the learned single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in Karan Singh's case (supra), wherein thedistinction was drawn between public place and public view in Para 5 which is extracted below:
'From the material on record in the case diary, further it cannot be said that the incident took place at place within public view. The words used in the provision are in place within 'public view' and not in a 'public place'. There is clearly a distinction between an incident taking place within public view and incident taking place in a public place. The incident took place at about 11.00 p.m. and the accused party only was present on the spot and what transpired between them has not been alleged to have taken place within public view. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that all the ingredients of offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act have been made out. There is absolutely no material to proceed against the accused persons for a charge on that count. The charge is groundless and deserves to be quashed at the investigation stage itself'.
9. The learned Counsel also refers to Strout's Dictionary Edn. 5 page 2080, wherein 'The word public was interpreted. It was held that the man's child or partner and above all his wife, as being a member of the public in relation to himself, do not form part of public' (Morrison Holdings v. I.R.C., (1966) 1 WLR 553). He also refers to Oxford Concise Dictionary, where the meaning of the word 'view' was given as to 'a range of vision; extent of visibility, what is seen from a particular point'. Therefore, referring to these decisions and the texts, the learned senior Counsel submits that the alleged offence has taken place in the Chambers of the Officers, not within the public view and therefore, prima facie the ingredient of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act has not been satisfied. He also refers to the contents of the complaint at Annexure byway of attachment made to the main representation and says that the first incident which was narrated was on 15-3-1996 wherein it was alleged that the 2nd petitioner littered certain words in his chambers at Madras. Therefore, he submits that this event assuming that he uttered such words, it would not confer jurisdiction on the 3rd respondent to investigate such a complaint as it is beyond his jurisdiction apart from contending that Section 3(1)(x)of the Act would not come into play. Similarly, he submits that the incident narrated which was alleged to have taken place on 4-1-1997 also was held in the chambers of the Officers also not within the public view. Therefore, the primary ingredient which is required under Section 3(1)(x) is not available and hence it is always open for this Court to interfere and quash the FIR which did not give the details for investigating a cognizable offence. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader relying on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ch Bhajan Lal's case (supra) submits that this power of interfering with the FIR has to be sparingly used by the High Courts under Article 226 of Constitution of India. The Supreme Court has fixed various guide lines under what circumstances this power has to be exercised in Para 108 of the said judgment, the circumstances have been stated, which are extracted below:
'108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunicated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuseof the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently canalised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4. Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and 'inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions ofthe Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/ or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge'.
Referring to those guidelines, the learned Government Pleader submits that where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint or have collected in support of the same, do not disclose the commission of offence or make it a case against the accused. But, in the instant case, sufficient evidence was collected in support of the allegations levelled in the FIR and therefore, it would not be appropriate for this Court to interfere with the investigation and further proceedings in accordance with law. It may be open for the respondents who are accused in the criminal case to seek discharge before the competent Court, but at the threshold they may not be permitted to obstruct the criminal proceedings which have been set in motion consequent on the Investigation culminating filing of the charge-sheet against the respondents.
10. In the counter filed by the 2nd respondent, it is only elicited that since a complaint was filed, action was initiated in accordance with taw and that it is nothing to do with the service matter of the 4th respondent. As already stated earlier, investigation was commenced after receiving the complaint registered as FIR No.3 of 1997 under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act read with Section 506 IPC and IPC and that it is not open for the petitioners to interdict thecriminal proceedings at this stage. In the counter filed by the 4th respondent he tried to expose the matter relating to the service conditions. He only stated that he was being harassed by the petitioners and therefore, he had made a complaint to the authorities and the same was registered as Crime No.3 of 1997. He also states that there are sufficient grounds to proceed with the prosecution. But, however, after withdrawing the complaint and after the 4th respondent was reinstated into service, no counter has been filed.
11. The main issue that arises for consideration is whether the grounds urged by the 4th respondent in the complaint contained the necessary ingredients of the penal provision under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act established prima facie case against the petitioners. The law is well settled that it is always open for the Court to interfere under Article 226 of Constitution of India if there were no prima facie grounds to proceed with the prosecution. For this purpose, it is necessary to refer to the complaint made by the 4th respondent to the police. The letter addressed by the 4th dated 8-1-1997 requesting the Commissioner of Police, Visakhapatnam to take action against the petitioners. The following is the extract of the letter:
'From
C/o B. Shankar Rao,
H.No.34-15-54,Siril Street,
Gnanapuram-530 009
Visakhapatnam.
8-1-1997
Visakhapatnam.
To
The Commissioner of Police,
Visakhapatanam.
Attn. Shri R.P. Meena, IPS.
Sub:--Harassment and termination of Employment Dude to acute caste antagonism.
Dear Sir,
I am writing this letter to you with utmost pain and agony as I have been harassed, insulted, hurt and finally removed from service for no fault of mine. My only mistake as I have been born in a Scheduled Tribe family.
I am a B.Tech. in Chemical engineering from JNTU, Ananthapur college of engineering and have been working with Bharat Petroleum Corporation for the last 18 months. During my tenure with the company I have been time and again harassed, discriminated, insulted, looked down upon and have been abused using my caste name. Though I have deeply hurt beyond words due to my helplessness and poor condition of family, 1 had suffered all the indignity silently.
