D.S.R. Varma, J.
1. This is an appeal preferred against the order, dated 26-04-2003, in W.C.No.5 of 2001, passed by the Commissioner for Workmen Compensation and Assistant Commissioner of Labour-II, Guntur. Railways are the appellants in this appeal.
2. One late Kotaiah was working as Traffic Gateman at Bellamkonda, in Vijayawada Division of South Central Railway. He was deputed for training at the Divisional Training School, Rajahmundry. He reported for training at Rajahmundry on 18-4-2000. He attended the training class on 18-4-2000 from 9.00 A.M to 12.00 A.M and 2.00 P.M to 5.00 P.M. Late Kotaiah was provided with residential accommodation in the premises attached to the Training School, for the training period.
3. Late Kotaiah had developed chest pain at 10.00 p.m on 18-4-2000 in the Training School campus, due to the stress and strain. Nobody was available at that time and no care was taken for the trainees. One J. Koteshwara Rao, a co-trainee of late Kotaiah has taken late Kotaiah to the Railway Hospital, Rajahmundry, at 12.00 midnight on that day. The doctor did not come immediately and came after half an hour. A Compounder was there at the hospital. There are no concerned instruments and the instruments available in the hospital are not in order. Only an injection was given to late Kotaiah and it was advised to take late Kotaiah to the General Hospital. Ambulance came after ten minutes and late Kotaiah was shifted to the Government Hospital at 3.00 a.m and thereby substantial delay occurred in treatment, which resulted in the death of late Kotaiah at 3.20 a.m on the next day.
4. Wife, Children and father and mother of the deceased Kotaiah laid the claim in W.C.No.5 of 2001, claiming a compensation of Rs.6,00,000/-, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and Assistant Commissioner of Labour-II, Guntur against -- (1) Principal, Divisional Training School, South Central Railway, Rajahmundry; (2) Medical Superintendent, South Central Railway Hospital, Rajahmundry, and (3) Divisional Railway Manager, South Central Railway, Vijayawada.
5. Before the Commissioner, Opposite Party No.2 (Medical Superintendent, Railway Hospital, Rajahmundry) filed counter-affidavit, which was adopted by Opposite Party Nos.1 and 3, contesting the claim of the Applicants.
6. Before the Commissioner, Applicants got examined the wife of the deceased as A.W.1 and another witness as A.W.2 and got marked Exs.A.1 to A.9. On behalf of the Opposite Parties, R.Ws.1 and 2 are examined and Exs.M.1 to M.12 are marked.
7. The Commissioner, after considering the evidence placed on record, arrived at the conclusion that the deceased Kotaiah was a 'workman' and his death took place due to heart attack in the course of his employment while he was discharging his duties as a trainee at the Training School at Rajahmundry on 18-4-2000. Taking the age of the deceased as 37 years, and taking the wages of the deceased as Rs.3,172/- per month, the Commissioner awarded a total compensation of Rs.3,05,344/- to the applicants by his order dated 26-4-2003, holding that Opposite Party Nos. 1 to 3 are jointly and severally liable to pay the same to the applicants, and directed the Opposite Parties to deposit the same by way of demand draft taken on State Bank of India, Guntur, making it clear that in default of making such deposit within thirty days from the date of receipt of his order, the opposite parties have to pay interest at 9% per annum from the date of accident till the date of realisation, in addition to the penalty that may be imposed under Section 4-A(3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act (for brevity 'the Act').
8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Commissioner, the Railways have preferred this appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.
9. The substantial questions of law that would arise for consideration and decision in this appeal are:-
(1). Whether developing massive 'myocardiac infarction' is covered under Section 3(1) of the Act?
(2) Whether the death of late Kotaiah arose 'out of and during the course of his employment'?
(3) Whether order of the Commissioner directing the opposite parties/appellants herein to pay interest at the rate of 9% p.a. from the date of accident till the date of realisation, in additional to penalty that may be imposed under Section 4-A(3) of the Act, is justifiable?
10. Question No.1:- In order to decide this question, it is apposite to notice the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, which run thus:
'3. Employer's liability for Compensation:- (1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter'.
