ORDER
Ramesh Ranganathan, J.
1. Maintainability of the writ petition, filed against an order of the Administrative Tribunal by a person who was not a party to the proceedings, is in issue. The petitioner herein, aggrieved by the order of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal (A.P.A.T) in O.A. No. 2278 of 2005 dated 15.7.2005 filed by the 5th respondent, seeks to have the order set aside in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, though he was not a party to the proceedings in O.A. 2278 of 2005.
2. Facts, to the extent necessary, are that the 5th respondent was initially promoted on 20.1.1999 as an Assistant Divisional Fire Officer subject to the condition that he pass the departmental test within a period of two years as prescribed in G.O. Ms. No. 296 dated 14.10.1998. He was subsequently reverted for want of vacancy. He was again promoted, by order dated 16.5.2003, on the condition that he pass the Refresher/Training Course within a period of two years from the date of promotion. The fifth respondent submitted a representation on 28.4.2005 requesting that the time granted for passing the departmental test be extended. The Director General of Fire Services, by order dated 10.5.2005, held that the earlier order dated 16.5.2003, promoting the fifth respondent, was issued erroneously even though he did not possess the prescribed qualification as stipulated in G.O. Ms. No. 568 dated 24.11.1992, that despite an opportunity being given to pass the Refresher Course within a period of 2 years the 5th respondent had failed to acquire the requisite qualifications and what was not specifically provided, in G.O. Ms. No. 296 dated 14.10.1998, could not be availed merely on the ground of an erroneous order of promotion issued on 16.5.2003. Pursuant to the order dated 10.5.2005, consequential orders were passed reverting the 5th respondent. Aggrieved thereby the fifth respondent approached the A.P. Administrative Tribunal and the Tribunal, by order in O.A. 2278/05 dated 15.7.2005, set aside the order of reversion passed by the Director General of Fire Services.
3. In the meanwhile, consequent upon his promotion to the post of Assistant Divisional Fire Officer, the petitioner assumed charge at his new station at Visakhapatnam on 1.7.2005. It is the petitioner's case that the 5th respondent did not refer to the proceedings of the Director General of Fire Services, Hyderabad dated 10.5.2005 in O.A. 2278 of 2005 filed by him and though the official respondents filed a detailed counter-affidavit, placing the memorandum dated 10.5.2005 on record, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the order impugned in the O.A. was not a speaking order and that the 5th respondent could not have been reverted for not passing the departmental test. It is the petitioner's case that the Tribunal has ignored the memorandum dated 10.5.2005 wherein it was held that the earlier promotion orders issued to the petitioner on 16.5.2003 was itself erroneous. Though the petitioner herein assumed charge on 1.7.2005, in view of the orders of the A.P.A.T in O.A. No. 2278 of 2005 filed by the 5th respondent, he was again reverted, vide proceedings dated 20.7.2005. Since the petitioner herein was not a party, to O.A. No. 2278 of 2005, he has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of the A.P.A.T in O.A. 2278 of 2005 dated 15.7.2005.
4. Sri K.V. Satyanarayana, learned Counsel for the 5th respondent, would submit that a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the A.P.A.T. is not entitled to directly invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the judgment of the Tribunal, and the writ petition filed by him is not maintainable. learned Counsel would rely on L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India : [1997]228ITR725(SC) , to submit that the Tribunal continues to act as a Court of the first instance in respect of areas of law for which they have been constituted and it would not be open for litigants to directly approach this Court i without invoking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal at the first instance, even if the j challenge was to an order of the Tribunal. learned Counsel would place reliance on K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India : (1997)IILLJ749SC , in support of his submission that, even in cases where the judgment of the Tribunal affects persons who are not parties thereto, they would still be required to approach the Tribunal, under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. learned Counsel would submit that since the petitioner herein was entitled to challenge his order of reversion dated 20.7.2005, even if it is as a consequence of the order of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 2278 of 2005 dated 15.7.2005, in an application under Section 19 and canvass the correctness or otherwise of the order passed in O.A. No. 2278 of 2005 dated 15.7.2005, he was not entitled to directly approach this Court and invoke its jurisdiction under Article V of the Constitution of India. learned Counsel would submit that since the petitioner has chosen not to approach the Tribunal at the first instance, the writ petition filed by him challenging the order passed by the Tribunal, in O.A. No. 2278 of 2005 dated 15.7.2005, must necessarily be rejected, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra). learned Counsel would also rely on Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty : [1998]2SCR1108 and T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu : (2003)IIILLJ275SC , to submit that litigants must necessarily approach Tribunals, established under Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution of India, which are Courts of the first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they are constituted, before they invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
5. Sri Nooty Ram Mohan Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that since the power of judicial review under Article 226 is part of the basic feature/structure of the Constitution of India, and cannot be taken away even by a constitutional amendment, restrictions on its exercise should not be easily inferred. learned Counsel would submit that unlike executive orders or statutory provisions which are required, in view of the law laid down in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), to be challenged before the Tribunal in the first instance before the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is invoked, what is under challenge in the present writ petition is an order of the Tribunal itself, and since the jurisdiction of the Tribunal has already been invoked pursuant to which the impugned order was passed by the Tribunal, the law laid down by the Apex Court in L Chandra Kumar (supra), that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal must be invoked in the first instance, has been complied with. learned Counsel would place reliance on T.K. Rangarajan (supra), to submit that the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), did not bar exercise of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, against orders passed by Administrative Tribunals, merely because its jurisdiction has been invoked by a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal. learned Counsel, while fairly conceding that the petitioner is also entitled to file an application under Section 19 of the A.P. Administrative Tribunals Act, would submit that the choice of the forum is for the petitioner to make, more so in matters involving violation of fundamental rights. learned