Judgment:
S.R. Nayak, J .
1. This writ appeal is preferred by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and its authorities assailing the validity and legality of the order of the learned single Judge dated 13-3-1987 made in Writ Petition No.8698 of 1985. The 1st respondent herein, namely, P. Srinivas Rao claiming to be a devotee of Narsingji Temple and Jeera Mutt situated in Jeera, Secunderabad belonging to Kimbaraka Sampradaya, a Vaishnavayet Institution, which is stated to have been founded more than two hundred years ago, filed the above writ petition praying for a direction to the State Government and its authorities to settle 'payment of compensation to the Jeera Mutt in accordance with the judgment and decree passed in AS No,20 of 1967, dated 12-4-1972.'
2. The background facts of the case may be summarised briefly as under: The Jeera Mutt was the owner of an extent of Ac. 15-05 guntas of land situated in and around the said Mutt. The land had been leased to one Vaman Naik. The said extent of land was acquired by the then Taluqdars of Bhagat under the provisions of Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act by passing an award on 18-7-1933 whereby and whereunder a sum of Rs.16,500/- as compensation was ordered to be paid to the perpetual lessee, namely, the said Hainan Naik and also a sum of Rs.600/- as annual grant to the Mahanth of the Mutt for life. The compensation was paid to the tenant and the annual grant of Rs.600/- was also paid to the Maliant upto 1972. In pursuance of the acquisition made in the year 1933, the possession of the land was taken over by the State authorities. The Mahant of the Mutt, being aggrieved by the award passed by the Taluqdars of Bhagat, dated 18-7-1933, awarding compensation to the tenant and denying compensation to the Mutt, sought reference of the claim to the High Court against the said award and the same was numbered as Case No.12/43F. While deciding that reference, a learned single Judge of the Hyderabad High Court by his order dated 25-10-1933 declined to entertain the reference holding that the acquired land was part of the British Administered area in Secunderabad and therefore His Excellency HEH Nizam's, Government had no jurisdiction over the acquired lands. Against this opinion of the learned single Judge, it is stated, an appeal was preferred to the Division Bench of Hyderabad High Court and the same was also dismissed. It is stated that the land thus acquired in the year 1933 was subsequently handed over to the Town Improvement Trust of Secunderabad which was subsequently merged in the A.P. Housing Board and the said Board in course of time had allotted the acquired land to a large number of persons and that the entire area is now fully developed. When the matter stood thus, in the year 1960, the Mahant of the Mutt filed a review petition before the District Collector, Nalgonda seeking review of the land acquisition proceedings initiated and completed in the year 1933. The District Collector did not take any action on the said review petition. When the matter stood thus, the Mahant of the Mutt filed a suit OS No.38 of 1964 in the Court of the First Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for declaration that the land acquisition proceedings 12th Shahruwar 1342 Fasli, dated 18-7-1933 issued by the Taluqdars of Bhagat were null and void and for a direction to the Government to issue a fresh notification so as to enable the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition to complete the acquisition proceedings de novo. The said suit was dismissed by the trial Court by its judgment and decree dated 21-1-1967. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the Mahant of the Mutt preferred AS No.20 of 1967 to the Court of Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The appellate Court by its judgment and decree dated 12-4-1972 allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge and decreed the suit. The decree passed by the learned Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad reads:
'This appeal coming on before me for hearing having been heard on 29th March, 1972, 5th April and 6th April, 1972 upon perusing the grounds of appeal, the judgment and decree of the lower Court and the material papers in the case and upon hearing the arguments of Sri C Seetharamaih, Advocate for the appellant and of Sri M.S. Rajalingam, Government Pleader for the respondent and the appeal having stood over to this day for consideration, this Court doth order and decree that the Judgment No.38 of 1964, be and hereby is set aside and this appeal is allowed. It is further ordered and decreed that the acquisition proceedings dated 12th Shahruwar 1342 Fasli (18-7-1933) by the Taluqdar of Baghat be and hereby declared null and void. This Court doth further order and decree that the respondent/Defendant do issue fresh notification to enable the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition (Housing Board) to complete the acquisition proceedings de novo. This Court doth further order and decree that the respondent/defendant do pay a sum of Rs.40.10 to the appellant/ plaintiff being the costs of the suit. It is further ordered and decreed that the respondent/Defendant do also pay a further sum of Rs.35.25 to the appellant/plaintiff being the costs of this appeal.'