11. From the above, two important ingredients are expected to be present for the application of Section 3 of the Act. Firstly, occurrence of the accident resulting in personal injury to the workman, and secondly accident must have arisen out of and in the course of employment of the workman.
12. Section 4 of the Act is an enabling provision for awarding compensation to a workman, when the aforesaid ingredients are satisfied.
13. It is further pertinent to note that the expression 'accident' is nowhere defined in the Act.
14. In Devshi Bhanji Khona vs. Mary Burno, 1985 LaB.I.C.1589, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, considering the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, and interpreting the expression 'arising out of and in the course of employment', observed thus:
'The object behind the legislation being protection to the weaker section with a view to do social justice, the provisions of the Act have to be interpreted liberally, so that other things being equal, the leaning of the court has to be towards the person for whose benefit the legislation is made. Bearing this principle in mind, the expression 'accident' found in sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act has to be understood as meaning a mishap or untoward event not expected or designed. In other words, the basic and indispensable ingredient of the accident is the unexpectation'
15. In the above cited decision (M/s Devshi Bhanji Khona's case), if gone into the facts, it was a case where the workman was already suffering from heart ailment and when he was subjected to over-exertion there was a sudden deterioration in his health condition, which eventually proved to be fatal. In such conditions, it was found that even though the workman-therein was found to be suffering from heart ailment already, because of the exertion, the death had occurred, while carrying some load. In such circumstances, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court took the view that 'there was a casual connection between employment and his death in an unexpected way'. Hence, it was held that the death of the workman was because the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment.
16. In United India Insurance Co. vs. C.S. Gopalakrishnan & Another, 1989(II) LLJ 30 another Division Bench of the Kerala High Court took the same view as was taken in the earlier decision in Devshi Bhanji Khona's case (1 supra), and it was observed that the expression 'accident', employed in Section 3 of the Act, must be construed in its popular sense, but it shall not be expected or designed.
17. In Shrimathi Laxmibai vs. Bombay Port Trust, 1954 I. LLJ 614 it was held:
'If the workman died as a natural result of the disease from which he was suffering, then it could not be said that his death was caused out of his employment. Further, if a workman is suffering from a particular disease and as a result of wear and tear in his employment, he dies of that disease, no liability could be fixed upon the employer. But, it is equally established that if the employment is a contributory cause or if the employment has accelerated the death, or if it could be said that the death was not due only to the disease but the disease coupled with the employment, then the employer would be liable and it could be said that the death arose out of the employment of his deceased'.
18. In National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs Balawwa, 1994 I. LLJ 433(Ker), another Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, following its earlier decisions, and also referring to the decision in M/s Mackinnon Mack enzie & Co. (P) Limited vs Rita Fernandiz, 1969 II LLJ 812 held thus:
'By series of judicial pronouncements, it is now well settled that the word 'accident' should be taken to mean a mishap or untoward event, not expected or designed; that if a person suffers heart-attack and dies, it necessarily mean that there has been an injury to the heart and that, that event being a mishap not expected or designed, is an accident and that if a workman suffers heart-attack out of and in the course of his employment, then the employer is liable to pay compensation under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Workmen's Compensation Act'.
19. Similar is the view taken by a learned single Judge of this Court (A. Gopal Reddy, J) in Depot Manager, APSRTC vs . G. Anjamma, : 1999(6)ALD101 . His Lordship, having considered various judgments, including the judgments of the Kerala High Court, referred to supra, and basing on the facts and circumstances of that case, held that the workman therein died due to strain and hard-working conditions with which the deceased was working since morning and developed chest pain, and that the employment was a contributory cause and resulted in injury to the heart of the workman and as such the death of the workman has taken place due to heart attack which arose out of and in the course of his employment.
20. From the above, the undefined expression 'accident' should be understood as a mishap or an untoward event, which is not expected or designed, and without any sole contribution on the part of the workman for the cause of the death/accident.
