ORDER
V.V.S. Rao, J.
1. The A.P. Board of Intermediate Education represented by its Secretary is the appellant in these appeals. The appeals are filed against a common order of the learned single Judge in WP Nos.14245 and 14443 of 1999. By the impugned order, the learned single Judge allowed the writ petitions and directed the appellant to conduct 'instant examinations' to the students of Intermediate vocational course and continue to conduct the same till the instant examinations are dispensed with. The learned single Judge further directed the appellant herein to conduct the examination to the students of Intermediate vocational course appearing for one subject only on the first day of commencement of supplementary examinations and declare the result of those students by the end of October, 1999. Necessary facts may be noticed as under by referring to the parties as they are arrayed in the writ petitions.
2. The petitioners studied Intermediate vocational course during the academic year 1997-99 in Computer Science and Engineering. They appeared for the final year examination in April, 1999. All of them failed in one subject. When they tried (o appear for the instant examination conducted by the Board of Intermediate Education (hereafter called the Board), the first respondent herein, the Board, refused to receive the examination fee on the ground that the said examination is being held only for students in the academic stream but not for vocational stream.
3. In the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent, it is stated that a decisionwas taken to conduct instant examination for Intermediate course for the year 1989, which was duly approved by the Board. The main object of instant examination is to dispense with the supplementary examination tor various administrative reasons. However, supplementary examinations are being conducted within a short period of three months and the first respondent also resolved not to conduct the instant examination from the academic year 1998 and the decision of the Government is pending. The facility of instant examination is available for Intermediate general students who fail in one paper in theory to save one academic year and pursue higher education without interruption. The object of vocational education is to prepare the students for self-employment after completing the intermediate course with more than 60% of practical training. There are 29 vocational courses and the number is likely to go up year after year with introduction of new courses. In view of this, the Intermediate vocational course examinations are conducted in 521 papers and, therefore, it is practically impossible to conduct instant examinations in vocational courses. As the Intermediate general courses and vocational courses are two different and distinct streams, they cannot be treated as one. In addition to this being less in number the students who might be eligible for instant examination will also be meager and, therefore, it is not feasible to conduct instant examination for vocational courses having regard to the important factors like time, labour and money in getting the question papers prepared, printed and conduct of the examinations. Having regard to the large number of subjects/papers amounting to 521, conducting of instant examination to Intermediate vocational course students was found to be not feasible.
4. Before the learned single Judge, the petitioners raised two contentions; that exclusion of Intermediate vocational coursestudents from instant examination is discriminatory, and that all the Universities treated the vocational courses as equivalent to general Intermediate by making Intermediate vocational course students eligible for B.Sc., B.Com, and B.E., degree courses as well as for B.Tech, course and, therefore, denying the opportunity of instant examination to vocational course students on the part of the respondents is arbitrary. The learned single Judge referred to the relevant Rules and Regulations for the conduct of instant examination and rejected the contention of the Board holding that the Board has not made any distinction between courses of academic stream and vocational stream while passing the resolution in its 38th Meeting held on 11-10-1994 and, therefore, there is no justification for denying the facility of instant examination to the students of vocational stream. The learned single Judge also held that as per the revised curriculum the vocational course was treated as equivalent to general Intermediate course and, therefore, in the absence of any material to show that policy makers applied their mind before taking a decision, the reason underlying the decision cannot be justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution.
5. Sri T.V.P. Prabhakar, the learned Standing Counsel for the Board submits that the Intermediate general course and vocational course are two distinct streams as the pattern, object and system of conduct of examination in two different types of courses cannot be compared and, therefore, being a valid classification the fundamental right of the petitioners is not in any way affected. It is his further submission that another learned single Judge of this Court in WPNo.12915 of 1997 considered a similar question and dismissed the writ petition holding that this Court is not competent to direct the Board to conduct instant examination to the students of vocational stream and that giving a direction to conductinstant examination in the middle of academic year is not justified. The learned Counsel also submits that in academic matters requiring expertise, jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not attracted. So to say, he submits that the decisions of the academic bodies are not justiciable under Article 226 of the Constitution.
6. Sri P. V. Subramanya Sarma, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the Intermediate vocational course in Computer Science and Engineering is like any other branch in MPC, or Bi.PC and for subjects like English, Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, all the students receive the lessons sitting in the same class and, therefore, there cannot be any distinction between the two students. When there is no distinction, treating the two categories of students alike for the purpose of instant examination, is discriminatory. The learned Counsel also referred to various provisions of A.P. Board of Intermediate Education Act, 1971 and would submit that there is no resolution of the Board prohibiting the students who studied in vocational courses for appearing in the instant examination and, that the action of the respondents in not permitting the petitioners for instant examination is discriminatory and arbitrary.
