S.R. Nayak, J.
1. This writ petition is directed against the order-dated 28-4-2000 made in LGC No.85 of 1996 on the file of the Special Court constituted under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short, 'the Act'). The writ petitioner is the respondent in the LGC.
2. The 2nd respondent herein viz., Kasula Raghumani, filed the above LGC in the Special Court for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of the land to an extent of 1102 sq. yards equivalent to 922 sq. meters comprised in Sy. No.63/2 of Sankeswar Bazaar, Saidabad village and Mandal of Hyderabad (the then Channinar Mandal), (hereinafter referred to as 'the schedule land'), by declaring the writ petitioner as the land grabber and to punish him under the provisions of the Act. The said application filed by the 2nd respondent herein was allowed by the Special Court holding that the petitioner herein is a land grabber within the meaning of the Act and directing him to vacate the schedule land within a period of two months from the date of the order and also directing prosecution of the petitioner for the offence of land grabbing as provided under the Act. Hence this writ petition by the respondent in the LGC.
3. The case of the 2nd respondent-applicant pleaded before the Special Court in the LGC is, in brief, as follows: The applicant purchased the schedule land for valuable consideration from the owner viz., Gajaraj Singh s/o late Ramsingh by a registered sale deed dated 4-4-1968 bearingdocument No.960/68. The total extent of Sy. No.63/2 is Ac. 16-00 and odd and the said land was originally owned and possessed by Gajaraj Singh. Gajaraj Singh was the owner of certain other lands also and there is a big palatial building with large extent of abutting open land in Sy.No.63/2 and the Municipal Corporation has assigned D.No.17-1-411 to the said building. The schedule land purchased by the applicant abuts the western compound wall of the premises of her vendor viz., Gajaraj Singh s/o late Ramsingh, The applicant was inducted into possession of the schedule land on the date of the sale deed and since then she has been in possession and enjoyment of the same in her own right as the owner of the schedule land. The applicant's husband was a Government employee and he has been transferred from one place to another, In view of the lack of funds, house could not be constructed in the schedule land immediately after the purchase. While so, the applicant received the suit notice filed by the writ petitioner, wherein ex parte interim injunction was obtained by him in respect of the schedule land restraining the applicant from interfering with the alleged possession of the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner is a milk vendor in the locality. The writ petitioner, claiming to have purchased the property comprised in Sy.No.78/3 of Said a bad village from one Misaiah by a registered sale deed dated 4-8-1992, grabbed the schedule land without any right or title. In the concise statement filed before the special Court, it is stated that the writ petitioner is claiming his title to the schedule land through one Sri Syed Mahamood in Sy. No.78/3 by stating that originally the schedule land belonged to one Sri Syed Mohamood from whom the schedule land was purchased by one Narasimha Reddy, and from Sri Narasimha Reddy, the schedule land was purchased by one Misaiah, and from Misaiah, the writ petitioner purchased the schedule land. It is further alleged that taking advantage of theabsence of the applicant and her husband from the city of Hyderabad, the writ petitioner trespassed into the schedule land and grabbed the same under the guise of an interim injunction obtained by him in the suit. The applicant also claimed that the schedule land is not covered by Sy .No.78/3, but it is covered in Sy.No.63/2.
4. The Special Court having taken cognizance of the case under Section 8 of the Act, issued notice to the writ petitioner. A notification was also issued under Section 8(6) of the Act calling for objections from the persons interested and the same was published in the A.P. Gazette Part-II Extraordinary No. 143 dated 5-7-1996.