Counsel would give several illustrations of the needless inconvenience and hardship which would be caused if the submissions to the contrary were to be accepted and this Court were to hold that persons affected, by orders of the Tribunal, are not entitled to directly challenge the said orders before this Court and are required to approach the A.P.A.T. in the first instance as they were not parties to the earlier proceedings before the Tribunal. learned Counsel would submit that since, under Section 5 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, the Tribunal functions in Benches, the judgment of the earlier Bench of the Tribunal would bind a subsequent Bench and even if the petitioners were able to persuade the subsequent Bench to take a different view, judicial discipline would necessitate the matter being referred to a Larger Bench and, since no reference can be made to a Larger Bench without hearing the opposite party and as the earlier order is binding on the subsequent Bench, no interim orders can be passed by the subsequent Bench of the Tribunal. learned Counsel would give another instance of a challenge to an order of a Full Bench of the Tribunal and submit that the subsequent Division Bench would be bound by the decision of the earlier Full Bench of the Tribunal and would not even be entitled to take a different view therefrom, in which event the petitioner would have to request the Tribunal to dismiss his application to enable him to approach this Court challenging the subsequent order of the Tribunal. learned Counsel would submit that in cases where a party to the O.A. has already filed a writ petition challenging the order of the Tribunal and in case the person aggrieved by the order, but was not a party to the O.A, is required to approach the Tribunal, the possibility of conflicting orders being passed could not be ruled out and while the subsequent O.A. may be dismissed by the Tribunal following its earlier orders this Court, in the writ petition filed against the order of the Tribunal, may quash the order of the Tribunal. learned Counsel would submit that relegating a litigant to invoke the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal, when he is aggrieved by an earlier order of the Tribunal, would be a mere ritual and a needless and useless formality. learned Counsel would submit that the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), did not prohibit orders of the Tribunal being subjected to challenge before this Court directly by litigants who were not parties to the earlier proceedings before the Tribunal, and the litigants being required to approach the Tribunal as the Court of the first instance, is only in cases where executive orders or statutory provisions are sought to be challenged, and not an order of the Tribunal itself.
6. Learned Government Pleader for Services II would place reliance on Section 19 of the A.P. Administrative Tribunals Act to submit that a person aggrieved was entitled to challenge the orders specifically mentioned therein and, since the order of the Tribunal is not one specified in Section 19 of the Act, the only relief available to a person aggrieved thereby is to challenge the order of the Tribunal before this Court, and not by filing an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act.
7. Before examining the rival contentions it is necessary to take note of the relevant provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Chapter III relates to jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals. Section 14 relates to the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal and Section 15 to the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the State Administrative Tribunals. Section 15 reads thus:
75. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of State Administrative Tribunals :-(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to-
(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any Civil Service of the State or to any civil post under the State;
(b) all service matters concerning a person not being a person referred to in Clause (c) of this Sub-section or a member, person or civilian referred to in clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 appointed to any Civil Service of the State or any civil post under the State and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with the affairs of the State or of any local or other authority under the control of the State Government or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the State Government;
(c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the State concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in Clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by any such local of other authority or corporation or society or other body as is controlled or owned by the State Government at the disposal of the State Government for such appointment.
(2) The State Government may, by notification, apply with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification the provisions of Sub-section (3) to local or other authorities and corporations or societies controlled or owned by the State Government;
Provided that if the State Government considers it expedient so to do for the purpose of facilitating transition to the scheme as envisaged by this Act, different dates may be so specified under this subSection in respect of different classes of, or different categories under 'any class of local or other authorities or corporations or societies.(3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall also exercise on and from the date with effect from which the provisions of this Sub-section apply to any local or other authority or corporation, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that date by all Courts (except the Supreme Court in relation to-
(a) recruitment and matters to recruitment to any concerning service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation or society; and
(b) all service matters concerning a person other than a person referred to in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of this Section or a member, person or civilian referred to in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 appointed to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation or society and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with such affairs.
(4) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall not extend to or be exercisable in relation to, any matter in relation to which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal extends or is exercisable.
8. Section 17 relates to the power to punish for contempt and reads as under:
17 Power to punish for contempt :-A Tribunal shall have, and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in respect of contempt of itself as a High Court has and may exercise and, for this purpose, the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), shall have effect subject to the modifications that-
(a) the references therein to a High Court shall be construed as including a reference to such Tribunal;
(b) the references to the Advocate-General in Section 15 of the said Act shall be construed,-
(i) in relation of the Central Administrative Tribunal, as a reference to the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General or the Additional Solicitor-General; and
(ii) in relation to an Administrative Tribunal for a State or a Joint Administrative Tribunal for two or more States, as a reference to the Advocate-General of the State or any of the States for which such Tribunal has been established.