21. In the instant case, it is to be seen from the evidence on record that the deceased/workman, who was originally working as Gateman in Railways at Bellamkonda of Vijayawada Division of South Central Railway, was deputed to Rajahmundry to undergo training. He attended the training class on 18-4-2000 from 9.00 a.m to 12.00 a.m and again from 2.00 p.m to 5.00 p.m. There was only a residential accommodation provided to the workman in the premises of the Training School, without providing him any boarding facility. The deceased workman complained of chest pain at 10-00 p.m on 18-4-2000. At that point of time, nobody was available to attend on him and he was shifted to the Railway Hospital, Rajahmundry, by his co-trainee by name Koteswararao at 12-00 mid night of that day, and after a short while the deceased died. From the above, it could be seen that the deceased was the employee of the Railways at Bellamkonda of Vijayawada Division of South Central Railway; and that he was deputed to undergo training at another place, viz., Rajahmundry. Training is more arduous than the routine duties of a workman. Whether the deceased/workman was suffering from heart ailment even before he developed chest pain or not, is not on record, nor at least it was in the knowledge of anybody, including the deceased workman. When once a workman was deputed for training to a different place than that of his original place of work, one has to necessarily stay at a place where he was asked to undergo training and in the present case, perhaps only residential accommodation was provided to the workman in the premises of the Training School, even though no boarding facility was provided to him, as the training classes were being taken up at regular timings, of course, with intervals. There is no apparent contribution on the part of the workman for developing chest pain. In other words, chest pain cannot, under the above circumstances, be termed as 'expected' or 'designed event', nor there was any contribution on the part of the deceased workman in that behalf. Hence, it should mean that it was an accident, as contemplated under Section 3 of the Act. Question No.1 is answered accordingly.
22. Question No.2:- It is not sufficient if merely an injury is sustained by a workman in an accident. It should necessarily be an accident arising out and in the course of employment. The question that automatically falls for consideration is when does the employment begin and when does it cease. This aspect would depend much upon the facts and circumstances of the particular given case.
23. In this context, the Supreme Court in B.E.S.T. Undertaking vs. MRS. Agnes, AIR 1964 SC 193 referred to the decision rendered by the House of Lords in Weaver vs. Tredegar Iron and Coal Co., Ltd, (1940) 3 All. E.R.157, which reviewed the entire case-law and gave a wider meaning to 'duty'. In paragraph-9 of the said judgment in B.E.S.T. Undertaking's case (7 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court noted thus:
Lord Atkinson posed the question thus: Is he doing something in discharge of a duty to his employer directly or indirectly imposed upon him by his contract of service? and answered:
'......... ......... the word 'duty'' in the test has such a wide connotation that it gives little assistance as a practical guide'. He proceeded to state:
'Duty' with the vague connotation given to it above cannot be rejected, but it does not seem to point very clearly to the desired goal. There can be no doubt that the course of employment cannot be limited to the time or place of the specific work for which the workman is employed to do. It does not necessarily end when the 'down tools' signal is given, or when the actual workshop where he is working is left. In other words, the employment may run on its course by its own momentum beyond the actual stopping place'. Lord Porter, dealing with the test of duty, remarked thus at p. 179 :
'In some cases, no doubt, it may be helpful to consider whether the man owed a duty to his employer at the time of the accident, and, indeed, if duty be construed with sufficient width, it may be a decisive test, but, so construed, to say that the man was doing his duty means no more than he was acting within the scope of his employment. The man's work does not consist solely in the task, which he is employed to perform. It includes also matters incidental to the task. Times during which meals are taken, moments during which the man is proceeding towards his work from one portion of his employer's premises to another, and periods of rest may all be included. Nor is his work necessarily confined to his employer's premises'.
