Skip to content


P.S. Saleema Bee Vs. Secretary, State Transport Authority, A.P., Hyderabad and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation

Subject

Motor Vehicles

Court

Andhra Pradesh High Court

Decided On

Case Number

WP No. 10395 of 2001

Judge

Reported in

2002(3)ALD304

Acts

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Sections 87

Appellant

P.S. Saleema Bee

Respondent

Secretary, State Transport Authority, A.P., Hyderabad and ors.

Appellant Advocate

E. Maruthi Raja, Adv.

Respondent Advocate

Government Pleader

Excerpt:


.....failed to obtain a temporary permit under section 87 of the act and obtain directions from this court to the regional transport authority or the state transport authority, as the case may be, to grant temporary permits. provided that a regional transport authority or, as the case may be, state transport authority may, in the case of goods carriages, under the circumstances of an exceptional nature, and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant a permit for a period exceeding four months, but not exceeding one year. 6. in this context it is well to remember the admonition administered by the supreme court in brij mohan parihar v. it the issue of such permits is postponed for any reason and only temporary permits are issued then the persons belonging to scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and the weaker sections would not be able to enjoy the benefit of the reservation. the provisions of the act and in particular sections 42 and 59 clearly debar all holders of permits including the corporation from indulging in such unauthorised trafficking in permits. the agreement entered into by the petitioner with the corporation is clearly contrary to the act and cannot, therefore, be..........failed to obtain a temporary permit under section 87 of the act and obtain directions from this court to the regional transport authority or the state transport authority, as the case may be, to grant temporary permits. if any applicant's request for temporary permit had been granted by the competent authority, the same would have expired after four months. but, by reason of interim orders passed by this court in large number of cases, a temporary permit is being issued virtually beyond the period prohibited by the statute itself. one should not lose sight of the language used in section 87(1) of the act which reads as under:'a regional transport authority and the state transport authority may, without following the procedure laid down in section 80, grant permits, to be effective for a limited period which shall, not in any case exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily.- (a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gathers; or (b) for the purpose of seasonal business; or (c) to meet a particular temporary need; or (d) pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit, and.....

Judgment:


ORDER

V.V.S. Rao, J.

1. The petitioner made an application on 21-11-2000 before the 1st respondent seeking temporary permit in respect of the bus bearing No. TN. 28/Z 2345 on the inter-State route Anantapur to Chintamani via Dharmavaram. The 1st respondent by proceedings R. No. 18184/B1/98 dated 2-1-2001 rejected the application inter alia recording that the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, the 2nd respondent herein, obtained pucca permit valid upto 31-4-2002 in respect of bus bearing No. AP.9Z 7456 with one round trip and that the route overlaps the notified routes. The 1st respondent also placed reliance on Section 104 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'the Act').

2. Aggrieved by the order of rejection dated 2-1-2001, the petitioner filed an appeal before the 3rd respondent-Tribunal on 6-2-2001. Along with the appeal he also filed an interlocutory application seeking direction to the 1st respondent to permit the petitioner to operate the petitioner's vehicle on the inter-State route. As no orders are passed, the present writ petition is filed on 21-5-2001 seeking direction to the 1st respondent permit the petitioner to operate the stage carriage bus bearing No. TN.28/Z 2345 on the said inter-State route by issuing temporary permit to his vehicle. Be it noted, in effect, the petitioner sought a direction from this Court to issue temporary permit.

3. This Court, while admitting the writ petition on 23-5-2001, by an order passed in WPMP No. 12974 of 2001 on the same day, directed the 1st respondent to permit the petitioner to operate stage carriage bus on the inter-State bus route in question. Be it noted, under the provisions of Section 87 of the Act, a temporary permit could be effective for a limited period and in no case shall exceed beyond four months. However, it is unfortunate that the 1st respondent filed an application, being WVMP No. 303 of 2002, after expiry of nine months, seeking vacation of the interim orders. In the meanwhile, by reason of the interim order, the petitioner was given successive temporary permits twice. It is also unfortunate that even the 2nd respondent, who opposed the grant of temporary permit before the 1st respondent, did not choose to bring to the notice of this Court that the temporary permit granted to the petitioner pursuant to the interim order of this Court dated 23-5-2001 itself expired in September, 2001.

