V. Sivaraman Nair, J.
1. This batch of 24 writ petitions - six of them-W.P.Nos. 8817,9221,9231,9824, 9825 and 10058 of 1992 filed by Associations of Students, six - W.P. Nos. 9661, 9731, 9843, 9852, 9946 and 10264 of 1992 filed by individual students, six W.P.Nos. 8592, 8698,9187,9809,9972 and 10687 of 1992 filed by aspirants for permission and the rest by individuals or Organisations interested in the cause of education, raise questions of concern about what the petitioners call crass commercialisation of professional education. Counsel for some of the respondents prefer the phrase 'privatisation of higher education'. They claim this to be the natural corrolary of liberalisation of Indian economy from the shackles of excessive control by the State, which is constrained by acute lack of resources for further development of institutions of technical and professional education. We heard the matter at length and are now delivering two judgments in two parts comprehending all the complex questions which were raised before us. Some of the petitioners have raised only aspects of validity of Section 3-A of the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admission and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act 5 of 1983, which was introduced by State Act 12 of 1992 and the Rules made thereunder. The other petitions involve challenge against the actions taken by the State and the educational agencies pursuant to that Act and the Rules. Three writ petitions are filed by persons Societies which would have filed applications for establishing Medical/ Engineering Colleges, but could not do so because there was hardly reasonable time to comply with the onerous conditions insisted upon by the Government in G.O.Ms. No. 198 and G.O.Ms. No. 250 and therefore, seek orders to quash those and other consequential orders. Three other writ petitions are filed by unsuccessful applicants. In this part of the judgment, we deal only with 9 Writ Petitions in which the separate questions apart from the validity of the statute and the Rules arise for consideration.
2. Petitioners in W.P.Nos. 9824 and 9825 of 1992 have sought to quash the orders granting permission to open 12 Medical Colleges and 8 Dental Colleges. They produced only an unnumbered Government Order dated 27-7-1992 along with the Writ Petitions. The Advocate General has produced all the relevant orders. Except the numbers - G.O.Ms. 321 to 340 and the names of the educational agencies - the orders are virtually the same.
3. Three aspirants for establishing Medical and Dental Colleges and two for Engineering Colleges are before us. Only two of them for Medical Colleges in Hyderabad /R.R. District and one for Engineering College in Nellore District had filed applications.
4. Petitioners in W.P. No. 8592 /92 have sought the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash G.O.Ms. No. 250 dated 22-5-1992. They had not filed applications, allegedly due to lack of reasonable time between the date of promulgation of the Rule and the last date for submission of applications.
5. W.P.Nos. 9809/92 and 10687/92 are filed by applicants for permission to establish Medical Colleges. In W.P. No. 9809/92, petitioner has sought issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the permission accorded by respondent No. 1 to respondents 3 to 14 and to declare that the petitioner is entitled for permission to set up a private unaided medical college. In W.P. No. 10687/92, petitioner has sought a direction to respondent No. 1 to grant permission to run a private medical college in pursuance of G.O.Ms. No. 250.
6. In W.P. No. 8698/92, the relief sought is a declaration that the notification bearing No.E2/25801 /91 dated 20-5-92 issued by the 2nd respondent is arbitrary and illegal. In W.P. No. 9187/92, petitioner has sought a declaration that G.O.Ms. No. 198 dated 20-5-1992 and actions pursuant thereto are illegal, void and ultravires. In W.P. No. 9972/92, the relief sought is a direction to consider the petitioner's application and to grant permission to commence Engineering College at Kandaleru, Nellore District.
7. W.P. No. 9946/92 is filed by a student who had appeared in the EAMCET test and had secured rank No. 246 among minority students. He seeks a direction to the respondents to admit him into the respondent-Engineering college, by reason of his rank among minority students who have passed the EAMCET test on the basis of merit without reference to Section 3-A of Act 5 of 1983 as amended by Act 12 of 1992.
8. The question of constitutionality of Act 12 of 1992 and Section 3-A which was introduced thereby in Act 5 of 1983 has been dealt with at some*length in the other Judgment. The points which remain for consideration are the submissions contained in the above Writ Petitions i.e. bias and other circumstances vitiating the orders granting permission to establish the colleges as specifically urged in W.P.Nos. 9824/92 and 9825/92. We will begin with the last two petitions where all grantees are parties and in which all concerned have filed detailed pleadings.
9. W.P. No. 9824/92 and 9825/92 contain substantially similar submissions, petitioners are Organisations of students represented by their Office Bearers. They claim to be interested in opposing the grant of permission to establish 12 Medical and 8 Dehtal Colleges in the State, 50% of the seats in which are proposed to be filled up by admitting students without reference to EAMCET ranking and constitutional and statutory reservations. They have alleged that the lst respondent granted permission for establishment of Medical and Dental Colleges due entirely to extraneous considerations. It is specifically alleged that the 5th respondent/Chief Minister was personally interested in Janapriya Educational Academy (respondent Nos. 8 and 22) of which his brother is Secretary and his wife is Treasurer. Though petitioners have alleged that grant of permission to respondents 6,7 and 9 to 25 also is the product of influence of extraneous considerations, we are not inclined to entertain that submission in the absence of better particulars of such extraneous considerations. We do not think it necessary to investigate such allegations due to the fact that the persons against whom some sweeping allegations are made, have not been impleaded as party-respondents.
10. Respondents who have filed counter affidavits have controverted those general allegations. They have brought on record a lot of materials justifying their selection for grant of permission to establish Medical and Dental colleges. They have also placed before us some statistical data in support of their submission that a better cost-efficient fee structure alone can salvage higher/ professional education in the State in view of resource-constraints gripping the State and the need to fix priorities in favour of development and poverty alleviation rather than for higher education which is a luxury. A further inquiry into the assertions and counter assertions on these aspects particularly the vague and nebulous area of mala fides does not seem to be within the scope of these proceedings.
11. Petitioners have in their affidavits, which are almost similar, stated that the 5th respondent went out of his way to favour the 8th and 22nd respondents, of which his brother is Secretary and his wife is Treasurer. It is asserted that it was the Chief Minister who decided the issue finally. In paragraph 13 of the affidavit (W.P. No. 9824/92) it is asserted that:
'This action is vitiated by personal mala fides of the Chief Minister which is based on corrupt and dishonest considerations, firstly, since he himself is associated with lanapriya Educational Society which has been granted permission to set up a. Medical and Dental College at Nellore.'
Paragraphs 14 and 15 allege the involvement of the members of the family of the 5th respondent in the attempt to establish Medical and Dental Colleges.
12. The 5th respondent has filed a counter affidavit. He dealt with the above assertions in paragraph 6(c) of his counter affidavit in the following terms :
'6(c): The allegations in paragraphs 13,14 and 15 are not true. I am not associated with Janapriya Educational Society as alleged. The alleged press statement is not accurate. The N.K.B.R. Institute of Science and Technology (an Engineering College) is run by Harijana Vidyarthi Udharana Sangham at Vakadu. The plea of the Janapriya Educational Society at Vakadu is owned by my family earlier is not true. The allegation that Janapriya Educational Society got permission to start a Medical and Dental college due to my personal interest and involvement is not true. The Expert Committee recommendations were accepted in toto. I deny that M. Subbarami Reddy is my confidant or my unofficial business partner as alleged by the petitioner.'
