ORDER
Ramesh Ranganathan, J.
1. This Criminal Petition is filed to quash the complaint in P.R.C. No. 9 of 2003 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Ramannapet. The allegations, in the complaint filed by the first respondent herein, are that the complainant and accused 1 to 9 belong to the same village of Ch. Ramavaram, and that the complainant belongs to the scheduled caste while the accused belong to the higher caste. On the date of the offence i.e., during Dusserah festival, the complainant, along with other villagers, went to the 'Dasara' bulrush tree for plucking leaves as per their custom. While the complainant was snapping the bulrush leaves, Accused 1 to 9 abused him, asked him not to touch the bulrush tree since he belonged to the Madiga caste and was an untouchable. Accused 1 to 9 prevented the complainant from snapping the bulrush leaves, abused him in a filthy and vulgar language as 'Madiga Lanjakodaka Mammalanu muttukontava', and chased him with axes and empty beer bottles. Accused No. 1 threw his axe on the complainant and when the complainant fell down, all the accused attacked him and attempted to murder him with axes and empty beer bottles. The witnesses, and others present, prevented the accused from indulging in further attacks. Thereafter, all the accused moved away from the place. The complainant sustained injuries on his back, legs and on his shoulder. Consequently, a complaint was lodged on 27-10-2001 before the Station House Officer, Mothkur. Thereafter, the complainant was sent to the Government Civil Hospital, Ramannapet for treatment. He was admitted in the Hospital for about 15 days and the doctor issued a wound certificate.
2. The complainant further alleged that all the accused were influential persons in society, that he sustained serious injuries, that all the accused intentionally and knowingly attempted to murder him and that they insulted and intimidated him with the intent to humiliate him as a scheduled caste in a place within the public view. Accused 1 to 9 were charged of offences under Sections 307 IPC and 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short 'the Act').
3. On the complaint being filed before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ramannapet, the matter was referred for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The Investigating Officer, in his final report, submitted that the evidence collected during investigation disclosed that on 26-10-2001 i.e., on Dasara day, at 2.00 P.M., the Sarpanch of Chowllaramaram village performed pooja at Gudi Mysamma temple and that the complainant, who belonged to the scheduled caste, also participated. The complainant and a few others were in an intoxicated state, pushed each other and the pandal erected in front of the temple fell on the complainant and others and as a result, the complainant sustained minor injuries. Meanwhile, the police went there and subsided the matter. On the same day at 5.00 P.M. all the villagers went to the ceremonial bulrush tree to pluck leaves in a ritualistic manner. The complainant went there in an intoxicated state, created nuisance there and fell down and some members of his caste took him back to his house. It is further stated that the evidence also disclosed that the accused had neither prevented the complainant from plucking leaves nor had they abused him in any manner, not the least by taking his caste name nor had they attacked him with axes or beer bottles. The minor injuries sustained by the complainant was because the pandal fell on him when he caused nuisance and pushed others in an intoxicated state and that, except the complainant, none of the other witnesses supported the allegations in the complaint. In conclusion, the Investigating Officer stated that the case be treated as false.
4. Pursuant to a protest petition being filed by the respondent-complainant herein the learned Magistrate, after examining the complainant on oath, took cognizance of the offence and issued summons to the accused. Aggrieved thereby, the present petition.
5. Sri M. Subba Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioners, would submit that the case diary would reveal that the investigating officer had examined all the witnesses referred to in the complaint filed by the complainant. Learned Counsel would submit that all these witnesses have categorically denied the version of the complainant and have stated that the petitioners herein (Accused 1 to 9) did not commit the alleged offence. Learned Counsel, while fairly conceding that the learned Magistrate had the power to take cognizance of the offence, would submit that in the present fact situation where the investigating officer had submitted a final report that the case was false, (as all the witnesses mentioned in the complaint had been examined by the investigating officer and all of them had categorically stated that the version put forth by the complainant was false), the learned Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, ought to have examined atleast a few, if not all of such witnesses, before taking cognizance. Learned Counsel would contend that, in the present fact situation, the learned Magistrate erred in taking cognizance of the offence, without examining even a single witness named in the complaint, relying solely on the evidence of the complainant. Learned Counsel would place reliance on S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar : 2001CriLJ4765 , in support of his submission that the learned Magistrate must be satisfied that a prima facie case is made out before he takes cognizance of the offence and in order to satisfy himself that a prima facie case has been made out, he ought not to have relied only on the self- serving testimony of the complainant and ought to have examined atleast a few of the witnesses referred to by the complainant himself in his complaint. Learned Counsel would also place reliance on G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. : 2000CriLJ824 , in support of his submission that the complaint as filed is clearly an abuse of process and that this Court, should exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, to prevent miscarriage of justice.
