ORDER
V.V.S. Rao, J.
1. This writ appeal is filed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 20-2-1998 in WP No.29904 of1995. In fact, in the order dated 20-2-1998, the learned single Judge passed an order refusing to review the earlier order passed in the same writ petition on 3-12-1996 when a mandamus was issued to third appellant herein to include the respondent in the list of successful candidates and directing the first appellant to make suitable appointment to the petitioner in accordance with her qualifications.
2. The parties are referred to in this judgment as they were arrayed in the writ petition.
3. The petitioner in her affidavit filed in support of the writ petition stated that she is a post-graduate in Science from Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupathi and that later she acquired M. Tech., from IIT Delhi. Pursuant to a notification issued by the 3rd respondent namely the Agricultural Scientists Recruitment Board, Krishi Anusandhana Bhavan, New Delhi, she applied for the post of a Scientist in Bio-Chemistry (Plant Sciences) and appeared for the competitive test for Agricultural Research Service (ARS/National Eligibility Test/Senior Research Fellowship (SRF). The petitioner was also interviewed by the 3rd respondent on 9-3-1995 and according to the petitioner she was also asked to appear for medical examination. Her antecedents were also enquired by the police at Delhi and also at her native place in Ongole. However, in the list of candidates published on 9-7-1995 her name was not found. Having failed to get any redressal on her two representations dated 3-08-1995 and 30-8-1995, she approached this Court seeking a mandamus to the respondents to issue an order of appointment to the petitioner for the post of Scientist under ARS pursuant to the examination conducted by the 3rd respondent.
4. The writ petition was admitted by the Court on 29-12-1995. Even after service of notice on 11-1-1996, it appears that therespondents did not enter their appearance. Therefore, the learned Judge based on the records passed orders directing the 3rd respondent to include the name of the petitioner in the list of successful candidates and also directed the first respondent to give her suitable appointment.
5. The respondents filed a review petition on 28-1-1997. In the meanwhile, the petitioner filed Contempt Case No.1603 of 1997 complaining disobedience of the orders dated 3-12-1996 passed by the learned single Judge. When the contempt case was taken up on 29-10-1997, the learned Counsel for the respondents/review petitioners gave an undertaking to the effect that if the training course conducted by NAARAM begins before the date fixed for the hearing of review petition, the petitioner will be admitted to the training programme. When the undertaking was not implemented, the petitioner filed an affidavit. The matter was taken up and a direction was given to the third respondent to admit the petitioner for training at NAARAM on 7-1-1998 in the fresh batch commencing on that date. From the impugned judgment, it appears that the petitioner was admitted to course and later she was asked to discontinue the training based on a letter issued by the first respondent to the effect that NAARAM should not act upon the order dated 27-12-1997 issued by the High Court until further orders from the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR). The Director and Joint-Director of NAARAM (who are not parties in the writ petition) were summoned to the Court who produced the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 21-1-1998 passed in SLP which was presumably filed before the Supreme Court against the order of learned single Judge dated 3-12-1996. In the said order, the Supreme Court while dismissing the SLP with a request to the High Court to decide the review application on 23-1-1998, and further directed that if the review petition is not decided on that date, the order of thelearned single Judge dated 3-12-1996 shall stand stayed till the review petition is decided.
6. Armed with the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above, the respondents through their Counsel appeared on 23-1-1998 in the review petition without records. Therefore the matter was to be adjourned to 27-1-1998. However, this did not preclude the learned single Judge from passing an order to the effect that since the Court decided to hear the writ petition, it should be taken on record and that the review has been decided in terms of the orders of the Supreme Court and that the earlier direction of this Court will continue to operate. In view of this the learned single Judge directed the Director and Joint-Director of NAARAM to give personal bonds to comply with the direction to continue the training until further orders of the Court. In this writ appeal, we are not concerned with the contempt case.
