Judgment:
ORDER
S.R. Nayak, J.
1. The petitioner is the son of a deceased employee by name R. Govinda Swamy who was working as Fitter in the establishment of the respondent-Corporation. It is averred that R. Govinda Swamy died in harness on 2-9-1986 and at that time the petitioner was said to be a minor. The petitioner on attaining the age of majority made an application seeking employment in the services of the Corporation under a scheme framed by the Corporation authorities earmarking 30% of jobs to the children of deceased employees. It is further averred that in pursuance of the said application the petitioner was called for interview on 14-8-91 and he was interviewed also. But the petitioner did not receive any communication from the Corporation authorities as to what happened to the interview conducted by them. Therefore, the petitioner on 9-6-1994 caused a notice through lawyer. A reply was sent by the Corporation on 16-6-94 informing petitioner that after the death of his father his mother opted for receiving pecuniary benefits under the scheme and not for employment, and accordingly pecuniary benefits were extended to the widow-mother. It is also stated at para 8 that the mother of the petitioner died on 1-3-1990 itself.
2. Sri Jayaprakasha Rao, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that extension of pecuniary benefits under the scheme to the deceased-mother would not absolve the Corporation authorities from the duty of appointing the petitioner to a suitable post under the scheme and the action of the authorities in refusing the appointment to the petitioner is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In support of his submission Mr. Jayaprakasha Rao would place reliance on the decision of the Karnataka High Court reported in Usha Ram Prasad v. India Trade Promotion Organisation, New Delhi 1994 II CLR 305. In the said decision the learned Judge of the Karnataka High Court held that the mere fact that the petitioner therein had received financial benefits which she was otherwise legitimately entitled to receive owing to her husband's death is not a good ground to disentitle her to seek appointment on compassionate grounds. The judgment indicates that the pecuniary benefits extended to the wife of the deceased was otherwise available to her. But that decision is not helpful to the petitioner having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case. The scheme framed by the authorities of the A.P.S.R.T.C. clearly provides for two options, namely.
(i) option to receive pecuniary benefits or
(ii) option to seek employment to the children of the deceased employee.
The facts narrated supra clearly go to show that after the death of the employee, the widow of the employee opted for pecuniary benefits under the scheme and it is not the case of the petitioner that his mother did not receive the pecuniary benefits under the scheme. If that is so, now it is not permissible for the petitioner to turn round and say that he is also entitled to the other alternative benefit contemplated under the scheme. The dependents of the deceased employee cannot have both. They have to necessarily opt for one of the two. Looking from that angle, I do not find any irregularity or illegality committed by the Corporation authorities in denying the appointment to the petitioner. Sri Jayaprakasha Rao with his usual persuasion submit that pecuniary benefits would not a substitute for granting employment. It may be so, but this Court while deciding hard case cannot lay down bad law.
3. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, I dismiss the writ petition. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.