9. Chapter IV prescribed the procedure and Section 19 thereunder prescribes the procedure to file applications before the Tribunals and reads as under:
19 Applications to Tribunals:-(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance.
Explanation-For the purpose of this subSection, 'order' means an order made-
(a) by the Government or a local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or by any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government; or
(b) by an officer, committee or other body or a agency of the Government or a local or other authority or corporation or society referred to in Clause (a).
(2) Every application under Sub-section (1) shall be in such form and be accompanied by such documents or other evidence and by such fee (if any, not exceeding one hundred rupees) in respect of the filing of such application and by such other fees for the service or execution of processes, as may be prescribed by the Central Government.
(3) On receipt of an application under Sub-section (1), the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem necessary, that the application is a fit case for adjudication or trial by it, admit such application; but where the Tribunal is not satisfied, it may summarily reject the application after recording its reasons.
(4) Where an application has been admitted by a Tribunal under Sub-section (3), every proceeding under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances in relation to the subject-matter of such application pending immediately before such admission shall abate and save as otherwise directed by the Tribunal, no appeal or representation in relation to such matter shall thereafter be entertained under such rules.
10. Section 20 prescribes that applications will not be admitted unless other remedies are exhausted and Section 21 prescribes the period of limitation to admit an application.
11. In L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra) among the issues which fell for consideration was whether the power conferred upon Parliament and State Legislatures, by Article 323-A(2)(d) or 323-B(3)(d) of the Constitution, to totally exclude the jurisdiction of 'Courts' except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136, in respect of disputes referred to in Clause (1) of Article 323A or with regard to any of the matters specified in Article 323B, runs counter to the power of judicial review conferred on the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and on the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court held that the power of judicial review, vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, was an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure and that ordinarily the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. The Supreme Court held that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of Courts and Tribunals, within their respective jurisdiction, was also part of the basic structure of the Constitution and that a situation where the High Courts are divested of all judicial functions, apart from that of constitutional interpretation, was to be avoided. The Supreme Court held that while the subordinate judiciary or Tribunals, created under ordinary legislation, could not exercise the power of judicial review of legislative action to the exclusion of the High Courts and the Supreme Court, there was no constitutional prohibition against their performing a supplemental as opposed to a substitutional role in this respect and as long as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/227, and that of the Supreme Court under Article 32, was retained there was no reason why the power to test the validity of legislative action, against the provisions of the Constitution, could not be conferred upon the Administrative Tribunals created under the Act or by the Tribunals created under Article 323B of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court held that the decision of the Tribunal would be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the Court under whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal falls and thereby two purposes would be served (1) The power of judicial review of legislative action would vest in the High Courts under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and (2) it would ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunal and the High Court will also have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which would be of use to it in finally deciding the matter. The Supreme Court held that an aggrieved party would be entitled to move the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India against the decisions of the Tribunals and, from the decision of the Bench of the High Court, to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court, in L Chandra Kumar's case (supra), summarized its conclusions thus:..Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Court concerned may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal...... (emphasis supplied).
12. The Supreme Court held that questions involving vires of statutory provisions or rules should be decided by a Bench of the Tribunal consisting at least two members one of whom should be a judicial member. In conclusion the Supreme Court held at Paragraph 99 thus:
In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of Article 323A and clause 3(d) of Article 323B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the 'exclusion of jurisdiction' clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323A and 323B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other Courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, The Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated....
(emphasis supplied)
13. Article 323A and Article 323B of the Constitution and other legislations, which excluded the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/227, were struck down and it was held that the jurisdiction conferred upon High Courts under Article 226/227 was part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal would continue to act as Court of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted and that it would not be open to the litigants to directly approach the High Court even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations.
14. In K. Ajit Babu's case (supra), the Central Administrative Tribunal, (Bombay Bench), rejected the application filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, as not maintainable. Sri K. Ajit Babu and Ors. were UDCs, Licensing Assistants and Section Heads in the establishment of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. They were promoted as Controllers on an ad-hoc basis and were working in the western zone headed by the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. In 1978 a policy was adopted whereby options were sought from employees whether they were ready to go on transfer in case they were promoted or they wished to stay at the place of their present posting foregoing their promotion. Officers who gave their options to go to the new place of posting, in case promotions were given to them, were given promotion in preference to the claims of their seniors. In 1983, P.S. Jhon and Ors. who were affected by the seniority list published on 13.10.1981 and were working at Ahmedabad, filed Civil Application No. 1533/ 83 before the Gujarat High Court contending that their option, for going to the new place of posting in case of promotion, was never sought. This application was transferred to the Ahmedabad Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal wherein it was numbered as Transfer Application No. 263/ 86. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench, in its judgment dated 14.8.1987, held that promotions made on this basis, without resorting to the recruitment rules or in terms of the quota laid down or the procedure for filling it up, was valid as long as it was ad-hoc and that the said ad-hoc promotions did not deprive seniority of those who had not given their options for going to the new place of posting. The Tribunal held that while the employer was free to allow juniors, who had given their options, to continue to enjoy promotion on an ad-hoc basis, the orders conferring regular promotions to such promotees could not be upheld insofar as it affected the seniority of those who had not given their options and that the officers who had not given their option had their right to promotion in their own turn of seniority. Consequent upon the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ahmedabad, the respondent authorities prepared and circulated four draft seniority lists inviting objections. A number of review petitions, filed seeking review of the judgment of the Tribunal in T.A. No. 263/86, were rejected by the Tribunal. After the review petitions were rejected, Sri K, Ajit Babu and Ors. filed applications under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act before the Central Administrative Tribunal relying on an earlier Full Bench decision of the Tribunal. The Central Administrative Tribunal held that persons who were not parties to the decision, but were affected by the decisions of the Tribunal were not entitled to file an application under Section 19 of the Act, but could only file a petition seeking review of the decision adversely affecting them. The applications filed under Section 19 were summarily rejected. Aggrieved thereby Sri K. Ajit Babu and Ors. approached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that often in service matters judgments rendered, either by the Tribunal or by the Court, also affect others who are not parties to the cases. It may help one class of employees and at the same time adversely affect the other class of employees and, in such circumstances, the judgments of the Court/Tribunal may not be strictly judgments in personam for the parties to the case, it then would be a judgment in rem and in such circumstances the question that arose for consideration was as to what was the remedy available to such a person who was not a party to a case, yet the decision in such a case adversely affected his rights. The Apex Court, while rejecting the conclusion of the Central Administrative Tribunal that the only remedy open to the affected person was to file an application seeking review of the judgment which affects them and not a fresh application under Section 19 of the Act, held that a review was not a right of appeal where all questions decided were open to challenge and that review was possible only on the restricted grounds mentioned in Order 47 C.P.C, that too if filed within the period of limitation. The Apex Court held that public policy demands that there should be end to law suits and if the view of the Tribunal was to be accepted the proceedings in a case would never come to an end. The Apex Court held thus:..Consistency, certainty and uniformity in the field of judicial decisions are considered to be the benefits arising out of the 'Doctrine of Precedent'. The precedent sets a pattern upon which a future conduct may be based. One of the basic principles of administration of justice is, that the cases should be decided alike. Thus the doctrine of precedent is applicable to the Central Administrative Tribunal also. Whenever an application under Section 19 of the Act is filed and the question involved in the said application stands concluded by some earlier decision of the Tribunal, the Tribunal necessarily has to take into account the judgment rendered in the earlier case, as a precedent and decide the application accordingly. The Tribunal may either agree with the view taken in the earlier judgment or it may dissent. If it dissents, then the matter can be referred to a Larger Bench/Full Bench and place the matter before the Chairman for constituting a Larger Bench so that there may be no conflict upon the two Benches. The Larger Bench, then, has to consider the correctness of the earlier decision in disposing of the later application. The Larger Bench can overrule the view taken in the earlier judgment and declare the law, which would be binding on all the Benches (see John Lucas (1987) 3 ATC 328 (Bang) FB). In the present case, what we find is that the Tribunal rejected the application of the appellants thinking that the appellants are seeking setting aside of the decision of the Tribunal in Transfer Application No. 263 of 1986. This view taken by the Tribunal was not correct. The application of the appellant was required to be decided in accordance with law....
(emphasis supplied)
15. In Gopabandhu Biswal's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration was as to whether a review petition could be filed before the Tribunal, against its earlier order against which an appeal to the Supreme Court had been rejected, by persons who were neither parties to the earlier proceedings before the Tribunal nor the proceedings before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held thus:.In the present case, however, it is urged that the four applicants who filed the two review petitions before the Tribunal were not parties to the main petition. They were also not parties to the special leave petition filed before this Court which was dismissed. However they are parties aggrieved and hence are entitled to apply for a review of the main judgment of the Tribunal. It is contended by them that the judgment of the Tribunal holding that the two cadres of Deputy Superintendent of Police and Assistant Commandant were a single cadre till 5-11-1980, has affected the chances of promotion of the applicants and, therefore, the applicants, being persons aggrieved, are entitled to maintain such review petitions when they had not been parties to the earlier judgment as well as the earlier special leave petition. We will assume for the time being that the applicants are persons aggrieved. Even so, the question is whether they can have a judgment which has attained finality by virtue of an order of this Court, set aside in review. There is no doubt that as between the parties to the main judgment, the judgment is final and binding. The respondents, State of Orissa and Union of India, are, therefore, bound to give effect to the judgment of the Tribunal in TA No. l of 1989 in the case of Gopabandhu Biswal If this is so, can a third party by filing a review petition get that same judgment reviewed and obtain an order that Gopabandhu Biswal is not entitled to the benefits of the directions contained in the main judgment since that judgment is now set aside? In our view this is wholly impermissible. It will lead to reopening a matter which has attained finality by virtue of an order of this Court. The applicants, even if they are persons aggrieved, do not have, in the present case, a right of review under any part of Order 47 Rule 1. Even under Order 47 Rule 1(2), the party not appealing from a decree or order can apply for review only on grounds other than the grounds of appeal which were before the appellate Court, and during the pendency of the appeal. In the present case all the grounds which were urged in review were, in fact, urged before the Tribunal at the time when the Tribunal decided the main application and they were also urged by the petitioner in the special leave petition which was filed before this Court. The special leave petition has been dismissed. The same grounds cannot be again urged by way of a review petition by another party who was not a party in the main petition.