4. In view of the submission made by Sri Narsimha Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal be directed to dispose of the appeal filed by the petitioner, in the ordinary course, it would not have been necessary for this Court to further dilate on the subject. However, it has now become rampant in this Court that the operators of the buses, who apply for temporary permits on the notified routes where there is no overlapping as well as non-notified routes and on inter-State bus routes, approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, having failed to obtain a temporary permit under Section 87 of the Act and obtain directions from this Court to the Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority, as the case may be, to grant temporary permits. If any applicant's request for temporary permit had been granted by the competent authority, the same would have expired after four months. But, by reason of interim orders passed by this Court in large number of cases, a temporary permit is being issued virtually beyond the period prohibited by the Statute itself. One should not lose sight of the language used in Section 87(1) of the Act which reads as under:

'A Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Authority may, without following the procedure laid down in Section 80, grant permits, to be effective for a limited period which shall, not in any case exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily.-

(a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gathers; or

(b) for the purpose of seasonal business; or

(c) to meet a particular temporary need; or

(d) pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit, and may attach to any such permit such condition as it may think fit:

Provided that a Regional Transport Authority or, as the case may be, State Transport Authority may, in the case of goods carriages, under the circumstances of an exceptional nature, and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant a permit for a period exceeding four months, but not exceeding one year.'

5. A plain reading of the above provision shows that judicial process of the Court granting directions to issue temporary permits ignoring the law is not only contrary to the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution, but, also results in miscarriage of justice. There is no gain saying that Article 226 is intended to prevent injustice and not to become a tool of injustice subverting public interests.

6. In this context it is well to remember the admonition administered by the Supreme Court in Brij Mohan Parihar v. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Anr., : [1987]1SCR369 . The Supreme Court also observed that a writ of mandamus shall not be issued contrary to law or cannot be issued directing the authorities to ignore law. In this connection, reference may also be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in A. Viswanathan v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Pondicherry and Anr., : [1987]2SCR179 , wherein their Lordships observed:

'It is regrettable that for some reason or other the State Transport Authority of Pondicherry has not taken steps to issue regular permits on about 18 routes in respect of which it has entered into inter-State agreements with the State of Tamil Nadu even though the need for issuing those permits is beyond dispute. But, on the other hand for nearly six years, it is stated, that the State Transport Authority of Pondicherry is issuing temporary permits under Section 62 of the Act repeatedly in respect of the routes. The disadvantages suffered by the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the economically weaker sections of the community by the procedure adopted by the State Transport Authority are obvious. If stage carriage permits are to be issued then in compliance with Sub-section (1-A) of Section 47 of the Act certain percentage of the said permits would have to be reserved for the persons belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and if the Government so desires to the economically weaker sections of the community. It the issue of such permits is postponed for any reason and only temporary permits are issued then the persons belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the weaker sections would not be able to enjoy the benefit of the reservation. If is unfortunate that even though Parliament has enacted the amendments nearly nine years ago the benefit of those provisions has not been availed of by those for whose benefit they were enacted.'

7. In Brij Mohan's case (supra) their Lordships held as follows:

'The provisions of the Act and in particular Sections 42 and 59 clearly debar all holders of permits including the Corporation from indulging in such unauthorised trafficking in permits. The agreement entered into by the petitioner with the Corporation is clearly contrary to the Act and cannot, therefore, be enforced. In the circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Corporation to allow him to operate his motor vehicle as a stage carriage under the permit obtained by the Corporation as its nominee.'

8. The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramachandra Ambedkar, : (1994)IILLJ173SC .

9. In this case, by reason of the interim order passed by this Court on 23-5-2001, admittedly, the petitioner was given a temporary stage carriage permit under Section 87(1) of the Act. The same, in usual course, could have expired on 2-9-2001. Subsequent to that, presuming that the petitioner could have filed an application, the authority might or might not have granted the temporary permit. By reason of the orders passed by this Court, the temporary permit got extended atleast on four occasions. In such matters, therefore, all the authorities, the Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Authority, should decline to grant any temporary permit for a second succeeding term of four months, assuming that such temporary permit had been given pursuant to the Court order, and approach the Court which passed the interim directions forthwith. These directions are being given to subserve the purpose for which Section 87 of the Act has been enacted.

10. Insofar as this case is concerned, the petitioner filed an appeal before the 3rd respondent on 6-2-2001 and waited upto 21-5-2001 for the 3rd respondent to pass appropriate orders on the interlocutory application. As no orders are passed, he approached this Court. This also gives a reason for this Court to observe that it would be appropriate for the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to pass immediate orders on interlocutory applications either accepting or rejecting the interlocutory prayer or may dispose of the main appeal itself. Keeping such applications pending for a long time without any reason would result in such statutory mishap as has happened in this case Atleast now it would be appropriate for the 3rd respondent to forthwith take up the appeal filed by the petitioner and dispose of the same in accordance with law. The 3rd respondent is requested to do so within a period of two weeks from today. The petitioner and the respondents 1 and 2 would appear before the 3rd respondent on 26-3-2002 with a copy of this order.

11. The writ petition is disposed of as above. No order as to costs.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organize Client Files //