7. Before the learned single Judge, the respondents filed counter-affidavit raising only a preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain a writ petition in respect of the service conditions of employees in the first respondent Council and actions of 3rd respondent Board. No other plea was taken with reference to the merits of the case.
8. Before the teamed single Judge, the petitioner contended that the notification issued by the Government of India applying the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (the Act) to the Indian Council of Agricultural Research Services with effect from 15th May, 1987, does not oust the jurisdiction of this Court because the 3rd respondent Board was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal. It is further submitted that since the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal was only supplementary and thewrit petition having been admitted, this Court can dispose of the same on merits. Other contentions were also raised with regard to the merits of the case.
9. The respondents contended before the learned single Judge that the 3rd respondent Board being part of ICAR and since ICAR was notified as an institution covered by the Act, the writ petition is not maintainable and specifically sought a decision on the jurisdiction point without going into the merits of the case. However, the respondents produced the record and made an attempt to demonstrate that the action of respondents in not appointing the petitioner, as scientist is justified according to the rules and regulations of the first respondent as well as the 3rd respondent. Dealing with the question of jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the writ petition, the learned single Judge decided the point in favour of the petitioner as follows :
'I am unable to accept this contention also for two reasons. Firstly, the Board itself was not notified and only the ICAR has been notified as the institution amenable to jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal. Once mandamus is issued to the Board to include the name of the petitioner in the list of the selected candidates, ICAR is bound to give the appointment as recommended by the Board. If they do not do so, it will only reflect their recalcitrant attitude which is already revealed in the course of this proceeding. Secondly, the Supreme Court has held in the case of L Chandra Kumar v. Union India, : [1997]228ITR725(SC) , that while the jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be ousted the Tribunals are to act as Courts of first instance. It must be noted that the Supreme Court has held as unconstitutional the exclusion of the jurisdiction clause, and therefore, in exceptional cases such as this, it wouldbe unfair to send the petitioner back to the Central Administrative only on the ground that she should have approached the Tribunal first even though on merits and in accordance with the rules as adumbrated by the Supreme Court it is obvious that there has been gross injustice in denying the selection.'
10. Again in the concluding part of the impugned judgment, it is observed as follows :
'In this background if the argument about jurisdiction is accepted as technically correct I am sure that the petitioner will be discontinued from training and the case will take its own time in Central Administrative Tribunal though ultimately it is bound to follow the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Ramachandra Iyer (supra) and pass the same order that was passed originally in this case.'
11. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellants and the respondent in this writ appeal. Both the Counsel repeated and reiterated the submissions made before the learned single Judge. The point that arises for consideration is :
'Whether this Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to entertain the writ petition against the 1st and 3rd respondents.'
12. The Central Administrative Tribunal established under Section 4 of the Act shall exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before date by all Courts in relation to all conditions of services of members belonging to Civil Service under the Union. The power to enlarge the jurisdiction of a Tribunal is vested in the Central Government by Section 14(2) of the Act. The said subsection empowers the Central Government to apply the provisions of sub-section (3) to other authorities, Corporations and Societiesowned or controlled by the Central Government. Sub-section (3) of Section 14 says that Tribunal shall exercise all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to recruitment or to a post in connection with the affair of such authority, Corporation or Society and all service matters affairs of such authority, Corporation and/or Society. The Government of India by notification dated 20-4-1987 specified 15-5-1997 as the date from which the provisions of Section 14(3) of the Act shall apply to Indian Council of Agricultural Research Services being a Society owned and controlled by the Government of India. Therefore, all the matters in relation to recruitment to the service of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research 1st respondent are necessarily to be adjudicated by the Tribunal. No other Court except the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction power or authority. This Court has no jurisdiction, power or authority to entertain and adjudicate any matter in relation to recruitment to the service of the first respondent Council.
