Ghulam Mohammed, J.
1. These three writ petitions raise identical questions of law and fact and, therefore, they are disposed of by this common judgment. For the purpose of this judgment, I may refer to the facts stated in WP No. 14205 of. 1988.
2. The petitioner is a private motor transport operator plying her stage carriage on two town-service-routes under a permit issued by the Regional Transport Authority, Nellore. They are (1) N.I. Estateto Potlapudi and (2) N.I. Estate to Chinnacherukur. The permits are renewed from time to time.
3. While so, the State Government, by G.O. Ms. No. 150, dated 13.2.1987, approved a Draft Scheme under Section 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 ('the Act' for brief) relating to Mofussil service route from Nellore to Kodur via Potlapudi. As per Note (b) appended to the Scheme, the holders of stage carriage permits in respect of town service routes having an overlapping of not more than 8 KMs., on the notified route are exempted from operation of the said Scheme. In this context there are three Bus stands in the Nellore town and the Busses of the Corporation start from one of those three and the bus plying on the notified route has Atmakur Bus stand as its starting point.
4. Thereafter, the second respondent herein purporting to be exercising power delegated upon him under Rule 312 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1964 passed an order dated 19-2-1987 under Section 68-F(2) of the Act, curtailing one of the two routes operated by the petitioner herein viz., N.I.Estate to Potlapudi between Nellore to Potlapudi on the ground that the said route overlaps the notified route covered by the Scheme for more than 8 K..Ms.
5. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred a Representation Petition No.75 of 1987 before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, A.P., Hyderabad, the first respondent herein, under Section 64-A of the Act. By order-dated 19-2-1987, the first respondent confirmed the order dated 9-9-1988 passed by the 2nd respondent and dismissed the P.P. observing that the 8 K.Ms. distance should be reckoned only from the Bus-Stand and not from the municipal limits. While matters stood thus, the petitioner approached this Court invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Courtunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
6. 1 have heard Shri Ravindranath Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri C. V. Ramulu, learned Standing Counsel for the A.P.S.R.T.C. and the learned Government Pleader for Transport.
7. Shri Ravindranatha Reddy learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order which is passed proposing to curtail the temporary permits on the ground that the route in question overlaps more than 8 K.Ms on the route covered by the Approved Scheme is erroneous because the holders of stage carriage permits in respect of town-service-routes to the extent of not more than 8 K.Ms on the notified route are exempted from the operation of the said Scheme. He also submits that the primary authority has misconstrued the scope and effect of Note (b) appended to the Approved Scheme which is to the effect that the approved Scheme relates to Mofussil service route only and that it does not prohibit plying of any vehicles on town service routes on which the petitioner has been plying vehicle under permits which have been renewed from time to time. He also submits that the provisions of the scheme cannot be interpreted to defeat the purpose of the Act namely public interest which alone is paramount and that the said purpose cannot be rendered nugatory by interpreting the scheme narrowly.
8. The controversy raised in this Writ Petition is no longer res integra. In view of the divergent views expressed by two Division Benches of this Court as regards the interpretation of the Scheme framed under Sub-section (2) of Section 102 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the controversy was settled and set at rest in an authoritative pronouncement by a Full Bench of this Court reported in A.P.S.R.T.C.v. S.T.A.T., : 2001(3)ALD235 (FB), which considered the nature and gamut of the Act and also scope and ambit of relevant Schemes dealing with cases where the applicants applied for grant of a pucca stage carriage permits in respect of town service routes. While extracting the conclusions reached by the Division Benches and dealing with the relevant provisions of law, the Full Bench observed:
'There is a great deal of difference between a town service and a mofussil service. A mofussil service in its very scheme is a long distance one which may have number of stages on the route; it may also have different fare structures and the stages prescribed therefor are also different, whereas town service normally operates in a particular limited route. Not only that the fare structures of the two services are different. The busses that are plied on the two services arc differently built so as to satisfy the need of the different types of commuters in the respective areas.'
Dealing with the purport and object of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, The Full Bench also observed:
'Having regard to the purport and object of the Act, 1988, permits are to be liberally granted. Chapter VI of the Act contains a special provision. There cannot also be any doubt whatsoever in regard to the principles adumbrated by the Apex Court in Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India, : AIR1992SC443 , in the matter of grant of permits in view of the liberalisation policy of the Government, which was intended to encourage healthy competition and eliminate corruption. Although the said decision has no application in relation to a scheme prepared under Chapter VI of the Act which provides for special provision relating to State Transport undertaking but it is also beyond any cavil of doubt that such exclusionary clause must be strictly interpreted.'