13. The Principal Secretary to Government, Health, Medical Family Welfare Department, has filed a counter affidavit on behalf of the 1st respondent in W.P. No. 9825/92. He denied the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the petitioner's affidavit as baseless. He stated that:
'An expert committee was appointed for Medical and Dental Colleges. Based on the recommendations of the expert committee, these institutions were selected imposing a number of conditions. In regard to other colleges, no orders have been issued. '
14. In paragraph 14 he stated that:
'The Janapriya Educational Academy was registered only on 11-5-1992. The President of the Society is Dr. D. Bhaskara Reddy and its Secretary is Sri N.Padmanabha Reddy.'
In paragraph 29 of the counter affidavit it is stated that:
'the decision to start private colleges was taken by the Cabinet. The actual choice was made by the portfolio Minister and the Chief Minister.'
15. It is therefore, clear from the pleadings that the 8th respondent-Society which was formed on 11-5-1992 has as its Secretary-Sri N. Padmanabha Reddy, who is admittedly the brother of the Chief Minister. From a perusal of the Memorandum of Association of the 8th respondent Academy/Society, which was produced for our perusal, and which we have marked as Ex.X-1, it is clear that the Treasurer of R-8 and R-22 is Smt. N. Rajyalakshmi, wife of the 5th respondent. The question of bias which the petitioners urge has to be considered in the light of the above facts which are evident from the record. We have also ascertained from counsel and the records and were assured that the applications of respondent Nos. 8 and 22 on behalf of Janapriya Educational Academy for permission to start the new colleges were signed by Sri Padmanabha Reddy, brother of the 5th respondent.
16. Bias of the decision-makers has been considered to vitiate the decision, be it that of judges or administrators. It is hardly a defence to say that the decision-making was not strictly judicial and standards applicable to nonjudicial process should be different. Nor does it seem to us correct to assert that bias cannot be imputed to an individual, some of whose relatives are members of a Society, because the latter has got a personality different from its constituents.
17. The Advocate-General referred us to a few decisions to bring home the point that bias vitiates only judicial or quasi judicial determinations and not pure administrative decisions - Gollapalli Nageswara Rao v. State of A.P., : [1960]1SCR580 and APSRTC v. Satyanarayana Transport, : AIR1965SC1303 . He also submitted that the question of bias is relevant only in cases where a person who suffers as a direct consequence of the biased decision complains and not otherwise. He submitted further that the relationship in the present case of two office bearers of the Academy to the 5th respondent is far too distant a factor to rest a finding on that the decision is vitiated by bias. He also urged that we need not consider the challenge based on bias vitiating the impugned orders in petitions that the two organisations or its Office Bearers have filed, since they are not directly affected/or prejudiced thereby, he submitted further that the Writ Petitions which contain general and vague assertions cannot be the basis for starting an investigation based on a complaint of bias. Advocate General also submitted that there was only one application for grant of permission to establish medical and dental colleges at Nellore, and the choice of the 8th and 22nd respondents who were the only qualified applicants cannot be faulted. He submitted further that only a competing applicant can be prejudiced by a biased decision and he alone can raise the question of bias. Sri P. Ramachandra Reddy, who appeared for respondents 8 and 22 also made submissions generally on these lines.
18. We have given our anxious thought to these submissions. We find that the basic facts are not in controversy. The wife and brother of the 5th respondent are Office Bearers of the 8th and 22nd respondents. According to the bye-laws and Memorandum of Association, that Society was registered with a membership of 7, on 11-5-1992. Two out of the seven are close relations of the 5th respondent. The powers and functions of the Secretary and Treasurer of the Society are extensive as is evident from Ex.X-1. The applications on behalf of respondents 8 and 22 were signed by the brother of the 5th respondent. The Government is said to have formed an Expert Committee to consider all those applications. It is alleged that the selection was made on the basis of its report. It is asserted that the final choice was made by the portfolio Minister and the 5th respondent. The question is whether on the above facts, it is open to a person other than an. applicant to complain about bias of the decision-maker in choosing the above two respondents for grant of permission to establish the colleges.
19. It is of paramount importance that decisions affecting the lives and liberties of citizens are rendered by people who are impartial, act fairly and bring to bear a dispassionate and objective consideration to the issues involved. 'It is of fundamental importance' as Lord Hewart C.J., stated in R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte Me Carthy, 1924(1) KB 256 'that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done'. This was elaborated by Denning L.J., in Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. v. Lanon, 1969 (1) QB 577 as follows:
'It (the Court) does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand. Nevertheless, there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture is not enough. There must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the justice, or Chairman, as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side unfairly at the expense of the other. The court will not inquire whether he did. in fact, favour one side unfairly. Suffice it that reasonable people might think he did. The reason is plain enough. justice must be routed in confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking 'the ludge was biased.'
20. It is instructive to note that one of the grounds to disqualify the respondent who sat as Chairman of a Rent Assessment Committee was that his father had a case pending against the plaintiff company. Lord Denning invalidated the decision of the Committee holding:
'In this case he (the respondent) was not a tenant, but the son of a tenant. But that makes no difference.'
21. The heresy that a public authority acting administratively - in the sense of otherwise than judicially - was beyond the control of courts was shot down in the common law countries in Re HK (as infant), 1967 (2) QB 617. That was followed by Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affair, 1969(2) Ch. 149 In India the obsequies of the theorty of wholesale exemption of administrative determinations from scrutiny of courts was performed in Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 15 when Hegde, J. speaking for a Constitution Bench observed:
'The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasijudicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated... In a welfare State like ours, it is inevitable that the organ of the State under. our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours, it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially, in essence, is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years, the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi judicial power' and'If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times, it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far-reaching effect than a decision in a quasijudicial enquiry.'
22. These principles were reiterated in M/s S. Mahapatra & Co. v. State of Orissa, : [1985]1SCR322 as applicable to exercise of quasi-judicial as well as administrative power. The Court observed that:
'There was, however, nothing to prevent those whose books were submitted for selection from pointing out this fact to the State Government so that it could amend its resolution by appointing a substitute or substitutes, as the case may be. There was equally nothing to prevent such non-official author - members from resigning from the Committee on the ground of their interest in the matter.'
23. The theme of the decision Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, : [1978]2SCR272 was the same as in Kraipak (7 supra), Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the majority held:
'Once we understand the soul of the rule as fair play in action - and it is so - we must hold that it extends to both the fields. After all, administrative power in a democratic set up is not allergic to fairness in action and discretionary executive justice cannot degenerate into unilateral injustice.'
24. As a matter of fact, in Gullapally Nageswara Rao (1 supra) and APSRTC (2 supra), the Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the concerned Ministers approving Schemes of nationalisation under Motor Vehicles Act proposed by. the Transport Department/Undertaking for the reason that the former was not part of, but outside the Department, and that bias of the Department could not be transposed to the Minister. Those decisions do proceed on the basis that if the Secretary or the Minister himself proposed the Scheme and the same person ultimately approved the Scheme overruling objections of Transport Operators, that order would be vitiated by bias. Two of us in two Division Bench decisions had occasion to consider the same question of bias with reference to the above two and other decisions, V. Sivaraman Nair, J. in W.P. No. 10263/90 and Batch dated 25-9-91 and M.N. Rao, J. in B. Narasimhulu v. Government of A.P., 1990 (3) ALT 502. We in entered the same finding that the association of the Department or its Secretary in the initiation of proceedings cannot affect the final decision taken by the Minister in-charge of the Department.
