Judgment:
ORDER
Ramesh Ranganathan, J.
1. This petition is filed to have the proceedings in C.C. 2 of 2003, on the file of the Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Eluru against Crime No. 14 of 2000 of T. Narsapur Police Station, quashed, and for a further direction to the respondents to pay just and fair compensation to the petitioners.
2. The allegations in the charge-sheet are that the love affair of one Penuboina Kumari, daughter of Chandrayya, aged 15 years, (younger sister of 1st petitioner and brother's daughter of the 2nd petitioner herein), with one Kokkonda Suryachari of Gandigudem village was brought to the notice of the 1st petitioner and his father who warned Suryachari. The villagers of Gandigudem village arranged a street cinema programme at Anjaneswamy Temple on the night of 31-5-2000. Penuboina Kumari left her house on the plea of watching the street cinema, met Suryachari at the nearby vacant fields and when she was returning at about 10.30 p.m., the 1st petitioner herein noticed both of them. On seeing the 1st petitioner, Suryachari ran away. The 1st petitioner is alleged to have dragged Kumari to their house and complained to the 2nd petitioner herein. Both the petitioners are alleged to have admonished, abused and bet her for continuing to maintain illicit contact with Suryachari. It is alleged that, Kumari succumbed to her injuries in the verandah of the house, that A-1 and A-2 worried about her death, hatched up a plan to cremate her without anybody's knowledge and in pursuance of their common intention, both the petitioners herein (A-1 and A-2) are said to have carried the dead body of the deceased into the cashew nut garden of the father of A-1, (the de-facto complainant and L.W. 1), covered the dead body with cashew nut sticks, poured kerosene and set the body ablaze. Both the accused are alleged to have waited at the scene of the offence till 4.00 a.m. on 1-6-2000 till the body was burnt into ashes, then to have brought water from the nearby borewell, extinguished the flames, collected the ash into a bag, to have thrown the ash into the Perumalla Kunta, washed their hands in the tank and thereafter to have left the place.
3. The deceased's-father is alleged to have searched in vain, thereafter to have approached T. Narsapuram police station at about 9.00 p.m. on 8-6-2000 and to have reported about the missing girl, which complaint was registered as Crime No. 14 of 2000 under the head 'girl missing.' It is alleged that during investigation, on 4-5-2001, both the petitioners herein approached L.W. 6 and L.W. 7, admitted having murdered Kumari and cremating her. L.Ws. 6 and 7 are said to have brought A-1 and A-2 to T. Narsapuram Police Station on 4-5-2001 and to have produced them before the S.I. of police. Both the accused are alleged to have confessed, in the presence of mediators L.Ws. 15 and 16. They were arrested at 5.00 p.m. on 4-5-2001. On the strength of the confession of both the accused, the S.I. of police altered the section, re-registered the crime from 'girl missing' into an offence under Sections 302 and 201, I.P.C. and further investigated the matter. Both the petitioners are alleged to have led the Sub-Inspector of Police to the scene of the offence. The S.I. of Police is said to have visited the first scene of offence situated at the verandah of the thatched hut of the complainant, the land in which the deceased was cremated and then the Perumalla Kunta pond wherein ash was thrown into. Separate scene observation reports were prepared. Both the accused were sent to judicial custody and, nearly two months thereafter, were granted bail by this Court, by order in Crl. M.P. 2552 of 2001, dated 26-6-2001. Charge-sheet in P.R.C. 37 of 2001 was filed before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Chintalapudi under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34, I.P.C. P.R.C. 37 of 2001 was later taken on file as S.C. 67 of 2002 by the First Additional District Judge, Eluru, West Godavari District.
4. As matters stood thus, on 17-1-2003 the alleged deceased-Penuboina Kumari returned back alive to her village.
5. Alleging that both the petitioners herein had played a hoax with the police stating that they were responsible for killing of the deceased, causing disappearance of the evidence by consigning the corpse to flames, scattering the ashes into a tank and that the police were left with no option but to arrest the two accused and file a charge-sheet on the strength of their extra-judicial confession, that they had misled the police suppressing facts and suggesting false information, the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Jangareddigudem Sub-Division, vide letter dated 5-4-2003 requested the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Chintalapudi to grant permission to charge the petitioners herein under Sections 203 and 211, I.P.C. instead of Sections 302 and 201, I.P.C. of which they were earlier charged in S.C. 67 of 2002. It is this alteration of the earlier charge-sheet, which is sought to be quashed.
6. In State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal : 1992CriLJ527 , the Supreme Court held that the inherent power of this Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. would be exercised to secure ends of justice and where the allegations made, in the F.I.R. or the charge-sheet, were so absurd and inherently improbable, on the basis of which no prudent man could ever reach a just conclusion that there were sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P.C. would be necessary.
