ORDER
V. Rajagopala Reddy, J.
1. The reference touches upon some important questions relating to the nature of the Rules framed by the High Court under Article 225 of the Constitution of India and the nature of the power of the Chief Justice in the matter of constitution of Benches. Since it was felt necessary to obtain an authoritative pronouncement in the above matters, the cases were referred to a Full Bench.
2. In Criminal Petition No.2578 of 1994 the petitioner who is the 1st accused in STC No. 1 of 1994 on the file of the Special Tribunal-cum-District & Sessions Judge, Chittoor, invoked the jurisdiction of this Court to quash the above proceedings on various grounds, Under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. W.P.No.12363 of 1988 was filed by the APSRTC represented by its Managing Director, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a Writ of Mandamus to declare the proceedings adopted by the respondents as arbitrary and illegal and for a direction to the respondents 2 and 3 to issue service certificate to certain individuals strictly in accordance with the guidelines. When these matters came up for hearing before a Division Bench, the learned Counsel for the petitioner raised a preliminary common objection contending that under the Rules of the High Court on its appellate jurisdiction and the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, framed under Article 225 of the Constitution of India, the above petitions have to be heard by a single Judge, but they can be heard by a Division Bench only on a reference by the single Judge. The above rules, being of statutory nature, will have to be followed. It was also contended that since the judgments of a single Judge are appealable to a Division Bench under Clause 15 of Letters Patent and if they are decided by Division Bench in the first instance, a valuable right of appeal will be lost. It was also contended that the inherent power of the Chief Justice to constitute Benches comes into play only in the absence of any rule made in that behalf and the inherent power cannot be exercised contrary to the specific provisions of the Rules and any such action would be ultra vires of the Rules. On these objections the following reference was made:
'Can the High Court ignoring the Rules framed under Article 225 of the Constitution of India and Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, post the cases to be heard by a single Judge before a Division Bench?'
3. The contention of Sri Kannabhiran, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners before us, is that the rules of the High Court under appellate side and the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, framed under Article 225 of the Constitution of India, provide for hearing of all writ petitions by single Judges, except the writ petitions pertaining to Habeas Corpus, Taxation matters and Election Petitions. All criminal petitions except the appeals from the judgment of the Criminal Court, in which sentence of death or imprisonment for life has been passed, have also to be heard by a single Judge and against the judgment of a single Judge in a writ petition an appeal is provided under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent before a Division Bench and when a writ petition, which has to be heard by a single Judge, was heard by a Division Bench, the right of appeal was taken away. The right of appeal, being a substantive right, accrues to a party on the date of filing of original proceedings; the above Rules being statutory and mandatory in character, have to be followed and in no case they can be violated. Learned Counsel relied upon Rule 14 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977 and Rules 1 and 2 of the High Court Appellate Side Rules, which we will consider presently. Learned Advocate General contended that the rules framed by the High Court are administrative, being rules of procedure, primarily meant for distribution of work among the Judges by the Chief Justice, are not enforceable by a Court of law.
4. From the above reference and the contentions raised by the learned Counsel, the only question that arises in the above matter, is:
'Whether the hearing of a case by a Division Bench, which, as per the Rules of High Court Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, ought to be posted and heard by a single Judge, would nullify the hearing.
5. To appreciate the above question, it is necessary to trace the source of the power under which the High Court Rules on Appellate Side' and the 'Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977' collectively called 'Rules', were passed. Chapter-V of the Constitution of India contemplates the establishment of the High Court in each State, consisting of Chief Justice and several other Judges. Article 225 provides for jurisdiction of the existing High Courts and respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Courts. The High Courts are empowered to make rules of Courts including the power to regulate the sittings of the Court and the Constitution of Benches, sitting alone or Divisional Courts. The said powers are the same as existed in the High Courts before the commencement of the Constitution of India. Andhra State came into existence on 1-10-1953. Under Section 30 of Andhra State Act, the High Court of Andhra shall have all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as under law in force immediately before the prescribed date, exercisable in respect of territories by the Madras High Court. Section 32 of Andhra State Act runs as follows:
'Subject to the provisions of this Part, the Law in force immediately before the prescribed day with respect to practice and procedure in the High Court at Madras shall with the necessary modifications, apply in relation to the High Court of Andhra, and accordingly that High Court shall have all such powers to make rules and orders with respect to practice and procedure as are immediately before the prescribed day exercisable by the High Court at Madras.'
