Judgment:
C.V.N. Sastri, J.
1. This Letters Patent Appeal by the first defendant in the suit is directed against the confirming judgment of the learned Single Judge decreeing the suit filed for rectification of the revenue records by incorporating the name of the first plaintiff as protected tenant of the suit land and also for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from claiming any interest in the suit lands or in the compensation payable for the acquisition of any portion of it and for other incidental reliefs.
2. The case has had a long and chequered career and this is, perhaps, the fourth round in this Court. Initially the trial Court dismissed the suit but on appeal, it was remanded to the trial Court. After remand, the trial court decreed the suit but again on appeal, it was remanded. Thereafter, the suit was once again, decreed by the trial Court and the same was confirmed on appeal by the learned Single Judge by the judgment under appeal. Hence the present Letters Patent Appeal by the first defendant in the suit. The facts necessary for the purpose of this appeal may be stated briefly:
3. The suit was originally filed by two persons, namely, Balaram Singh and Boddu Swamy as plaintiffs 1 and 2 respectively claiming that the first plaintiff was the protected tenant of the plaint Schedule lands and the second plaintiff was his co-tenant, that the name of the first plaintiff was duly recorded as the protected tenant in the official Tenancy Register prepared in the year 1950 as well as in the Khasra Pahani of the year 1954-55 and the name of the father of the second plaintiff was also recorded as joint tenant, but in the revenue records prepared after 1954, their names were omitted. The second defendant in the suit, namely, Abbasi Begum who was the pattedar of the suit lands, purported to alienate the same in favour of the first defendant by means of a registered gift (wakf) deed dated 22-8-1956 suppressing the fact that the first plaintiff was the protected tenant and the name of the first defendant was got surreptitiously incorporated in the revenue records as pattedar of the plaint schedule lands. The said alienation of the suit lands by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant was illegal and void as it was made without obtaining permission of the competent authority Under Section 47 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, (for short 'the Act'). It was also claimed that the first plaintiff acquired ownership rights to the suit lands Under Section 38-E of the Act. It was further claimed that a portion of the suit land was acquired by the Housing Board and the defendants had no right to claim any part of the compensation that might be awarded for the acquired land. On the said allegations the suit was filed claiming the aforementioned reliefs.
4. The first defendant alone contested the suit denying that the first plaintiff was the protected tenant and the second plaintiff was his co-tenant and further contending that the suit properties being Wakf properties, the suit was bad for non-joinder for the A.P. Wakf Board and that the suit was also barred Under Section 99 of the Act and the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It was also contended that the suit lands were declared as 'urban' land for the purpose of development and as such, they are outside the purview of the Act and the plaintiffs cannot, therefore, claim any rights in the same. It was finally contended by the first defendant that as there was a dispute with regard to the compensation awarded for the acquired land, a reference Under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act was made to the civil Court which held, by its judgment dated 28-12-1971 (marked as Ex.B-5), that the plaintiffs are not protected tenants and they are not, therefore, entitled to any portion of the compensation awarded. The said judgment operates as res judicata.
5. 1n the course of the proceedings both the plaintiffs died and their legal representatives were brought on record.
6. On consideration of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial Court as well as the learned Single Judge found all the issues in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit.
7. In this appeal, Sri Syed Sharif Ahmed, the learned Counsel for the appellant has advanced only two contentions. Firstly he contended that as it was held in Ex.B-5 that the plaintiffs were not the protected tenants and as the said judgment had become final, it operates as res judicata. In support of this contention, Sri Sharif sought to place reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Galib Bin Awaz v. Mohd. Abdul Khader, : [1987]2SCR1229 . Secondly the learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that the plaintiffs' claim for ownership rights Under Section 38-E of the Act was negatived by the Revenue Divisional Officer, who is the competent authority, by proceedings dated 27-2-1975 (marked as Ex.B-6) and as such the suit is liable to be dismissed.
8. As regards the first contention, the learned Judge has elaborately discussed the same in his judgment with reference to all the relevant statutory provisions and the case law on the subject. On an exhaustive review of the same, the learned Judge concluded that the question whether a person is a protected tenant or not, is a matter to be decided exclusively by the Tribunals constituted under the Act subject to revision by the High Court and the jurisdiction of the civil Court to go into the said question is expressly barred Under Section 99 of the Act. Accordingly the learned Judge held that the reference Court Under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act has no jurisdiction to go into the status of the first plaintiff as a protected tenant even incidentally and consequently its decision in Ex.B-5 is without jurisdiction and it does not, therefore, operate as res judicata. We are in agreement with the said conclusion reached by the learned single Judge.
9. In Galib Bin Avaz v. Mohd. Abdul Khader, : [1987]2SCR1229 relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant, the Supreme Court, no doubt, held that the arbitrator appointed under the Requisioning and Acquisition of Immovable property Act (30 of 1952) can decide the question of protected tenancy under the Act. But the said judgment is easily distinguishable from the case on hand as in the said case the Supreme Court pointed out that the bar Under Section 99 of the Act was against a civil Court but not against the arbitrator appointed under the Central Act. It was further pointed out therein that two earlier orders passed by the Supreme Court in that case had left it open to the arbitrator to decide the question whether the respondent in that case was a protected tenant or not. The said judgment of the Supreme Court cannot, therefore, render any assistance to the appellant herein. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant must, therefore, fail.
10. The second contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is also without any substance. As rightly pointed out by Sri P. Ramachandra Reddy, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, the Revenue Divisional Officer under Ex.B-6 dated 27-2-1975 accepted the first plaintiff's status as protected tenant but negatived his claim for ownership Under Section 38-E of the Act on the ground that the pattedar is not possessed of more than two family holdings. Section 38-E of the Act confers a special right on a protected tenant to acquire ownership of the lands in his possession provided that the landlord is possessed of more than two family holdings. If the landlord holds less than the two family holdings, then the protected tenant is not entitled to the ownership certificate. Therefore, the learned Judge was right in holding that the mere negation of right to ownership under Ex.B-6 does not extinguish the plaintiffs' rights to continute as protected tenants. The second contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant also thus fails.
11. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in the L.P.A. and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.