According to the applicants certain documents though produced before the Tribunal were not noticed by the Tribunal in deciding the main matter. Even so, once a judgment of a Tribunal has attained finality, it cannot be reopened after the special leave petition against that judgment has been dismissed. The only remedy for a person who wants to challenge that judgment is to file a separate application before the Tribunal in his own case and persuade the Tribunal either to refer the question to a Larger Bench or, if the Tribunal prefers to follow its earlier decision, to file an appeal from the Tribunal's judgment and have the Tribunal's judgment set aside in appeal. A review is not an available remedy...If the Tribunal decides to follow its earlier judgment the respondents in these applications can file petitions for leave to appeal if they so desire; and any other person aggrieved may also, with the leave of the Court, apply for special leave to file an appeal. In the event of the Tribunal coming to a conclusion that its earlier judgment requires reconsideration, the Tribunal can refer the question to a Larger Bench. In either case the persons aggrieved can apply and intervene to put forward their point of view....
(emphasis supplied)
16. In T.K. Rangarajan's case (supra), writ petitions were filed before the Madras High Court challenging the action of the Tamilnadu Government in terminating the services of all employees who had resorted to strike for their demands. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that since the petitioner had not approached the Administrative Tribunal before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ petition as filed was not maintainable. Aggrieved thereby the petitioners approached the Supreme Court and the Apex Court held thus:..At the outset, it is to be reiterated that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court is empowered to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to meet unprecedented extraordinary situation having no parallel. It is equally true that extraordinary powers are required to be sparingly used. The facts of the present case reveal that this was most extraordinary case, which called for interference by the High Court, as the State Government had dismissed about two lakh employees for going on strike.
It is true that in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India's case (supra), this Court has held that it will not be open to the employees to directly approach the High Court even where the question of vires of the statutory legislation is challenged. However, this ratio is required to be appreciated in context of the question which was decided by this Court wherein it was sought to be contended that once the Tribunals are established under Article 323A or Article 323B, jurisdiction of the High Court would be excluded. Negativing said contention, this Court made it clear that jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution and it cannot be said that such Tribunals are an effective substitute of the High Courts in discharging powers of judicial review. It is also an established principle that where there is an alternative, effective, efficacious remedy available under the law, the High Court would not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and that has been reiterated by holding that the litigants must first approach the Tribunals which act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted and therefore, it will not be open to the litigants to directly approach the High Court even where the question of vires of the statutory legislation is challenged....
There cannot be any doubt that the aforesaid judgment of Larger Bench is binding on this Court and we respectfully agree with the same. However, in a case like this, if thousands of employees are directed to approach the Administrative Tribunal, the Tribunal would not be in a position to render justice to the cause. Hence, as stated earlier, because of very very exceptional circumstance that arose in the present case, there was no justifiable reason for the High Court not to entertain the petitions on the ground of alternative remedy provided under the statute....
(emphasis supplied)
17. In T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Government of A.P. (2001) 1 SCC 516, the State Government and one of its officers filed a writ petition before this Court challenging the jurisdiction of the A.P.A.T to take cognizance of contempt. In another matter, an application was filed invoking the contempt jurisdiction of this Court, without approaching the Tribunal under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, complaining of wilful disobedience of an order passed by the A.P.A.T. On the question as to whether such proceedings were maintainable before this Court, or the A.P.A.T, the Division Bench of this Court held that in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra), Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 did not survive and that the A.P.A.T could not exercise its contempt jurisdiction. On the order of the Division Bench being challenged, the Apex Court held thus:.It is thus clear that the Constitution Bench has not declared the provisions of Article 323A(2)(a) or Article 323B(3)(d) or Section 17 of the Act ultra vires the Constitution. The High Court has, in its judgment under appeal, noted with emphasis the Tribunal having been compared to like 'Courts of first instance' and then proceeded to hold that the status of Administrative Tribunals having been held to be equivalent to Courts or Tribunals subordinate to the High Court the jurisdiction to hear their own contempt was lost by the Administrative Tribunals and the only course available to them was either to make a reference to the High Court or to file a complaint under Sections 193, 219 and 228 IPC as provided by Section 30 of the Act. The High Court has proceeded on the reasoning that the Tribunal having been held to be subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Article 226/227 of the Constitution and its decisions having been subjected to judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, the right to file an appeal to the Supreme Court against an order passed by the Tribunal punishing for contempt under Section 17 of the Act was defeated and on these twin grounds Section 17 of the Act became unworkable and unconstitutional. We do not find any basis for such conclusion or inference being drawn from the judgments of this Court in the cases of Supreme Court Bar Assn., (1998) 4 SCC 409 or L Chandra Kumar (1997) 3 SCC 261 or any other decision of this Court. The Constitution Bench has in so many words said that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226/227 could not be taken away by conferring the sane on any Court or Tribunal and jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the High Court now legislatively conferred on Tribunals to the exclusion of the High Court on specified matters, did not amount to assigning Tribunals a status of substitute for the High Court but such jurisdiction was capable of being conferred additionally or supplementally on any Court or Tribunal which is not a concept strange to the scheme of the Constitution more so in view of Articles 323A and 323B. Clause (2Kb) of Article 323A specifically empowers Parliament to enact a law specifying the jurisdiction and powers, including the power to punish for contempt, being conferred on the Administrative Tribunals constituted under Article 323A. Section 17 of the Act derives its legislative sanctity therefrom. The