3. Though the Mahant obtained a favourable decree, he did not execute the decree and the Government also did not take any steps to acquire the subject land de novo by issuing any further notification. The Government also did not assail the validity of the decree passed in AS No.20 of 1967 by preferring any further appeal. In other words, the decree passed by the Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad in AS No.20 of 1967 was allowed to become final.
4. When the matter stood thus, on 12-8-1985, the 1st respondent, P. Srinivasa Rao filed Writ Petition No.8698 of 1985 and that writ petition was allowed by a learned single Judge of this Court by order dated 13-3-1987. It reads:
'This writ petition is filed seeking a direction to the Government to settle the payment of compensation to the Jeera Mutt in accordance with the Civil Court's judgment. It is stated that the lands belonging to Jeera Mutt were acquired in the year 1933 but till now the compensation is not paid, though 43 years have elapsed.
In view of the above-stated circumstances, the Government is directed to settle the payment of compensation, according to law, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.'
5. Being aggrived by the above order of the learned single Judge, the State Government and its authorities have filed the writ appeal in the year 1989. During the pendency of the writ appeal, in the year 1995, the Mahant of Jeera Mutt viz., Sri Jyothi Prakash Das, as well as GPA holder filed WAMP Nos.517 of 1996 and WA No.2909 of 1995 respectively to implead them as party respondent to the writ appeal. The WAMP filed by the GPA holder was dimissed on 14-6-1996 on the ground that the Mahant did not empower the GPA holder to pursue legal remedies. However, the Court by a separate order made in WAMP No.517 of 1996 made on the same day i.e., 14-6-1996, allowed WAMP No.517 of 1996 and impleaded the Mahant as party-respondent to the writ appeal. Subsequently, a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 24-6-1996, opining that the acquisition of the land in the year 1933 is ab-initio void and the State Government being a welfare State cannot take the property of the citizens without paying compensation and that the State Government should have taken steps to acquire the land de-novo in pursuance of the decree dated 12-4-1972 in AS No.20 of 1967, and also opining that it would be unreal to direct the Government to start acquisition proceedings de novo inasmuch as such a course of action would give an unfair advantage to the Mahant in the matter of determination of the compensation amount, directed as follows:
'......we will direct that the compensation payable to the respondents-Mutt be determined as if Section 4(1) notification was issued on 12-4-1972 i.e., date of the appellate Court's judgment. But so far as the potential value of the land is concerned, 25% of such value as is relatable to the improvements made by the Government between 1933 to 1972 shall only be payable to the respondents, but that in fixing the market value all other legitimate considerations as under the Land Acquisition Act shall be taken into account. We direct that records be sent to the Court of Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad to enquire and determine the compensation payable to the Mutt adopting the principles of the Land Acquisition Act, subject to the conditions as stipulated above. In making the enquiry the Court shall afford opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence. After the compensation is determined, the report along with records be submitted to this Court for passing the orders regarding the payment of compensation. The enquiry be completed within two months from the date of receipt of the records from the Court along with the order. The Registry is directed to despatch the records to the Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.'
At this stage itself, it needs to be emphasised that the above direction was issued by this Court as an interlocutory direction without there being any application from any of the parties as could be seen from the records. As directed by this Court, the Additional Chief, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, after holding enquiry, submitted a report dated 9-7-1997 determining the market value of the acquired land at Rs.1,73,80,440/- as on 12-4-1972. It was also held by the learned II Additional Chief Judge, CCC, Hyderabad in the report that the Mutt is entitled to all the statutory benefits under the amendment Act 68 of 1984 except the benefits under Section 23(1)(A) of the Land Acquisition Act. In the meanwhile, the State and the State authorities have filed WAMP No.2088 of 2000 for recalling the order dated 24-6-1996, WAMP (SR). No.92478 of 2000 for review of the order dated 24-6-1996, WAMP (SR). No.92475 of 2000 seeking permission to file additional grounds and WAMP No.2087 of 2000 to condone the delay of 1447 days in filing the review application. The appeal along with the above applications were placed before us for final hearing.
6. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the State and its authorities would contend that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the writ petition filed by the so-called devotee of the mutt is not maintainable; that by invoking the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the mutt or its mahant or its devotee cannot be permitted to circumvent the remedies provided under CPC or A.P. Hindu Charitable and Religious Endowments, Act, by which the institution of the Jeera Mutt is governed, nor the power of this Court under Article 226 can be invoked to revive a cause of action, which is barred by law of limitation under the statute. The learned Advocate-General would highlight that admittedly the land was acquired as far back as on 18-7-1933 under the provisions of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act and neither the mutt nor the perpetual lessee took any steps to recover possession of the subject land lost in the year 1933 itself, after the Hyderabad High Court, on a reference made by the Mahant, declared by its order dated 25-10-1973 that the acquisition of the land under the provisions of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act is invalid and since possession of the land remained with the State from the year 1933, after expiry of a period of 12 years, that is to say in the year 1945 itself, the title of the mutt to the acquired land was divested and the same was invested in the State Government by force of law of prescription. Further, the learned Advocate-General would contend that even the decree dated 12-4-1972 secured by the mahant of the Mutt in AS No.20 of 1967 from the Court of the Additional Chief Judge, CCC, Hyderabad was allowed to lapse and become in executable after the expiry of 12 years period. In other words, the learned Advocate-General would contend that the decree passed in AS No.20 of 1967 on 12-4-1972 could not be executed under CPC after 12-4-1984. Thus, the learned Advocate-General would contend that the mutt has lost the right to recover possession of the subject land or to claim any compensation in respect of the said land, by application of law of prescription as well as on account of the fact that the civil Court decree dated 12-4-1972 in AS No.20 of 1967 became barred by time as on 12-4-1984, and in that view of the matter there was absolutely no justification, legal or factual, for the learned single Judge to issue the kind of direction impugned in the writ appeal, and particularly at the instance of a devotee of the mutt. The learned Advocate-General would further contend that even on facts, the direction issued by the learned single Judge, is totally unjust and arbitrary, because when the land was acquired under the provisions of Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act and the compensation was determined, the perpetual lessee and the mahant of the mutt received compensation of Rs.16,500/-and annuity grant of Rs.600/- respectively and that this conduct of the mahant disentitles him from making any grievance at this distance of time. The learned Advocate-General would lastly contend that the writ petition should have been dismissed in limine on the ground of laches itself, as there is absolutely no explanation of the writ petitioner for the delay in filing the writ petition in the year 1985, after a long lapse of 52 years from the date of acquisition of the land and after a lapse of 13 years from the date of the decree dated 12-4-1972 in AS No.20 of 1967.
7. Mr. M. Srinivasa Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the mahant of the mutt, the 3rd respondent in the writ appeal, would contend that since the acquisition of the land in the year 1933 under the provisions of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act is held to be illegal and void by the judgment and decree dated 12-4-1972 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judge, CCC, Hyderabad in AS No.20 of 1967, it became imperative for the State and its authorities either to reconvey possession of the subject land to the mutt and if that is impracticable or impossible, on account of the fact that the land is already developed extensively and it has become a posh area in the city, then, to determine fair compensation and pay the same to the mutt. The learned Counsel would further contend that the State and its authorities cannot be permitted to make unlawful gain at the peril of the mutt having taken over possession of the subject land for public purpose without the authority of law. The learned Counsel would also contend that since by virtue of the direction issued by this Court on 24-6-1986 the learned Additional Chief Judge, CCC, Hyderabad has already submitted a report determining compensation after conducting enquiry, it is appropriate that the State be directed to pay the compensation as determined by the learned Additional Chief Judge, CCC, Hyderabad. None appeared on behalf of the writ petitioner-respondent nor any representation was made on his behalf.
8. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, a short question that arises for our consideration and decision is whether the learned single Judge is justified in directing the Government to settle the payment of compensation in respect of the subject land, which was acquired and the possession of which was taken over in the year 1933. It cannot be gainsaid that the question of payment of compensation in respect of a land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act would not arise unless such land is actually acquired under the provisions of the said Act. In other words, the acquisition of the lands should precede payment of compensation as envisaged under the said Act. It is not even the case of the writ petitioner that the subject land was acquired by the State Government after the civil Court passed the decree in AS No.20 of 1967 on 12-4-1972. In that view of the matter, issuance of a direction to the State to pay compensation to the owner of the land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act, without issuing a direction to the State to acquire such land as envisaged under the said Act, would not arise. In the writ petition, the petitioner did not seek any direction to the State and its authorities to acquire the land and pay compensation in terms of the provisions of the said Act nor the learned single Judge, even assuming that the High Court can mould the relief and pass appropriate order, has not issued any direction to the State Government to acquire the land and pay compensation. It is altogether a different matter whether this Court can, in the facts and circumstances of the case, would justify in issuing a direction to the State and its authorities to acquire the land which was taken over by the State authorities as far back as in the year 1933, that too, after payment of compensation to the perpetual lessee and annuity of Rs.600/- to the mahant for large number of years. Of course, that is not the question which directly arises before us in this appeal. However, if we were to answer that question, it is trite to state that such a direction could not be issued by this Court in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. We say this because, the power under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked by a person to revive a legal right lost by him by application of law of limitation or a right which is lost otherwise by operation of law. As pointed out supra, not only mutt lost the property by law of prescription, but also the civil Court decree dated 12-4-1972 in AS No.20 of 1967 was also allowed to lapse with effect from 12-4-1972.
9. The Supreme Court, in State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar, : [2000]2SCR134 , held that when possession has been taken by the appellants therein pursuant to void documents, Article 65 of the Limitation Act would apply and the limitation to file the suit would be 12 years. Even assuming that the acquisition of the land under the provisions of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act, 1933 was void ab-initio as contended by the mutt and its mahant, even then, after expiry of 12 years from the date of taking over the possession of the subject land by the State authorities, the mutt could not have sought recovery of possession. Sarangadeva Peria Matam, v. Ramaswanri Goundar, : [1966]1SCR908 , is an authority to state that the mutt being a juristic person, having the power to acquire, own and possess properties and having the capacity to sue and being sued, may acquire property by prescription and may likewise lose property by adverse possession. In paragraph 6 of the above judgment, the Apex Court held --
'We are inclined to accept the respondents' contention. Under Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, limitation for a suit by a math or by any person representing it for possession of immovable properties belonging to it runs from the time when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. The math is the owner of the endowed property. Like an idol, the math is a juristic person having the power of acquiring, owning and possessing property and having the capacity of suing and being sued. Being an ideal person, it must of necessity act in relation to its temporal affairs through human agency............It may acquire property by prescription and may likewise lose property by adverse possession. If the math while in possession of its property is dispossessed OP if the possession of a stranger becomes adverse, it suffers an injury, and has the right to sue for the recovery of the property........'
There is no controversy between the parties that the Slate took over possession of the subject land in the year 1933 itself and since then it and subsequently its alienees have been in adverse possession and the whole property has been passed on to hundreds of hands in the course of these decades.
10. Even otherwise, no relief could have been granted in the writ petition in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, : AIR1995SC1991 . In that case in the year 1991, the respondent, an agriculturist of the State of Maharashtra, filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) for a direction to the State Government to grant him compensation for his land allegedly utilised by the Government without his consent in the course of execution of scarcity relief works undertaken by the State Government in the year 1971-72. Rejecting the plea of the Government to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches, and allowing the writ petition, the High Court, held that in a welfare State, the State Government could not take such attitude when the citizens came before the Court and complained that they had been deprived of their property without following due process of law and without paying compensation. Before the Supreme Court, the State urged that the respondent was, on account of the laches and delay on his part, disentitled to any relief from the High Court. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the power of the High Court under Article 226 must be exercised judiciously and reasonably and persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where the Court grants the relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 against any person including the State without considering his blameworthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State.
11. In the instant case also, the writ petitioner filed the writ petition in the year 1985, that is to say, after 52 years from the date of acquisition of the land and after 13 years from the date of the decree in AS No.20 of 1967 without any satisfactory explanation for this inordinate delay, and in that view of the matter, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine.