13. The argument which we should say without any ingenuity advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that as the 3rd respondent namely the Agricultural Scientists Recruitment Board has not been mentioned in the notification of Government of India dated 20-4-1987 by which provisions of Section 14(3) were applied to ICAR, it should be taken that this Court's jurisdiction is not ousted. This argument found favour with the learned single Judge. With respect we do not agree with the learned single Judge for reasons more than one. Firstly, the prayer in the writ petition itself is for appointment of the petitioner to the post of Scientist in the 1st respondent Council. In fact, the second part of mandamus issued on 3-12-1996 is a direction to the 1st respondent to give suitable appointment to the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner is notclaiming any relief against the 1st respondent. Secondly, the provisions of Section 14(3) make it clear that the matters concerning recruitment to any service are outside the purview of any Court. The 3rd respondent Board is a adjutant body for the purpose of making recruitment to Agricultural Research Services (ARS) which is nothing but the services under the 1st respondent. Further, admittedly the 3rd respondent is a recommendatory body and it is only the 1 st respondent who recruits to Agricultural Research Services. Therefore, the argument that the 3rd respondent Board is not notified under Section 14(2) of the Act has no substance. Thirdly, even the petitioner concedes to the legal position that even though the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is only supplementary this Court having already admitted the writ petition could as well dispose of the same on merits. This was countenaced by the learned single Judge who in fact in a different way agreed with the legal position that this Court has no jurisdiction. In this connection, it is useful to refer to the concluding part of the impugned judgment:
'In this background if the argument about jurisdiction is accepted as technically correct I am sure that the petitioner will be discontinued from training and the case will take its own time in Central Administrative Tribunal though ultimately it is bound to follow the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Ramachandra Iyer (supra) and pass the same order that was passed originally in this case.'
14. In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, : [1997]228ITR725(SC) , a seven Judge Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the constitutional vires of Clause 2(d) of Article 323-A, Clause 3(d) of Article 323-B of Constitution of India and Section 28 of the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that these provisions of the Constitution of India and the Act to theextent they exclude the jurisdiction of High Courts and Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution are unconstitutional. The Apex Court further held that all the decisions of the Tribunals constituted under the Act and other respective enactments will be subject to jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls will serve two purposes. It would save the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts and ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunal and secondly the High Court will have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which will be of use to it in finally deciding the matter. All the matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, a citizen has to first necessarily approach the Tribunal and then only seek the remedy of judicial review before the High Court. This is the law declared by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court further held:
'The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have under our constitutional set up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which isa creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone the concerned High Court may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Court. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal.'
15. The law so declared was further emphasised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the same judgment as follows :
'The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Court even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislation (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to interpreted in the manner we have indicated.'
16. In view of the above reasoning in the impugned judgment for entertaining the writ petition, with great respect is not sustainable. We may make a few observations which in our view are apposite in a situation like this. No doubt an analysisof the facts and appreciation of various contentions made by the petitioner, do indicate that the argument is plausible one. However strong a petitioner's case may be, unless the jurisdiction is vested, no Court is competent to adjudicate upon the issues that arise for consideration. In the present case, this Court has no initial jurisdiction and cannot entertain the disputes concerning the service matters at the first instance. That is the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In face of the law declared by the Supreme Court this Court is not competent to take a contrary view which should be void in the eye of law. Discipline of law requires that law declared by the Apex Court shall be followed and the High Court is not competent to interpret the judgments of the Supreme Court and arrive at a suitable conclusion to get over the questions of jurisdiction. Not only because of Article 141 of the Constitution of India but also because of doctrine of Precedent - the law declared by the highest Court is binding on all the lower Courts.
17. For all the above reasons, we allow the writ appeal setting aside the order of the learned single Judge dated 3-12-1996 and 20-2-1998 without costs. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioner made a request that in view of the undertaking given in the contempt case, the petitioner may be given an appointment in the first respondent Council. This is seriously disputed by the learned Counsel for the respondents-appellants. In view of our findings, we do not feel inclined to give any such directions. However, it will be open to the competent authority or Central Administrative Tribunal to consider such a request, if made, in accordance with law.