5. The writ petitioner filed counter opposing the application filed by the applicant. There is no need for us to refer to all the averments in the counter. The relevant material averments in the counter having bearing on the decision-making be noted briefly as under: The schedule land is covered by Sy. No.78/3 of Saidabad village and Mandal and not by Sy.No.63/2 as claimed by the applicant. The schedule land originally belonged to one Syed Mahamood, who was the owner and pattadar of Sy .No.78/3 of Sankeswar Bazaar, Saidabad village and Mandal, Hyderabad. The schedule land was sold by the said Syed Mahammod in favour of one Mr. Narasimha Reddy who, in turn, executed as sale deed in favour of Mr. Misaiah on 7-10-1966, Mr. Misaiah, in turn, executed an agreement of sale on 5-4-1993 in favour of the writ petitioner confirming the earlier oral agreement of sale dated 4-8-1992 in his favour and acknowledged receipt of the amount periodically. Under the oral agreement dated 4-8-1992 a sum of Rs.30,000/- was received by Mr. Misaiah towards sale consideration on that day and the writ petitioner was put into physical possession of the schedule land. A sum of Rs.60,000/- and Rs.30,000/- were paid toMr. Misaiah on 5-12-1992 and 9-2-1993 respectively towards sale consideration. Mr. Misaiah had also agreed to receive the balance sale consideration of Rs.55,000/-on the date of registration of the sale deed before the Sub-Registrar. The written agreement of sale is dated 5-4-1993. The original owner Mr. Syed Mahamood was in possession of the schedule land in his own right and thereafter Mr. Narasimha Reddy was in physical possession of the schedule land and after him Mr. Misaiah was in possession and Mr. Misaiah put the writ petitioner in physical possession of the schedule land on 4-8-1992 in pursuance of the oral agreement and since then the writ petitioner has been in actual possession and enjoyment of the schedule land. Subsequently an additional counter-affidavit was filed by the writ petitioner wherein he stated that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the schedule land for more than 30 years before he purchased the schedule land and thereby he perfected his title to the schedule land by adverse possession. In the additional counter-affidavit, it is also contended that old Sy.No.78/3 correlates to new Sy.No.63/2. A rejoinder was filed by the applicant denying the claim of the writ petitioner that old Sy.No.78/3 correlates to new Sy.No.63/2.
6. The Special Court, on the basis of the above pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues for trial:
1. Whether the applicant is the owner of the application schedule property?
2. Whether the rival title set up by the parties is true and valid?
3. Whether the respondent is a land grabber within the meaning of A.P. Act XII/1982?
4. To what relief?
7. On behalf of the applicant, the applicant herself was examined as PW1 andher husband was examined as PW2 and 12 documents were marked as Exs.Al to A12. On behalf of the writ petitioner, he himself was examined as RW1 and the son of Mr, Misaiah was examined as RW2. A resident of the locality, one Mr. Ahmad Ali, was examined as RW3 and as many as 27 documents were marked as Exs.B1 to B27.
8. The Special Court, on consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, recorded its findings on issue Nos.l to 3 in favour of the applicant and against the writ petitioner and held that the writ petitioner is a 'land grabber' within the meaning of that term as defined under Clause (d) of Section (2) of the Act. The Special Court also held that the writ petitioner has failed to establish the plea that he perfected his title over the schedule land by adverse possession. In view of the above findings recorded by it, the Special Court passed the order impugned in this writ petition, the operative portion of which reads as follows:
'In view of the findings recorded on issue Nos.l to 3, the application is allowed and the respondent is directed to vacate the application schedule property within a period of two months from today, failing which the RDO., Hyderabad shall initiate appropriate action under Rule 15(2) of the Rules framed under the Act and property take possession of the application schedule property after evicting the respondent therefrom within one month after the expiry of the period of two months mentioned above and handover possession of the application schedule property to the applicant and submit compliance report in the prescribed form to this Court. The applicant is entitled to costs quantified in a sum of Rs.2,000/-(Rs. Two thousand only).
Having regard to the facts and in the circumstances, particularly our observations that Ex.B5 is a fabricated document as well as Ex.B12, we are of the opinion that it is a fit case to order prosecution. Accordingly, we order prosecution of the respondent forthe defence of land grabbing under the provisions of the Act XII/1982. Criminal case will be posted before the II Bench.'
9. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. The arguments of Sri Vedula Venkataramana, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner run as follows:
(a) On the pleadings of the applicant LGCNo.85 of 1996 should not have been entertained by the Special Court; when an order of injunction is subsisting, the person who suffered injunction cannot convert the dispute into a land grabbing case; declaratory remedy regarding title to a property cannot indirectly be claimed by instituting a land grabbing case; the remedy provided under the Act is not comprehensive remedy for seeking relief of declaration to title and recovery of possession; the Special Court has failed to record a clear finding as to whether the writ petitioner is a land grabber under Section 2(d) read with Section (2)(e) of the Act and without a specific finding about this, the Special Court has granted declaration of title in favour of the applicant and directed prosecution of the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained in this count itself.
