1. This writ appeal by the State Bank of India is directed against the order dated 3rd December, 1999 made in W.P. No. 12231 of 1999 by a learned single Judge of this Court, whereunder this Court directed the appellant herein to permit the respondent-writ petitioner also to attend the interview and final selection to the post of regular sweeper along with the other candidates sponsored by the District Employment Exchange.
2. In order to consider the question as to whether the impugned order suffers from any legal infirmity requiring our interference, the relevant facts may have to be noticed:
3. The respondent-writ petitioner was working as a temporary employee in the appellant bank as part-time sweeper since April, 1994. She has also registered her name in the District Employment Office at Chittoor with Registration No. 05/1989/01171 dated 28-6-1989.
4. The case of the respondent-writ petitioner is that she is fully qualified and eligible for being appointed as regular sweeper in the appellant-bank. The District Employment Officer, however, sent a list to the appellant-bank sponsoring the names of some candidates for the post of Sweeper, which does not include the name of the respondent-writ petitioner. Then she made a representation on 14-6-1999 requesting the appellant bank to interview her also for the post of Sweeper, but they have refused to accept the same on the ground that her name was not sponsored by the District Employment Officer.
5. It is contended that the appellant-bank has not issued any public notification calling for applications from the eligible candidates for selection and recruitment to the post of Sweeper. No publication has been made in the newspapers. The course adopted by the appellant-bank is contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Excise Superintendent, Malkapatnam v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao, : (1997)ILLJ56SC . The case set up by the respondent-writ petitioner is that the appellant-bank, in law, is required to issue a public notification inviting applications from the eligible candidates and consider the cases of those applicants along with the cases of candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchange. The appellant-bank cannot be permitted to restrict its choice in the matter of selection and recruitment and confine it only to the candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchange.
6. The respondent-writ petitioner, however, contended that she had been working as part-time sweeper-cum-water woman for more than five years and, in the circumstances, particularly in view of the length of continuous service her case at any rate is required to be considered by the appellant-bank irrespective of the fact whether her candidature is sponsored by the employment exchange or not.
7. The appellant-bank filed a detailed counter affidavit inter alia stating that the management of the appellant-bank initiated the process to recruit part-time non-messengers for Chittoor District. There were six vacancies of part-time General Attenders (sweepers) and the bank has to recruit six persons to fill up the said posts. In terms of the instructions contained under the codified circular of the Bank relating to the staff, the recruitment of subordinate staff, whenever needed, is being made in consonance with the Government directives, as also the provisions obtaining under Section 4 of the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 (for short 'the Act') after notifying the vacancies to the Employment Exchanges.
8. The Employment Exchange sponsored the names of 120 candidates at the ratio of 20 candidates for each of the vacancies for the purpose of selection and appointment to the posts part-time attenders. This procedure is being followed regularly by the bank.
9. It is specifically stated in the counter affidavit that the recruitment of employees for subordinate staff is on the basis of regulations framed by the bank. Reliance is placed upon clause (g) of Chapter 23 in State Bank of India Reference Book on staff matters, Volume II, which specifically mentions about the recruitment to subordinate cadre. Clause (g) reads as follows:
'Recruitment of subordinate staff, where needed, should be made subject to the above instructions, only through the Employment Exchanges as per Government directives. However, guards/ watchmen will be appointed from out of ex-servicemen only who have been honourably discharged from service. The sources of manpower for appointment of guards/watchman are given in paragraph 29.9 of Chapter 29.'
10. In the counter affidavit it is further averred that the Government of India had issued a directive on 30th September, 1978 directing the public sector banks to make the recruitment of subordinate staff on the basis of the guidelines issued by them. The guidelines inter alia provide that the recruitment should be through the Employment Exchanges, and the bank can go to the open market only after obtaining non-availability certificate from the appropriate Employment Exchange. This procedure, in respect of the recruitment, is required to be followed not only by the appellant bank but also by all the nationalised banks, subsidiary banks and Reserve Bank of India.