During the last 6 months I have been working in BPCL Installation at Visakhapatnam under MD. Sundaresan (Manager). He had been severely antagonistic, based on caste abused and insulted continuously and tried to force me into resigning. I have almost been driven to such a desperation I had to commit suicide as no other alternative was available to me. Suddenly without even issuing a show-cause notice have served a letter of termination and they are thrown on to the roads.
Now I request you to kindly take cognizance of the atrocity perpetrated on me by Mr. Sundaresan (Manager-BPCL) at Visakhapatnam and others in Bharat Petroleum and take appropriate measures to bring them to book and do justice to me. I enclose herewith the verbationdiscussions Mr. Sundaresan and others had with me in this regard.
Thanking you,
Very truly yours,
Sd/- Kishan Malothu.
Attachment
1. When I was working at Madras despatch unit I have been called by Mr. K, Padmakar, Br. Mgr, ER at his chamber and before handing over the letter dated 15-3-1996 which was issued by the Ramakrishnan, DGM he was told that SC, ST candidates are just like 'Monkeys and donkeys, we want only the people like Horses'.
2. At Vizag on 4-9-1996 I have been called by Mr. Sundaresan, Manager over phone to his chamber and told that 'This is not the job will be done by the tribe candidate, actually you are not eligible for this job, you are a tribe candidate, you are only suitable for State Government jobs. Mr. C.S. Panth, Dy. Manager and Mr. Sundaresan asked me about my family background. They questioned me that (i) Are they you are, the people who wear dresses half naked, (ii) some people even don't wear clothes, (iii) Are you belong to this category?
I told 'Yes'.
They laughed at me and told that you leave this Organisation. For sake of you only we are telling all these things to you.
After that they have asked me to write a test and they have put a test. After test they have told that you are unfit for this job, you immediately resign it and try for any State Government jobs. You are not eligible for this job.'
12. The learned senior Counsel for thepetitioners Mr. E. Manohar submit that the alleged offence should have been committed In a place within the public view. He submits that it need not be a public place, but public should view the incident or insult or intimidation and then only it falls within the meaning of Section 3(1)(x). He submits that even according to 4th respondent the incidents occurred though nearly one year earlier to the date of filing complaint, had taken place in the chamber of officer and it cannot be under any stretch of imagination said that public had viewed the event. Further, there were no other persons except the complaint (respondent No.4) and the Officer concerned. Therefore, he submits that it does not amount to insult or intimidation in any place within public view and strongly relied on Karan singh's case (supra). On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader submits that the interpretation sought to be given by the learned Senior Counsel is misconceived. He submits that the offence should be committed in a place which is amenable to public view and therefore, if the chamber of the Officer is amenable for public view, it is sufficient to constitute an offence and it is not necessary that the public should physically view the situation or event.
13. Having given serious consideration to the issue, I am of the view that the contention of the learned Government Pleader cannot be countenanced for the simple reason the very section itself is specific that the insult or intimidation should have taken place in public view. It need not be a public place, it could also be a private place. The intention of the Parliament was very clear that this insult or intimidation should have been caused in a place within the public view. If it is committed in any place which is not within the public view, it would not be treated as an offence. Otherwise, the Parliament could have omittedthe words within the public view, and it would be redundant if the contention of the learned Government Pleader is accepted. Admittedly, in the instant case, the alleged offence has taken place in the chambers of the Officers where there was no public, and which was not within the public view. It is not even the contention of the 4th respondent that the events were viewed by the public on the days mentioned by him in the complaint. In such a situation, it would be very difficult for this Court to conclude that even though public did not view the event, yet, it has to be treated as a offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court fully covers the case on hand.
14. Admittedly, in the instant case the 4th respondent was appointed as an Officer and his probation was terminated on account of the unsatisfactory service. But, however, that is not the subject matter before this Court. But, be that as it may, when the probation was terminated on 3-1-1997, then only he started making complaints. He made a complaint on 8-1-1997 narrating that he was insulted and humiliated by the petitioners Nos.2 to 4 and this constituted an offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. It is to be noted that the alleged incidents date back to 15-3-1996 and 4-9-1996 and no reasons are forthcoming as to why he kept for such a long time when he was insulted or humiliated. More over, it is brought out to the notice of this Court that the 4th respondent was again reappointed as an Officer and he is now working as an Officer. He also sent letters to the management that he is withdrawing the complaints and to the same effect he sent letters to the Commissioner of Public and also to the Station House Officer, Malakapuram Police Station. As seen from the letter dated 19-5-1997, he had addressed to the management for reinstatement. The said letter reads thus:
'To dt 19/05/1997 The General Manager
(Southern Region)
B.P.C.L. Madras.
From:
Malothu Kishan,
Emp.No.4131(Was)
Officer Trainee (Was)
B.P.C.L. Visakhapatnam.
Sub :--Appeal for reinstatement Into service.