(b) The Special Court does not have jurisdiction to deal with cases of land grabbing unless the jurisdiction facts such as 'land grabber', 'land grabbing' and 'unauthorised structures' are established and they were found to exist at least as per the pleading filed before it; when the writ petitioner filed a suit in the civil Court and secured temporary injunction order against the applicant, the applicant who suffered such injunction cannot be allowed to institute a land grabbing case as if the temporary injunctiongranted by the civil Court in favour of the writ petitioner and against the applicant has no legal consequence, possession which is supported by an order of injunction granted by the jurisdictional civil Court can never be construed as illegal possession and, therefore, the special Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the applicant.
(c) The Special Court has not recorded any specific finding as to whether Gajraj Singh, the vendor of the applicant, the 2nd respondent herein, had title to the house plot; it is specifically denied in the counter filed before the Special Court that Gajraj Singh had title to the house plot; it is pleaded that Syed Mahamood was the original pattadar as per Ex.B27 Vasool Bakki and Saitwar of 1931-32; the applicant-2nd respondent has failed to adduce any evidence about patta granted in favour of Gajraj Singh and also about the source of title to Gajraj Singh; when the applicant has failed to discharge the burden of proof cast on her regarding the title of the house plot, the Special Court is not justified in going into the title of the writ petitioner and, therefore, the findings recorded by the special Court are perverse;
(d) The special Court ought to have seen that old Sy.No.78/3 corresponds to new Sy.No.63/2 as per the Vasool Baki and Saitwar of 1931-32; ignoring the primary record, the special Court has proceeded to take into account the report of the Mandal Revenue Officer submitted under Rule 6 of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules, 1988 (for short, 'the Rules') and the report of the Assistant Director, Survey, which does not specifically disclose that Sy.No.78/3is non-existent; the findings recorded by the special Court are as a result of total misreading of the evidence on record and they are liable to be set aside.
(e) The special Court ought to have seen that even if the agreement of sale under which the writ petitioner has claimed the house plot is not acceptable to the Court, it is not conclusive to allow the land grabbing case; the applicant has utterly failed to prove her title and source of title of her vendor; the findings recorded by the special Court are contrary to the evidence on record;
(f) A bona fide dispute of title between the parties will not fall within the expression of 'land grabbing' as per clause (d) of Section (2) of the Act and, therefore, the special Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such dispute.
(g) The report submitted by the MRO under Rule 6(2) of the Rules is not the proof and that report can be used by the special Court only for the limited purpose to decide whether it should take cognizance of the case or not, whereas in the instant case, the special Court has heavily relied on the report of the Mandal Revenue Officer to record the findings on merits of the case against the writ petitioner.
(h) Although under Section 10 of the Act, the burden of proving that the application schedule land has not been grabbed is placed on a person against whom the allegation of land grabbing is made, as held by the Courts, the initial burden to prove that the applicant is the owner of the application schedule land is on the applicant and not on the personagainst whom the allegation of land grabbing is made, and in the instant case, the applicant has utterly failed to discharge that initial burden and on that count itself the application should have been dismissed.
(i) The findings recorded by the special Court are perverse and they are not based on any legal evidence and, therefore, those findings can be corrected by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution by issuing writ of certiorari. In support of this contention, learned Counsel placed reliance on Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, : [1964]5SCR64 , and State of West Bengal v. Krishna Shaw and another, : AIR1990SC2205 .
10. In order to decide whether the special Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the 2nd respondent herein, it becomes necessary for us to first notice certain relevant statutory provisions. The expressions 'land', 'land grabber', 'land grabbing' and 'unauthorised structures' are defined in Clause (c), (cc) , (d), (e) and (j) respectively of Section 2 of the Act. They read as follows:
'2(c) 'land' includes rights in or over land, benefits to arise out of land, and buildings, structures and other things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth;
(cc) 'land belonging to a private person' means any land belonging to--
(i) an evacuee;
(ii) a military personnel; or
(iii) any other private individual;
The value or the extent of which or the nature of the evil involved shall be of substantial nature or in the interest of justice required.'
(d) 'land grabber' means a person or a group of persons who commits land grabbing and includes any person who gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands or for construction of unauthorised structures thereon, or who collects or attempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation, or who abets the doing of any of the abovementioned acts, and also includes the successors in interest.
(e) 'land grabbing' means every activity of grabbing of land (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person), by a person or group of persons, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands, or enter into or create illegal tenancies or lease and licence agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or to construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation, of unauthorised structures; and the term 'to grab the land' shall be construed accordingly.