11. The short question that falls for consideration in this writ appeal is as to whether a writ of Mandamus would lie directing the appellant bank to act contrary to its own regulations and directives issued by the Government of India from time to time in the matter of recruitment of subordinate staff? Whether the appellant bank is required to issue public notification inviting applications from the interested and eligible candidates for the recruitment of subordinate staff?
12. The whole of the case of the respondent-writ petitioner is based upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Visweshwara Rao (1 supra), in which it is observed:
'Better view appears to be that it should be mandatory for the requisitioning authority/establishment to intimate the employment exchange, and employment exchange should sponsor the names of the candidates to the requisitioning departments for selection strictly according to seniority and reservation, as per requisition. In addition, the appropriate department or undertaking or establishment should call for the names by publication in the newspapers having wider circulation and also display on their office notice boards or announce on radio, television and employment news bulletins; and then consider the cases of all the candidates who have applied. If this procedure is adopted, fair play would be subserved. The equality of opportunity in the matter of employment would be available to all eligible candidates.'
13. In order to consider the ratio of the said judgment, it would be necessary to notice the background facts and the circumstances in which the Supreme Court made the observations noted hereinabove. The Excise Superintendent, Malkapatnam, Krishna District sought to make appointments to 723 posts from the candidates sponsored through the medium of employment exchange. The respondents therein independently applied for consideration of their claims, but they were not considered. It is necessary to notice that as per the rules in vogue governing the sponsoring of the candidates by the employment exchanges, 20 names will have to be sponsored for each vacancy and quite possibly in that case the required number of candidates i.e. nearly about 14,000 may not have been even registered their names in the employment exchange for the particular cadre.
14. In Mastan Rao v. Superintendent, Excise Department, 1984 (2) ALT 79 this Court speaking through Jeevan Reddy, J (as he then was) had an occasion to examine the scheme and the organisation of employment exchanges, as also the provisions of the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959. The learned Judge having traced the history preceding the enactment of the said Act observed:
'While there is no compulsion on the employment seekers to register themselves with the Employment Exchange, the Organisation soon became well known throughout the country, and because of the unique nature of the service performed by it, almost every seeker of employment started registering himself with this Exchange. No fee has ever been prescribed for registering the unemployed persons.'
15. That after making an analysis of Sections 4, 5 and 10 of the Act and the rules framed thereunder, the learned Judge observed:
'All employers in the public sector, as also the notified employers in private sector are under an obligation to notify the vacancies to these Exchanges. An elaborate and comprehensive procedure has been evolved for first classifying and documenting all the applications of the employment seekers and their subsequent forwarding to, and consideration by the employers. The Employment Exchanges are bound to send the names of suitable candidates against the vacancies notified. In view of this vast net-work it appears a little too late in the day to hold that the vast net-work of Employment Exchanges developed for over a period of 30 years by the Ministry of Labour and Employment over the whole country is not a well publicised medium, so as to form a reasonable classification for the purposes of a source of recruitment.'
(Emphasis is of ours).
16. The learned Judge further held that
'an appointment made to a post under the State, after notifying the vacancy to the prescribed Employment Exchange, satisfies the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 and that, it is not obligatory upon the employer to issue a public advertisement. The position would be different as already emphasized if there is a Rule or other provision of law requiring that such a public notification should be issued, calling for applications.'
(Emphasis is supplied).
17. The learned Judge further held that 'no citizen has any right to compel the employer to consider his case also for such appointment, even though he is not sponsored by the employment exchange. No such right flows either from a reading of sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Act, or from Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.' It is, however, observed that 'if the employer finds that none of the persons sponsored by the Employment Exchange or available from the Employment Exchange, is suitable for the post, it is open to him to appoint a person not so sponsored by the Employment Exchange. But, if he wants to do so, he would again be under a constitutional obligation to either issue a public notification or adopt such other fair and appropriate procedure as to ensure an equality of opportunity to all eligible persons.'