Thus, the Andhra High Court was vested with the same jurisdiction as exercised by Madras High Court before Andhra State was formed and was to follow the same practice and procedure obtained in the High Court of Madras and to be governed by the rules and orders in regard to practice and procedure existing in the Madras High Court. Under the Letters Patent of 1818 Supreme Court of Judicature of Madras was established. Under the Letters Patent of 1862 High Court Judicature for the Presidency of Madras was created. On the creation of the State of Andhra and later the State of Andhra Pradesh, this Court has been established as a successor of the power of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Madras High Court. This aspect as regards the establishment of the High Courts in India, prior to the Constitution, was succinctly dealt with by one of us (Sri P.S. Mishra, Chief Justice) in A. Srinath and Ors. v. The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, 1996 (1) ALT 893 (F.B.). who, speaking for the Full Bench, observed:
'..... the Madras High Court has exercised in such civil, criminal, admiralty, Vice-Admiralty, testamentary, into State and matrimonial jurisdiction, original and appellate and all such powers and authorities for and in relation to the administration of Justice as are conferred upon it under the said Letters Patent and/or amendment thereto. This Court has also exercised all the above powers except the ordinary original jurisdiction as spelled out in Clause 12 of the Madras Letters Patent. A Letters Patent power of the Court in Clause 15, however, is common to both the Courts and exclusive to this Court for the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Andhra Pradesh. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, subject to the provisions in the Constitution of India and as substituted by Order in Council dated 3-11-1927, reads as follows:
'And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Madras from the judgment passed in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, of one Judge of the said High Court or Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything the rein before provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of a Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act made (on or after the first day of February, 1929) in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is fit one for appeal, but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to us, our heirs or successors in our or their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.'
The appellate jurisdiction is accordingly created with respect to matters, civil and criminal not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 or in the exercise of the criminal jurisdiction of one Judge of the High Court or one Judge of any Division Court pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act. The last part of the clause wherein appeal to the Privy Council is preserved, however, stands repealed by the Constitution of India. Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, which has been continued, as we shall presently see, even after the repeal of 1915 Act by promulgation of Government of India Act, 1935 and by the Constitution of India, reads:
(1) Each High Court may by its own rules provide, as it thinks fit, for the exercise, by one or more judges, or by Division Courts constituted by two or more Judges, of the High Court, of the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court.
(2) The Chief Justice of each High Court shall determine what Judge in each case is to sit alone and what Judge of the Court, whether with or without the Chief Justice, are to constitute the several division Courts'
In other words, if rules framed by the Court provide that one or the other original or appellate jurisdiction of the Court would vest in one or more Judges, that would determine whether a certain case would be listed before a single Judge or before a Division Bench of two or more Judges. The Chief Justice shall determine that (sic. which) Judge in each case is to sit alone and what (sic. which) Judges of the Court, whether with or without the Chief Justice, are to constitute the several Division Courts.
4. Clause 37 and 38 of the Letters Patent respectively provide for regulation of proceedings in civil and criminal cases. Clause 37 reads:
'Regulation of Proceedings:- And we do further ordain that it shall be lawful for the said High Court of Judicature at Madras from time to time to make rules and orders for the purpose of regulating all proceedings in civil cases which may be brought before the said High Court, including proceedings in its admiralty, Vice-Admiralty, testamentary, intestate and matrimonial jurisdiction, respectively: Provided always, that the said High Court shall be guided in making such rules and orders as far as possible by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, being an Act passed by the Government- (sic. Governor-)General-in-Council, and being Act No. VIII of 1859, and the provisions of any law which has been made, amending or altering the same, by competent legislative authority, for India'.
Clause 38....................................
Thus, as provided under Clause 37 in its Letters Patent, this Court has been given the power to make rules and orders provided that the Court would be guided in making such rules and orders as far as possible by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended or altered by the competent legislative authority in India. In criminal cases, however, it is required to conform to the procedure or laws made by the Legislature. The Constitution of India has created the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and Article 225 thereof provided.
'Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution;
Provided that any restriction to which the exercise of original jurisdiction by any of the High Courts with respect to any matter concerning the revenue or concerning any act ordered or done in the collection thereof was subject immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall be no longer apply to the exercise of such jurisdiction.