25. We should note here a submission which counsel for the petitioner made with specific reference to the decision in M/s Mahapatra (8 supra) and the Rules of Business of the State Government. Rules 5 and 7 of the above Rules provide that if any member of the Council of Ministers is interested in any matter coming up for consideration, the file may be referred to another Minister as may be nominated. Counsel submits that if the 5th respondent was fair-minded as he claims, he should have nominated another Minister to take a decision on the applications. We are not persuaded to dismiss this submission out: of hand.
26. We, therefore, hold that it makes little difference to the application of the principles of natural justice, of which 'no person shall be a judge in his own cause' is an important one, to the determination of disputes by mart or women in authority - be it judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative. The only limitation shall be a provision in a statute excluding natural justice. Even such a provision cannot outlive a challenge on constitutional grounds unlike in England; where the Parliament is supreme, whereas in India the Constitution is.
27. Advocate General submitted that no lis is involved in the grant of permission to establish medical colleges and therefore, the principles of natural justice including bias, cannot apply to the decision rendered by the 1st respondent. It is too late in the day to urge this contention after Kraipak (7 supra). The selection of the best from among eligibles for appointment in the Indian Forest Service, which was considered in that decision, also did not involve a lis in the conventional sense. There was no formal proposal from one party, opposition by the other and a decision on a consideration of both. But/there was a duty to assess the eligibility of all aspirants and also to choose on a comparison of their merits and demerits on the basis of relevant and material considerations. That involved screening away the ineligibles, choice of the best and rejection of others who did not make the grade. Any process of selection when aspirants are many more than what can be granted, involves the process of comparison, elimination and selection. Every such proceeding invites in substance quasi- judicial process, particularly when people seek to assert their rights constitutional legal or otherwise; and selection involves rejection of such claims of some of them. If conformity with tradition is obligatory, the invocation of the power to grant the licence or privilege or permission which regulates the right may be treated as a proposal. It is not as if every such proposal shall be granted. for its compliance with the prescribed formalities, if there is no competing applicant. It shall still be scrutinised to ascertain whether it is desirable that the sole applicant may or may not be granted the permission. Every such proposal may be treated as an opposition to similar proposal if there are other applicants. The selection of the required number of applicants and rejection of the others is the decision in either case. If the only applicant is refused permission or licence, that decision is also quasi-judicial. Like wise, the grant of permission to the sole applicant may in certain circumstances, be exposed to scrutiny and review for non-compliance with the statutory guidelines or being opposed to public interest. In all those cases, conventional requirements of quasi-judicial proceedings will be satisfied. It is idle to contend, after Kraipak (7 supra) that a process of decision-making involving ascertainment whether statutory requirements are satisfied, whether public interest is furthered or prejudiced and choice on comparison of competing claims of aspirants, who are larger in number than the positions to be offered, including rejection of a few - is purely administrative and therefore, beyond the scope of natural justice and bias.
28. It is well to remember that the A.P. Education Act, 1982, under which the Government invited applications for grant of permission to establish Medical, Dental and Engineering colleges, is a statute that conferred a statutory right on educational agencies to apply for such permission. Sections 20 and 21 regulate the exercise of that statutory right. One of those considerations is the educational needs of the locality. Suitability of the land and building, the teaching staff and conditions of their service, financial resources of the applicant etc., are some of the other relevant considerations. The competent authority has to consider the applications with reference to the above and other guidelines provided in those provisions. What the Government, therefore, had before it when it took the decision to grant permission, were applications for exercise of the statutory right by educational agencies. They were more in number than the number of colleges which the Government decided to grant. That did involve an assessment on the basis of the objective criteria which the A.P. Education Act, 1982, and the Rules including G.O.Ms. No. 250 and 198 of 1992 have provided. It was obviously for the purpose of ascertaining whether the applicants did comply with those criteria and who among them complied better that the Government appointed an Expert Committee. All the elements of a quasi-judicial determination were thus present - a lis in the sense of the applications - which were proposals that incidentally involved opposition to the proposals of others and an obligation to render a decision on the basis of objective standards prescribed by the statute to deal with and dispose of attempts by educational agencies to assert their statutory right.
29. Advocate General submitted that there were no applications for establishment of Medical and Dental Colleges at Nellore, except those from respondents 8 and 22, and therefore, there was no opposition to those applications. He therefore, submitted that since there was no need to compare that applicant with any other aspirant, and there was no other application to be rejected, no quasi-judicial process was involved in granting permission to the above two respondents. He also submitted that only a rival who has lost, can complain of bias of the decision-maker and mere was no rival to those respondents. In other words, none other, much less a public interest litigant even assuming the petitioners in W.P.Nos. 9824 and 9825 of 1992 qualify as such - can challenge the decision in favour of respondents 8 and 22 on the ground of bias. These submissions were reiterated by Sri P. Ramachandra Reddy, counsel for respondents 8 and 22.
30. We are not impressed by either of these submissions. We have found that the applications by the educational agencies have to be tested for their compliance with the statutory conditions and obligatory standards. The Government has to test each applicant on the crucible of conformity with objective standards prescribed by the statute, even if there was no competing applicant. Even if there was only one applicant for one college to be sanctioned, that application can as well be rejected, if it does not comply with the objective standards. The decision as to compliance rested with the Government. We are of the view that even if there was no competing applicant, the Government had an obligation to conform to the standards fixed by the statute and in public interest in dealing with the sole applicant. That determination naturally attracts the principles of natural justice. It was stated with incomparable felicity in Guptan v. State, 1963 KLT 1031' by Chief Justice Menon of Kerala High Court that 'all wielding of power shall be held in the leading strings of fair procedure.' Grant of permission to establish an educational institution is undoubtedly a 'wielding of power'. Fairness in action is an appeal to the sober second thoughts of every administrator charged with decision-making in preference to first impulses to favour the friendly. Refusal to heed to that appeal should result in invalidation of the decision.
31. We draw support from decision in Visakhapatnam Co-op. M.T. Limited v. Bangarraju, : (1956)1MLJ212 and Annamalai v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 A.P. 739 decided under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Collector was ex-officio Chairman of one of the applicants as also ex-officio Member of the Regional Transport Authority which granted permit to that applicant. Rajamannar, C.J., speaking for a Division Bench, held the decision to be a nullity due to bias. In Annamalai, AIR 1957 A.P. 739 one applicant, owner of a proprietary transport concern, was appointed as a Member of the Regional Transport Authority. He transferred his permit to his brother-in-law and thereafter, granted stage permit on the very application which he had filed. Umamaheswaram, J. declared that order a nullity due to bias. That decision was affirmed in Writ Appeal No. 6/1956 by a Division Bench consisting of Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) and Viswanatha Sastri, J. These decisions make it amply clear that bias vitiates, notwithstanding the fact that the aspirant only represented an institution while his kin decided in favour of that institution.
32. We have to consider the second submission on the standing of the petitioners in W.P. No. 9824 and W.P. No. 9825 of 1992 as claiming to represent the student community of the State who are deeply concerned with what they call 'government sponsored commercial venture to sell professional education to the highest bidders'. That has to be done in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court and this court on public interest litigations. Advocate General referred us to Sri Sachidan and Pandey and Ors. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1989 SC 1109 (Paras 58 and 60) and S.P. Gupta v. President of India and Ors., : [1982]2SCR365 . In the former decision, the court cautioned about the need to lay down guidelines to restrict the inflow of spurious causes as public interest litigation, but did not lay down any rule that only a person aggrieved, can file a Writ Petition or that class-action is taboo. There were different opinions expressed by the Judges, but there was happy unanimity that a lawyer is a person interested to maintain an action to screen and scan the process of appointment of judges. Bhagwathi, J., observed in S.P. Gupta, : [1982]2SCR365 that:
'The frontiers of public law are expanding far and wide and new concepts and doctrines which will change the complexion of the law and which were so far embedded in the womb of the future, are beginning to be born.'