(j) 'unauthorised structures' means any structure constructed, without express permission in writing of the Municipal Commissioner in any Municipal Corporation or Municipality, and else where of the authority concerned, or except in accordance with any law for the time being in force in the area concerned.
11. The Act as amended by amendment Act 16 of 1987 seeks to provide remedy to a person whose land is grabbed. Identical remedies are available before Courts deriving power and jurisdiction under the A.P. Civil Courts Act, 1972. In contemplation of emergence of a situation wherein all suits for ejectment of the land may have to be instituted before the special Court constituted under the Act, which would create problem of overburden of the Special Court, Clause (cc) of Section 2, lays down that only those lands of private persons which by their value, or extent, or the nature of the evil involved, being of substantial nature requiring interference in the interests of justice, fall within the definition of clause (cc) of Section 2 of the Act. It, therefore, follows that remedies in regard to lands of private persons not falling within the definition of Section 2(cc) of the Act can only be sought in civil and criminal Courts functioning under the A.P. Civil Courts Act and Criminal Procedure Code, and not before the Special Court. As per Clause (d) of Section 2, 'land grabber' is a person who commits land grabbing. The expression 'land grabbing' is defined in Clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act. Therefore, the definition of 'land grabbing' is to be read into the definition of 'land grabber' in order to decide whether a person is a land grabber or not.
12. The statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act reads as follows:
'It has come to the notice of the Government that there are organized attempts on the part of certain lawless persons operating individually and in groups to grab either by force, or by deceit or otherwise lands belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including wakf or any other private person. The land grabbers are fonning bogus co-operative housing societies or setting up fictitious claims and indulging in large scale and unprecedented and fraudulent sales of land through unscrupulous real estate dealers or otherwise in favour of certain section of people, resulting in large scale accumulation of the unaccounted wealth. As public order is also adversely affected thereby now and then by such unlawful activities of land grabbers in State, particularly in respect or urban and urbanisable lands, it was felt necessary to arrest and curb such unlawful activities immediately by enacting a special law in the regard.'
The preamble to the Act reads as follows:
'An Act to prohibit the activity of land grabbing in the State of Andhra Pradesh and to provide for matters connected therewith.
Whereas there are organized attempts on the part of certain lawless persons operating individually and in groups, to grab, either by force or by deceit or otherwise, lands (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private persons) who are known as 'land grabbers'.
And whereas such land grabbers are forming bogus co-operative housing societies or setting up fictitious claims and including in large scale and unprecedented and fraudulent sales of lands belonging to the Government, local authority, religious or charitable institutions or endowments including a wakf or private persons, through unscrupulous real estate dealers or otherwise in favour of certain sections of the people resulting in large accumulation of unaccounted wealth and quick money to land grabbers;
And whereas, having regard to the resources and influence of the persons by whom, the large scale on which and the manner in which, the unlawful activity of land grabbing was, has been or is being organized and carried on in violation of law by them, as land grabbers in the State of Andhra Pradesh, and particularly in its urban areas, it is necessary to arrest and curb immediately such unlawful activity of land grabbing;
And whereas public order is adversely affected by such unlawful activity of land grabbers.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Andhra Pradesh in the Thirty-third year of the Republic of India as follows:'
Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act provides for constitution of the special Courts by the Government for the purpose ofproviding speedy enquiry into any alleged act of land grabbing and trial of cases in respect of ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed. Subsections (1), (1-A), (2) and (8) of Section 8 of the Act read as follows:-
'8. Procedure and powers of the special Courts :--(1) The special Court may, either suo motu or on application made by any person, officer or authority take cognizance of and try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, whether before or after the commencement of mis Act, and pass such orders (including orders by way of interim directions) as it deems fit;
(1-A) The special Court shall, for the purpose of taking cognizance of the case, consider the location, or extent or value of the land alleged to have been grabbed or of the substantial nature of the evil involved or in the interest of justice required or any other relevant matter:
Provided that the special Court shall not take cognizance of any such case without hearing the petitioner.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972, any case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing or the determination of question of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of any land grabbed under this Act, shall be triable only in a special Court constituted for the area in which the land grabbed is situated; and the decision of the special Court shall be final.
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(8) Any case, pending before any Court or other authority immediately before the constitution of a special Court, as would have been within the jurisdiction of such Special Court, shall stand transferred tothe Special Court as if the cause or action on which such suit or proceeding is based and arisen after the constitution of the Special Court.'