18. It is further held that 'Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution do not cast an invariable or mandatory obligation upon an employer to advertise a vacancy for public information, through press unless, of course, there is a rule or other provision of law requiring him to do so. This does not, however, mean that an employer can make an appointment to a post under the State in such manner as he likes. In the absence of any rule or other provision of law prescribing the procedure to be followed by him he must follow a fair and reasonable procedure which ensures an equal opportunity for all eligible persons to apply for the post and then consider the same on a fair and reasonable basis; that it would be sufficient compliance with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution, if an employer notifies the vacancies to the prescribed Employment Exchange, and makes a selection from out of the persons sponsored by the Employment Exchange.'
19. In N. Hara Gopal v. T.T.D. Tirupathi, 1985 (3) APLJ 150 (DB), a Division Bench of this Court while adverting to more or less a similar contention as to whether the employer coming under the Act is put under further and more onerous obligation to confine his recruitment to the names sent by the employment exchanges observed that the employers 'are not justified in law in contending that the employer's field of choice to select their employees or method of recruiting their employees is, in any way, limited by the Act. We also hold that the employer's choice is not at all confined to those names sent by the Employment Exchange and that they are not debarred by law from considering the claims of petitioners for appointment only for the reason that their names are not sent up by the employment exchange or for the reason that they have directly applied to the respondents seeking appointment. It also follows that all orders of the Government either of the State or of the Centre curtailing the liberty of the employers to appoint men of their choice are ultra vires of the powers of the Governments under the provisions of the above Act.'
20. The Court, however, observed that only such of the applications received properly shall have to be considered by the employer.
'The question of compelling the public employer to consider the applications made seeking employment would arise only in those circumstances where the applications are received through legitimate, regular and proper channel. In other situations and circumstances, directing the employer to consider the applications received by him would result in conferring favours even on those few who applied to the employer adopting secretive methods. Such results would clearly be repugnant to Article 16 the soul of which lies in ensuring equity and fairness and equality of opportunity to all citizens in public employment. This Court, therefore, cannot direct the consideration of the applications of the fortuitous some who might have stolen a march over their unsuspecting rivals.'
(Emphasis is added).
21. When the said matter has been carried to the Supreme Court in Union of India v. N. Hargopal, : (1987)ILLJ545SC , the Supreme Court held that 'the Act does not oblige any employer to employ those persons only who have been sponsored by the Employment Exchanges. The object of the Act is not to restrict, but to enlarge the field of choice so that the employer may choose the best and the most efficient and to provide an opportunity to the worker to have his claim for appointment considered without the worker having to knock at every door for employment. The Act only places an obligation on the employer to notify the vacancies that may occur in his establishment before filling those vacancies.'
22. It is further held by the Supreme Court that 'while the government is at perfect liberty to issue instructions to its own departments and organisations provided the instructions do not contravene any constitutional provision or any statute, these instructions cannot bind other bodies which are created by statute and which functions under the authority of statute. In the absence of any statutory prescription the statutory authority may however adopt and follow such instructions if it thinks fit. Otherwise, the government may not compel statutory bodies to make appointments of persons from among candidates sponsored by Employment Exchanges only.'
23. It is further observed that the instruction to fill up notified vacancies in government departments by candidates sponsored by Employment Exchanges is not violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 'Insistence on recruitment through Employment Exchanges advances rather than restricts the rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16. The submission that Employment Exchanges do not reach everywhere applies equally to whatever method of advertising vacancies is adopted. In the absence of a better method of recruitment any restriction that employment in government departments should be through the medium of employment exchanges does not offend Articles 14 and 16.'