6. Before examining the aforesaid contentions, it is necessary to take note of the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sections 190 and 200 thereof read thus:
Section 190 Cognizance of offences by Magistrates: '(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under Sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence:
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;
(b) upon a police report of such facts;
(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed
(2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under Sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try.
Section 200: Examination of complainant
A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate:
Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses-
(a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a court has made the complaint; or
(b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under Section 192:
Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under Section 192 after examining the complaint and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-examine them.
Section 190 Cr.P.C. talks of cognizance of offences by Magistrates. This expression has not been defined in the Code. In its broad and literal sense, it means taking notice of an offence. This would include the intention of initiating judicial proceedings against the offender in respect of that offence or taking steps to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings or for other purposes. The word 'cognizance' indicates the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons. Cognizance is defined in Wharton's Law Lexicon as:
'Cognizance (Judicial), Knowledge upon which a Judge is bound to act without having it proved in evidence: as the public statutes of the realm, the ancient history of the realm, the order and course of proceedings in Parliament, the privileges of the House of Commons, the existence of war with a foreign state, the several seals of the king, the Supreme Court and its; jurisdiction, and many other things. A Judge is not bound to take cognizance of current events, however notorious, nor of the law of other countries.
7. It has, thus, reference to the hearing and determination of the case in connection with an offence. (State of West Bengal v. Mohammed Khalid 1995(2) ALT (Crl.) (SC) 621)
8. In Anil Saran v. State of Bihar : 1996CriLJ408 , the Supreme Court held thus:.Though the Code defines 'cognizable offence' and 'non-cognizable offence', the word 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Code. But it is now settled law that the court takes cognizance of the offence and not the offender. As soon as the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the offence stated in the complaint or the police report etc. cognizance is said to be taken. Cognizance of the offence takes place when the Magistrate takes judicial notice of the offence. Whether the Magistrate has taken cognizance of offence on a complaint or on a police report or upon information of a person other than the police officer, depends upon further action taken pursuant thereto and the attending circumstances of the particular case including the mode in which case is sought to be dealt with or the nature of the action taken by the Magistrate. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 190 of the Code, any Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, (b) upon a police report of such facts, and (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed....