This has not only saved the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court but also the Letters Patent including the incorporation of Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915 in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent aforequoted as also the rules framed by the High Court as provided Under Section 108 of the said 1915 Act until such time when the appropriate Legislature by virtue of powers conferred by the Constitution made any law on the subject.'
6. Thus, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court and also Clause 15 of the Letters Patent including Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915 as existed prior to the Constitution was saved by Article 225 of the Constitution.
7. Let us now examine the scope of the Rules of the High Court-Appellate Jurisdiction and the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977 in so far as they relate to the Constitution of Benches by the Honourable Chief Justice.
8. Under Clauses 36 and 37 of the Letters Patent the Andhra Pradesh High Court Appellate Side Rules have been framed, empowering the High Court to make rules for regulating the procedure for the exercise of powers of Judges sitting in single and in Division Benches and the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the High Court.
9. Clause (sic. Chapter) 1 of the Rules provides for Constitution of Benches. In Rule 1 matters were enumerated which may be heard by a Bench of a single Judge. All the appeals from the judgments or orders of the criminal Courts in which a sentence of death or imprisonment for life was awarded, may be heard by a Division Bench. Rule 2 speaks of constitution of Benches of two Judges. Every application, petition or appeal referred by a single Judge has to be heard by a Bench of two Judges. A Full Bench shall be a bench of any number not less than three of the Judges. Under Rule 6 notwithstanding anything in the above rules, the Chief Justice may direct that any application, petition, suit, appeal or reference shall be heard by a Full Bench.
10. Rule 14 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, framed under Article 225 of the Constitution of India, is also to be noticed and is extracted as under:
'14. (a) The following petitions shall be heard by a Bench of two Judges,
(i) Petitions for a writ in nature of Habeas Corpus;
(ii) Petitions relating to Elections under the Representation of the People Act, 1951;
(iii) Petitions relating to Income-tax, Gift-tax, Wealth-tax, Estate duty, Sales-tax and Excise Acts and other Allied Acts (State and Central Taxation cases)
(iv) Petitions relating to matters coming within the purview of:-A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. A.P. Lokayukta & Upa-Lokayukta Act, 1983 and The Consumer Protection Act, 1986
(b) All other petitions shall be posted before a Single Judge who may, if he thinks fit, refer any of them to a Bench of two Judges.'
Under Rule 24, the High Court Appellate Side Rules, are made applicable to the writ proceedings, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977.
11. The High Court has number of Judges. Hence, it is not possible that all the Judges should hear every case that comes up before the Court. Any function of the High Court, as seen from C1.26 of Letters Patent, which is directed to be performed by the High Court in exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction may be performed by any Judge or a Division Bench. Clause (1) of Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, empowers the High Court to make its own rules to exercise its functions by one or more Judges or by a Division Bench. Clause (2) thereof, empowers the Hon'ble Chief Justice to constitute the Benches. As ruled in Zikar v. The Government of State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 Nagpur 11.
'The first Sub-section authorises the Court as a whole to frame rules for the exercise of the jurisdiction possessed by the High Court. The second Sub-section empowers the Chief Justice to regulate the sittings of the Court.'
We are presently concerned in the instant reference, to consider the validity of the Constitution of Benches and hearing of cases by a Division Bench, in violation of the Rules 1 and 2 of the Appellate Side Rules and Rule 14 (sic.15) of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977.