power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself under Article 215 of the Constitution remains intact but the jurisdiction, power and authority to hear and decide the matters covered by Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act having been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals the jurisdiction of the High Court to that extent has been taken away and hence the same jurisdiction which vested in the High Court to punish for contempt of itself in the matters now falling within the jurisdiction of Tribunals if those matters would have continued to be heard by the High Court has now been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals under Section 17 of the Act. The jurisdiction is the same as vesting in the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution read with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The need for enacting Section 17 arose, firstly, to avoid doubts, and secondly, because the Tribunals are not 'Courts of record'. While holding the proceedings under Section 17 of the Act the Tribunal remains a Tribunal and so would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution subject to the well-established rules of self-restraint governing the discretion of the High Court to interfere with the pending proceedings and upset the interim or interlocutory orders of the Tribunals. However any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt shall be appealable only to the Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of the order appealed against in view of the specific provision contained in Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act is a piece of legislation by reference. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act are not as if lifted and incorporated in the text of the Administrative Tribunals Act (as is in the case of legislation by incorporation); they remain there where they are, yet while reading the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act in the context of Tribunals, the same will be so read as to read the word 'Tribunal' in place of the word 'High Court' wherever it occurs, subject to the modifications set out in Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for appeals. In its text also by virtue of Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 the word 'High Court' shall be read as 'Tribunal'. Here, by way of abundant caution, we make it clear that the concept of intra-Tribunal appeals i.e., appeal from an order or decision of a Member of a Tribunal sitting singly to a Bench of not less than two Members of the Tribunal is alien to the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The question of any order made under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by a Member of the Tribunal sitting singly, if the rules of business framed by the Tribunal or the appropriate Government permit such hearing, being subjected to an appeal before a Bench of two or more Members of the Tribunal therefore does not arise. Any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt is appealable under Section 19 of the Act to the Supreme Court only. The Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar has nowhere said that orders of the Tribunal holding the contemner guilty and punishing for contempt shall also be subject to judicial scrutiny of the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution in spite of remedy of statutory appeal provided by Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act being available. The distinction between orders passed by the Administrative Tribunal on matters covered by Section 14(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act and orders punishing for contempt under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, is this: as against the former there is no remedy of appeal statutorily provided, but as against the latter statutory remedy of appeal is provided by Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act itself....
(emphasis supplied).
18. In G. Lakshmi Reddy v. Principal Secretary to Govt. Irrigation & CAD Dept, Hyderabad : 2002(1)ALT415 , the question which arose for consideration, before the Larger Bench of this Court, was whether the directives issued by the Apex Court in L Chandra Kumar's case (supra), to the effect that a writ petition could be filed by a civil servant only upon exhausting the remedies before the Administrative Tribunal and not directly regardless of the urgency or extraordinary situation that may exist in a given case, would impair or in any way dilute the efficacy of the power of judicial review vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which power has been held to be part of the basic structure/feature of the Constitution. The Larger Bench held thus:.By reason of the decision of the Apex Court the power of judicial review of this Court has not been taken away. In L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra), the Apex Court had to strike a balance between exercise of power of a Tribunal constituted in terms of Article 323A of the Constitution and/or the basic feature of the Constitution viz., judicial review. It may be true that the Court has directed imposition of self-restraint in the matter of entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The matters which would not ordinarily inhibit a Court from exercising its writ jurisdiction have succinctly been stated by the Apex Court in Whirlpool Corporation (1998) 8 SCC 1, in the following terms:
Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.
Is it not open to the Superior Court to expand the said rule having regard to a different fact situation obtaining therein? The answer to the said question must be rendered in the affirmative. By reasons of such interpretative role the Apex Court had not shut down the doors of the High Court for all times to come. It merely evolved a constitutional scheme so that the very purpose and object of creation and constitution of Administrative Tribunals is fulfilled. It is axiomatic that unless such a power was imposed, there would be possibility of litigants approaching the High Court directly on one pretext or the other leading to the destruction of the creation of institution of Tribunals itself
There cannot be any doubt, as has been held in S.R. Bommai AIR 1994 SC 1918, that the power of judicial review is a constituent power and cannot be abdicated by judicial process of interpretation. But the same by itself would not mean that the Apex Court in another decision cannot lay down a law to the effect as to how and in what manner such a constituent power should be exercised. It will bear repetition to state that in terms of L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra), the Apex Court has not denied or defined the basic structure doctrine to a litigant nor by reason thereof any erosion has been caused by judicial interpretation.
L. Chandra Kumar was decided on the touchstone of Article 323-A of the Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the constitution of Tribunals which were constituted under Article 323-A. It also upheld the power of judicial review. In power of judicial review of administrative action as also judicial review of legislation.... Having considered the wide power the Tribunal enjoys particularly the power of judicial review, balance had to be struck between the functions of the Administrative Tribunal vis-a-vis the basic structure doctrine in the light of the jurisdiction to the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 and that of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution....
