Judgment:
ORDER
Motilal B. Naik, J.
1. An interesting question of law is raised in all these C.R.Ps and therefore, all these C.R.Ps. are disposed of by this common order. The off-shoot of controversy raised in all these revisions are the orders passed by the District Munsif, Sullurpet, Nellore District on 7-11-1994 on the applications filed under Order I Rule 10 of CPC by these revision petitioners.
2. In order to appreciate the genesis of controversy, it would be appropriate to trace few facts which are as under:
All these petitioners have instituted suits for specific performance on the basis of sale agreements dated 22-11-1989, against the third respondent in all these revisions. For convenience sake, the parties are addressed as arrayed in the suits.
3. Plaintiffs in various suits are the petitioners herein. They claim that sale 40 agreements were entered into for the sale of certain extents of lands with the third respondent on 22-11-1989 which are ranging from one acre to less than one acre. The sale consideration seems to be less then Rs. 1,000/- in all these transactions. The lands which were proposed for sale by the third respondent in all the revisions are stated to be assigned lands which were surrendered by various declarants in ceiling proceedings. When the plaintiffs demanded registration, the third defendant failed to execute the sale deed in their favour pursuant to sale agreement dated 22-11-1989. Therefore, all these revision petitioners instituted the suits on the file of the lower court seeking a decree for specific performance basing on the sale agreement dated 22-11-1989. These suits are filed by the vendors (sic. vendees) to the sale agreement dated 22-11-1989 through their general power of attorney.
4. When the suits for specific performance were pending, the District Collector, Nellore and the Mandal Revenue Officer, Tada of Nellore District, filed implead petitions under Order I Rule 10 of CPC seeking to implead themselves as defendant Nos. 2 and 3 respectively in the suits. In support of the petitions filed under Order I Rule 10 of CPC, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Tada has filed an affidavit before the lower Court contending that the lands in question, subject matter of suit agreement, are surplus lands distributed by the Government to weaker sections of Veenadu village, Tada Mandal in Sy. No. 516-1 to an extent of around Acs. 32.47 cents. The MRO further stated in the affidavit that the beneficiaries to whom the surplus lands were assigned have not brought these lands under cultivation as required under the conditions of assignment, within a reasonable period and therefore, the MRO seems to have inspected the lands personally and found the fact for himself and issued necessary notice to the beneficiaries who are defendants in the suit seeking their explanation. Though notices have been received by the beneficiaries-defendants, explanation was not forthcoming, as a result of which the MRO cancelled the assignment granted in their favour and resumed the lands after following necessary procedure contemplated under law. The Mandal Revenue Officer further stated in the affidavit that as a result of cancellation of pattas issued in favour of the defendants, the Government has resumed the lands and the property vests in the Government. The defendants have no right to alienate the suit schedule properties to anybody when they have lost rights over the same. After coming to know that the plaintiffs and defendants have created false agreements of sale basing on which the plaintiffs instituted the suits for specific performance, the Mandal Revenue Officer felt that the design by the parties to the agreement of sale is only to frustrate the benefits granted to the defendants and therefore, filed I.As. in all the suits under Order I Rule 10 of CPC seeking to implead the District Collector as defendant No. 2 and the Mandal Revenue Officer as defendant No. 3 along with the original assignees who are defendants in the suits.
5. All these I.As. filed by the District Collector, Nellore and the Mandal Revenue Officer, Tada were resisted by the plaintiffs by contending that the District Collector and MRO are not necessary parties for the purpose of deciding the issues in a suit filed for specific performance. It was contended by the plaintiffs before the lower Court that when a suit for specific performance is filed, the relief is sought against the vendee (sic. vendor) and not against any other party. Even if the suit is decreed irrespective of the title over the suit property, the plaintiffs are prepared to take a decree for specific performance and as such the presence of the District Collector and MRO is not necessary.
6. The plea of the plaintiffs was opposed by the implead-petitioners/ District Collector and MRO, inter-alia, contending that when the lands in question are Government lands, Government shall be the necessary party to the suits. It was stated before the lower Court that the beneficiaries who were given lands for a particular purpose have fallen prey in the hands of the plaintiffs by entering into an agreement of sale and if the sale agreements are allowed to be given effect to, it would frustrate the benefits given to the beneficiaries. It is further contended that since the lands have been resumed by the Government, Government is a necessary party for proper adjudication and settlement of dispute comprehensively. 10
7. The lower Court on a consideration of various factors felt that in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation and in order to enquire into the totality of the rights of the proper parties, though the suits are one for specific performance against the original defendants, (felt that) impleading the District Collector and the Mandal Revenue Officer may not prejudice the interests of the plaintiffs and allowed the I.As. filed under Order I Rule 10 of CPC on 7-11-1994 by separate orders, which are the subject matter of these revisions.