12. It is not in dispute that most of the cases are posted as per the Rules. The grievance of the learned Counsel is that when that is the situation why should there be any exception in posting these cases before a Division Bench, when such a posting is not permissible under the Rules, particularly when the parties are deprived of their right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. This argument is based on the misapprehension that the rules give a right to the litigants of hearing of their cases by the High Court by particular number of Judges. The Rules contemplate apportionment of work among the Judges, for hearing and determination of the cases coming up before the High Court, by way of a single Judge or Bench of two Judges or a Full Bench. The object of the Rules appears to be that most of the cases can be disposed of by single Judges and only some important matters need to be heard by Division Benches. The language of the Rules does not indicate that if the matter is not posted as per rules, the hearing would be vitiated. The litigant cannot be heard to say that his case should be heard by a single Judge than by two Judges, since hearing by two Judges (sic. one Judge) is not only less expensive but would give him better comfort. Rule 1 of the Appellate Side Rules only say that the matters may be heard and determined by one Judge'. It does not follow from these words that these matters should in no case be heard by a Division Bench. In the same Rule it is also provided that a single Judge, before whom the matter is posted for hearing, may refer it for hearing and determination by a Bench of two Judges. Rule 14(a) of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, also contemplates hearing of writ petitions relating to Habeas Corpus, Election matters, Tax matters and other certain special enactments by Bench of two Judges. As per Rule 14(b) 'All other petitions shall be posted before a single Judge who may, if he thinks fit, refer any of them to a Bench of two Judges'. The language is similar to what we find in Rule 1 of the Appellate Side Rules. It is apparent from the language of the Rule, that a matter which is to be heard by a single Judge can also be heard by a Division Bench. A Division Bench does not appear to be incompetent to hear such matters. The above rules, having been framed for distribution of work between the Judges and being rules of procedure, are only administrative in nature and unenforceable. They do not create any right in the litigant to claim that his case should be heard by a particular number of Judges.
13. Let us examine the cases which dealt with the nature, content and effect of the rules framed by the High Courts for the distribution of the work among the Judges:
14. In Zikar's case (2 supra) it has been observed:
'26. The rules made by the High Court only provide for the convenient exercise of jurisdiction of the Court, but do not give any special judicial power to the Chief Justice over the other Judges of the Court. Under the rules the jurisdiction of the High Court is exercised by one or more Judges according to the nature of the cases. But a decision by a single Judge or a division Court given in accordance with the rules of the Court is a decision of the Court itself.'
In Mahendra Raut and Ors. v. Darsan Raut and Ors., : AIR1952Pat341 , it has been held-'.. I do not think that it can be doubted that a rule laying down the powers of a single Judge is a rule of practice and procedure as to the internal arrangement within the Court for disposal of cases. No party can say that he has a right to be heard by a particular number of Judges. If, therefore, a change is made in the rules and an appeal is heard by a single Judge instead of by two Judges, no party can object unless some vested right is affected, it being clearly understood that there is no vested right that an appeal to the High Court must be heard by a particular number of Judges.'
Considering the similar question whether change in the rules whereby appeal was heard by a single Judge instead of by two Judges, would affect the vested right of any party, it was ruled in the above decision -
'......if the party had no vested right to have his appeal heard by the particular number of Judges, in the High Court, how can it be said that a change in the rules relating to the power of a single Judge has taken away his right of appeal given by the statute? The right of appeal given by the statute remains unaffected unless the party aggrieved can say that he had a vested right to be heard by two Judges - which right he clearly had not.'
In fact, this question raised in the instant case is covered on all fours by a Full Bench decision of this Court in K. Venkateswarulu and Ors. v. S. Satyanarayana and Ors., 1956 ALT 152 = 1956 An.W.R. 117 = AIR 1957 A.P. 49, where Viswanatha Sastry, J. speaking for the majority of the Full Bench, discussed about the construction of Rules 1 and 2 of the Appellate Side Rules of the High Court, and ruled-
'The Chief Justice of the High Court is the authority to determine which Judge is to sit alone and which Judges are to constitute the several division Courts. The Appellate Side Rules having been made by the High Court tinder statutory authority referred to above, if they have a meaning and effect inconsistent with the Acts authorising them or if they are in excess of the powers conferred thereunder or if they contravene the provisions of other enactments they are pro tanto ultra vires.
Otherwise they have the force of law and are binding on all the Judges of the Court, as held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in- 'District Magistrate of Trivandrum v. M. Mappillai ILR (1939) Mad. 708: (AIR 1939 Mad. 120)... .... ....5. Under Article 216 of the Constitution corresponding to Section 2 of the High Courts Act, 1861, the High Court consists of a Chief Justice and a number of Judges. Its jurisdiction, broadly speaking, is original and appellate as stated in Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915. Where there are several Judges and a large volume of work, it is impracticable for the entire Court to sit for the determination of every appeal and it is obvious that there should be a division of the functions which the High Court has to perform.