24. In G.S. Talcher Thermal Station vs. Bijuli Naik, 1994 Lab I.C.1379 (Orissa) summing up the law on this point, it was held thus:
'But, the general principles are that -(i) there must be a casual connection between the injury and the accident and the work done in the course of employment; (ii) the onus is upon the applicant to show that it was the work and the resulting strain which contributed to, or aggravated, the injury; (iii) it is not necessary that the workman must be actually working at the time of his death or that death must occur while he was working or had just ceased to work' (iv) where the evidence is balanced, if the evidence shows a greater probability which satisfies a reasonable man that the work contributed to the causing of personal injury, it would be enough for the workman to succeed. But, where the accident involved a risk common to all humanity and did not involve any peculiar or exceptional danger resulting from the nature of the employment; or where the accident was the result of an added peril to which the workman, by his own conduct, exposed himself, which peril was not involved in the normal performance of the duties of his employment, then the employer will not be liable under Section 3 of the Act'.
25. Falling back upon the Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in C.S. Gopalakrishnan's case (2 supra), dealing with the subject, it was observed thus:
'.... In order to say that the accident has arisen out of and in the course of the employment, there should be some casual connection between the employment and the death.
9 Though it is necessary that there should be a casual connection between the employment and the death in the unexpected way in order to bring the accident within Section 3, it is not necessary that it should be established that the workman died as a result of exceptional strain or some exceptional work that he did no the day in question'. If the nature of the work and the hours of work caused great strain to the employee and that strain caused the unexpected death, it can be said that the workman died as a result of an accident which has arisen in the course of his employment.
26. A Full Bench of Assam High Court in Assam Railways and Trading Co., vs. Saraswati Devi, AIR 1963 Assam 127 observed thus:
'.............. Even in cases where a person has been suffering from heart disease, if the nature of the work has contributed to the deterioration of the heart and his death, the personal injury can be said to arise out of his employment. The case where the deceased was not suffering from any previous heart disease is, to my mind, a stronger case and in such circumstances if he suddenly gets a heart attack while proceeding to perform his duty, the accident is nothing but arising out of his employment'.
27. Sri R.S. Murty, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants also relies on the above-quoted Full Bench decision of the Assam High Court in Assam Railways' case (supra). The majority view of the Full Bench was in the aforequoted terms. Therefore, the Full Bench decision of the Assam High Court in Assam Railways' case (supra) is not helpful to the appellants, but would only help the workman.
28. Sri R.S. Murty, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, further relies on the decision rendered by the Karnataka High Court in Ananthamma v. M.D., Coop. Spinning Mills Ltd., Raichur, 1999 I. LLJ 173. In that decision, a learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court held that heart failure does not fall within the scope of Section 3 of the Act. A perusal of this decision would only reveal that the broad principles laid down already by various Courts are not in deviation but, on facts, it was held in the said decision that the workman was not entitled for compensation. The facts in that decision are quite different from that of the facts of the case on hand. In that case, the deceased was, after attending the training class, at 5.00 p.m, on his own errand, approached the Health Unit at 12-00 p.m and thus exposed himself to the peril not connected to the employment. The facts in the said case are quite different from the facts of the present case on hand. But, the settled principles were only distinguished by the learned Judge of the Karnataka High Court, on the facts of that case, and held that the workman was not entitled for compensation.
29. Learned Counsel for the appellants, Sri R.S. Murty, also places reliance upon the decision rendered by a learned single Judge of this Court in Anjaiah v. Lakshmaiah, : (1960)IILLJ434AP . A perusal of the said decision would only disclose that, on facts, a learned single Judge of this Court (Sanjeeva Row Nayudu, J) held that the workman was entitled for compensation. The broad principles regarding the question of the 'accident' and 'arising out and during the course of employment' were also discussed while arriving at the conclusion that the workman was entitled for compensation. Therefore, this decision is unexceptionable, but not helpful the appellants.
30. From a conspectus of the above decisions, broadly the following aspects would emerge, to determine the aspect of accident 'arising out of and in the course of employment': -
(1). The minimum requirement is establishment of the fact of casual connection between the accident and the work done in the course of employment.
(2). It is not necessary that the workman must be actually working at the time and place of his work, when and where the accident or death/injury occurred.
(3). Even if the accident had occurred during the course of employment of a workman, there shall not be any voluntary involvement in a peculiar or exceptional danger which results from the nature of employment, or the workman must not have contributed to the peril, some thing by his own conduct or exposing himself to risk, which risk, in normal course, is not expected to be taken by the workman.