8. Sri M.V. Ramana Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners-plaintiffs primarily contended that when a suit is filed for specific performance against a defendant, no possession is involved in the suit and as such the respondents 1 and 2 in these revisions are not necessary parties. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the requirement of Order I Rule 10 of the Code is that if in the opinion of the Court, the presence of a party is necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, such a party can be permitted to be added to the suit either as a plaintiff or defendant as the case may be. The present suits are filed for specific performance of agreements of sale and a decree is sought against the defendants i.e., the third respondent herein directing him to execute a registered sale deed in the name of the parties as desired by the plaintiff in accordance with the agreements of sale in respect of the plaint schedule property at the expense of the plaintiffs or alternatively the Court may execute and register the sale deeds. When the relief is against the third respondents who are to act upon and register the sale deeds in terms of the agreements of sale dated 22-11-1989, it is contended by Sri M.V. Ramana Reddy that the lower Court ought not to have permitted the respondents 1 and 2 to implead themselves as parties in the suit proceedings by allowing their applications filed under Order I Rule 10 of CPC. In support of his contentions, Sri Ramana Reddy placed reliance on the decisions reported in Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra @ Gadasa Guru; : (1995)3SCC147 . Rasiklal Shankerlal Soni v. Natverlal Shankerlal Upadhyaya, : AIR1975Guj178a . Panne Khushali v. Jeewanlal Mathoo Khatik; : AIR1976MP148 . Dwarka Prasad Singh v. Harikant Prasad Singh, : [1973]2SCR1064 . and New Redbank Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Kumkum Mittal and Ors., : (1994)1SCC402 .
9. It is also contended by Sri Ramana Reddy that the defendants (assignees) are no doubt assignees but however, all these assignees have paid land value. When once the land value is collected, the assignees become the owners and the Government cannot have any say in the matter and the Government ceases to be the owner of these lands. In support of his contention, Sri Ramana Reddy has also placed before me a decision of this Court rendered in Dharma Reddy v. Sub-Collector, Bodhan., 1988 (2) ALT 302. He also further contended that even if the assignee violates the terms and conditions of the patta, it is not open to the Government to resume the lands as provided under Section 4 of Act 9 of 1977. It becomes obligatory to make an enquiry against the violation of patta conditions and if it is found that the assignee has violated the patta conditions and sold the lands to third parties, it is open to the Government to cancel such a transaction and put the assignee or his legal heirs in possession of the assigned lands as far as possible. However, it is stated that if the assignee or his legal heir again violates the conditions, it would then be open to the Government to cancel the patta and resume the lands. In support of his contention, Sri Ramana Reddy also placed reliance on a decision of the DivisionBbench of this Court in Uppu Pandaiah v. The Manial Revenue Officer, 1992 (2) An. W.R. 791. He further contended that the orders of the lower Court, impugned in these CRPs have to be set aside, as the lower Court has not properly appreciated the context under which the provisions of Order I Rule 10 of CPC have been contemplated.
10. The learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of respondents 1 and 2, has on the contrary submitted that the lands in question, which are the subject matter of the suit transaction are assigned lands ; the assignees who are the defendants in the suits have violated the terms and conditions of patta and, therefore, the Government have resumed the lands after giving necessary notice. If they have any grievance against such resumption, they can as well question the same before the Revenue Divisional Officer. When once the Government resumes such lands, the said lands vest in the Government. As these lands are Government lands, Government is a necessary party to protect its interest. The learned Government Pleader stressed the need to examine the facts as to how the entire transaction relating to the sale of assigned lands to the petitioners and the filing of the suits for specific performance has culminated, and contended that if the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners are to be accepted, the entire process of assignment to the poor and landless would get frustrated, being not in tune with the policy of the Government when assignment is made only in favour of landless poor with the sole intention to uplift them.
11. The learned Government Pleader, therefore, contended that though the suits are filed for specific performance of agreements of sale, for proper adjudication of the issue, respondents 1 and 2 are necessary parties in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation as held by this Court in Bala Narasimha v. Gangaputra Co-operative Housing Society., : AIR1984AP166 . Placing strong reliance on the above decision, he submits that the respondents 1 and 2 i.e., the District Collector, Nellore, and MRO, Tada by necessary implication be made as parties to the suits to protect the interests of the Government, which is the real owner of the property.
12. In view of the varied submissions made by Sri M.V. Ramana Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Government Pleader for Arbitration, appearing for respondents 1 and 2, what is to be seen is whether the order passed by the lower Court allowing the applications filed under Order I Rule 10 of the Code to implead the respondents 1 and 2 as necessary parties, is just and proper or whether the said order could be interfered with under Section 115 of CPC by this Court.
13. The third respondent in all these CRPs is the sole defendant in all the suits filed by the petitioners for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 22-11-1989 for certain extents of lands. There is no dispute as to the fact that these lands are the surplus lands surrendered by declarants under Land Ceiling Proceedings, which were vested in the Government after due process.