9. As to when cognizance is taken of an offence will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is impossible to attempt to define what is meant by taking cognizance. It is only when a Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and subsequent sections of Ch. XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Section 204 of the Code that it can be positively stated that he had applied his mind and therefore had taken cognizance. (Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. The State of West Bengal : 1959CriLJ1368 ) In H.S. Bains v. The State (Union Territory of Chandigarh : 1980CriLJ1308 , the Supreme Court held thus:.On receipt of a complaint a magistrate has several courses open to him. He may take cognizance of the offence and proceed to record the statements of the complainant and the witnesses present under Section 200. Thereafter, if in his opinion there is no sufficient ground for proceeding he may dismiss the complaint under Section 203. If in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding he may issue process under Section 204. However, if he thinks fit, he may postpone the issue of process and either enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. He may then issue process if in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding or dismiss the complaint if there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. On the other hand, in the first instance, on receipt of a complaint, the. magistrate may, instead of taking cognizance of the offence, order an investigation under Section 156(3). The police will then investigate and submit a report under Section 173(1). On receiving the police report the magistrate may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b) and straight away issue procession This he may do irrespective of the view expressed by the police in their report whether an offence has been made out or not. The police report under Section 173 will contain the facts discovered or unearthed by the police and the conclusions drawn by the police therefrom. The magistrate is not bound by the conclusions drawn by the police and he may decide to issue process even if the police recommend that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further. The magistrate after receiving the police report, may, without issuing process or dropping the proceeding decide to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the complaint originallysubmitted to him and proceed to record the statements upon oath of the complainant and the witnesses present under Section 200, Criminal Procedure Code and thereafter decide whether to dismiss the complaint or issue process. The mere fact that he had earlier ordered an investigation under Section 156(3) and received a report under Section 173 will not have the effect of total effacement of the complaint and therefore the magistrate will not be barred from proceeding under Section 200, 203 and 204. Thus, a magistrate who on receipt of a complaint, orders an investigation under Section 156(3) and receives a police report under Section 173(1), may, thereafter, do one of three things; (1) he may decide that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drop action; (2) he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b) on the basis of the police report and issue process; this he may do without being bound in any manner by the conclusion arrived at by the police in their report; (3) he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a) on the basis of the original complaint, and proceed to examine upon oath the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200. If he adopts the third alternative, he may hold or direct an inquiry under Section 202 if he thinks fit. Thereafter he may dismiss the complaint or issue process, as the case may be....
10. In India Carat (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka : [1989]1SCR718 , the Supreme Court held thus:.The position is, therefore, now well settled that upon receipt of a police report under Section 173(2) a Magistrate is entitled to take cognisance of an offence under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against the accused. The Magistrate can take into account the statements of the witnesses examined by the police during the investigation and take cognisance of the offence complained of and order the issue of process to the accused. Section 190(1)(b) does not lay down that a Magistrate can take cognisance of an offence only if the investigating officer gives an opinion that the investigation has made out a case against the accused. The Magistrate can ignore the conclusion arrived at by the investigating officer and independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognisance of the case, if he thinks fit, in exercise of his powers under Section 190(1)(b) and direct the issue of process to the accused. The Magistrate is not bound in such a situation to follow the procedure laid down in Sections 200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance of a case under Section 190(1)(a) though it is open to him to act under Section 200 or Section 202 also....
11. The law laid down by the Apex Court in India Carat (P) Ltd. : [1989]1SCR718 has been reiterated in State of Orissa v. Habibullah Khan (2003) 12 SCC 129, Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra : 2004CriLJ4623 ; and Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar : 2006CriLJ2468 .
12. Cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the offender and, therefore, once the court on perusal of the complaint is satisfied that the complaint discloses the commission of an offence and there is no reason to reject the complaint at that stage, and proceeds further in the matter, it must be held to have taken cognizance of the offence. If the Magistrate proceeds to examine the complainant and such other evidence as the complainant may produce before him then, it should be held to have taken cognizance of the offence and to have proceeded with the inquiry. (CREF Finance Ltd. v. Shree Shanthi Homes (P) Ltd. : 2005CriLJ4524 ).