(4). It is sufficient to prove that there was casual connection between the employment and the injury/death. It is also not necessary that the workman died as a result of exceptional strain or exceptional work.
(5). The width of time of employment need not necessarily be confined to the working hours of the workman. The movements of the workman which are ancillary to the employment shall also be taken into consideration to determine the aspect of 'during the course of employment'.
(6). Even if a workman was suffering from heart disease, if the nature of the work has contributed to the deterioration in his health condition resulting his death, such injury can be said to be an 'accident' said to have occurred during the course of his employment.
31. Now, in order to answer Question No.2, it is necessary to fall back upon the facts, in brief, even at the cost of repetition. As already pointed out, late Kotaiah, the deceased workman in this case, who was working as a Gateman in South Central Railway at Bellamkonda of its Vijayawada Division was deputed to undergo training at Rajahmundry from 18-4-2000. The purpose of training would be, in normal parlance, for the purpose of imparting a better qualitative performance of a workman which, again, would, in normal course, be intensive. It is to be seen that when the workman was brought to a different place for such training the entire campus where the training was being imparted shall not necessarily be treated as a place of work, the reason being the workman was directed to participate in such training as an employee of the employer. It is not as though the workman volunteered to participate in a training camp at a different place than the place of his regular work and when a workman was actually required to participate in training in a camp located at a different place there are no real working hours for the simple reason that the workman has to be under the watchful eyes of the employer all through the day. The training hours, in such cases, alone cannot be treated as the period of work. In regular course of duty, the workman will be required to work in a particular day in a particular timings, but in a training camp though the time is prescribed for imparting the necessary education, the workman virtually is detained in that particular camp or campus. Further, in such training camp, the freedom of the workman, even after the training hours, would be very restricted. In other words, the freedom at the training camp cannot be equated with that of the freedom of the workman when he was on regular duty at the place of his actual employment.
32. Participation in a training camp and its intensity would, undoubtedly, be more arduous than the usual routine employment. It is more stressful than the regular work of the workman. To put it in a different way, the workman has to necessarily undergo more stress in the course of the training - training to learn something more than what the workman was performing in routine manner.
33. Furthermore, it is nobody's case that the workman was already suffering from heart ailment. Myocardiac infarction is in a way an unexpected, uncalled for and a fatal event, which could not be treated at all as 'designed'. As already pointed out by various Courts, the workman need not necessarily explain that earlier he was not suffering from heart ailment and only because of the stress or additional strain during the course of employment -- in the present case, the training camp, nor it is the case of the other side that the workman had done something which he was not supposed to do, or in a way peculiar to the work entrusted to him, inviting trouble to his own life, on his own accord. Therefore, from the above facts and in the light of various judgments referred to supra, I am of the considered view that the workman died due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment for the reason that the workman has to necessarily undergo training in the prescribed periods and also stay at a specific place prescribed without boarding facility, and all these factors, in my view, would add something more to the ailment, which even the workman was not aware of. Hence, this Question No.2 is also answered in favour of the workman.
34. Question No.3:- This question relates to the validity or otherwise of the order passed by the Commissioner directing the appellants to pay interest from the date of accident till the date of recovery of the amount at the rate of 9% per annum, in the event of their failure to deposit the compensation amount of Rs.3,05,344/- within thirty days from the date of his order.
35. In this context, a four-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo vs Srinivas Sabata and Another, : (1976)ILLJ235SC held that an employer becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workman by the accident, which arose out of and in the course of employment. Thus the relevant date for determination of the rate of compensation is the date of accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim.
36. Similar is the view taken by the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board and Another v. Valsala K., 1999(6) ALT 6(SC). In addition to the above, a learned single Judge of this Court (P.S. Narayana, J) in Midicharla Ramanamma and Others vs. Naga Prathap and Another, 2003(1) Decisions Today 54(AP), having regard to the facts of that case, held that the appellants-therein were entitled to interest at 9% per annum from the date of accident till the date of realisation. For the foregoing reasons, this Question No.3 is also answered in favour of the workman.
37. In the result, I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.