7. Having regard to the pleadings in the writ petition and rival contentions made before us, the following points arise for consideration:
1. Whether the issue of permitting the Intermediate students of vocational course for instant examination is justiciable before the Court of judicial review?
2. Whether the classification of Intermediate general course and Intermediate vocational course is valid and does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution?
3. To what relief?
Inre point No. 1:
For the purpose of establishment of a Board to regulate and supervise the system of Intermediate Education in the State of Andhra Pradesh, to specify the courses of study, A.P. Act 2 of 1971 called A.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1971 (the Act, for brevity) was enacted. The Board is established under Section 3 of the Act. Section 9 deals with powers of the Board and Section 12 empowers the Board to make Regulations with the approval of the Government. Section 17 of the Act provides for making of Rules by the Government to carry out the purpose of the Act. Section 9 of the Act inter alia provides for powers of the Board to make Regulations providing for course of study, medium of instruction in such branches of Intermediate Education, to formulate the schemes for the conduct of Intermediate examination, to admit students to such examination (Section 9(1)(iv)) and to conduct Intermediate examination and to take all steps ancillary thereto (Section 9(l)(vi)), Therefore, as per the provisions of Section 9(1)(iv) and 9(1)(vi) it is only within the province of the Board to formulate schemes for conduct of examination, to admit candidates to such examination and to take all steps ancillary thereto. Section 12 empowers the Board to make Regulations to carry out the purpose of the Act including the Regulations providing for subjects and conduct of Intermediate examination (Section 12(2)(h)).
8. It is not denied that the Board has made Regulations with the approval of the Government dealing with conduct of instant examinations, called Rules and Regulations for conduct of instant examinations in exercise of powers under Section 12 of the Act. The relevant regulations read as under:
'Board of Intermediate Education: Andhra Pradesh: Hyderabad.
Rules and Regulations For The Conduct Of Instant Examination.
1. The instant examination will be held only in 'Theory' papers. No examination will be held in 'Practical Papers'.
1.1. Candidates Eligible:
(i) The instant examination will be conducted only for the candidates of 'Academic stream'. This does not apply to the candidates of vocational stream.
(ii) Candidates of 2nd year (Regular and Private) who appeared at the immediate preceding Annual Examination and passed in all practical and theory papers except in one theory paper either 1st year or 2nd year are alone eligible for instant examination'.
9. A plain reading of the Regulations show that the instant examination is to be held only in theory papers and no instant examination is permissible in practical papers. Regulation 2 is categorical when it says that instant examination will not be conducted for vocational stream and only students of Intermediate general stream alone are entitled to appear in the instant examination. Further, Regulation 2(ii) enables only those students of II year Intermediate for appearing in the instant examinations if they fail in only one theory paper. Before the learned single Judge as well before us, it is the contention of the Board that there are large number of subjects in vocational Intermediate Education and, therefore, it is not feasible or possible to conduct instant examination for Intermediate vocational stream. That the object of the rule is rational cannot be doubted. Further, having regard to the nature and course of study, a body of expertsin the field of education has made the regulations and it is not for this Court to adopt a process of interpretation to bring into the fold of the Regulation, the candidates belonging to Intermediate vocational stream.
10. The Board is constituted in accordance with Section 3 of the Act and sub-section (2) of Section 3 deals with the Constitution of the Board. A reading of the same shows that all persons from the field of education and academics are in the Board and, therefore, insofar as the Intermediate Education is concerned, the Board consists of experts and academicians. In the light of this, as long as the Regulations are validly made in accordance with Section 12 of the Act, laying down criterion for instant examination cannot be held arbitrary. We have gone through the minutes of the meeting of the Board, especially the agenda item No.14 and we are of the considered opinion that the Regulations made by the Board are in accordance with the agenda as well as the minutes of the meeting. The finding ofthe learned single Judge that the 38th Meeting of the Board did not make distinction between the academic stream and vocational stream and it is only in the regulations such a distinction is made is not sustainable.
11. The important aspect is whether the decision of the Board or the Regulation enabling only the Intermediate students of academic stream to avail the benefit of instant examination in one theory paper is justiciable.