12. Above all, the very conduct of the mutt and its mahant does not entitle them to any relief at the hands of this Court under Article 226. We say this because, when the land was acquired in the year 1933 and compensation was determined and annuity grant payable to the mahant was also determined, both the perpetual lessee and the mahant received the compensation and the annuity grant till the year 1972. If the mahant or the mutt was of the opinion that the land acquired by the State Government is null and void, it/he should not have received the compensation and the annuity grant till the year 1972 and should have sought enforcement of the decree dated 12-4-1972 in AS No.20 of 1967 within the period of limitation and having failed to pursue such lawful course available to them by virtue of the decree, they cannot seek the kind of relief sought in the writ petition.
13. The mutt is an institution and governed by the provisions of A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Endowments Act, which provides the complete machinery for adjudication by the Deputy Commissioner, of several types of disputes under Section 87 of the said Act. The suits in regard to such matters are also barred under Section 157 of the said Act. Having regard to the nature of the present claim, it should be held that a devotee can only figure as a next friend and the next friend can come into picture only when the institution is left without a person who is in management or where there is dereliction of duty on the part of a person who is in charge of the management. None of these conditions existed when the so-called devotee presented the writ petition and, therefore, the writ petition filed by the devotee is not maintainable. It is also relevant to notice that the perpetual lessee who received the compensation of Rs. 16,500/- and the mahant of the mutt who received the annuity grant of Rs.600/- till the year 1972 after acquisition of the land in the year 1933 are also not made parties to the writ petition. In that view of the matter also, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine for non-joinder of necessary parties.
14. It is relevant to notice that when the lands were acquired in the year 1933, they were found to be in possession of a perpetual lessee and compensation was determined and it was paid to the perpetual lessee. In addition thereto, annuity was also paid to the mahant for nearly 40 years as part of compensation. Though the High Court of Hyderabad declared that acquisition proceeding was null and void, no fresh acquisition proceedings were undertaken for all these years. It is stated in the counter-affidavit filed by the State and its authorities that the Government allotted the property to the Town Improvement Trust and it was parceled out into house sites and several people purchased the same and constructed buildings. After all these developments, the mahant filed the suit in the year 1964 and though he was able to secure a favourable decree in AS No.20 of 1964, he allowed the decree to lapse and become non-executable. In that view of the matter also, the writ petition does not merit acceptance and consideration on merit.
15. Before concluding, we may advert to the submission made by Mr. M. Srinivasa Rao, learned senior Counsel appearing for the mahant of the mutt with regard to the interlocutory order made by this Court on 24-6-1996, to which reference is already made above. It is true that this Court, without there being any application by any of the parties, directed the Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad to conduct enquiry and determine compensation. It is also true that in pursuance of that direction, the II Additional Chief Judge, CCC, Hyderabad has submitted a report on 9-7-1997. We do not think that either the direction issued by this Court on 24-6-1996 or the report submitted by the II Additional Chief Judge, CCC, Hyderabad on 9-7-1997 will have any bearing on the decision-making at the final hearing of the writ appeal. As pointed out supra, in our considered opinion, the writ petition should not have been entertained at all for more than one reason and neither the mutt nor the mahant nor the devotee is entitled to seek mandamus to the State Government to pay compensation for the land acquired particularly having allowed the decree in AS No.20 of 1964 dated 12-4-1972 to lapse by force of law of limitation. On equitable grounds also, neither the mutt nor the mahant is entitled to again receive compensation for the same acquired land in addition to the compensation already received by the perpetual lessee and the mahant, even assuming that the acquisition made in the year 1933 is invalid.
16. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we allow the writ appeal and set aside the order of the learned single Judge dated 13-3-1987 made in WP No.8698 of 1985. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed. With the disposal of the writ appeal, all the interlocutory orders made during the pendency of the writ appeal shall stand vacated. In that view of the matter, WAMP No.2088 of 2000 for recalling the order dated 24-6-1996, WAMP. (SR.) No.92478 of 2000 for review of the order dated 24-6-1996, WAMP (SR) No.92475 of 2000 seeking permission to file additional grounds and WAMP No.2087 of 2000 do not survive for consideration on merit and they are accordingly disposed of as unnecessary. No costs.