(emphasis supplied)
19. In R. Manjula v. Principal Secretary to Govt, Revenue (Service-I) Department : 2002(3)ALD648 , the question which arose for consideration was whether the decision of the Tribunal in refusing to grant ex parte ad interim orders interdicting promotions to the post of Deputy Collector, was susceptible to the judicial review of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench of this Court held thus:..We have adverted to the provisions of the Constitution and made a reference to the Act with a view to highlight that the Tribunals created under Article 323A of the Constitution of India cannot be equated and placed along with other inferior Tribunals whose origin is not traceable to any of the provisions of the Constitution of India. No doubt, all the decisions of Tribunals created pursuant to Article 323A of the Constitution are subject to High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India as held by the Supreme Court in L Chandra Kumar v. Union of India's case (supra). The power of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not wholly excluded. The Tribunals so constituted are even entitled to handle the matters involving the constitutional issues. 'The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court, which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts' (See L. Chandra Kumar).
The Tribunal so constituted is competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned and has the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. The Tribunal acts 'as the Court of first instance' in respect of the areas of law for which it is constituted. Litigants are not entitled to directly approach the High Court even in cases where they question the vires of the statutory legislations by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Such is the extent and reach of the power and jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribunal.
It has to be borne in mind that the Tribunal so constituted is not subordinate to the High Court. This Court does not exercise any administrative superintendence over the Tribunal. The Court merely exercises jurisdiction conferred under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India which is a supervisory jurisdiction.
It is very well settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not interfere with the exercise of discretionary power by the inferior Courts/ Tribunals, unless such exercise has resulted in grave and irreparable injury to the concerned and particularly in case where such discretion is exercised by a Tribunal whose origin is traceable to the constitutional provisions. The decisions of the Tribunal are subject to a scrutiny before a Division Bench of this Court.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of he considered opinion that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not normally interfere with the discretionary orders passed by the Tribunal. Grant of an interlocutory order or refusal thereof is within the discretion of the Tribunal. This Court would not interfere with such discretion exercised by the Tribunal with regard to the interlocutory orders unless it is established that passing of such interlocutory order or refusal thereof had resulted in an irreversible situation resulting in manifest injustice. It would not be appropriate for this Court to entertain any writ petition only for the purpose of granting an interim order during the pendency of the main proceedings before the Tribunal. However, it would be entirely a different matter if the discretion exercised by the Tribunal in the matter of granting interim relief results in incalculable repercussions and public mischief. In such cases where denial of interim orders may lead to public mischief, grave irreparable injury or shake a citizen's faith in the judicial process, it is not only the power but the duty of the Court to interfere and grant appropriate relief accordingly. Suffice it to observe interference of this Court with the exercise of discretion by the Tribunal at interlocutory stage is not a matter of course...
(emphasis supplied)
20. While Sri Nooty Ram Mohan Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that L. Chandrakumar (supra) did not prohibit a litigant from directly approaching this Court in cases where the order of the Tribunal was sought to be challenged, Sri K.V. Satyanarayana, learned Counsel for the 5th respondent, would contend otherwise and submit that every litigant, irrespective of the decision which he chooses to challenge whether an executive order or a statutory provision or even an order of the Tribunal, must necessarily approach the Tribunal in the first instance before the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227 can be invoked.
21. The question, which we must decide, is whether a person aggrieved is disentitled from directly invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 to challenge the order of the Tribunal, merely because he was not a party to the proceedings before it, and has not invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 'in the first instance' before invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
22. The power of judicial review, over administrative and legislative action, vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the power to exercise judicial superintendence, over decisions of Courts and Tribunals within their respective jurisdiction, is part of the basic feature/structure of the Constitution of India and, ordinarily, such a power vested in the High Courts can never be ousted or excluded. A situation where the High Courts are held to be divested of these powers, apart from that of constitutional interpretation, has to be avoided. Administrative Tribunals, created under Article 323A of the Constitution, perform a supplemental role. While they are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules and to act as Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they are constituted, their decisions are nonetheless subject to scrutiny by the Division Bench of the High Court. As held by the Larger Bench of this Court, in G. Lakshmi Reddy's case while the power of judicial review is a constituent power and cannot be abdicated by a judicial process of interpretation, nonetheless the Supreme Court can lay down a law prescribing the manner in which such a power is to be exercised. It, however, needs no emphasis that, since the constituent power of judicial review conferred on the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is part of the basic feature/structure of the Constitution of India, any limitation on the manner of its exercise, beyond what has been specifically laid down by the Supreme Court, should not be readily inferred. Since the Apex Court, in L Chandra Kumar's case (supra) did not specifically exclude exercise of the power of judicial review by the High Court, of orders of the Tribunal at the instance of a person aggrieved thereby, on the ground that he was not a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal, there is no reason to infer any such limitation.