The Court also held :
'But if no specific injury is caused to a person or a determinate class or group of persons by the act or omission of the State or any public authority and the injury is caused only to public interest, the question arises as to who can maintain an action for vindicating the rule of law and setting aside the unlawful action by enforcing the performance of the public duty. If none can maintain an action for redress of such public wrong or public injury, it would be disastrous for the rule of law, for it would be open to the State or the Public authority to act with impunity beyond the scope of its power or in breach of a public duty owed by it.'
33. The question of locus standi came up for consideration of the Supreme Court on a number of occasions. Speaking for the majority of the Constitution Bench in Fertiliser Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 Chandrachud, C.J., held that:
'But in an appropriate case, it may become necessary in the changing awareness of legal rights and social obligations to take a broader view of the question of locus standi to initiate a proceeding, be it under Article. 226 or under Article 32 of the constitution. If public property is dissipated, it would require a strong argument to convince the Court that representative segments of the public or at least a section of the public which is directly interested and affected would have no right to complain of the infraction of public duties and obligations.'
34. In the concurring judgment on behalf of Bhagwati, J., and himself, Krishna Iyer, J. articulated the transformation in the court's approach to locus standi and public interest litigation in the following words:
'We have no doubt that in competition between courts and streets as dispenser of justice, the rule of law must win the aggrieved person for the law court and wean him from the lawless street. In simple terms, locus standi must be liberalised to meet the challenges of the times. Ubi jus ibi remedium must be enlarged to embrace all interests of public minded citizens or organisations with serious concern for conservation of public resources and the direction and correction of public power so as to promoto justice in its time facets.'
He held further in paragraph 48 as his concluding caveat:
'If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern beyond what belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this country, the door of the court will not be ajar for him. But if he belongs to an organisation which has special interest in the subject matter, if he has some concern deeper than that of a busy body, he cannot be told off at the gates, although whether the issue raised by him is justiciable may still remain to be considered. I therefore, take the view that the present petition would clearly have been permissible under Article 226.'
34. (a) In K.R. Shenoy v. Udipi Municipality, : [1975]1SCR680 the Supreme Court upheld the 'Special and substandial interest of the rate payers' to seek enforcement of statutory duty by public body by compelling compliance with the public authority's statutory obligation to stop illegal construction.
35. In Dr. P. Nalla Thampy Thera v. Union of India, : [1984]1SCR709 the Supreme Court commended the effort of the petitioner who filed a Writ Petition which was 'essentially in the nature of a public interest litigation to voice the grievance of the community availing the services of Indian Railways.'
36. Krishna Iyer, J. in A.S.K. Sangh (Ely.) v. Union of India, : (1981)ILLJ209SC rejected the objection to grant of relief in a petition which an unregistered trade union had filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. He observed :
'Whether the petitioners belong to a recognised trade union or not, the fact remains that a large body of persons with a common grievance exists and they have approached the Court under Article 32........We have no hesitation in holding that the narrow concept of 'cause of action' and 'person aggrieved 'and 'individual litigation' is becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions.'
37. In Chaitanya Kumar v. State of Karnataka, : [1986]2SCR409 the Supreme Court observed;
'The Court cannot close its eyes and persuade itself to uphold publicly, mischievous executive actions which have been so exposed. When arbitrariness and perversion are writ large and brought out clearly, the court cannot shirk its duty and refuse its writ. Advance of the public interest and avoidance of the public mischief are the paramount considerations. As always, the Court is concerned with the balancing of interest, and we are satisfied that in the present case that the High Court had little option but to act as it did, and it would have failed in its duty had it acted otherwise and refused to issue a writ on the ground that the allegation of personal bias against the Chief Minister was false. Had that been done, the public mischief perpetrated would have been perpetuated. That is not what courts are for.'
38. In Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosav, : [1987]1SCR458 , the Supreme Court stated that:
'the petitioner might have moved in his private interest, but enquiry into the conduct of the examiners of the Bombay University in one of the highest medical degrees was a matter of public interest.'
The Court proceeded further to observe -
'Such state of affairs having been brought to the notice of the Court, it was the duty of the Court to the public that the truth and the validity of the allegations made be inquired into. It was in furtherance of public interest that an enquiry into the state of affairs of public institution becomes necessary and private litigation assumes the character of public interest litigation and such an enquiry cannot be avoided if it is necessary and essential for the administration of justice.'
39. In yet another decision in Dr. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, : [1987]1SCR798 , the Supreme Court repelled the objection raised by the respondents that the petitioners had no locus standi to maintain a Writ Petition. The Court observed:
'He has sufficient interest to maintain a petition under Article 32 even as a member of the public, because it is a right of every citizen to insist that he should be governed by laws made in accordance with the Constitution and not laws made by the executive in violation of the constitutional provisions.'
We do not propose to multiply authorities.
40. The above decisions, which are a few of the many, on the scope of Public Interest Litigation, locus standi and community actions, make it abundantly clear that the students as a class or their organisations or any of them as representing the community are/is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India complaining against illegalities and improprieties alleged to have been committed in establishing colleges of higher/technical education. We find that the students as a community or their organisations and the individuals representing the community have the necessary locus standi in their attempts to expose any infirmity in the decision making process including the bias of the person who decides issues having their reverberations in matters vitally affecting their interests.
41. We find from the pleadings and the Government file which the Advocate General produced before us mat it was the approval of the 5th respondent as Chief Minister that gave finality to the decision to grant permission to establish Medical and Dental Colleges, among others, to respondents 8 and 22, of which his close kin - his brother and wife - were the moving spirits. He would, in fairness, have avoided associating himself with that decision as he could have done under Rules 5 and 7 of the Rules of Business. His association with that decision cannot but have the effect of vitiating the decision for unfairness due to bias.
42. We are not persuaded to accept the submission urged fervently by the Advocate General that in a public interest litigation - assuming W.P. No. 9824/ 92 to be one such - the petitioner is not entitled to seek interference with the decision allegedly vitiated by bias. We are unable to accept this highly technical plea, once we find that the impugned act amounted to mischievous executive action as in Chaitanya Kumar (19 supra). Once such a perversion of the executive power is exposed to its gaze, the Court cannot shut its eyes or shirk its duty. As was held in Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil (20 supra), it becomes necessary and essential that the Court countenances the complaint and grants relief, since even private litigation assumes the character of public interest litigation.
43. The Advocate General urged emphatically that no relief can be granted and the writ petition shall not even be entertained, if it is based entirely on news paper reports. He referred us to the decisions of the Supreme Court in M/s. Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar and Ors. etc., v. State of Punjab, : [1982]2SCR31 and Lakshtni Raj Shetty v. State of Tamil Nadu, : 1988CriLJ1783 . Counsel for petitioner referred us to B. Prabhakar Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 1986 SC 211 to the effect that an uncontroverted news paper report can, by itself, be the basis of relief in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. We have, adopted the golden mean of eschewing either of the above two extremes. We have proceeded only on the basis of pleadings and the record.