7. The charge-sheet, filed in P.R.C. 37 of 2001, later taken on file as S.C. 67 of 2002 by the 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, Eluru, was for offences under Sections 302 and 201, I.P.C. i.e., for committing murder and causing disappearance of evidence of the offence. These offences, of which both the petitioners herein were charged, were based on their alleged confession of having murdered Penuboina kumari and to have cremated her. While such confession/admission is itself, to say the least, unusual, the alteration in the charge-sheet resulted in the petitioners herein being charged of the offence under Sections 203 and 211, I.P.C. i.e., giving false Information in respect of an offence committed and false charge of an offence made with the intention to cause injury. Sections 203 and 211, I.P.C. read thus:
203. Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, gives any information respecting that offence which he knows or believes to be false, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
Explanation : In Sections 201 and 202 and in this section the word 'offence' includes any act committed at any place out of India, which, if committed in India, would be punishable under any of the following sections, namely, Sections 302, 304, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 402, 435, 436, 449, 450, 457, 458, 459 and 460.
211. Whoever, with intent to cause injury to any person, institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceedings against that person, or falsely charges any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;
and if such criminal proceeding be instituted on a false charge of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for seven years for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
8. Since Penuboina Kumari, allegedly murdered by the petitioners herein, returned alive to the village on 17-1-2003, the allegations in the altered charge-sheet, in substance, is that the petitioners had earlier given false information to the police that they had committed murder knowing fully well that they had not and had, with the intention to cause injury to themselves, caused criminal proceedings to be instituted against themselves.
9. Would a person play hoax with the police stating that he had murdered another and had caused disappearance of evidence, when the person allegedly murdered was, in fact, alive? Would accepting these allegations of masochism as true not be credulous? Are not the allegations made against the petitioners of their having given false information to the police that they had committed murder and had caused disappearance of the evidence, so absurd and improbable, on the basis of which no prudent man could ever reach a just conclusion that there was sufficient ground for proceeding against them? The answers thereto can only be in the affirmative. It defies reason that two persons would confess to having murdered their sister/niece, when in fact, she was very much alive. There is substantial force in the submission of Sri K. Balagopal, learned Counsel for the petitioner, that alteration in the charge-sheet by the police was only to cover up their earlier lapse in having charged the petitioners of murder and destruction of evidence under Sections 202 and 211, I.P.C. The proceedings in C.C. 2 of 2003 on the file of the Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Eluru are accordingly quashed.
10. The next question which arises for consideration is as to whether the State is liable to compensate the petitioners herein for the physical and mental agony caused to them on account of the false case foisted against them of firstly having committed murder and destroying evidence and later, (when the girl allegedly murdered returned alive), of having given false information of having committed an offence knowing fully well that they had not. and of having caused criminal proceedings to be instituted against them with the intention of causing injury to themselves?
11. Sri. K. Balagopal, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would rely on Section 114 of the Evidence Act in support of his submission that the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events and human conduct in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Learned Counsel would submit that such a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act would necessitate this Court to presume that no person would confess to an offence of murder which he had not committed and bring upon himself the possibility of his being sentenced to death. Learned Counsel would contend that the so-called admission, when examined in the light of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, could only be disbelieved, as such confession/admission, could never have been voluntarily made. He would submit that the mental and physical agony which the petitioners had undergone, on being illegally confined for nearly two months for an offence which they had not committed, is only because they were falsely charged of such an offence coupled with the fact that such allegations would have led to their being ostracized within their community, and this needless trauma which the petitioners were subjected to necessitates their being compensated by the State. Learned Counsel would rely on State of Maharashtra v. Dadaji Kacharu Sonawane 1984 Cri LJ 1023 (Bom) and Jamnaprasad Sarju Tiwari v. Saban K. Done 1993 Cri LJ 1470 (Bom) in support of his submission that this Court can award compensation under Section 482, Cr. P.C.
12. Learned Public Prosecutor would submit that these are all matters which this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P.C. ought not to examine. He would submit that in criminal proceedings while costs may be awarded, this Court in proceedings under Section 482, Cr. P.C. could not direct payment of compensation, since the extent of damage caused, the identity of the persons who had perpetrated such damage and the quantum of just compensation to be awarded are all matters of evidence and are better examined and adjudicated in a properly constituted suit before a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. Learned Public Prosecutor would submit that awarding of compensation would necessarily lead to the inference that the Investigating Officials were responsible and that no such order could be passed without giving them an opportunity of being heard. He would refer to Section 357, Cr. P.C. in support of his submission that it is only in cases where the Court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence of which fine forms a part, would the Court, when passing judgment, order that the whole or any part of the fine recovered should be applied towards payment to any person as compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence. While reiterating his submission that compensation can be claimed only by institution of a suit before a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction, learned Public Prosecutor would submit that it is only under Section 357, Cr. P.C. that the Criminal Court, while imposing a sentence, could award compensation and not in proceedings under Section 482, Cr. P.C.