12. In the field of administrative law, there are two distinct schools of thought. According to one school, all decisions of all authorities are subject to judicial review before a Court exercising public law jurisdiction. The other school of thought subscribes to the view that all decisions are not reviewabie when there are certain decisions, which are simply beyond thescope of judicial review. Whatever be the reasons for the two schools of thought, both of them agree that certain decisions or 'certain exercises' of power though amenable to judicial review, the issues they raise are not justiciable issues. For example, the Indian Courts do not consider certain issues as amenable to judicial review viz., the making of treaties, the defence of the country, the dissolution of Parliament, the appointment of Ministers and river water disputes. The reason being that being prerogative powers, they are not susceptible to judicial review and the other reason being that such issues cannot be reviewed for the Courts do not have the training nor is the machinery of the judicial review and the evidence on which the Courts act, suitable for such disputes.
13. It is not easy to precisely give the meaning of 'justiciability'. Broadly speaking an issue is not justiciable if the judicial process is unsuitable for reaching decisions on such issues either because the Court lacks expertise or there are no manageable standards to consider and appreciate the evidence placed before the Court. 'Underlying the concept of justiciability' is the idea that certain issues raise questions with which the judicial process is not equipped to deal' (see page No. 123 'Judicial Remedies in Public Law' by Clive Lewis 1992 Ed).
14. The concept of justiciability is not clearly defined in English Public Law. Quite often question of justiciability overlaps with other region of judicial restraint to the extent the review is permissible. According to Clive Lewis, the nature and subject matter of public law may render disputes about a particular exercise unsuitable for judicial review because they raise politically sensitive issues of national policy and national security and the procedural limitations of judicial review may also render certain issues non-justiciable.
15. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All.ER 935, Lord Roskill noticed certain issues, which are not justiciable as under:
'... But I do not think that right of challenge can be unqualified. It must, 1 think, depend on the subject matter of the prerogative power, which is exercised. Many examples were given during the argument of prerogative powers, which as at present advised I do not think could properly be made the subject of judicial review. Prerogative powers such as those relating to the making of treaties, the defence of the realm, the prerogative of mercy the grant of bonus the dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of Ministers as well as others are not, I think, susceptible to judicial review because their nature and subject matter is such as not to be amenable to the judicial process.'
16- In Council of Civil Services Union case, Lord Diplock while dealing with the question of reviewability of prerogative powers observed-
'.... I find it difficult to envisage in any of the various fields in which the prerogative remains the only source of the relevant decision-making power a decision of a kind that would be open to attack through the judicial process on this ground. Such decisions will reasonably involve the application of Government policy. The reasons for the decision-maker taking one course rather than another do not normally involve questions to which, if disputed, the judicial process is adapted to provide the right answer, by which I mean that the kind of evidence that is admissible under judicial procedures and the way in which it has to be adduced tend to exclude from the attention of the Courtcompeting policy considerations which, if the executive discretion is to be wisely exercised, need to be weighed against one another, a balancing exercise which Judges by their upbringing and experience are ill-qualified to perform'.
17. In S.R. Bomtnai v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1918, the distinction between judicial review and justiciability was considered. Sri Justice J.S. Varma (as his Lordship then was), observed as under:
'.... There are no judicially manageable standards for scrutinising such materials and resolving such a controversy. By its very nature such controversy cannot be justiciable. It would appear that all such cases are, therefore, not justiciable... It would appear that situations wherein the failure of constitutional machinery has to be inferred subjectively from a variety of facts and circumstances, including some imponderables and inferences leading to a subjective political decision, judicial scrutiny of the same is not permissible for want of judicially manageable standards. These political decisions call for judicial hands off envisaging correction only by a subsequent electoral verdict, unless corrected earlier in Parliament...
.. In other words, only cases which permit application of totally objective standards for deciding whether the constitutional machinery has failed, are amenable to judicial review and the remaining cases wherein there is any significant area of subjective satisfaction dependant on some imponderables or inferences are not justiciable because there are no judicially manageable standards for resolving that controversy and those cases are subject only to political scrutiny and correction for whatever its value in the existing political scenario. This appears to be the constitutional scheme.'
18. Therefore, insofar as Indian public Law is concerned, if there are no judicially manageable standards for scrutinisng the material, which is the basis for the decision, and the Court is not equipped to deal with the situation presented before it, such issues are non-justiciable. Also if the decisions are made or taken in the area of subjective satisfaction depending on some imponderable or inferences, such issues are not justiciable, because there are no judicially manageable standards for resolving such controversy.