44. Advocate General submitted that the writ petition contains irresponsible assertions of serious nature and the original petition containing such irresponsible, vague and general assertions cannot be countenanced. He referred us to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, : (1974)ILLJ172SC and certain passages from Sukhwinder Pal, : [1982]2SCR31 . We do not propose to enter this controvertial region for the reason that we are not basing our decision on. any allegations of mala fides. We have made the position clear even at the commencement of the judgment.
45. This takes us to the question about the validity of the decision of the State Government granting permission to establish 12 Medical and 8 Dental Colleges at a stretch. The chronology of events leading to the order as disclosed by the pleadings is very relevant. Act 12/92 introducing Section 3-A in Act 5/83 was enacted on 15-4-1992. Thereafter, most of the Societies which filed applications were registered, the eighth respondent having registered itself on 11-5-1992. CO.Ms. No. 250/92 was promulgated on 22-5-1992 under Sections 20 and 99 of A.P. Education Act, 1982. According to the recitals contained in the report of the Expert Committee, that Committee was constituted on 6-6-92. It was in the mean time that the Government issued notifications on 25-5-1992 and 28-5-1992 inviting applications for permission to establish Medical, Dental and Engineering Colleges. Last date for submission of applications was fixed as 8-6-1992. There was hardly fifteen days from the date of promulgation of the Rules to the last date fixed for filing applications. The relevant Rules required the applicants for permission to establish Medical Colleges, to depositan amount of Rs. 1,00,00,000/ -. They were also required to furnish Bank Guarantee for another Rs. 1,00,00,000/ - and to produce evidence of financial liquidity to the extent of Rs. 4,00,00,000/ -. These had to be done before 8-6-1992. On 17-6-1992 the Government took a decision that government land, wherever available, would be allotted to applicants at the prevailing market price, for establishment of Medical/Dental Colleges. Members of the Committee conducted spot-inspection of the land and other facilities offered by the applicants from 18-6-1992. The Committee formulated its guidelines on 28-6-1992. It submitted its report on 26-7-1992. On the same day, the Health Minister saw and signed the file without expressing any opinion one way or the other. The Chief Minister on 27-7-1992, approved paragraph-5 of the Government file which contained the names of the 20 grantees for permission to open Medical (12 applicants) and Dental (8 applicants) Colleges. The note-file does not indicate that except the report of the Committee, there was any other material justifying the order of the State Government. As a matter of fact, both the first and fifth respondents have asserted in their counter affidavits that the Government only accepted the report of the Expert Committee in toto. In other words, reasons for the order are those contained in the report. The Government has taken the position that its order may stand or fall on the validity of the report of the Expert Committee.
46. We have seen that the State Government as also the fifth respondent, have asserted that they accepted in toto the report of the Experts' Committee. We had occasion to peruse the report which was placed before us in two instalments. The first one which the Advocate General produced, turned out to be a xerox copy of what was stated to be the report of the Committee with materials leading to that report. Thereafter, when this was pointed out, the Advocate General produced what was called the original Report. We have perused these two reports in the presence of counsel for petitioners in WJP.Nos. 9824 and 9809 of 1992 and Sri Krishna Koundinya, Special Government Pleader, representing the Advocate General who deputed him. Counsel for the petitioners pointed out a large number of discrepancies between those reports. We do not propose to go into the details of such discrepancies. Suffice it for us to say that there is considerable force in the submission of counsel for petitioners that the report produced earlier is not an exact reproduction of what is now claimed to be the original which the Advocate General has produced later. We do not, however, propose to rest our conclusions on this aspect alone. We will revert to this later.
47. In the Government file, which contains the decision resulting in the impugned orders, what we find is only the concluding portion of the report captioned 'Report of the Committee appointed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to scrutinise the applications for the establishment of unaided private Medical/Dental Colleges in the State of Andhra Pradesh'. That report was signed by the three members on 26-7-1992. We have compared that portion of the report with the corresponding portions in the two copies of the report referred to above. They are exact reproductions of each other. The concluding portion of the report was seen by the Minister for Health on 26-7-1992. On 27-7-1992 the Chief Minister endorsed: 'Para 5 approved.' That para contains the names of 12 and 8 grantees respectively of permission to start medical/ dental colleges. We also find an endorsement, at the bottom of the twelve grantees of permission to establish medical colleges, as follows :
'For future
Church of South India, Medak (not to be included in the proceedings).'
We have seen that the report which the Health Minister and the Chief Minister saw purports to be a summary of the conclusions arrived at by the Experts' Committee. No other material is seen to have been placed before them.
48. There is serious criticism that there was actually no inspection by the Experts' Committee of the facilities offered by the various applicants and the evidence relating to compliance with the provisions prescribed in G.O.Ms. No. 250 dated 22-5-1992. Some instances were sought to be illustrated by counsel, particularly counsel appearing in Writ Petition No. 10687 of 1992 (Bhagavan Mahaveer Hospital Medical Society) and W.P. No. 9809 of 1992 (St. Paul's Education Society, Hanamkonda). Reference was also made to the discrepancies between the spot inspection reports, scrutiny of those reports and the final recommendations. Some such instances are those in regard to the applications of (1) Rajaraja Narendra Academy of Science and Technology (R 6), (2) Indoor Medical Education Society (R 7), (3) Madugula Kistha Reddy Memorial Education Society (R 10) and (4) Sidhartha Academy of General and Technical Education (R21).
49. In Part II of Summary Sheets of Applicants the comment about the enclosures relating to financial liquidity of the 6th respondent is as follows:
'Comment : The above letter from the Bank is not a substitute for possession Rs. 04.00 crores worm of liquid assets'.
The following remarks were offered thereafter:
'Remarks:- The Society has also not indicated whether it would be using the facilities of the Government Hospital nor furnished any undertaking in that respect.
All other formalities as per Rules have been complied with.'
In respect of 7th respondent, in the inspection report after local inspection of the land offered by the 7th respondent which appears at page 89 of the Report of the Experts' Committee (Item-6), it is stated as follows:
'Indur Medical Educational Society, Nizamabad. Land 15.00 K.Ms away from Nizamabad town on Bodhan road. Wet land. Sugar cane cultivation. Road side location.
Remark:- Very conjested and polluted (Foul smell during sugar cane crushing season) Temporary facilities in other Educational Institutions.' The summary of application of Respondent No. 10 contains the following comment:
'Comment:- This is no substitute for a Bank Guarantee for Rs. 4.00 crores guaranteeing due performance of the commitment by the Society. All other documents as required by Rules (Gazette Notification) have been furnished.'The local inspection report which appears at Page - 64 the relevant portion of which about the land is as follows :'The land has got access to the main road but the ownership is disputed and has to be carefully verified.'
49 (a). Summarising the conditions above, it is not ideally suitable to locate Dental Colleges or institutions. The comment and remarks in respect of Respondent No. 21 in the summary of applications at page 45 Part II, is as follows:
'Comment:- The above enclosures appear to have been furnished in lieu of the Rs. 80.00 lakhs requirement, This cannot be accepted. (3) Sale Deeds (Registered) in respect of 10 Acres - 48 Cents of land. Remarks:- The requirement of liquid assets to the tune of Rs. 80.00 lakhs has not been properly met.'
50. It is a mystery as to how, in the light of the above comments and remarks in the inspection report, the Committee recommended grant of permission to these institutions. In the Note on aided-private Medical and Dental Colleges, Item-9 relates to Raja Raja Narendra Academy of Science and Technology. No reference is made to the comment on the summary of applications to the effect that financial liquidity as prescribed was not satisfied. Item-2 in the Note relates to Respondent No. 7. There again, there is no reference to the comments in the inspection report that the land was not suitable for establishing the College. Item-12 relates to Respondent No. 10. Yet there again, no reference was made to the inspection report. The claim of 21st respondent was examined at page101 of the file, No reference was made to the comment and remarks which we have extracted above. We do not propose to multiply such instances.