Section 482, Cr. P.C. reads as under:
482. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
13. The inherent powers of the Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. to secure the ends of justice, are neither limited nor affected by any other provision in the Criminal Procedure Code.
14. In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Md. Sharaful Haque 2005 Cri. LJ 92, the Supreme Court held thus (para 8):
Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages, three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All Courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle 'quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest' (when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision, inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse, it would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which results in injustice and prevents promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
15. On the scope of the High Court's inherent power under Section 482. Cr. P.C. to award exemplary costs to secure ends of justice, the Supreme Court in Mary Angel v. State of Tamil Nadu : 1999CriLJ3513 , held thus (paras 8 and 12):
In our view, Section 482, Cr. P.C. stands independently from the other provisions of the Code and it expressly saves the inherent powers of the High Court by providing that:
482. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.Therefore, to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice the High Court is empowered to pass 'such order' which may include order to pay costs to the informant (complainant) and the language of the section does not in terms place any fetter. This power is not conditioned or controlled by any other section nor is curtailed by any provisions which empower the Court to award costs. No doubt, this jurisdiction is of an exceptional nature and is to be exercised in exceptional cases for achieving the purposes stated in the section. Secondly, costs could be either for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the litigation as it can be exemplary to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of Justice or giving effect to any order passed under the Code....From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that if there is an express provision governing the particular subject-matter then there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the Court because the Court is required to apply, in the manner and mode prescribed, the provisions of the statute which are made to govern the particular subject-matter. But the highest Court in the State could exercise inherent powers for doing justice according to law where no express power is available to do a particular thing and express powers do not negative the existence of such power. It is true that under the Criminal Procedure Code, specific provisions for awarding costs are only those as stated above. At the same time, there is no specific bar that in no other case, costs could be awarded. Further, in non-cognizable cases, Section 359 empowers the Courts including the appellate Court or the High Court or the Court of Session while exercising its powers of revision to order the convicted accused to pay to the complainant, in whole or in part, the cost incurred by him in the prosecution including the expenses incurred in respect of process fees, witnesses and pleaders' fees which the Court may consider reasonable. Hence, it may be inferred that in a cognizable case and in an appeal or revision arising therefrom, the High Court cannot exercise its inherent power for awarding costs dehors the said provisions. But such an inference is not possible in cases where the Court is exercising powers under Section 482. It is to be stated that in cognizable cases also under Section 357 while awarding compensation out of the fine imposed on the accused, inter alia, the Court is required to take into consideration expenses properly incurred in the prosecution. Hence, exercise of such power would, on the contrary, be in conformity and not in conflict with the powers conferred under Section 148(3), 342 and 357 or 359 of the Cr. PC. In appropriate cases, where it is necessary to pass such an order, the Court may award costs for the purposes, namely,
(i) to give effect to any order passed under the Court,
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court,
(iii) to secure the ends of justice as there is no
(a) negative provision for exercise of 'such power,' and
(b) inconsistency with the other provisions.
Further, awarding of costs, as stated above, can be for two purposes, one for meeting the litigation expenses and, secondly, for preventing the abuse of the process of Court or to do justice in a matter and In such circumstances, costs can be exemplary. It is true that this jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly for the aforesaid purposes in most appropriate cases and is not limitless but is to be exercised judiciously.....In the result, we hold that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, the Court has power to pass 'such orders' (not inconsistent with any provision of the Code) including the order for costs in appropriate cases
(i) to give effect to any order passed under the Code, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or
(iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
As stated above, this extraordinary power is to be used in extraordinary circumstances and in a judicious manner. Costs may be to meet the litigation expenses or can be exemplary to achieve the aforesaid purposes.
16. In Dadaji Kacharu Sonawane (1984 Cri LJ 1023), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, while examining the scope of Section 482, Cr. P.C. held as under:
At first blush the section appears to be aiming merely preserving the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court proceeding upon the postulate that it already possess that jurisdiction clarifying thereby that the said jurisdiction is not the creature of that Statute as such. But a closer scrutiny of the section reveals that, to some extent, it also qualifies that inherent jurisdiction. The inherent jurisdiction of this Court that is referred to in Section 482 is the particular jurisdiction.
a. to give effect to any order under the Code;
b. to prevent abuse of process of any Court or;
c. otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
To our mind, the power contained in Cl. (c) above, that is power to secure ends of justice Is attracted by the facts of this case. Even after knowing that the evidence adduced by the prosecution against the accused was patently inadequate and unreliable, incapable of bringing home any conviction against the accused, the Government persisted in filing this appeal making the accused, his wife and possibly also children suffer for three additional years. The accused has the constitutional right of freedom; he has the right to carry on his avocation peacefully. That was denied to him with a superficial justification which turns out to be illusory and illegitimate. Ends of justice do require that the Government should recompense him, at least partially.