Considering the judgment of this Court in Mohd. Basha v. Secretary, RegionalTransport Authority, : AIR1975AP242 , the Full Bench further observed:
'Having regard to the different kinds of permits contemplated under the Act and a special permit under Section 63(6) can be granted we find no reason as to why town permits cannot be granted when the scheme of nationalisation covers only mofussil routes. The note appended to a scheme framed under the statute must be construed having regard to the fact that it is a purposive enactment.
Relying upon the Supreme Court decision in Reserve Bank Of India V. Peerless Co., : [1987]2SCR1 , the Full Bench further held:
'ft is a well settled principle of law that where the law is not clear, recourse must be taken to purposive interpretation.....It is,therefore, evident {hat the note (2) appended to G.O. Ms. No. 179, dated 28-6-1990 that the scheme shall not affect the existing town services operating on the notified routes is merely ciassificatory in nature which was appended so as to obviate the difficulties that may be faced by the existing town services operating on the notified routes but the same cannot by itself take away the statutory right with which any person under a statute has been clothed nor it can interfere with or change the enactment or any part of the statute. So read and having regard to the object and purport of the issuance of the notification, we arc of the opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Rajappa Kawati v. G. Hanumantha Rao and Ors., : 1995(3)ALT878 , lays down the correct proposition of law and the view taken by the Division Bench in W.A.No.56 of 1992 dated 14-10-1992 does not reflect the correct interpretation of the provisions. For the reasons aforementioned, the Writ Petitions filed by the A. P. State Road Transport Corporation arc dismissed and W.P.No.2157 of 1995 is allowed.'
9. Shri C. K Ramulu, learned standing Counsel for the A.P.S.R.T.C. however, vehemently argued that against the judgmentof the Full Bench, an S.L.P. has been filed before the Supreme Court and that the Apex Court has been pleased to grant stay of operation of the judgment of the Full Bench and thus, the decision of the Full Bench does not apply to the cases on hand.
10. In my considered opinion, there is no impediment for this Court to decide the controversy raised in these matters following the judgment of the Full Bench despite the fact that the stay granted by the Supreme Court is in operation for the reason that the contention raised by the learned standing counsel holds good in respect of Division Bench judgments. Insofar as the Full Bench judgment is concerned, the dicta laid down therein continues to have binding force on the single Judges and the Division Benches of this Court unless the said judgment of the Full Bench is set aside or quashed by the Supreme Court as held by a Division Bench of this Court in Koduru Venka Reddy v. Land Acquisition Officer, : [1988]170ITR15(AP) (DB), which laid down thai:
'When a judgment of the High Court is subject-matter of an appeal and (he said judgment is suspended, the only effect of such suspension is that that judgment cannot be executed or implemented. But so long as the Full Bench judgment stands, the dicta laid down therein is binding on all Courts including the single Judges and Division Benches of this Court. The dicta laid down therein cannot be ignored unless the Court, after hearing a particular case doubts the correctness of the dicta and thinks it appropriate that it should be reconsidered.
The contention raised by the learned standing counsel for the A.P.S.R.T.C. is, therefore rejected.
11. Since, the questions raised in the present Writ Petition W.P. No.14205 of 1988 are squarely covered by the Full Bench judgment, following the same, the WritPetition is allowed in terms of the judgment of the Full Bench.
W.P. Nos.3374 and 3375 of 1987
12. As already noticed above, these two Writ Petitions also raise identical questions of law and fact similar to those raised in W.P. No.14205 of 1988 and are also covered by the Full Bench decision of this Court (supra).
13. The learned standing Counsel for the A.P.S.R.T.C., however, contended vehemently that the petitioners in these two Writ Petitions have rushed to this Court without availing of the alternative remedy available to them in the statute and as they had bypassed the statutory remedy provided in the statute, the Writ Petitions may be dismissed.
14. In my considered view, the contention of the learned counsel docs not hold good in view of the fact that as far back as 18.3.1987 both the writ petitions were admitted and interim orders were granted in favour of the petitioners and the petitioners have been plying their vehicles by virtue of the temporary permits granted pursuant to the directions issued by this Court. At this distance of time, it would not be proper for this Court to drive them back to avail of the alternative remedy available in the statute,
15. Having regard to the fact that the question raised in these writ petitions arc also covered by the Full Bench judgment of this Court, following the same, I also allow WP Nos.3374 and 3375 of 1987 in terms of the judgment of the Full Bench. There shall be no order as to costs.