Section 15 provides that the provisions of the Act have overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or custom, usage, or agreement-or decree or order of a Court or any other Tribunal or authority. Having regard to the definition of the expressions 'land grabber' and 'land grabbing' under Clause (d), (e) of Section 2 of the Act and the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 7 and Sub-section (1) of Section 8, it is quite clear that the condition-precedent for assuming jurisdiction by the special Court is that the case filed before it must have arisen out of any alleged act of land grabbing.
13. The word 'grabbing' is not defined in the Act. The literal meaning of the word 'grab', according to the Chambers Dictionary is 'sudden grasp, to clutch or unscrupulous seizure'. According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word 'grab' means 'to grasp or seize suddenly and eagerly; hence as to appropriate unscrupulously'. Therefore, it may be said that 'actus reus' in 'land grabbing' includes every activity to illegally take possession or enter into land. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act, which begins with a non-obstante clause, provides that the special Court can try any case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing or the determination of question of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of any land grabbed under the Act. The non-obstante clause incorporated in subsection (2) of Section 8 is rather significant and it connotes the wide jurisdiction vested in the special Court. A Division Bench of this Court in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Government of A.P., : 1998(6)ALT227 (DB), dealing with the extent of jurisdiction vested in the special Court, held--
'The words used in sub-section (2) are rather significant. To wit, notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure...Any case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing or the determination of questions of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of any land grabbed under this Act. The extent of jurisdiction as is permitted by the statute, therefore, is rather wide in its application. Three several (sic. specific) situations have been noted viz., (i) jurisdiction can be had in regard to a case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing; (ii) jurisdiction can be had in a case where determination of questions of title and ownership are involved and (iii) jurisdiction can be had where lawful possession of any land grabbed under the Act is involved. All these three specific situations as envisaged by and under the statute would be triable in the Special Court and the decision of the Special Court shall be final -- this is the language and total import of Section 8. The user of the expression 'or' is very significant and none of these three situations can be read in conjunction with each other but three specifically specified situations independent of the other are contemplated by reason of the user of the world 'or' and any other interpretation to Sub-section (2) of Section 8 would do a violent injustice and departure from the legislative intent which is neither feasible nor practicable. In any event it is not permissible. So far as the law Courts are concerned, the legislative intent shall have to be given to its priority and when the intent is otherwise clear and categorical, question of having any other meaning attributed to it does not and cannot arise. This aspect of the matter, however, cannot be ignored, neither any other interpretation would subserve the ends of justice.'
As held by the Division Bench in the above case, the disjunction 'or' occurring in the definition of 'land grabbing' in Clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act cannot be read in conjunction with each other with reference to the three situations specified therein. Therefore, it cannot be said that the application filed by the 2nd respondent is incompetent, because, by the time theapplication was filed in the special Court, the writ petitioner had obtained temporary injunction from the civil Court in a suit filed by him for bar injunction. It needs to be emphasized that if a person enters into the land owned by another without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally taking possession of such land, it satisfies the necessary conditions to constitute such act as 'land grabbing' and to hold the person guilty of such land grabbing as a 'land grabber'. In K. Mohanlal v. Stale of A. P. and Ors., : 1997(4)ALT220 , a Division Bench of this Court held that the special Court constituted under the Act is indisputably a Court discharging judicial functions, almost the same functions as the civil Court discharges for trial of cases involving the determination of question of title and ownership or lawful possession. Further, this Court in Government of A.P. v. Sathiah, : 1993(2)ALT252 , held that the 'litmus paper test' for applying the provisions of the Act is in respect of the situation and the location of the land. The Court held that any dispute with regard to the title, ownership or possession of such land shall fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court. In the same case, the Court also held that the words 'any alleged act of land grabbing' occurring in Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act do not leave any doubt that the special Court and the Special Tribunal alone have the jurisdiction to deal with the allegation of 'land grabbing', no matter whether it is by or against the Government, local authority or private party. If matters relating to any given case bring it within the jurisdiction of the Special Court conferred by Section 7 of the Act, then, necessary the matter is required to be enquired into by the Special Court of exclusive jurisdiction constituted under the Act. This is the clear purport of Sub-section (8) of Section 8 of the Act, which requires that all cases pending in any Court or other authority immediately before the constitution