Such a division of functions among the Judges or a delegation of authority to exercise jurisdiction to one or more Judges, in whichever way it may be regarded, has been made by the Appellate Side Rules framed by the High Court. The exercise of the High Court's jurisdiction by one or more Judges must be subject to the conditions and within the limits prescribed by the Rules.
A single Judge's power to exercise the functions of the High Court is limited to cases, where, by the Rules, the exercise of such function is entrusted to a single Judge and he would be acting beyond his jurisdiction if he were to decide a case required by the Rules to be heard and decided by a Division Bench.'
Learned Judge considering the true nature and effect of the Rules 1 and 2 of the Appellate Side Rules, ruled-
'Rule 1 is a rule of procedure, not of jurisdiction and while it lays down that an appeal whose value does not exceed Rs.7,500/- may be heard by a single Judge, it does not oust the jurisdiction of a division Bench of two Judges to hear the appeal. This is apparent from Rule1 itself which provides that a single Judge before whom the appeal is posted for hearing may, at any time, adjourn it for hearing and determination by a Bench of two Judges... .... ....There is no inherent incompetence in a Division Bench of the High Court to deal with an appeal whose value does not exceed Rs. 7,500/-. Far from this being the case, the Division Bench could hear and decide appeals from decrees however high their value might be. It is only where a Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit or appeal that the parties cannot, by their consent, convert the proceedings into a proper judicial process... .... ....Rules 1 and 2 of the Appellate Side Rules are rules of procedure apportioning the work among Judges who have the same powers and jurisdiction. Rule 2 says that a Bench of two Judges may hear every appeal from the decree or order of a Civil Court except those mentioned in R-l. So far as the exception is concerned, it is a matter of direction that the matters enumerated in R-l need not be heard by a Division Bench of two Judges. There is no hard and fast rule by which one can say whether a provision is directory or mandatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. Lord Penzance in Howard v. Bodingtion, 1877-2 PD 203 at p. 211 (M) said:'I believe, as far as any rule is framed, you cannot safely go further than that in each case you must look to the subject-matter, consider the importance of the provision and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act, and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the enactment is what is called imperative or only directory...............'
Veeraswamy, J. in Soosai Anthony D'Costa Nicholas D 'Costa v. Francis v. Francis Roche Anthony Kurush Roche and Ors., : AIR1962Mad304 rejecting the argument that the petitioner had a right vested in him by the order of reference to have his appeal heard by a Full Bench of three Judges, held-
'.....The only right of the petitioner obviously was to appeal to the High Court and it certainly did not include a right or claim to have the appeal heard by one or more Judges constituting a Division Bench or a Full Bench. It is true that Section 24 of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, 1125 regulates how and when the Chief Justice or a Division Bench may make a reference of a case to a Full Bench. But this is only by way of an arrangement for convenient disposal of cases having regard to the exigency and necessity in particular circumstances. No more is the scope of that section and its language does not warrant the view that it confers any right upon a litigant to have his case heard by a particular number of Judges of the High Court. Constitution of Benches or arrangement for sitting of single Judges is entirely a matter of routine procedure unlike a right of appeal.......'
In re Sridhar Rao and Anr. AIR 1958 A.P. 60. Subba Rao, C.J., (as he then was) on behalf of the Division Bench, ruled-
'We think there is an essential distinction between a substantive right of appeal and the procedure prescribed for disposing of that appeal. The second appeal filed in the Hyderabad High Court was transferred to the Andhra Pradesh High Court and was disposed of by the said High Court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by that High Court for disposing of such appeals. Whether the appeal is disposed of by a single Judge or by a Bench of two Judges it is a disposal by the High Court itself. The internal distribution and allocation of work between and among the Judges of the High Court is a matter of procedure and the change of the procedure does not affect the vested right of a party as it does not deprive him of his right of appeal to the High Court'.
Sankaran C.J., speaking for the Full Bench in Kochnpennu Kochikku v. Kochikka Kunjipennu and Ors., : AIR1961Ker226 also held that the litigant has no vested right to have his case heard by particular number of Judges. It was therefore held-
'The question, therefore is whether any appellant has a vested right to have his appeal heard by particular number of Judges. If the rules providing for the hearing of the appeal by a Single Judge or by a Bench of two or more Judges are merely rules regulating the internal working of the Court, i.e., the practice and procedure of the Court then it is obvious that such rules cannot confer any right on the litigant. The rules are meant only for the convenient working of the Court and the authority competent to lay down such rules will be entitled to modify the rules and to alter the procedure of the Court.