19. In the field of education, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in number of cases has laid down that ordinarily academic matters are outside the purview of judicial review, so to say academic matters are ordinarily not justiciable. We may refer to some of the decided cases.
20. In University of Mysore v, Govinda Rao, : [1964]4SCR575 , a Constitution Bench was concerned with the question whether the degree of Master of Arts of Durham University is equivalent to High Second Class Master's Degree of an Indian University. Before the High Court, respondent questioned the appointment of appellant No.2, Sri Annaiah Gowda who after a due selection process was appointed as Research Reader in English in the Central College, Bangalore. The appellant No.2 had a degree from Durham University. The essential qualification required as per the advertisement was a I Class or High Second Class Master's Degree of an Indian University or an equivalent qualification of a foreign university in the subject concerned. The Board of appointment, which consisted of experts, treated Sri Annaiah Gowda's foreign degree as equivalent to High Second Class Master's Degree of Indian University and appointed him as Reader. The appointment was questioned before the Mysore High Court and the High Court quashed the appointment of Sri AnnaiahGouda holding that Sri Annaiah Gouda secured 50.2% marks in his Master's Degree and, therefore, he does not satisfy the criteria of high second class. Also observing that as the Board of Experts treated the foreign degree as equivalent to Indian degree, it would not be just for the Court to differ from the opinion of the experts. In the appeal by the University, the Supreme Court held that in the field of education it is safe for the Court to leave the decisions of academic matters to experts who are more familiar with the problems they face than the Courts. The relevant observations of the Apex Court read as under:
'Boards of appointments are nominated by the Universities and when recommendation made by them and the appointments following on them are challenged before Courts, normally the Courts should be slow to interfere with the opinions of experts. There is no allegation about mala fides against the experts who constituted the present Board; and so, we think, it would normally be wise and safe for the Courts to leave the decisions of academic matters to experts who are familiar with the problems they face than the Courts generally can be'.
21. In Maharashtra S.B.O.S. and H.S. Education v. Paritosh, AIR 1985 SC 1543, the validity of Regulation 104(3) of the Maharashtra Secondary Education Board Regulations, 1977 fell for consideration. The said Regulation, which is a peace of subordinate delegated Legislation referable to Section 36 of the Parent Act inter alia provided that no revaluation of the answer book/supplements shall be done and that only verification of marks is allowed. The said regulation was struck down by the Bombay High Court as being unreasonable and ultra-vires. The Supreme Court while accepting the appeal from the MaharashtraBoard of Secondary Education upheld the Regulation inter-alia on the ground that the wisdom or otherwise of not providing for revaluation of answer script is ordinarily beyond the scope of judicial review. The observations of the Supreme Court in this regard are apposite which read thus:
'... As has been repeatedly pointed out by this Court, the Court should be extremely reluctant to substitute its own views as to what is wise, prudent and proper in relation to academic matters in preference to those formulated by professional men possessing technical expertise and rich experience of actual day-to-day working of Educational Institutions and the Departments controlling them. It will be wholly wrong for the Court to make a pedantic and purely idealistic approach to the problems of this nature, isolated from the actual realities and grass root problems involved in the working of the system and unmindful of the consequences which would emanate if a purely idealistic view is opposed to a pragmatic one were to be propounded....'
22. In J.P. Kulshreshta v. Allahabad University, : (1980)IILLJ175SC , the legality of the selection of Readers by the Allahabad University was the subject of controversy. The relevant Ordinances prescribe I Class or High Second Class Master's degree as the minimum qualification for being eligible for the post of Reader. The duly constituted selection committee interviewed 13 applicants and prepared a select list including respondent No.9. In the select list except respondent Nos.9 and 10 other respondents did not have a high second class i.e., more than 54%. Therefore, the 2nd petitioner before the High Court who did not appear for the interview objected before the Executive Council, which overruled the objections and accepted the recommendations of the selection committee. Having failed, thepetitioner approached the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution questioning the legality of the selections on various grounds. A learned single Judge held the appointments bad in law except in regard to respondents 7 and 10 who got I Class and high second class respectively. A Division Bench allowed the appeals by the University and the matter was brought to Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals holding that those who had not secured 54% marks were ineligible and hence the appointments of respondents 5, 6 and 8 as Readers violated the relevant statutes. One of the submissions made before the Supreme Court by the University and other respondents was that the Court under Article 226 should not substitute its judgment to that of the opinion of the academicians. The Supreme Court dealt with the said submission as follows:
'Rulings of this Court were cited before us to hammer home the point that the Court should not substitute its judgment for that of academicians when the dispute relates to educational affairs. While there is no absolute ban, it is a rule of prudence that Courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic bodies. But University organs, for that matter any authority in our system, is bound by the rule of law and cannot be a law unto itself. If the Chancellor or any other authority lesser in level decides an academic matter or an educational question, the Court keeps its hands off; but where a provision of law has to be read and understood, it is not fair to keep the Court out.'