51. One of the files which were handed over to us relating to the 7th respondent contains a letter dated 4-8-1992 from the Principal Secretary to Government, Home, Medical and Family Welfare Department to Sri A. Padmanabha Rao, Director of Medical Education who was one of the members of the Experts' Committee enclosing a letter of one Sri T. Venugopal Reddy. He requested that the record relating to the 7th respondent may be sent along with the remarks of the latter on the petition. Copy of a letter dated 5-8-1992 of Sri Rao, Director of Medical Education is in the file. On a reference to the petitioner, Sri Venugopal Reddy, Sri Rao stated :
'... Whether M/s. Madugula Kista Reddy Memorial Educational Society (M.K.R.M.E. Society) has or has not colluded with late Sri Anjaiah's heirs and produced make-believe documents as alleged in the representation can be proved only after a thorough probe and enquiry into the matter. In view of the legal niceties involved in the matter, I am of the opinion that the relevant documents may be sent to the Law Department of the Government for its views. An enquiry into the claims and counterclaims of the concerned parties will be helpful in bringing out the facts concerning the title, possession etc., of the land. I am herewith enclosing the original application (in the form of a bound book) of M /s. M.K.R.M.E. Society.'
52. Needless to state that these four were among the grantees of permission to establish Medical/Dental Colleges. We do not propose to multiply such instances. There are other irreconcilable discrepancies between the spot inspection reports, the alleged summary of such reports and the conclusions based thereon which alone were forwarded to the State Government. Suffice it for us to say that these discrepancies justify in ample measure the criticism that the Committee would not have brought to bear a dispassionate consideration collectively to the applications of the institutions.
53. One other, important factor which is to be noticed is that in the list of applicants for dental colleges, which precedes the report of the Experts' Committee, item 17 is Nellore Education foundation which had applied for establishment of a dental college at Nellore. We have seen the application. The application was accompanied by a letter issued by the State Bank of Hyderabad, Nellore Branch, dt. 13-6-1992 to the effect that an amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- was already deposited. The summary of that application, in Part II of the alleged inspection report, reveals that bank deposit receipts of nearly 2,00,000 (U.S,) and over Rs. 1,16,000/- in Indian currency had been produced by the above society. It had also offered ten acres of land in Nellore Bit II with agreements of sale to support their claim that they were in possession of the necessary land. We also find that the sponsors and members of the society are highly qualified non-resident Indians, including post-graduates in Medicine. The application also indicates that it was supported by sufficient financial liquidity. We have perused the inspection report with an anxiety to see what was observed by the Committee about this applicant. Curiously, however, there is not even a mention of this Society or of any inspection of the land or other facilities which it offered. In the summary of conclusions again, there is absolutely no reference to this application. Nor do we find any mention of any reason why this Society whose application was not rejected out of hand was not processed or duly considered.
54. While on the question of inspection, we have not gone into the merits or otherwise of the applications, nor is it for us to decide as to whether there are other more competent applicants with better facilities. We are pointing out the above facts only to show that the Experts' Committee had not applied its mind to relevant considerations with any uniformaly applicable standards nor did it discharge its duty in an appropriate manner with the seriousness which the situation demanded.
55. It is well to remember that the Experts' Committee was constituted under a Rule which required it to submit a report after verification of the applicants (G.O.Ms. No. 250 dated 22-5-1992). We also note that the ascertainment of educational needs of the locality and the qualifications of each applicant is a statutory duty under sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982.
56. on the question of inspection alleged to have been conducted by the Experts' Committee, we find that the inspections were conducted not by the Committee but by individual members on their own, separately and independently. For instance, Dr. C.V. Krishna Rao is seen to have conducted most of the inspections alone without the presence of the other members, who are also seen to have performed in the same manner. He inspected the facilities offered by Madugula Kistha Reddy Education Society, Bhagavan Mahaveer Medical Education Society and 8 others between 16-6-1992 to 18-6-1992. The files produced by the Advocate General disclose that the guidelines which the Experts' Committee - which called it the 'Scrutinising Committee' - set for itself to follow in selecting applicants were formulated on 28-6-1992. However, it does not appear from the record that the Government ever saw the guidelines which formed the basis for the Committee's Report for selection and elimination of applicants; much less approved the same. In other words, the Scrutinising Committee set its own standards, notwithstanding the limitations on its powers and the obligation of the Government and the Government alone to take a final decision in the matter under Rule 4 of the 1992 Rules promulgated under CO.Ms. No. 250 dated 22-5-1992 read along with Sections 20 and 21 of the A.P. Education Act, 1982.
57. We have referred to the fact that the position taken up by the State Government was that the report of the Experts' Committee was accepted by it in toto. The Health Minister endorsed the file on 26-7-1992 and the Chief Minister ordered approval of the list of grantees on 27-7-1992. In other words, the attempt is to imply that reasons supporting the grant were those mentioned in the Experts' Committee's report. The report in turn has to be read and understood in the light of the 'guidelines' which the Committee set for itself, but which the Government does not seem to have been aware of. The Committee took scrupulous care not to refer to the 'guidelines' anywhere in its report. In other words, the Government delegated almost the whole process of screening, eliminating and selecting the applicants to the Experts' Committee, whose report and the record leading to it expose the limits of shoddy and scrappy manner in which a Statutory Committee can discharge its solemn duties. We would have considered this aspect at greater length but refrain from doing so, for the reason that neither the Committee nor its individual members are parties in the writ petitions.
58. After perusing the reports and on a comparison of the other materials on record, we cannot but observe that the entire exercise was nothing less than a disaster. We are fairly clear that it is impossible to support the decision of the State Government on the basis of the alleged report of the Experts' Committee as found in the note file or the highly discrepant materials found in the two files containing reports and other materials which were produced for our perusal. We are of the opinion that the inspection alleged to have been conducted by individual members on the reports each member submitted independently cannot be treated as the product of the collective deliberations of the Committee. As a matter of fact, there was no such collective functioning of the Committee. We do not find any proceedings of the Committee in the two files which were handed over to us about allocation of local inspection of specified institutions, to the individual members. Nor are there any indications in those files as to how and in what manner the inspections were conducted. The petitioner in W.P. No. 10687/92 has specifically asserted that he was not aware of any inspection at any time by the Experts Committee. Counsel submitted that the observation in the inspection report may as well be made of any other land, but not the land which it had offered, he also submitted that it is doubtful whether any person who knew the land - officials or otherwise - had identified the land. He submits that in inspecting the land for establishment of a Medical College involving investment of crores of rupees, it is not too much to expect greater responsibility from a statutory Committee of inspection. We are not told how and when the committee functioned, or when and in what manner it submitted its report to the Government. On a perusal of the entire material including the pleadings before us, we are left with the impression that the report was got up in a hurry and the supporting materials were got together at random after the issue exploded into litigative prominence without much time or effort to correlate them with each other.