24. In G. Trilochana Rao v. A.P. Residential Schools for B.Cs., : 1991(2)ALT616 a question as to whether any instrumentality of a State will be justified in taking a policy decision that it will restrict its consideration to persons sponsored by the Employment Exchange had arisen for consideration. This Court took the view that 'any instrumentality of a State will have to abide by the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of our Constitution. It is open for them to make any Rules or lay down guidelines for recruitment provided they do not conflict with the aforesaid constitutional provisions.' While adverting to the specific question referred to hereinabove, this Court after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Hargopal (4 supra) held:
'The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court is that, if such a policy is followed it cannot be said to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 merely because applications were not invited from general public. In that context, the question whether the provisions of the Employment Exchange Act apply to a particular post may not be relevant. Enforcement of the provisions of the Act is not sought in case of attenders against the organisation. But when the organisation itself has chosen to confine consideration to candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchange, it cannot be said to be illegal. This is as a substitute for inviting applications. The question is not whether the post is covered by the provisions of the Employment Exchange Act or the applicability of the Act but, whether the body which is State within the meaning of Article 12 is following the procedure consistent with the mandate of Articles 14 and 16........It is open to an employer which is a State to invite applications from the public even where notification of vacancy is mandatory. So also, it may do in cases where notifying the Employment Exchange may not be necessary... The decision to confine the recruitment to those sponsored by Employment Exchange even in cases of vacancies like Attenders may in a way hamper the rights of the employer by restricting his field of choice but, at the same time, it is evident that persons only of that area where vacancies have arisen and who satisfy the qualifications and are on the waiting list since a long period will be sponsored and considered. Calling of applications from open market for such posts create their own difficulties. It is for the concerned authority to decide whether they wish to call candidates from open market or from Employment Exchange or from both sources for a selection by them....... The question of applicability of the Employment Exchange Act to the post in such cases is not material.'
(Emphasis is of ours).
25. In S. Ramu v. Executive Officer, T.T. Devasthanam and another, 1993 (1) LLJ 286 a Division Bench of this Court after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Hargopal (4 supra) held that though the Act 31 of 1959 does not, in express terms, apply to the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam nothing prevents the Devasthanam from considering, as and when an occasion so arises, only candidates sponsored by or through the Employment Exchange. If the Devasthanam decides otherwise, a writ may not lie to compel it to do so. But, if it decides to consider candidates sponsored only by or through the Employment Exchanges, writ or direction to the contrary cannot be issued against it.
26. In Raj Kumar v. Shakti Raj, : AIR1997SC2110 the Supreme Court found fault with the practice adopted by the State of Haryana of following the procedure, whereunder after the selection of the candidates, names of selected candidates were called from the employment exchange. Obviously, the successful candidates in the written examinations were asked to approach the employment exchange of the circle concerned and, accordingly, names came to be sponsored. 'The procedure adopted is clearly illegal denying equal opportunity to many a candidate waiting in the register of the employment exchange concerned. Therefore, the Government hereafter should strictly follow the procedure by not only calling their names from the employment exchange, but also by publishing in the local and national newspapers and giving wide publicity in the media as well as getting the written examination and the interview conducted by the SSSB; marks should be awarded strictly according to the procedure.'
27. In Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh, : AIR1997SC4310 selections and appointments of Assistant Teachers were made after inviting applications from the Employment Exchanges instead of by advertisement. This procedure has been resorted to looking to the requirements of a time-bound scheme. The procedure adopted was held as not unfair. It is observed:
'The State has relied upon the case of Union of India v. N. Hargopal : (1987)ILLJ545SC where Government instruction enjoining that the field of choice should, in the first instance, be restricted to candidates sponsored by the employment exchanges, was upheld as not offending Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In the case of Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Administration : (1992)IILLJ452SC , this Court approved of recruitment through employment exchanges as a method of preventing malpractices. But in the subsequent and more recent case of Excise Superintendent v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao : (1997)ILLJ56SC this Court has distinguished Union of India v. Hargopal on the basis of special facts of that case. It has observed that the better course for the State would be to invite applications from employment exchanges as well as to advertise and also give wide publicity through TV, Radio, etc. The Court had to consider whether persons who had applied directly and not through employment exchange should be considered. This Court upheld their claim for consideration.
There are different methods of inviting applications. The method adopted in the exigencies of the situation in the present case cannot be labelled as unfair, particularly when, at the relevant time, the two earlier decisions of this Court were in vogue.'
