Judgment:
ORDER
1. The alleged contempt, arises out of an order passed by this Court dated 21-2-1997 in WPMP.29034 of 1996 in WP.23516 of 1996. The respondent is the writ petitioner. The award passed by the Labour Court dated 21-6-1996 was under challenge in the writ petition. When the writ petition has come up for admission, the interim order was passed on 21-2-1997, while admitting the writ petition, granting interim stay of operation of award of the Labour Court-I, Hyderabad dated 21-6-1996 passed in ID. No.599 of 1993 subject to the condition that the respondent, herein, pays last drawn wages, in accordance with Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, to the respondent in the writ petition who is the petitioner in this case. Subsequently, on hearing the Counsel on both sides, the order was modified, videorder dated 244-1997, directing the respondent herein to pay the current wages in accordance with Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act and the wages was directed to be paid on 10 th of every month.
2. This contempt case has been filed by the respondent in the writ petition who is die petitioner herein alleging that the respondent herein had disobeyed the order of this Court. It is the case of the petitioner that, in the first instance, current wages have been paid to the petitioner in compliance with the order, but subsequently the respondent-writ petitioner discontinued to pay the current wages, and started paying only the last drawn wages. It is complained that the respondent herein thus disobeyed the order of this Court which directed payment of current wages.
3. The respondent-contemnor, appearing through an advocate, filed a counter affidavit. It was averred in counter affidavit as follows:
'Accordingly we paid him all arrears of wages in that month only and continued to pay him wages upto the month of November, 1997. Copies of the documents. viz., the Calculation Memo and the covering letter duly acknowledged by the petitioner is produced as Annexure 'A'. I submit that thereafter in Dena Bank v. Kiritkumar T. Patel, reported in 1998-I-LLJ page 1, the Supreme Court interpreted die phrase 'full wages last drawn' to mean wages payable at the time of termination of service and not as on the date of the award of the Labour Court. Accordingly the wages payable to him was revised and he was informed on 6th January, 1998 that so far he was paid a sum of Rs. 57,044.75 but the actual wages payable to him as per the Supreme Court's Judgment is only Rs.35,012.12 an therefore he was paid an excess amount of Rs.22,032.63 and we will revert to him as and when the excess payment is adjusted. Copy of the letter dated 06-01-1998 is produced as Annexure 'B'. I am advised to submit that the above judgment of the Supreme Court is the Lawdeclared by it under Article 141 of the Constitution of India overruling the judgment of this Hon'ble Court interpreting Section 17E of the ID Act. I had obtained legal advise on the same. I submit that even after receipt of our letter dated 6th January,' 1998 and suppressing the contents of the said letter, the petitioner got issued a legal notice dated 5-2-1998 and I gave reply dated 9th February, 1998 to the advocate enclosing my letter dated 6th January, 1998. Copies of the notice dated 5-2-1988 and our reply dated 9-2-1998 are produced as Annexure 'C' and 'D' respectively.
I deny the allegation in para-3 that I have taken law into my own hands and deliberately flouted the orders of this Hon'ble Court. I submit that I have got utmost respect for this Hon'ble Court and I have no intention whatsoever to flout the orders of this Hon'ble Court. It is all a question of interpretation of the phrase 'full wages last drawn'. This Hon'ble Court did not specify any amount to be paid by us in the stay order. As per the stay order we have to pay him wages in accordance with Section 17-E of the ID Act.
As per the latest judgment of the Supreme Court holding that 'full wages last drawn' means wages payable at the time of termination of service, the wages to the petitioner has been worked out and he was informed accordingly.'
The Counsel for the respondent submits that in view of the ruling in Dena Bank v. Kiritkumar T. Patel, 1998 (1) LLJ 1 respondent is not liable to pay the current wages as directed by this Court since the law has been declared by the Supreme Court in the above decision interpreting full wages last drawn as meaning, wages drawn on the date of the termination and not current wages as directed by this Court. Hence, he contends that the respondent is not liable to comply with the order of this Court and that the law declared by the Supreme Court was bindingon him and not the order of this Court. In my considered view, the stand taken by the contemnor is wholly indefensible. The parties are bound by the order of this Court so long as the order remains operative, until it was modified, clarified or set aside. Admittedly, the order of this Court enjoined upon the respondent to pay current wages i.e., wages drawn on the date of the award. Admittedly, he paid up to November, 1997. Thereafter, he discontinued on the ground that the Supreme Court in Dena Bank's case (supra) ruled otherwise. It is true that under Article 141 of the Constitution of India the decision of the Supreme Court is the law of the land, but unless the order passed by this Court is set aside or modified by the Supreme Court or by any application subsequently made by the respondent to this Court challenging the order in view of the Supreme Court, the order holds good even after the judgment of the Supreme Court on the same question. This is the settled proposition of law. The parties cannot escape the rigour of an order passed against them on the ground that the order was bad in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court. This stand, contemnor could not have taken. If the respondent-contemnor had entertained any doubt whether the order passed by this Court could still to be complied with inspite of the order of the Supreme Court, the only known mode open to him was to file an application before this Court seeking for clarification. Without resorting to any such course, the respondent has taken brazenly defiant stand. The respondent is not an illiterate person not to have known the consequences of his defiance. He took the law into his hands. If this is permitted, rule of law and administration of justice would be in jeopardy. No body should be permitted to question the authority of the Court and disobey the orders in the guise of his own interpretation of law. Knowing fully well the consequences of his act, he has taken the defiant stand. Even, after hearing the arguments, when this Court expressed its view, the learned Counsel would not hear. The learned Counsel vehemently reiterated that in view of the Judgment of the Supreme Court, the order of this Court standsoverruled and that he was not liable to obey the order.
4. In the circumstances, I have to hold that the respondent has committed contempt of this Court. He is therefore liable for punishment as per law. In the circumstances, the Contemnor is liable for punishment under Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Coming to the question of punishment, there appears to be no remorse or apology expressed, either in the counter affidavit or in the submissions, except stating that he has respect to the Court.
5. The respondent is therefore punished with a simple imprisonment for a period of three (3) months and with a fine of Rs. 2,000-00 (Rupees two thousand only) to be paid within one month from today and in default of payment of fine, the respondent is further liable for simple imprisonment for 15 days.
6. The contemnor shall continue to pay the current wages in accordance with the order of this Court, with effect from December, 1997.
7. Contempt case is accordingly allowed.