Dear Sir,
As I have lost my livelihood due to the termination I am undergoing financial hardship. I have came up in life with lot of industry and hard work. I am the first person to have become Engineer in my locality where my tribe inhabits. My community would be deprived of the benefit of my education and statue.
In view of the above, I request you to kindly reconsider my case and arrange to reinstate me to service for which I shall be much grateful, Regards.
Thanking you,
Yours faithfully,
Sd/- (Malothu Kishan)'
In pursuance of the said letter, the management considered the matter and as a special case appointed the petitioner as an Officer trainee by an Order dated 21-5-1997, which reads thus:
'Appointment - Officer Trainee
1. You may recall that as your performance was not found satisfactory by this Corporation, we by our letter No.STF. Doss. Contention dated 3rd January, 1997, terminated your services with effect from 4th January, 1997. Subsequentthereto, by filing a complaint dated 9th January, 1997 with the Commissioner of Police, Visakhapatnam you tried to put pressure upon the Management of this Corporation to reappoint you in the services of the Corporation. For quashing the said complaint, this Corporation was forced to file a Writ Petition being No.2833 of 1997 which is still pending in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad.
2. On 19th May, 1997, you addressed a letter to General Manager, (Southern Region), BPCL explaining your hardship due to the loss of your job and requested the Corporation to consider your case sympathetically.
3. Your aforesaid letter dated 19th May, 1997 was considered along with the facts as mentioned in paragraph 1 above and this Corporation, as a very special case and without prejudice to its contentions as made out in the writ petition mentioned above, is pleased to appoint you as an Officer Trainee of this Corporation on the terms and conditions contained hereunder:
(a) You will withdraw the aforesaid complaint dated 9th January, 1997, filed by you with Commissioner of Police, Visakhapatnam.
(b) to (e) xxxxx
4. If the above terms and conditions are acceptable to you including the terms mentioned in Annexure B, you arerequested to :
(a) return, as a token of your acceptance, the duplicate of this letter, duly signed, at the time of your reporting.
(b) Join the Corporation's services on the aforesaid terms at our VizagInstallation immediately and in any case on or before 28th day of May, 1997.
5. Please note that this offer of your appointment will automatically stand cancelled without any further reference to you, if you fail to fulfil any of the above conditions.
Yours faithfully,
For Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.
Sd/- S.M. Mac Arthur,
Chief Recruitment Manager.
I accept this appointment along with the terms and conditions set out in this letter.
Signature:
Name: Kishan Malothu'
Further, 4th respondent also wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Police on 23-6-1997 to the following effect:
'Sub : -- Regarding Complaint Filed against FIR No.3/97 under Atrocities Act, 1989.
Ref:--My Complaint Dated: 9th Jan. 1997.
Dear Sir,
Without any prejudice to my rights and immunities accrued under the Atrocities Act, 1989, I wish to submit the following to you for your consideration.
Management of BPCL have taken a rational view and without prejudice to my contentions in Writ Petition No.2833 of 1997 Dated ......... reappointed me into service. Vide their letter May 21st 1997. As per the terms and conditions of that letter I have agreed to withdraw the complaint in good faith as decided by my management.In the above circumstances, I request you to drop further investigation into the matter as an agreement has already been reached with BPCL in this regard.
Thanking you'
Similarly on 27-6-1999, a letter was sent to the management which reads thus:
'Sub :--Withdrawal of my complaint dated 9th January 1997.
I am enclosing my letter dated 23-6-1997 addressed to Commissioner of Police, Visakhapatanam, wherein I had requested him to withdraw my complaint dated 9th January, 1997. The letter has been duly acknowledged by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Malkapuram Police Station, Visakhapatnam.
I would be grateful, if you could kindly arrange to issue my confirmation letter at the earliest.
Thanking you'
Thus, the scenario has been completely changed after the petitioner was reinstated into service. Considering the subsequent events that the 4th respondent had withdrawn the complaint and requested the Commissioner of Police, not to investigate the complaint further is yet another indication to gain the impression that complaint lacked bona fides.
15. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the complaint did not prima facie establish the offence enumerated in Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.
16. Consequently, this Court has to necessarily to interfere with the proceedings initiated by the authorities. Admittedly, this is a case where the Officers of the Government of India Undertakings were sought to be involved in the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act and this Courtfinds that it would be unfair to allow the Officers to suffer further humiliation if the offence prima facie is not made out against the Officers. Though, the learned Government Pleader submits that it is always open for the Officers to take steps in accordance with the provisions of Cr.PC yet, this Court feels that it is not necessary to adopt such a course of action, and it would only add fuel to the fire of humiliation which does not advance the cause of justice. Hence, I do not agree with the submission of the learned Government Pleader. The FIR registered against the Petitioners Nos.2to4 as Crime No.3 of 1997 on the file of P.S. Malkapuram, Visakhapatnam, consequent on the complaint made by the 4th respondent on 9-1-1997 and further investigation process is liable to be quashed. Accordingly, it is quashed. The further proceedings initiated consequent on the registration of the FIR including filing of charge-sheet also are to be necessarily declared as illegal and without jurisdiction and I do so.
17. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.