In our innerent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal P.C., therefore, we direct the State Government to pay a sum of Rs. 2000/ - to the accused as compensation at the time when the accused is released from the jail.
17. In Jamnaprasad Sarju Tiwaari v. Saban K. Dhone 1993 Cri LJ 1470, it was held as under:
Mrs. Chheda, learned Counsel representing the Bombay Municipal Corporation officers, has made a serious grievance to this Court in the course of her submissions by pointing out that this tendency of indiscriminately prosecuting the Bombay Municipal Corporation's officials who have discharged their official functions is on the increase and that they are made to face prosecutions before Criminal Courts. She has pointed out that even if they are placed in different parts of the city by virtue of subsequent transfers that they have to give up their work and personally attend Court because even exemption applications are not granted. The facts of the present case would amply justify the grievance made by the learned Counsel and to my mind it is necessary to take a stringent view of the situation. Even though the appellant before me is not the accused but a complainant before the Court, in exercise of inherent powers of this Court, I do not think that the High Court is powerless to set right this state of affairs. Under these circumstances, the appeal is dismissed, and I direct that the original complainant, Jamnaprasad Sarju Tiwari, shall pay compensatory costs to each of the four accused personally in the sum of Rs. l,000/- and to the Bombay Municipal Corporation in the sum of Rs. 5,000/- for having instituted this prosecution and for having followed it up in the present appeal and expended so much of judicial time. The authorities of the Bombay Municipal Corporation shall, with the assistance of the Court, take all necessary steps to ensure that these payments are recovered.
18. The inherent power of this Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. is exercised to secure ends of justice and in order to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone Courts exist, the State in appropriate cases can be directed to pay costs, leaving it open for the State to conduct an enquiry and recover the costs paid by it from those actually responsible.
19. While the extraordinary power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. is only to be used in extraordinary circumstances and in a judicious manner, the present case is one which eminently justifies exercise of such power to direct payment of costs to the petitioners herein. Not only were they charged for committing murder and of destroying evidence, (when in fact, the person allegedly murdered was very much alive), and were kept in judicial custody for nearly two months, even after the alleged deceased came back alive, the petitioners were forced to undergo the ordeal of being charged of giving false information to the police of having committed an offence of murder knowing fully well that they did not.
20. The contention of Sri K. Balagopal, learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the initial charge of murder, under Sections 302 and 211, I.P.C. illegal detention of the petitioners for nearly two months for an admittedly false charge, and the trauma which they must have undergone including their being ostracized within the community for having murdered their sister/niece when in fact, the girl was alive, would necessitate their being compensated, is not without merit. What, however, shocks the conscience of this Court is that even after the girl returned back alive, instead of giving a quietus to these unfortunate events, the petitioners have again been charged, under Sections 203 and 211, I.P.C. for furnishing false information that they had committed the offence of murder and destroying evidence knowing fully well that they had not. Prima facie, there is force in the submission of Sri K. Balagopal, learned Counsel for the petitioners, that the petitioners were charged under Sections 203 and 211, I.P.C. by the police only to cover up their mishandling of the investigation and their having falsely charged the petitioners of a crime which never took place. Since the Investigating Officers have not been put on notice or given an opportunity of being heard, I do not propose to examine these issues any further, and leave it open to the petitioners, if they choose, to take appropriate action, both civil and criminal, for the damage suffered by them on account of these unsavory incidents. The petitioners are however required to be paid suitable costs, for the harrowing experience they have undergone and the uncalled for misery they had to suffer for no fault of theirs. I consider it appropriate to direct the State to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- each to the petitioners herein as costs, leaving it open to the State to cause necessary enquiry in this regard and recover the costs, paid to the petitioners, from those actually responsible. Payment of costs of Rs. 10,000/- each to the petitioners herein is not as compensation for their sufferings, but is only in the nature of symbolic costs, and would not therefore preclude them from taking appropriate action, both civil and criminal, to claim compensation for the damage caused and the trauma undergone. It shall also be open to the State to take disciplinary action against the officers involved.
21. The criminal petition is allowed. The proceedings in C.C. 2 of 2003, on the file of the Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Eluru, against Crime No. 14 of 2000 of T. Narsapur Police Station, are quashed. The State is also directed to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- each to the petitioners herein within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.