So long as the changes thus brought about in the rules of procedure of the Court do not affect any vested or substantive right of a litigant, the rules as modified from time to time will have retrospective effect and will be applicable to pending actions also. As already stated, the right of the litigant is to have his cause decided by the Court before whom the cause is being agitated. In the present case, the appellants have a right to have the appeals decided by the High Court.
Whether that decision is given by a Single Judge of the High Court or by two or more Judges of the High Court, or by all the Judges of the High Court sitting together, the decision will be the decision of the High Court. Hence, it cannot be said that the variation in the number of Judges hearing the case and rendering the decision, will in any way prejudice the right of the appellant to have a decision by the High Court. His right was only to appeal to the High Court and not to a Bench consisting of a particular number of Judges.'
A Full Bench of our Court in St. Anthony's Educational Society, Narasaraopet v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, : 1993(3)ALT561 (F.B.) has after analysing the Appellate Side Rules, held that the rules are administrative in nature. The learned Judges held that.
'5. Appellate side rules contemplate constitution of Benches consisting of one Judge or two Judges or three or more Judges. The Benches are constituted by the Chief Justice keeping in view the nature of the cause, or matter that has to be heard, the pendency of the cases in the Court, and the relevant statutory provisions including the Appellate Side Rules. The cases are posted before the respective Benches for disposal as per the directions of the Chief Justice. The power vested in the Chief Justice to constitute Benches and give directions for posting of cases before the respective Benches is described by a Full Bench of Five Judges of this Court as administrative power exercised 'for proper functioning of the Court in the interests of the administration of Justice'.
A Bench of five judges, of this Court in V. Venkata Reddy and Ors. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, ILR (1973) A.P. 787 = 1973 (1) ALT 1 (F.B.) while considering the question whether the reference to it was in accordance with the Rules and the practice, held at page 811:
'There is no impediment in or restriction on the power of the Chief Justice in the matter of constitution of Benches or Full Benches and that power is an administrative power vested in him for proper constitution of Benches for purposes of disposal of the cases before the Court and for proper functioning of the Court in the interests of the administration of justice'.
Again, at page 860, it was held as follows:
'It has to be noted that the power vested in the Chief Justice under Rules 5 and 6 of the Appellate Side Rules is only discretionary and administrative in nature, but is not of judicial character.'
It is, therefore, plain that the rules are administrative and that the hearing of a case by a Division Bench is neither ultra vires of the rules or without jurisdiction.
15. The next question that immediately falls for consideration is whether the petitioner's right to prefer Letters Patent Appeal from the decision of the single Judge would be lost, if they were heard by the Division Bench at the first instance.
16. We have no hesitation in rejecting this contention also. It is true that the right of appeal is a valuable vested right, as is held in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhary and Ors., : [1957]1SCR488 ; in Mohan Lal v. Delhi Administration, : 1975CriLJ1645 and in Umaji Keshao Meshram and Ors. v. Smt. Radhikabai and Anr., : [1986]1SCR731 . But a litigant has no vested right that his case should be heard by a single Judge and not by two Judges of the High Court. As held by the Full Bench in K. Venkateswarlu's case (4 supra), under Rule 1 the single Judge, before whom the case is posted as per the Rules, could direct the appeal to be posted before a Division Bench and hence a Division Bench cannot be said to have no Jurisdiction to hear such a case. In fact the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent arises only against the judgments of a single Judge. Writ Petitioner's right of appeal arises only if a judgment is rendered by single Judge. Cl, 15 of the Letters Patent clearly states that an appeal shall lie from the judgment of one Judge of the said High Court. Until the judgment is delivered by the single Judge, no right of appeal would accrue to the petitioner. In K. Venkcitesivarlu's case (4 supra), this point was also raised and considered and the Full Bench rejecting the contention, ruled:
'The right of the appellant is to enter the High Court and invoke its interposition to redress the error of the Court below and this right is not touched. His right of further appeal to the Supreme Court, if he has the right, is also not prejudicially affected by a Division Bench hearing the appeal in the first instance instead of by way of a Letters Patent Appeal, There is no vested right in a litigant that his appeal should be heard by a single Judge and not by two Judges of the High Court sitting as a Bench.
