ORDER
P.S. Narayana, J.
1. Heard Mr. D. Raghava Reddy, learned counsel representing the revision petitioner-1st respondent - and Mr. Narender Reddy, learned counsel representing the State Bank of India.
2. Mr. Raghava Reddy, learned counsel would contend that the application was moved by the revision petitioner, the 1st respondent in M.V.O.P. No. 377 of 2002 on the file of learned Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-Principal District Judge, Kadapa, under Order-I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'Code') for impleading the State Bank of India, Chinnamandem Branch (hereinafter referred to as 'S.B.I.'), as party respondent, on the ground that the revision petitioner secured loans from the S.B.I. for purchasing the motor vehicle in question under 'hire purchase agreement' and hence the ownership of the vehicle continues with the S.B.I. by virtue of the said 'hire purchase agreement'. Learned counsel had drawn the attention of this Court to the definition of 'hire purchase agreement' under the provisions of The Hire-Purchase Act, 1972 (Act No. 26 of 1972) (for short 'the Act').
3. Per contra, Mr. Narender Reddy, learned counsel would maintain that merely because the loan was advanced for purchase of motor vehicle, which is under hypothecation, it cannot be said that the S.B.I. is the owner of the motor vehicle in question and hence the liability relating to the payment of compensation cannot be fastened as against the State Bank of India. The learned counsel would maintain that in view of the same S.B.I. cannot be said to be a necessary party to compensation claim. Learned counsel also had taken this Court through the reasons recorded at paragraph No. 3 of the impugned order and would submit that the view expressed by the learned judge is the correct view in the facts and circumstances of the case and the said order needs no disturbance at the hands of this revisional Court since there is no jurisdictional error committed by the learned Judge in making the said Order.
4. Heard both the learned counsel.
5. The revision petition is preferred as against the order dismissing an application filed to implead the S.B.I. as a party respondent in M.V.O.P. No. 377 of 2002 on the ground that the S.B.I. is the real owner of the motor vehicle in question and hence in a compensation claim filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the 'M.V. Act'), such party would be a necessary party. The same was opposed and the application was ultimately dismissed by the learned Judge observing at paragraph No. 3 as under:
'Merely because the owner of the offending vehicle had obtained loan from the bank and hypothecated the same with the bank, the bank cannot be equated with the owner of the vehicle within the meaning of Motor Vehicles Act for the purpose of paying compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased who died in the motor vehicle accident. It is not the Bank, but the petitioner herein that is in possession of the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement. When the petitioner in this interlocutory application himself is in possession of the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement, he is unable to show as to how the bank could be said to be owner of the vehicle. If under hire-purchase agreement between the Bank and the petitioner any civil liability is cast on the bank, such claim against the bank can be put forth in a civil suit, but not in this original petition before this Tribunal whose jurisdiction is limited.'
6. Section 166 of the M.V. Act reads as under:
'166. Application for compensation.-
(1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 165 may be made,-
(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or
(b) by the owner of the property; or
(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or
(d) by any agent duly authorized by the person, injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be:
Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application.
(2) Every application under Sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident...occurred or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed:
Provided that where no claim for compensation under Section 140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant.(3) xx xx xx (Omitted by ibid)
(4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under Sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act.
7. Section 169 of the M.V. Act reads as under:
169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals:
(1) In holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit.
(2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed;
And the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
(3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry.
8. In Kishan Reddy v. K. Ramulamma1 a learned Single Judge of this Court at paragraph No. 6 held as under:
'In exercise of the powers conferred under the Act the Governor of Andhra Pradesh has framed the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. Rule 473 of the said Rules provides that Order 5 Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30; Order 9; Order 13, Rules 3 to 10; Order 16, Rules 2 to 21; Order 17 and Order 28, Rules 1 to 3, shall, so far as may be, apply to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. It is true that neither Section 169 of the Act nor Rule 473 of the Rules specifically makes Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal initiated under the Motor Vehicles Act. But, on that count it cannot be said that the application made by the Claimants under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to implead the revision petitioner as Respondent No. 3 in the main O.P. is not maintainable in law. At this stage, it is relevant to note the significant phrase i.e., 'follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit' occurring in Sub-section (1) of Section 169 of the Act. In the absence of any restraining provision, the Claims Tribunal is at liberty to follow any procedure that it may choose to evolve for itself so long as it is consistent with the rules of natural justice and does not contravene the provisions of law. Section 169 expressly empowers the Claims Tribunal to formulate its own procedure. Since the Claims Tribunal has all the powers of a Civil Court, it may choose to follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. In holding an inquiry under Section 168 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal is empowered to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. The intention is that the enquiry should not take the shape of an elaborate and longdrawn proceedings of a regular civil suit, but should be concluded as much speedily as possible. The nature of the inquiry should be more or less like a judicial enquiry. There can be no gainsaying that vast power exists in the Claims Tribunal to determine its own procedure in dealing with claim applications. The Claims Tribunal has all the trappings of a Court and the proceedings before it closely resemble to the proceedings in a Civil Court. Moreover, it is quite clear that the legislature purposely did not make all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, which are of a summary nature, as the whole intention of the legislature is to ensure a speedy disposal of the claim applications filed by the injured persons or the legal representatives of the deceased. Under Section 110-C (now Section 169), the Claims Tribunal is empowered to evolve its own procedure and for the purpose of dealing with a claim application it can resort to any provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. There is no bar to adopt the procedure provided under Order-1 Rule 10 of the Code of the Civil Procedure.'
9. There cannot be any doubt or controversy relating to the applicability of Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code and the said provision says:
Suit in the name of wrong plaintiff.
10.(1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just.
Court may strike out or add parties-
(2) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party properly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
(3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent. Where defendant added, plaint to be amended.
(4) Where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant.
(5) Subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877) Section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons.
10. Similar view had been expressed relating to applicability of Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code to claims under the M.V. Act in P. Sujathamma v. G.M. Siva Prasad and Annamma v. Accident Claims Tribunal3. Strong reliance was placed on the definition of 'hire-purchase agreement' under Section 2 of the Act. The Hire Purchase Act, 1972 came into force on 1st June, 1973 vide GSR 222 (E) dated 30th April, 1973, but the notification was rescinded by GSR 288 (E) dated 31st May, 1973 and the Act was made effective from 01-09-1973 but this notification was also rescinded by GSR 402 (E) dated 30th August, 1973. The Act did not come into force till date. However, the definition was relied upon and this aspect deserves no serious consideration in view of the fact that the said Act did not come into force as on this date.
11. Apart from this aspect of the matter, even if the views expressed by the Apex Court and different High Courts relating to the 'Hire-Purchase Agreement', if carefully scrutinized, the stand taken by the revision petitioner cannot be accepted. The S.B.I. just advanced the loan for the purpose of purchase of the motor vehicle. The motor vehicle is, no doubt, under the hypothecation of the S.B.I. and hence S.B.I. is entitled to realise the amount. When that being the limited purpose, it cannot be said that merely because the S.B.I. had advanced the loan, it would be deemed to be the owner for the purposes of the M.V. Act referred to supra and to contend that such party is a necessary party to be brought on record in a compensation claim is an argument, which cannot be definitely accepted.
12. Hence this court is of the considered opinion that the S.B.I. is not a necessary party to the present compensation claim. Learned Judge recorded reasons and ultimately dismissed the application.
13. This Court does not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order. The revision petition is devoid of merit and accordingly the same shall stand dismissed. No costs.