13. If the complainant is dissatisfied with the police report he may come even at that stage to file a petition embodying his dissatisfaction. But such a petition can be acted upon only if it is treated as a fresh petition of complaint. If it is so treated, then the complainant will have to be examined on oath before any further action is taken on the petition. (Akshoy Kumar Dutta v. Jogesh Chandra Nandy : AIR1956Cal76 . When a protest petition is filed, it is clearly the duty of the Magistrate to treat it as a complaint, and to proceed straightway to the examination of the complainant under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Sushil Kumar Hazra v. Banka Mahato : AIR1957Cal393 ). Under Section 200, the Magistrate shall examine the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) on oath. (P.S. Ramaswami Nadar v. R. Viswanathan 1957 Crl.L.J. 673)
14. At the stage of taking cognizance, the Magistrate has only to decide whether sufficient ground exists or not for proceeding further in the matter. Notwithstanding the opinion of the police, a Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance if the material on record makes out a case for the said purpose. The investigation of an offence is the exclusive domain of the police. The taking of cognizance of the offence is an area exclusively within the domain of a Magistrate. At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction, can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons. (Jagdish Ram v. State of Rajasthan : AIR2004SC1734 ; U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Mohan Meaking Ltd : 2000CriLJ1799 ; and Dy. Chief Commissioner of Imports and Exports v. Roshan Lal Agarwal : 2003CriLJ1698 )
15. The defence of the accused cannot be considered while considering the question whether a prima facie case had been made out or not. The test to be applied while considering whether the accused should be summoned or not is whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against him. The sufficiency has to be judged from the complaint, the solemn affirmation and the evidence, if any, on record. The defence of the accused is not a material which has to be considered in the matter of taking cognizance. (Halimuddin Ahmad v. Ashoka Cement Ltd. 1976 Crl.L.J. 449 At the stage of cognizance, the statements or evidence should not be sifted and no attempt should be made to find out by critical appreciation if the alleged statements against a person are true or not, yet for the purpose of taking cognizance, the court is bound to apply the standards strictly to find out if the materials alleged against the accused are sufficient to make out a prima facie case of the offence alleged to have been committed by him. The Magistrate has been given discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Once the magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in the conviction of the accused. (Manoranjan Tripathy v. Ganesh Prasad Singh 1994 Crl.L.J. 204) The scope of interference in such matters was considered in Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi : 1976CriLJ1533 , wherein the Supreme Court held thus:.Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside:
(1) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;
(2) Where the allegations made in the complaint are potently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;
(3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and
(4) Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings....
16. In the case on hand the Investigating Officer, in his final report, submitted that the case be treated as false. Pursuant to a protest petition being filed by the complainant the learned Magistrate, after examining the complainant, took cognizance of the offence and issued summons to the accused.
17. On receipt of the final report from the investigating officer, it is open to the Magistrate to ignore the conclusion arrived at therein and independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the offence, if he thinks fit, in exercise of his powers under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. It is also open to the Magistrate to consider the protest petition as a fresh petition of complaint for taking cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C. in which event he is required to follow the procedure laid down under Section 200 of the Code in taking cognizance. Under Section 200 a Magistrate, taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint, is required to examine upon oath the complainant and witnesses present, if any.
18. It is not in dispute that, in the present case, the Magistrate had examined the complainant and had recorded his statement before taking cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code. It is also not in dispute that the complainant did not produce any witnesses before the Magistrate to support his case. The question is as to whether he was required, in law, to examine all or atleast some of the witnesses referred to by the complainant himself in his initial complaint including those who were examined by the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation.
19. While the Magistrate was required under Section 200 Cr.P.C. to examine the complainant and the witnesses, if any, present, in cases where no witnesses are present, it is open to the learned Magistrate to examine the complainant and on the basis of his testimony take cognizance of the offence if a prima facie case of an offence having been committed by the accused, has been made out.
20. The words 'witnesses present, if any' in Section 200 Cr.P.C. make it clear that the Magistrate is merely required to examine such of those witnesses who are present. While examination upon oath, of the complainant, is mandatory, examination of witnesses is not. It is only if any of the witnesses are present is the Magistrate required to examine them on oath. The Magistrate is neither required to insist on the complainant producing witnesses for examination nor is he entitled to refuse to take cognizance solely on the ground that no witnesses were examined. The learned Magistrate is not disentitled from taking cognizance, of the offence, under Section 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C. solely on the basis of the examination on oath of the complainant, as long as he is satisfied that a prima facie case of an offence having been committed, has been made out. Non- examination of witnesses, other than the complainant, would not preclude the Magistrate from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code.
21. The jurisdiction, exercised by the Magistrate in taking cognizance of an offence, is discretionary. The Magistrate, while taking cognizance, is only required to satisfy himself as to whether there were sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused and not as to whether there were sufficient grounds for conviction. This sufficiency is required to be judged on the solemn affirmation of the complainant and the evidence, if any, on record. The defence of the accused is not required to be taken into consideration. While taking cognizance of an offence the learned Magistrate is not required to carefully sift evidence and find out, on critical appreciation, if the statements are true or not. Failure by the Magistrate, to take into consideration the statement of witnesses recorded during the course of investigation or the investigating officer's conclusion that the accused had not committed the offences alleged against them, is therefore of no consequence.