(10) If an appeal against a decree not exceeding Rs. 7,500/- in value is posted for hearing in the first instance before a Division Bench of two Judges without its being referred by a single Judge under Rule 1 of the Appellate Side Rules, it is open to the Division Bench to direct the appeal to be posted before a Single judge in conformity with Rule 1.
If, however, the Division Bench proceeds to hear and decide the appeal, it does not act without jurisdiction and the decree and judgment of the Division Bench are not a nullity but will be valid and binding on the parties.'
17. Courts have consistently ruled that the Hon'ble Chief Justice has got an inherent power to post a particular case before a Division Bench, notwithstanding that, ordinarily, it is a matter to be heard by a single Judge. Clause 1 of Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, enables the High Court to exercise its functions amongst the Judges of the High Court by constituting Benches. Clause 2 empowers the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the High Court for posting of cases before Benches and also empowers him to post a particular case or cases before a particular Bench or Benches.
18. The first Sub-section authorises the Court as a whole to frame rules for the exercise of the jurisdiction possessed by the High Court. The second Sub-section empowers the Chief Justice to regulate the sitting of the Court having regard to the importance of the matters and the volume of the work. Thus, the Hon'ble Chief Justice has undoubtedly possesses powers to regulate the sittings, in his discretion. It is also relevant to notice that Articles 159, 217, 224 and 229 of the Constitution of India give a special position to the Chief Justice under the Constitution. The Full Bench of Patna High Court in Mahendra Rant's case (3 supra), considered the Special position of the Hon'ble Chief Justice, observing:
'(7) Within the limit and boundary of the rules, it has been the practice in this Court, within my experience, for the Chief Justice to direct what case or class of cases shall be placed before each Judge or Bench. For example, under R-1 (XV) a single Judge has power to hear all criminal appeals other than an appeal in which a sentence of death or of transportation for life has been passed. Within the framework of this rule, it has been the long standing practice of this Court for the Chief Justice to direct that appeals involving a lesser sentence, such as six months', three years', or even five years' imprisonment, shall only be placed before a single Judge and appeals involving a higher sentence shall be placed before a Division Bench. Similarly, though R-1 (ii) lays down that a single Judge may hear and dispose of a second appeal which does not exceed Rs. 1,000/- in value, it is open to the Chief Justice to direct that a single Judge shall deal with second appeals of a lesser value, namely, Rs. 500/- only, and second appeals exceeding Rs. 500/- in value shall be placed before a Division Bench. Such practice is, I think, sanctioned by and is consistent with Rules 10 and 10-A quoted above. I do not, however, think that R-10 or 10-A, empowers the Chief Justice to go beyond the limit of the rules or amend the rules of the Court by administrative action embodied in a Standing Order. There is room for administrative action within the framework of the rules; but there can be no fundamental change of the rules by administrative action only'.
The following observations made in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik and Ors., : AIR1982SC1198 are very significant and revealing to understand the nature and amplitude of the power of the Hon'ble Chief Justice:
'The Chief Justice is the master of the roster. He has full power, authority and jurisdiction in the matter of allocation of business of the High Court which flows not only from the provision contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act, but inheres in him in the very nature of things'.
The power and authority of the Hon'ble Chief Justice to constitute Benches and to post causes before one or two or three or more Judges and to give necessary directions regarding all matters of posting of cases has been considered in depth by a recent Full Bench of this Court in St. Anthony's Educational Society's case (8 supra). Following the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Raghubir Singh, : [1989]178ITR548(SC) , as regards the practice followed by the Supreme Court in sitting in divisions for the disposal of cases, A. Lakshmana Rao, Acting Chief Justice (as he then was) speaking for the Bench ruled:
'6. The general practice of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court sitting in divisions for the disposal of cases, has been explained in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh as 'the method adopted out of necessity and convenience, in view of the large volume of work that the Supreme Court has to handle'. The power vested in the Chief Justice of India to constitute Benches is described as the authority devolving by convention. It was observed in that decision:
'....But having regard to the volume of work demanding the attention of the Court, it has been found necessary in India as a general rule of practice and convenience that the Court should sit in Divisions, each Division being constituted of Judges whose number may be determined by the exigencies of judicial need, by the nature of the case including any statutory mandate relative thereto, and by such other considerations which the Chief Justice, in whom such authority devolves by convention, may find most appropriate'.7. Thus, the power and authority is vested in the Chief Justice of a High Court to constitute Benches of one or two or three or more Judges and give appropriate directions for posting of cases before those Benches. It is a settled principle of law that the Chief Justice can suo motu direct that any application, petition, suit, appeal or reference which is usually to be heard by a single Judge, shall be heard by a Bench of two or three or more Judges, as is held in V. Venkata Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (9 supra). This power vested in the Chief Justice is essential for the effective, orderly, consistent and smooth functioning of the Court and necessary in the interest of the administration of justice'.