of aspecial Court shall stand transferred to the special Court having jurisdiction. Therefore, it is quite clear that a civil Court is barred from trying matters which fall within the exclusive domain of jurisdiction of the special Court constituted under the Act. That is the only reasonable way of construing the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 7, and Sub-sections (1) and 8 of Section 8 of the Act. In view of the fiction contained in Sub-section (8) of Section 8 of the Act, it must be held that because of the pendency of the suit when the Act had come into force, the cause of action must be deemed to have arisen after the constitution of the Special Court under Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, the matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court, and the civil Court cannot determine the matter. In K. Krishna v. Special Court, 1995 (4) An. WR 451, this Court held that the Special Court can play the role of a civil Court and decide the disputed question of title and possession. In Gurram Rami Reddy and another v. State of A.P., : 2000(3)ALD328 (DB), a Division Bench of this Court held that if the dispute instituted before the Special Court falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court, the Special Court can entertain the application notwithstanding the pendency of a suit in civil Court in respect of the same subject-matter for mere injunction. The Court also held that the findings given by the Special Court as to the land grabbing, title or lawful ownership or possession in respect of the land involved in the application would be binding on the civil Court. The Division Bench held--
'.....Nothing has been argued specifically as to how mere failure to transfer the pending civil suit to the special Court/special Tribunal would affect the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, if otherwise on the basis of the averments in the application filed before the Special Court and the counter therein, and on the basis of the questions involved in theapplication, the special Court could be held to have jurisdiction. As to the per-dency of the suit for injunction, which is said to be still pending, it was for the civil Court either to have transferred the suit to the Special Court of deal with it otherwise. At any rate, as the dispute involved falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court, all findings given by the Special Court as to the land grabbing, title and lawful ownership or possession in respect of the land involved in the application will be binding on the civil Court. It is open to the applicant in the land grabbing case (respondent No.2 herein) to apprise the civil Court of the decree passed by the special Court in the matter with authenticated copy of the decree passed and in such an event, the suit before the civil Court shall stand dismissed.....'
14. In the instant case, the applicant in her pleading has clearly stated that she purchased the schedule land by a registered sale deed dated 4-4-1968 and she has also referred to the title held by her vendor and the vendor's vendor. It is also specifically alleged that the writ petitioner-respondent, taking advantage of the absence of the applicant and her husband from the city of Hyderabad, trespassed into the schedule land and grabbed the Same under the guise of an ex pane ad hoc temporary injunction claimed to have been obtained by him in a suit. The applicant has also laid before the special Court the prima facie evidence i.e., the registered sale deed dated 4-4-1968 in support of her claim. The applicant also claimed that the schedule land is not covered by Sy.No.78/3 and it is covered by Sy. No.63/2. It cannot be said that the material allegations in the application, if true, do not constitute 'land grabbing' within the meaning of that term under Clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act. Therefore, we hold that the averments contained in the application of the applicant filed before the special Court make out a case of 'land grabbing' envisaged under Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act. As the writ petitioner denied the title of the applicant in respectof the land grabbed and asserted tes own title thereto, there was absolutely no error on the part of the special Court in taking cognizance of the application and taking further steps under the Act. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the special Court should not have entertained the application filed by the applicant and that the jurisdictional facts, which give jurisdiction to the Special Court, are lacking in the application filed by the applicant. We also do not find any merit in the contention of the learned Counsel that the Special Court constituted under Section 7 of the Act has limited jurisdiction and it has no jurisdiction to grant comprehensive reliefs of declaration of title and recovery of possession for the reasons stated supra. Similarly, we do not find any merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that merely because he had secured temporary injunction from the civil Court in his favour and against the applicant before the applicant instituted the LGC, he should not be treated as 'land grabber' within the meaning of that term in clause (d) of Section 2 of the Act and, therefore, the special Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the LGC. As pointed out supra, once it is shown that the dispute instituted before the Special Court falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stands ousted. If that is the position in law, merely because, in a suit filed by the writ petitioner respondent for bare injunction he had obtained an ex pane ad hoc temporary injunction, that fact itself would not oust the jurisdiction of the special Court. What determines the jurisdiction of the special Court is the existence of jurisdictional facts envisaged under the Act itself and not on what the civil Court has done in a suit filed by a party to the dispute instituted before the Special Court.