59. We are of the opinion that the Government abdicated its jurisdiction as the competent authority to grant or refuse permission to establish educational institutions under Sections 20 and 21 of A.P. Education Act, 1982 read with Rule 4 of the 1992 Rules. Professedly, it looked on in careless abandon-perhaps even encouraged the Committee to arrogate the power and jurisdiction which the statute and the Rules confided only in the Government. On the pleadings, the Government reduced itself into a signing machine and issued the 20 orders impugned in these writ petitions only because the Committee had selected the applicants. Obviously, it did not consider the applications in exercise of its statutory duty. Those orders are evidently invalid and are liable to be set aside.
60. We have now to deal with some of the alternative contentions which are raised specifically in some of the other writ petitions. Petitioners in W.P.Nos. 9809 and 10687 of 1992 had applied for permission to open medical colleges at Warangal and Hyderabad /R.R. districts respectively. They claim that they had complied with all the conditions laid down in G.O.Ms. No. 250. Unlike some of the successful applicants, they also claim that they have existing infrastructural facilities. Petitioner in W.P. No. 10687/92 claims that it has a super-speciality hospital with 150 beds and that that hospital is on the threshold of expansion into a 500-bed hospital even at present. It also claims mat infrastructural facilities available with them are sufficient for further immediate expansion. It is the assertion of these petitioners that they had produced positive proof relating to their financial liquidity which is second to none of the other applicants and could have justified the grant of permission in their favour, in view of their excellent track record. They assert that they were not informed about any local inspection of the sites or the facilities. They also assert that their applications were arbitrarily and wantonly rejected.
61. Sri Subba Reddy, counsel appearing for petitioner in W.P. No. 10687/92 also submitted that at least courtesy demanded the State Government to have intimated the petitioner about the disposal of its application, after having received an amount of Rs. 20,000/- as non-refundable fee along with the application. Attempts were made to compare the qualifications, which the petitioner claims to have, with those of party-respondents who were granted permission in the respective regions. We refrain from going into those details, because it is neither necessary nor desirable that we consider the qualification afresh as if in an appellate review. The only exercise of jurisdiction except in exceptional cases shall be to see whether the administrative authority has exceeded its jurisdiction or erred in its exercise or has violated the principles of natural justice or has acted so wantonly, perversely or arbitrarily as to result in manifest injustice and thereby invite interference by this Court. We will therefore, confine our attention to those aspects alone.
62. We have found that Sections 20 and 21 of A.P. Education Act has conferred a statutory right on educational agencies to apply for permission to open educational institutions. The exercise of that statutory right is subject to regulations. But every applicant is entitled to insist that his application is duly considered by the competent authority with reference to the provisions of the Act and the Rules and standards of universal application. The only question which we have to consider is whether this basic duty has been duly performed in dealing with the applications of the petitioners. We have found that State Government disposed of only 20 applications of respondents 6 to 25 granting them permission, for the reasons mentioned in the report of the Experts' Committee. The authority which is expected to grant or reject applications has not even seen the applications filed by these two and the other applicants. Going by the contents of the file which led to the impugned orders, it is absolutely clear that the Government had not seen the reasons, if any, which the Experts' Committee had stated for rejecting the Applications of the two petitioners. It is impossible to assume that the State Government retained the power to act positively in respect of some of the applicants and could or did delegate the power to refuse the other applications to the Experts' Committee which is an authority not confided with any such power by the statute; Even if the Government proceeded under the latter assumption that by itself cannot confer competence on the Committee to dismiss the applications. The reasons for grant or rejection made by the Experts' Committee would not become reasons in the order of the Government, unless the latter specifically incorporated them as part of its order in some manner known to law. We have not been referred to any statutory provision under which the competent authority's power to grant or reject applications filed under Sections 20 and 21 of the A.P. Education Act or Rule 4 of the 1992 Rules can be delegated on the sly to an authority which is not prescribed under the Act. The Experts' Committee was constituted under Rule 4 of the A.P. Unaided Medical and Dental Colleges (Establishment, Management and Admission) Rules, 1992 which is in the following terms;
'4. Permission for the Establishment of Medical and Dental Colleges in private sector:
After the last date for the receipt of the applications, a committee consisting of Director of Medical Education; an eminent person from the Medical field and a representative of University of Health Sciences will scrutinise the applications received, and forward them to the Government. The Govennment will select the society for the establishment of medical College or Dental College at a particular place from among the applicants for that place and accord permission to the selected society with such conditions as may be deemed necessary, including number of seats allowed, for the establishment of College and to commence the functioning of College within the stipulated time. If the Society fails to fulfil the conditions within the stipulated time and fails to start functioning of the College the permission so granted shall be withdrawn/cancelled after due notice and another society which fulfills the requirement will be given permission for the establishment of the college. The decision of the Government under this rule shall be final.'
The above rule, under which the Experts' Committee was constituted, did not entrust to the Committee the power of rejecting the applications filed by educational agencies for permission to establish educational institutions. The Experts' Committee has performed that function which the statute did not entrust with. If we deem the 20 applications which were granted and the reasons therefor as reasons for rejecting the other applications, even then, the power to reject the applications has been exercised only by the Committee and not the Government. This exercise was completed by two different authorities - the positive aspect by the State Government and the negative aspect by the Experts' Committee. Though there is some indication in the note file that the list of 57 applications for Medical Colleges and 41 for Dental Colleges was part of the file, they are no where in the file. There are no indications at all, even in the file, that any other part of the Report of the Experts' Committee containing its reasons for not granting applications of 78 applicants was seen by any one in the Government, who saw the file as per the note file.
63. We are of the opinion that the authority which granted the applications had to deal with all the applications, limit the number of institutions to be established and determine the places to establish them. The Government itself should have stated reasons why some among the many were to be granted and the rest had to be rejected. This is the clear indication of Rule 4 of the 1992 Rules read with Sections 20 and 21 of the A.P. Education Act, 1982. The reason now conjured up in the counter affidavit will hardly be a substitute for a reasoned order disposing of the applications. As has been stated in Mohinder Singh Gill (9 supra), it is impermissible to read part of the counter affidavit as order or reasons for rejecting the applications which should have been dealt with by the State Government and State Government alone.
64. W.P.Nos. 8592/92, 9187/92 and 9698/92 were filed by aspirants who would have filed applications for the grant of permission to establish a Medical College and/or Engineering Colleges. They challenge G.O.Ms. No. 250 Education/92 and the notification dated 25-5-1992 issued pursuant thereto, which fixed 8-6 1992 as the last date for receipt of applications and G.O.Ms. No. 198 Education/92 and the notification dated 28-5-92 inviting applications with the last date for receipt thereof as 8-6-1992. Counsel for the petitioners urged before us that there was only just about or less than two weeks after the publication of the notification for the applicants to comply with the onerous conditions like producing proof of deposit of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- Bank Guarantee for another amount of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- and evidence of financial liquidity to make up an aggregate amount of Rs. 4,00,00,000/- in addition to evidence of availability of land and other infrastructure. Their case is that had they been given some reasonable time, they also would have applied for permission to establish Medical and Engineering Colleges. According to them, they founded Indian Muslim Academy and the Muslim Academy of Sciences respectively to satisfy the requirements of Section 21 of A.P. Education Act, 1982 and had made other arrangements for establishing the colleges, but were disabled from applying due to constraints of time. The petitioner in W.P. 9187/1992 submits that he should have been enabled to apply as an individual and the insistence that only registered Society can apply is discriminatory. He has sought to challenge not only G.O.Ms. No. 198/Edn./92 but Section 3-A of Act 5 of 1983 and even Act 1 of 1982. Those aspects are covered by the other Judgment.