After referring to Govinda Rao 's case (supra), Justice Krishna Iyer, who spoke for the Bench, further observed as follows:
'The later decisions cited before us proudly conform to the rule of cautionsounded in Govinda Rao's case. But to respect an authority is not to worship it unquestioningly since the bhakti cull is inept in the critical field of law. In short, while dealing with legal affairs which have an impact on academic bodies, the views of educational experts are entitled to great consideration but not to exclusive wisdom'
23. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. D.K. Singh, : AIR1987SC190 , the MBBS students of Motilal Nehru Medial College filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court for a direction to the authorities to advance the final year MBBS Examinations to July, 1986 instead of scheduled date in January, 1987. The grievance projected before the Court was that if the examinations were conducted in January, 1987, the students would be unable to apply for admission to the post-graduate course, which commences in March, 1986. The High Court allowed the writ petition holding that it was unreasonable for the authorities to compel the students to wait for six months. The Supreme Court while reversing the judgment of the Allahabad High Court held:
'... we think that the High Court was not justified in interfering in a matter of such an academic nature as this. The question whether a course of study should commence in January or July of the year in a Post-graduate Medical Institution is dependant on number of factors like availability of seats, availability of beds in the hospital, availability of teachers, laboratories and equipment and perhaps a host of other factors with which we are not familiar. Ordinarily, it should, therefore be a matter best leave to the University. When an academic year should commence and when it should end is eminently a matter for the education authorities and not for the Court. One cannot disclocate the timeschedule of the University merely for the convenience of a few students'.
24. In Dr. Malleswara Rao v. University of Health Sciences, (1990) II An.WR 270, the question which fell for consideration before a learned single Judge of this Court was whether a student who is prosecuting a Super Speciality Medical Course can be asked to take practical examination at a college different from the one where he underwent training for the Super Speciality Course and if the student is compelled to take two examinations, theory and practical, at two different centers, whether it would violate Article 14 of the Constitution being unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory. While rejecting the contention of the petitioner, this Court held as under:
'This Court will not readily interfere in matters relating to academic decisions of academic authorities unless the decisions taken are ex-fade arbitrary or biased or without any jurisdiction. Whether on the facts of the case it is proper to hold the practical examination at a centre different from the one where the theory examination was conducted cannot be enquired into by this Court because that is the function of the officers and the authorities concerned under the University of Health Science Act, 1986 and the Medical Council of India.'
25. Having regard to the principles of justiciability and the decided cases, we are of the considered opinion that the question whether Intermediate vocational stream students are entitled to be admitted to the instant examination or whether the Regulations made by the expert body like the Board is valid or not, is not justiciable. In any event, as held by us, the Regulation is rational and it is in accordance with Sections 9 and 12 of the Act.
In re point No.2:
Sri P. V. Subratnanya Sarma, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the students of Intermediate vocational stream are eligible to appear for Engineering and Medical Common Entrance Test, that they are eligible for appearing for I year graduate courses, that though the two streams are given two different certificates, for all purposes they form one class and in the matter of instant examination, the students of Intermediate vocational stream cannot be discriminated. We are afraid, we cannot agree with this submission. The object of vocational education is to prepare the students for self-employment and, therefore, the stress in vocational stream is on practical training. Further, there are 521 papers in the vocational courses and, therefore, it is not possible or feasible to conduct instant examination in one paper on par with Intermediate general stream. It is well settled that classification between two groups of persons and two types of inanimate things is permissible provided the object sought to be achieved by such classification is valid and has some rational principle. We have already held that the rule is rational and the classification is validly made having regard to the nature and the structure of Intermediate vocational stream. In view of this, the fact of Intermediate vocational stream students are also eligible for higher courses on par with Intermediate academic stream students, does not make any difference insofar as considering the question of discrimination on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is liable to be rejected.
In re point No. 3.
In the result, the writ appeals are allowed setting aside the order of the learned single Judge and consequently the writ petitions stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.