15. Section 10 of the Act in no uncertain terms records that the burdenof proving that the land has not been grabbed by him shall be on such a person who alleges the same. The general principles of Evidence Act as regards burden of proof is well settled, i.e., one who alleges must prove. On a plain reading of Section 10, it is abundantly clear that the initial burden is on the applicant, whether it is Government or private person, to prima facie prove that the land grabbed belongs to it or him. Once the said initial burden is discharged satisfactorily, then, what follows is the presumption that the land is grabbed and that the alleged land grabber shall prove that the land in question has not been grabbed by him. In the instant case, the applicant has discharged the initial burden cast on her by pleading and producing the sale deed under which he purchased the property i.e., Ex.Al dated 4-4-1968. Ex.Al prima facie proves that the applicant acquired the title in the schedule land and it also shows that with the execution of the sale deed, she was also put into possession of the schedule land. Since the applicant has discharged the initial burden of proof cast on her, the burden is shifted to the writ petitioner to prove that he has not grabbed the schedule land. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the applicant has failed to discharge the initial burden of proof cast on her regarding title of the schedule land.
16. Similarly, there is no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that old Sy No.78/3 corresponds to new Sy.No.63/2. Dealing with this aspect, the special Court held that Ex.B5, which is the sale deed dated 7-10-1966 executed in favour of Mr. Misaiah s/o Lakshmiah, the vendor of the writ petitioner-respondent, relied upon by the writ petitioner, is totally a different document relating to some other property situated at Dargah Aurani Bee Saheba - Imambada, Hyderabad under Ward No. 17 and it has nothing to do with theschedule land. Alternatively, the special Court has held that there is absolutely nothing on record to establish the title of the writ petitioner to the schedule land even assuming for the sake of argument that old Sy .No.78/3 correlates to new Sy.No.68/2.
17. This takes us to the other contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Special Court has heavily relied upon the report of the MRO submitted under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 of the Rules. Sub-rule (1) of Rule (6) provides that every application filed under Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act should be referred for local inspection or verification or both by the MRO having jurisdiction over the area. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 reads as follows:--
'(2) The Mandal Revenue Officer or the other officer to whom the application has been referred under Sub-rule (1) shall make or cause to be made an inspection or verification or both, as soon as may be practicable and shall submit a full and complete report within two weeks from the date of receipt of order with reference to Revenue Records and facts on ground as to the following:--
(i) the correctness of the statements made in the application with regard to columns 1 to 15 and 19 in Form-I;
(ii) the facts relating to ownerships, actual possession and use of the land concerned; and
(iii) such other particulars and information as would be useful to the Court to arrive at a correct decision on the claims made in the application :
Provided that the said report is not required to be submitted in respect of the application filed by the Mandal Revenue Officer.'
It is not the case of the petitioner that in preparation of the report under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 of the Rules, the MRO has exceeded his jurisdiction or recordedfinding de hors the three items specified in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Sub-rule (2). The report of the MRO submitted under Rule 6(2) of the Rules cannot be said to be totally irrelevant to the decision-making by the special Court. When the Act itself directs the special Court to refer the application to the jurisdictional MRO for report with reference to the three aspects statutory specified, it cannot be said that the report submitted by the MRO in terms of the statute, should be eschewed in the decision-making altogether. Be that as it may, the findings recorded by the special Court in favour of the applicant and against the petitioner are not based solely on the report of the MRO submitted under Rule 6(2) of the Rules. The Special Court, in addition to other relevant materials and evidence, has also referred to the report of the MRO in support of its conclusions. Therefore, we do not find any error on the part of the special Court in taking into account the report of the MRO and the report of the Assistant Director, Survey also in the decision-making.
18. There is also no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the findings recorded by the special Court are not based on any legal evidence. As quite often held and reiterated by the Constitutional Courts, judicial review is not against the decision as such, but against the decision-making. It is also well settled that while reviewing the impugned actions under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority and reappreciate the evidence on record and come to a conclusion different from the one reached by the statutory or administrative authority. The Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the statutory authorities on grounds of insufficiency or inadequacy of the evidence. The Court can interfere with the findings only in cases where the findings recorded by the statutory authority are perverse or arenot based on any legal evidence. Having perused the impugned judgment passed by the special Court, we should state that each and every finding recorded by the special Court is based on legal evidence and sound reasoning. We do not find any flaw, factual or legal, in the impugned order. The writ petition is devoid of merit.
19. In the result and for the foregoingreasons, we dismiss the writ petition withno order as to costs.