14. When the surrendered surplus lands are vested in the Government, the Government is competent to distribute the same under Section 14 of the A.P.L.R Act to various sections of the society either for using from as house sites or for agricultural purposes or for any other purpose, as the case may be on their fulfilling certain requirements. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the said Act provides for payment of the value of the land as prescribed and on such payment, the patta shall be granted in respect of the lands. Sub-section (5) of Section 14 prohibits any alienation in respect of the land in violation of the conditions specified in sub-section (4). Any violation, the Government is entitled to resume. Admittedly, the subject matter of suit lands are assigned lands. Though D-form pattas are granted to these assignees, they are to put in use of these lands within certain period indicated in the conditions to grant 'D-Form' patta.
15. It may be true that the assignees who are defendants in the suits might have paid prescribed value to the concerned authorities and obtained pattas. But as provided under sub-section (5) of Section 14 of the A.P.L.R. Act, the lands which are assigned, any alienation effected or other acts done in respect of any land in violation of the conditions specified in Ssub-section (4), such action shall be void and the Revenue Divisional Officer shall resume the lands after giving an opportunity. Therefore, such lands which are surrendered under ceiling proceedings and are assigned to poor people, are protected from alienation. The veracity of cancellation of the pattas issued in favour of these assignees need not be examined in these CRPs as it is outside the purview of consideration in the CRPs. However, a submission is made that once the value of the land is paid by the assignees, the Government loses its right over such lands as held by this Court in Dharma Reddy's case (6 supra). I do not think, the facts in that case could be made applicable to the facts in issue.
In that case, the lands were brought under construction of a project and the Government had issued G.O.Ms.No. 1294, dated 6-6-1955 in favour of such persons whose lands were affected by such construction. Such persons were assigned few acres of alternative lands for which the assignees, under such circumstances, have also paid necessary value as determined by the Government. In that context, a learned single Judge of this Court held that the assignees are masters over the lands and they can alienate or part with the lands assigned to them and the Government cannot have any right over their lands. The Court in that case was of the view that alternative lands were assigned to them in lieu of their lands being acquired for project making activity of the State and therefore, the assignment in such circumstances cannot be considered to be an assignment made in favour of the weaker sections of the society. When there is violation of the conditions of assignment, it would be appropriate for the Government to examine such violations within a reasonable period and set at naught the mischief brought through the alienations. It is obligatory on the part of the welfare State that surplus lands are to be assigned to weaker sections of the society either for the purpose of construction of houses or agricultural purposes or for any other ancillary activity, to support their livelihood.
16. It is no doubt true that a Division Bench of this Court in Uppn Pandaiah's case ( 7 supra) held that when there is alienation or sale in violation of assignment conditions, it would be open to the competent authorities to make an enquiry and cancel such transactions. The Division Bench also held that after the transaction being declared void, the assignees or his successors shall be re-assigned. The requirement of Section 4 of the Act 9 of 1977 is to give one more opportunity to the beneficiary to enjoy the assigned lands. But, however, if the beneficiary again defaults and alienates such property, it is open to the authority, contemplated under the Act, to cancel the assignment after giving due opportunity and resume such lands to the Government. In these CRPs, this Court is primarily concerned with the orders passed by the lower Court on the implead petitions filed under Order I Rule 10 of CPC. This Court need not go into merits of such resumption of lands, after cancellation, by the MRO, Tada. However, if the defendant/third respondents are aggrieved, it would be open to them to question the said order of cancellation effected by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Tada in a proper Forum.
17. As has been indicated, the lands in question are the assigned lands and subsequent developments indicate that the pattas granted have also been cancelled. The Government is stated to have resumed the lands. The necessary implication, therefore, is that the lands now vest with the Government. Whether such vesting of lands in the Government, after cancellation is proper or not, is not a question to be decided herein. When it is made known to the Court that the lands vest in the Government, even in a suit for specific performance, though it is directed against the sole defendant alone, I am of the view that the broader implication is, to avoid multiplicity of litigation in case the petitioners obtain a decree against the third respondent and seek execution of such decree for possession when the Government is claiming to be in possession of such lands. Therefore, I am inclined to hold that in the absence of respondents 1 and 2, there cannot be any proper adjudication on all the questions involved.
18. The decisions cited in support of the claims of the Revision Petitioners, opposing the implead-petitions, in my view, in the set of peculiar circumstances, may not lend assistance to them.
19. It is in this context, I am inclined to hold that, in order to enable the Court to adjudicate effectively and completely and settle the questions involved, the presence of respondents 1 and 1, who represent the interests of the Government, shall be necessary parties to the suits. I am fortified in my view by a decision of this Court in Bala Narasimha's case ( 8 supra).
20. In the view I have taken, I do not find any justifying reasons to interfere with the orders impugned in these CRPs as the orders do not suffer from any material irregularity warranting interference by this Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The CRPs are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.