23. The areas of law, for which a State Administrative Tribunal acts as a Court of first instance, are those specified in Sections 15 and 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. While a challenge to an administrative or legislative action, in areas of law for which the Tribunals are constituted, can only be made by invoking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in the first instance, is a person, who is not party to the proceedings before the Tribunal, not entitled to challenge the order of the Tribunal, invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? The answer thereto, in our opinion, must necessarily be in the negative. One has to bear in mind the distinction between a decision of the Tribunal and the ratio laid therein. While the decision of the Tribunal is binding inter parties, the ratio laid down would only constitute a binding precedent, when a similar question arises for consideration before a subsequent Bench of the Tribunal. A decision of the Tribunal can be subjected to challenge before the Division Bench of the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, either by a party to the decision or a person, who though not a party, is aggrieved thereby. If, however, an administrative action, as a consequence of the decision of the Tribunal, is to be challenged without the earlier decision of the Tribunal itself being called in question, then the person aggrieved has necessarily to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in the first instance before approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
24. The contention, that a person aggrieved by an earlier decision of the Tribunal to which he was not a party must invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in the first instance filing an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, is based on a conjoint reading of the judgments of the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar and K. Ajit Babu (supra). The submission, in substance, is that since the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar case (supra) held that the Tribunals shall continue to act as Courts of first instance and as in K Ajit Babu's case (supra), it has been laid down that an application, under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, can be filed against an earlier order of the Tribunal, a person who is aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, but was not a party to the earlier proceedings, must first invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal by way of an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act and only after inviting an order from the Tribunal would he be entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This submission must be rejected at the threshold, for it is well settled that judgments are not to be read as statutes. A judgment is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation made therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. Neither in L. Chandra Kumar nor in K. Ajit Babu's case (supra), did the question raised herein arise for consideration.
25. Even otherwise, the judgments of the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar and K. Ajit Babu (supra) do not support such a view. While the Apex Court in L Chandra Kumar's case (supra), held that the Tribunal shall act as the Court of first instance where administrative or legislative action is the subject-matter of challenge, the judgment does not lay down that even against a judicial order of the Tribunal a person aggrieved thereby, but was not a party to the proceedings, must necessarily file an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act and only thereafter approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Both K. Ajit Babu and Gopabandhu Biswal's (supra), on which reliance has been placed by Sri K.V. Satyanarayana, learned Counsel for the 5th respondent, do not also support the view canvassed by him. In K. Ajit Babu's case (supra), the subject-matter of challenge was the seniority list prepared consequent upon the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal in T.A. No. 263/86. The subsequent Bench of the Administrative Tribunal rejected the application filed under Section 19, under the misconception that it was the earlier order in T.A. No. 263/86 which was itself under challenge, and held that such an application was not maintainable. The Apex Court, while overruling the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal and holding that an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act was maintainable, took note of the fact that the Tribunal had thought that the appellants were seeking to set aside the earlier decision in T.A. No. 263/86 and held that this view taken by the Tribunal was not correct. In Gopa Bandhu Biswal, case (supra) the Supreme Court held that a third party was not entitled to file a review petition against the earlier judgment of the Tribunal which had attained finality on the special leave petition filed there against being dismissed by the Supreme Court, for that would amount to reopening the matter which had attained finality by virtue of the orders of the Supreme Court.
26. As held by the Apex Court, in K. Ajit Babu and Gopabandhu Biswal's (supra), an earlier decision of the Tribunal, which has attained finality, cannot be sought to be reopened by a third party to the proceedings by filing an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. In the present case, the order reverting the petitioner is consequent upon the earlier order reverting the 5th respondent being set aside by the Tribunal. While the petitioner herein could have challenged his order of reversion by filing an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals and to have contended that the law laid down in the earlier judgment of the Tribunal ought not to be followed, it was not open for him to seek to have the decision of the Tribunal, in O.A. No. 2278/05 dated 15.7.2005, wherein the order reverting the 5th respondent was quashed, set aside. Since the petitioner can have the order reverting him set aside only if the order reverting the fifth respondent is upheld, the remedy available to the petitioner, to have the earlier order of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 2278/05 dated 15.7.2005 set aside, is not by way of an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, but by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. While an administrative order or a statutory provision, made in compliance with the law laid down by the Tribunal, can be challenged by way of an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, the decision of the Tribunal and the relief granted therein cannot be overturned by invoking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act and can only be questioned before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. While the earlier decision of the Tribunal can be set at naught either by way of a review petition filed before the Tribunal under Section 22 of the Administrative Tribunals Act or by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the subsequent Bench of the Tribunal cannot overrule the decision and the relief granted to a party to the proceedings, by the earlier Bench of the Tribunal. In the present writ petition, the order of the Tribunal and the relief granted to the fifth respondent are itself under challenge. The law laid down in L. Chandra Kumar's case (supra) that the Tribunal would function as a Court of first instance is satisfied since the order under challenge is an order of the Tribunal. The writ petition as filed is, therefore, maintainable.
27. Petitions seeking leave of this Court, to challenge the order of the Tribunal, require careful scrutiny and only on a clear case being made out, necessitating the order passed/relief granted by the Tribunal being set aside, would this Court grant leave to challenge the judgment of the Tribunal. Under the guise of an application seeking leave, the jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunals, which are Courts of first instance, should not, normally, be permitted to be bypassed nor would litigants, even if they be persons aggrieved, be entitled to challenge administrative and legislative action under the guise of a challenge to the order of the Tribunal, in cases where the order of the Tribunal is not directly in issue.
28. In the case on hand what is under challenge is the order of the Tribunal itself since the order reverting the petitioner is a direct consequence of the order reverting the fifth respondent being set aside by the Tribunal. It is only if the order of the Tribunal is set aside by this Court, and the order reverting the 5th respondent is upheld, would the petitioner herein be entitled to have his order of reversion set aside.
29. Rule nisi. Call for records; Notice returnable in four weeks.