28. From a brief survey of the various authorities referred to hereinabove, the following principles emerge:
1) The Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 does not take away the right of the employer in the public sector to choose its own method of recruitment and to appoint to its service persons other than those drawn from the employment Exchange. The Act does not oblige the employer to consider the names sent to him by the Employment Exchange alone. The employer is free to choose from anywhere. The Act merely commands the employer to notify the vacancies, supply information, submit the returns and to provide access to records.
2) The employer is not precluded from issuing public notification inviting applications from the eligible candidates for filling up of the posts and considering the applications so received along with the applications of the candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchange.
29. The question that falls for consideration is as to whether a writ of Mandamus lies compelling the employer to compulsorily issue a public notification inviting applications from the eligible candidates for the purpose of filling up of the vacancies in the specified categories of posts even if the regulations or the statutory rules, as the case may be, provide for recruitment only from out of the candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchanges?
30. In our considered opinion, the decision of the Supreme Court in Visweshwara Rao (1 supra) does not deal with the said situation. The Supreme Court, in fact, had not gone into this aspect of the matter. In the case on hand, the regulations of the Bank command that the recruitment of subordinate staff, where needed, should be made subject to the instructions, only through the Employment Exchanges as per Government directives. This rule/regulation is not impugned on the ground of any constitutional vice. The appellant-bank being the employer is precluded from considering the candidature of any other candidate except the candidature of the candidates sponsored by the employment exchange. It would have been a different matter altogether had the regulations/rules were silent in this regard. In such a situation, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Visweshwara Rao (1 supra) would come into play whereby employer is required to issue a public notification inviting applications and consider the cases of those applicants also along with the candidates sponsored by the employment exchange.
31. In our considered opinion, it is for the concerned authority to decide whether they wish to call the candidates from open market or from the employment exchange or from both sources for a selection by them. If the employer decides to adopt both the courses, it cannot be precluded from doing so. But if the employer decides to restrict his choice to the candidates sponsored by the employment exchange, the same does not offend Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as has been held in Hargopal (4 supra).
32. It is too well settled and needs no restatement in our hands that a writ of Mandamus does not lie compelling the State or its instrumentalities to act contrary to law. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot issue any writ, order or direction compelling the State or its instrumentalities, as the case may be, to violate law. Such directions, in our considered opinion, may result in destruction of rule of law.
33. In Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao, : [2002]2SCR661 the Supreme Court explained the scope and conditions for exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a mandamus. It is observed:
'Coming to the third question, this is more important from the point of consideration of the High Court's power for issuance of Mandamus, it appears that the Constitution empowers the High Court to issue writs, directions or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore essentially, a power upon the High Court for issuance of high prerogative writs for enforcement of fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental or ordinary legal rights, which may come within the expression 'for any other purpose'. The powers of the High Courts under Article 226 though are discretionary and no limits can be placed upon their discretion, they must be exercised along the recognised lines and subject to certain self imposed limitations. The expression 'for any other purpose' in Article 226 makes the jurisdiction of the High Courts more extensive but yet the Courts must exercise the same with certain restraints and within some parameters. One of the conditions for exercising power under Article 226 for issuance of a mandamus is that the Court must come to the conclusion that the aggrieved person has a legal right, which entitles him to any of the rights and that such right has been infringed. In other words, existence of a legal right of a citizen and performance of any corresponding legal duty by the State or any public authority, could be enforced by issuance of a writ of Mandamus. 'Mandamus' means a command. It differs from the writs of prohibition or certiorari in its demand for some activity on the part of the body or person to whom it is addressed. Mandamus is a command issued to direct to any person, corporation, inferior courts or government, requiring him or them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of a public duty. A mandamus is available against any public authority including administrative and local bodies, and it would lie to any person who is under a duty imposed by a statute or by the common law to do a particular act. In order to obtain a writ or order in the nature of mandamus, the applicant has to satisfy that he has a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and such right must be subsisting on the date of the petition (Kalyan Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1962 SC 1183). The duty that may be enjoined by Mandamus may be one imposed by the Constitution, a statute, common law or by rules or orders having the force of law.'