This matter was also considered by the latest Full Bench in A. Srinath's case (1 supra). P.S. Mishra, Chief Justice, speaking for the Bench traced the history of establishment of High Court at Madras and taking notice of various authorities on the subject in considering the question whether, in the absence of one or more of the Judges constituting the Bench, a review petition should only be heard by the remaining Judge, endorsed the view expressed by the Full Bench of Madras High Court in Mayavaram Financial Corporation Limited, Mayiladuhtrai v. The Registrar of Chits, Pondicherry (1991-2LW 80), which was follows:
'The business of the Court will be determined by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice alone, who in his discretion may decide what Judge is to sit alone and what Judges are to constitute different benches and allotted business of the Court. The Letters Patent aforequoted recognises this power of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the Court and as held by the Supreme Court, even in the absence of a specific provision, this is an inherent power of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice...........But it will still not be open to any party to insist that his case must be heard by the Judge or Judges, who had passed the decree or made the order. There may be cases where after passing the decree or making the order, one or all of the Judges constituting the Bench may feel embarrassed in hearing the review petition. They may in such a situation, order for the case being placed before some other Judge. They need for this purpose make an open pronouncement except indicating their disinclination to hear the matter to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. What would be done in such a case if the Hon'ble the Chief Justice did not exercise his inherent power to constitute a new Bench to hear the review petition. There may be many other circumstances and situations in which the Hon'ble the Chief Justice exercising his inherent power to constitute a new Bench to hear the review petition. There may be many other circumstances and situations in which the Hon'ble the Chief Justice exercising his inherent power, may not think it desirable to place the review petition before the Bench, which passed the decree or made the order. As this is a rule of procedure and not a substantive right, it is not for the litigant to suggest who should hear the review petition. A prudent exercise of discretion by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice in this matter, and since this power has been held to inhere and vest with the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, in our view, by itself is a sufficient safeguard to ensure its prudential exercise, should be more than enough for the parties to accept the constitution of the Bench or allotment of the case to a Judge or Judges for the hearing of the review petition.
There shall be nothing wrong if in a situation like one contemplated in Rule 5 of Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the review application is listed before such Judge or Judges or any of them, who are available and who had passed the decree or made the order. There shall also be nothing wrong if the case is listed before a Bench of equal strength, which passed the decree or made the order under review provided the remaining Judge or Judges of the original Bench except the Judge or Judges who are no more available, are members of the new Bench. In exceptional case, there shall also be no infringement of any vested right of any party if the review petition is not placed before any of the Judges of the original Bench but instead placed before a Bench constituted by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for the said purpose.
To sum up:
(3) The Hon'ble the Chief Justice has the inherent power to allocate the judicial business of the High Court including who of the Judges should sit alone and who should constitute the Bench of two or more Judges. No litigant shall, upon such constitution of a Bench or allotment of a case to a particular Judge of the Court will have a right to question the jurisdiction of the Judges or the Judge hearing the case. No person can claim as a matter of right that this petition be heard by a single Judge or a Division Bench or a particular single Judge or a particular Division Bench. No Judge or a Bench of Judges will assume jurisdiction unless the case is allotted to him or them under the order of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice.'
19. From the above discussion it is manifest that the Hon'ble the Chief Justice enjoys an inherent and unrestricted administrative power in the matter of constitution of Benches in the interests of administration of justice and that the hearing by a Division Bench of a case which should be heard, ordinarily, by a single Judge, is not incompetent or without jurisdiction and that in any event a litigant has no right to be heard by any particular number of Judges.
20. The reference is accordingly answered.
21. Post the cases before the Division Bench for disposal.