22. The Magistrate has to exercise his discretion judicially. Once it is found that such discretion has been judicially exercised, it is not for this Court to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimate end in the conviction of the accused. It is only in cases where the allegations made in the complaint taken at face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offence or where the allegations in the complaint are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there were sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused or where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate is capricious, arbitrary and based on no evidence or on irrelevant and inadmissible material, would interference of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. be justified.
23. Now to the judgments relied upon by Sri M.Subba Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner. In G. Sagar Suri 2000(2) SCC 636, the Supreme Court held thus:.Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has to be exercised with a great care. In exercise of its jurisdiction High Court is not to examine the matter superficially. It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of civil nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing process a criminal Court has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this Section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
24. In S.N. Palanitkar AIR 2001 SC 2960, the Supreme Court held thus:.In the case on hand, we have already stated above that except against Appellant 7, no offence was made out against the remaining appellants as the ingredients of offences alleged against them were not satisfied. Unfortunately, the High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to correct manifest error committed by the learned Magistrate in issuing process against Appellants 1-6 and 8 when the alleged acts against them did not constitute offences for want of satisfying the ingredients of the offences. The approach and considerations while exercising power and jurisdiction by a Magistrate at the time of issuing process are to be in terms of Sections 200 - 203 under Chapter XV CrPC, having due regard to the position of law explained in various decisions of this Court, and whereas while exercising power under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to look at the object and purpose for which such power is conferred on it under the said provision. Exercise of inherent power is available to the High Court to give effect to any order under CrPC, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This being the position, exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC should be consistent with the scope and ambit of the same in the light of the decisions aforementioned. In appropriate cases, to prevent judicial process from being an instrument of oppression or harassment in the hands of frustrated or vindictive litigants, exercise of inherent power is not only desirable but necessary also, so that the judicial forum of court may not be allowed to be utilized for any oblique motive. When a person approaches the High Court under Section 482 CrPC to quash the very issue of process, the High Court on the facts and circumstances of a case has to exercise the powers with circumspection as stated above to really serve the purpose and object for which they are conferred....
It is no doubt true that summoning an accused, in a criminal case, is a serious matter and criminal law cannot be set in motion as a matter of course. The accused can approach this Court, under Section 482 Cr.P.C, to have the proceedings quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and he is still required to undergo the agony of a criminal trial, for the provisions of Section 482 of the Code are devised to advance justice and not to frustrate it. (Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate : 1998CriLJ1 ). Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in Section 482 Cr.P.C. which merely reocognises and preserves the inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur in sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised ex debito justitae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of these powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. (Minu Kumari10).
25. Under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions 'abuse of the process of law' or 'to secure the ends of justice' do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice can only be secured in accordance with law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code. (Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. : 1999CriLJ3964 )
26. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code is the exception and not the rule. While exercising powers under the Section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself. While judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment, at the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. (State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa : 2002CriLJ998 ; State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy : 2004CriLJ3845 ).
27. Cases which require interference, under Section 482 Cr.P.C, are few and far between. The most common cases where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. The inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C must be exercised only in the rarest of rare cases, (State v. Navjot Sandhu : (2003)6SCC641 ; State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla : 1996CriLJ1372 , M. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka : 2004CriLJ822 , Mohd. Malek Mondal v. Pranjal Bardalai (2005) 10 SCC 608), for such a power does not confer arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. (Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana : 1977CriLJ1900 ).
28. This Court would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, sparingly, with circumspection, in the rarest of rare cases and not as a matter of course. Since the Learned Magistrate has the discretion to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C, on the basis of the complaint/protest petition, after examination on oath of the complainant, and as he was satisfied that a prima facie case of an offence having been committed had been made out, non-examination of witnesses would not justify interference by this Court, under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
29. The Criminal Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.