34. In the case on hand, it is clear that the appellant-bank is not under any public duty or obligation to consider the applications of candidates for the purpose of recruitment of subordinate staff other than those sponsored by the employment exchange in view of its own rules/regulations. On the other hand, it is precluded from considering the candidature of any other candidate except those sponsored by the employment exchange. There is neither any public duty nor any corresponding right conferred upon any candidates for consideration of their cases for appointment in the subordinate staff in the appellant-bank along with the candidates sponsored by the employment exchange.
35. We are, therefore, of the opinion that so far as the appellant-bank is concerned, it is under public duty and obligation to implement its own regulations and legally bound to consider the candidature of only those whose names are sponsored by the employment exchange.
36. It has become a common practice to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking directions as against the employer to consider the application filed on one's own accord for employment along with the applications of the candidates sponsored by the employment exchange. The grant of such directions would confer a benefit on an individual without even ascertaining as to who are waiting in the rolls of employment exchange and since what period. By one stroke this Court cannot equate the candidates knocking the doors of this Court at the last minute asking for such relief with the candidates who are waiting in the queue in the employment exchange for years together. Such directions may result in treating the unequals as equals. It amounts to permitting such candidates to have a steal over their unsuspecting rivals. It may amount to creating a special class whose cases are required to be considered for selection and appointment along with the candidates sponsored by the employment exchange without any due regard to the seniority of registration. If such a situation is allowed to continue, it may ultimately result in creating and constituting a favoured class. The same would be an anathema to Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
37. The Supreme Court in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Administration, : (1992)IILLJ452SC cautioned that ignoring the legitimate claim of the persons registered in the Employment Exchanges and getting employed directly those who are either not registered with the Employment Exchange or who though registered are lower in the long waiting list in the Employment Register results in a large scale corruption. It is observed:
'Although there is an Employment Exchange Act which requires recruitment on the basis of registration in the Employment Exchange, it has become a common practice to ignore the Employment Exchange and the persons registered in the Employment Exchanges, and to employ and get employed directly those who are either not registered with the Employment Exchange or who though registered are lower in the long waiting list in the Employment Register. The Courts can take judicial notice of the fact that such employment is sought and given directly for various illegal considerations including money........A good deal of illegal employment market has developed resulting a new source of corruption and frustration of those who are waiting at the Employment Exchanges for years. Not all those who gain such backdoor entry in the employment or in need of the particular jobs. Though already employed elsewhere, they join the jobs for better and secured prospects. That is why most of the cases which come to the Courts are of employment in government departments, public undertakings or agencies.'
Emphasis is supplied).
38. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that a writ of Mandamus does not lie compelling the employer to act contrary to its own regulations or rules, as the case may be, and to consider the cases of those who submit applications directly on their own accord along with the candidates sponsored by the employment exchange, even though the rules or regulations, as the case may be, prohibit such consideration. In case where there is no such restriction imposed by the regulations or rules, as the case may be, the employer is bound to follow the procedure in terms of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Visweshwara Rao (1 supra). But, in case where the rules or regulations themselves provide for recruitment only from out of the candidates sponsored by the employment exchange, the employer is not required to issue any notification inviting applications and get the same published in the newspapers and consider those applications along with the candidates sponsored by the employment exchange. In the absence of any such rule or regulation, the employer is bound to invite applications from the interested candidates and follow a fair and transparent procedure satisfying the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
39. However, in the instant case, the respondent-writ petitioner has been working as part-time sweeper since April, 1994. The appellant-bank, obviously, intends to employ a different person in her place resulting in her retrenchment. Her case is required to be considered for re-employment if the process of recruitment undertaken by the appellant-bank results in retrenchment of the respondent-writ petitioner in terms of Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There shall be an order accordingly.
40. The impugned order under appeal is accordingly set aside. The writ appeal is disposed of. No order as to costs.
41. The Court acknowledges the invaluable assistance rendered by Sri G. Vidyasagar, learned amicus curiae who readily agreed to assist the Court at its request.