65. We are of the opinion that in a venture which involves financial assurances for assets to the extent of Rs. 5,00,00,000/- of which Rs. 1,00,00,000/- has to be in cash, some reasonable time should have been given by the Government within which the applications could have been submitted and entertained. We may perhaps agree that the time given in the instant case was not sufficient. But the response which the notification evoked, viz., 98 applicants altogether - is some indication that there was enough number of applicants who were ready and willing to comply with all the requirements. However, in the nature of the order which we propose to make, it is not necessary for us to consider this aspect any further.
66. This leaves us with W.P. No. 9946/92. Petitioner therein is a student belonging to the Muslim community represented by his next friend. He had appeared in the EAMCET examination and had passed with general rank No. 10151. He has rank 246 among the minority students on the basis of their performance in the EAMCET examination. He submits that under Section 4(1) of Act 5/83, minority students are entitled to admission in the Muffakham Jah College of Engineering & Technology owned and managed by respondents 1 to 3 on the basis of rank in EAMCET examination or in the qualifying examination, as the case may be. Sub-section (2) enables the management of minority to admit non-minority students also but such admission shall be only on the basis of merit as determined by rank obtained in the EAMCET examination or in the qualifying examination. He submits that he would ordinarily have been admitted, but for the insistence of the Management that 50% of the available seats will be filled up by admission of candidates selected by the Management without reference to the above provisions. His further complaint is that in admitting students to 50% of the seats, even assuming that the Management is entitled to have the benefit of Section 34 of the Act, admissions should be confined to students belonging to the minority community and that too,on meritonly. His positive case is that when he approached the Management, he was told that his admission will be subject to payment of larger amount of money which he cannot afford in spite of the fact that the respondent is a minority educational institution and he belongs to the very minority community and had obtained rank in the EAMCET examination. He submits that in spite of positive directions from this Court and the State Government and the Director of Technical Education, the respondent had admitted students to all but a few of 50% of the seats which the Management assumes, is earmarked for candidates which it may choose without reference to merit. He also submits that most out of such students belong to non-minority communities and have ranks far below him in the EAMCET examination. It is on these grounds that he submits that there may be a direction to the respondent-college to admit him to 1st year Engineering Course in accordance with his rank in the EAMCET examination among students belonging to the minority community to which She Management also belongs.
67. Mr, Habeeb Ansari, Counsel appearing for the respondent submits that the Management is entitled, by reason of Section 3-A which was introduced in Act 5/83 by Act 12/92 and according to which 50% of total number of seats in the College may be filled up by the Management from among candidates who have passed EAMCET examination. He submits that in terms of Section 3-A the Management is free to effect admissions without reference to rank in the EAMCET examination. He submits further that the right of the Management to make such admissions is irrespective of the community to which, the applicant belongs. He asserts that the petitioner may perhaps obtain admission in the remaining 50% of the seats, but he cannot insist that he shall be admitted. in the Management quota on his own terms. He also submits that it shall not be the look out of the petitioner if the Management fills up 50% of the seats by any qualified candidates, be they belong to minority community or otherwise.
68. We understand Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, of the right of a minority community to establish and administer educational institutions of its choice to be pervasive in character1 in the sense that its benefit shall be available not only to the institutions or managements belonging to the community, but as well to the students, teachers and other people belonging to the minority community. Article 30(1) in its fullest amplitude is the right conferred on each individual member of the minority community, not to its institutional hierarchy alone. Along with his tight under Articles 15 and 29, a student belonging to the minority community is entitled to insist by reason of the right conferred by Article '30(1), to claim that his claim for admission shall be considered in institutions established and administered by the minority community to which he belongs. Article 30(1) and Article 29 of the Constitution of India have the effect of balancing protective discrimination in favour of members of the minority community in the matter of educational opportunities on one side and the requirement of excellence in educational standards on the other. This cannot be done by bartering away seats in minority educational institutions to non-minority students on considerations other than merit. According to the EAMCET Rules read along with Sections 4(1) of Act 5/1983, students belonging to minority are ordinarily entitled to preference in the matter of admission to such minority institutions on the basis of rank in the EAMCET examination inter-se as between candidates belonging to the same minority community.
69. We need only state that Section 3-A cannot have any effect in respect of minority institutions because admissions to such institutions are covered by Section 4 of Act 5/1983 which contains Special Provisions in respect of Minority Educational Institutions'. The non-obstante provision, with which Section 3-A commences, makes only Sections 3 and 5 of Act 5/1983 inoperative and not the provisions of Section 4 of Act 5 /1983. Minority institutions which are governed by the specific provision, viz., Section 4 cannot say that the non-obstante clause wish which Section 3A begins enables them to claim the benefit of admission to 50% of the total seats in their institutions without reference to merit ranking. This submission flies in the face of provisions of Section 4 of Act 5 /1983. Section 3-A does not have the effect of erasing or eliminating Section 4(1), even though, it may supersede some of the provisions contained in Sections 3 and 5. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the respondent-institution is bound to grant admission to the petitioner in accordance with his rank in the EAMCET examination as is enjoined by Section 4 of Act 5/1983.
70. In the light of the above discussion, we allow Writ Petition Nos. 9824,9825 and 9946 of 1992 to the extent indicated above.
71. We quash the orders, G.O.Ms.Nos. 321 to 350. There will be a direction to the Respondents 1 to 3 in W.P. No. 9946/92 to admit the petitioner in First Year Engineering Course in terms of Section 4(1) of Act 5/1983. It is not necessary for us to grant any specific relief in W.P.Nos. 9809 and 10687 of 1992. Nor is it necessary for us to grant any further relief in W.P.Nos. 8592,8698 and 9187 of 1992. They are disposed of.
72. We shall not leave this case without expressing our anguish at the very casual manner in which the top bureaucracy in the State dealt with the entire issue. Experienced and responsible Officers should have told the Ministers that a Committee constituted under Rule 4 of the 1992 Rules could only scrutinise the applications and submit the applications for consideration of the Government. They seem to be oblivious of the statutory provisions in Sees. 20 and 21 of the A.P. Education Act and Rule 4 of the 1992 Rules that only the competent authority could deal with the applications and grant or reject them. They reduced themselves to the role of observers when all the statutory provisions were thrown to the winds as it were. We are intrigued that the file in which the interests of close relatives of the Chief Minister should have been submitted to him without even a casual reference to the relevant Rule in the Business Rules. Their performance in connection with these writ petitions is hardly any more complimentary. They seem to have thrust a compilation of papers into the hands of the Advocate-General asserting that it was the original Report of the Committee. On examination by us, it was found to contain only xerox copies, most of which did not contain signature by anybody. When that was pointed out, they caused production of yet another bunch of papers which were said to be the real original of the Expert Committee Report, of which the papers produced earlier were said to be copies. Curiously, however, many of the so called originals contained dated signatures which were not found in the xerox copies. When we perused the note file, we found yet another 'Report of the Committee' which the Government is said to have accepted in toto. Fortunately, the final portion of the Report, which alone is found in the note-file, corresponds in every particular to its counter parts in the two files which the AdvocateGeneral produced earlier. Obviously, none of the senior civil servants bothered to check up the papers which they caused the Advocate-General to produce in Court. Whether the careless abandon was deliberate or due to default is unfathomable. We are left with the impression that they acted like boneless wonders indulging in a command performance. We wish that civil servants entrusted with great responsibilities in guiding the destinies of our country act with greater sense of duty. Conscious as we are of the constraints under which the civil servants function now, we do not propose to proceed any further.