Judgment:
D.S.R. Varma, J.
1. Heard both sides.
2. This Contempt Appeal is directed against the order, dated 19-6-2009, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, in C.C. No. 839 of 2008, sentencing the appellants herein to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each to the respondent herein, within a period of two weeks from the date of said order, for depriving him of his livelihood and causing mental agony, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of seven days.
3. Appellants are the respondents and the respondent is the petitioner, before the learned single Judge of this Court.
4. For the sake of convenience, the appellants and the respondent will be referred to as 'the respondents' and 'the petitioner', respectively.
5. The factual background of the case, in brief, is that when the property in dispute was sought to be acquired by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (for brevity 'the Corporation') for the purpose of road widening, in the interest of public, the petitioner filed W.P. No. 577 of 2003, which was disposed of by a learned single Judge of this Court, by order, dated 9-1-2003, with a direction that demolition can be effected only after following due process of law. After the said order was passed, there appears to have been no necessity for the respondents to proceed with the activity of demolition till the year 2008. Subsequently, the respondents appear to have started negotiations with the owners of various properties with regard to widening of the road, in the interest of public, and most of such owners had given their consent for demolition, subject to the payment of compensation.
6. In that process, notices have been given to various owners as contemplated under Section 146 of Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 (for brevity 'the Act'). Insofar as the property in W.P. No. 577 of 2003 is concerned, notices have been issued to all the registered owners, as per the municipal records. Insofar as the disputed property is concerned, the alleged original owner by name Ismath Pasha gave consent letter for demolition in the year 2008. It is needless to repeat that the entire exercise has been done as postulated under Section 146 of the Act.
7. The learned single Judge, having considered the matter and having heard both sides, allowed the Contempt Case, through the impugned order, sentencing the respondents to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-each, to the petitioner within a period of two weeks from the date of said order for depriving him of his livelihood and causing mental agony, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of seven days. Aggrieved by the same, the respondents have preferred the present Contempt Appeal.
8. Now, it is the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the respondents did not follow the order of this Court in W.P. No. 577 of 2003. It is his specific case that no notice, as contemplated under law i.e., either under the Land Acquisition Act or under the Act, was ever issued to the petitioner before proceeding with the demolition of the schedule property. In other words, it is the specific contention of the petitioner that he is the true owner of the property and, therefore, notice was required to be issued to him before contemplating demolition and that as the notice was issued on a wrong person, it amounts to deliberate violation of the order of this Court and hence contemptuous.
9. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents filed a counter before the learned single Judge bringing out certain facts basing on the record. He submits that as per the records of the registered owners, the petitioner was not the registered owner and, as on the date of demolition and even in the year 2003, when actual demolition was contemplated, there was a litigation pending in the form of a suit for partition, in which the present property was shown in the name of one Mohd. Jameeluddin. One Kamaluddin, who claims to be the successor of the original owner, disposed of a part of the disputed property in favour of the petitioner illegally and, in fact, the same is on record. He pointed out that the present property has fallen to the share of some other person, but not to the vendor of the petitioner.
10. Therefore, it is the contention of the learned Standing Counsel, appearing for the respondents, that since the petitioner is, as per the records, not said to be the true owner of the disputed property, notices were issued to the registered owners as defined in the municipal records. Therefore, issuance of notices to the registered owners and the agreements obtained by such registered owners for demolition of the property, for the public purpose, cannot be termed as violation of the order of this Court. It was further stated in the counter affidavit that since the respondents have followed the procedure, as contemplated under Section 146 of the Act, and, in case, if there is any mistake on the part of the respondents, in following due procedure, as contemplated under law, it is neither deliberate nor wilful and accordingly sought to be excused.
11. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently contended that the petitioner is the true owner of the property, having purchased the same from the original owner and since he obtained an order way back in 2003, in W.P. No. 577 of 2003, wherein and whereby this Court directed the respondents to follow due process of law before resorting to any demolition and when the respondents have the knowledge of the said order, they are under an obligation to issue notice to the petitioner before proceeding further with the demolition. It is further complained that instead of following the order of this Court, the respondents have issued a notice to a wrong person, consent was obtained and the demolition was taken up. In other words, it is his contention that, while resorting to the activity of demolition, the respondents have identified some other persons, who are not the true owners of the property. Hence, the said action on the part of the respondents is deliberate and there is wilful disobedience of the order of this Court.
12. In the light of the relative contentions, we are of the view that there is much controversy involved in this matter regarding the title of the petitioner.
13. In other words, the entire controversy revolves around the question - as to who is the true owner of the property. On the one hand, it is the contention of the respondents that they strictly went by the record, identified the registered owners and it is their specific case that the name of the petitioner was not found in such registered owners list. Therefore, they have resorted to issue notices to the enlisted registered owners and with their consent, they proceeded further with the demolition work.
14. No doubt, the petitioner had no opportunity of being heard, having obtained an order from this Court in W.P. No. 577 of 2003 to the effect that due process of law should be followed.
15. Now, the incidental question would be - as to what is due process of law, whether the identification of the true owner after looking into the records of title, etc., is to be done by the respondents or it is for the aggrieved party to approach the respondents and make a complaint?
16. We are of the view that due process of law should be understood and the procedure must be followed by the respondents with due diligence and then arrive at a correct conclusion with regard to the title and then they have to proceed with the demolition.
17. As a matter of fact, the whole exercise cannot and need not be taken up by the respondents. Nevertheless, they have to go by the record, which is the minimum procedure to be adopted and if that is so, it is obvious that the respondents, having identified the registered owners, followed the list and served notices on them and they cannot go into the question of title.
18. In other words, it is not incumbent on the part of the respondents to serve notice on the petitioner, believing that he is the true owner, for the reason that it was he, who filed the writ petition and obtained order in W.P. No. 577 of 2003. If that is the case, if a notice was given to the petitioner and proceeded further, the same amounts to exceeding of the jurisdiction by the respondents. These questions of fact cannot be resolved by the respondents.
19. Prima facie, the procedure contemplated under Section 146 of the Act had been followed by the respondents and if there is any dispute with regard to the title and when the said procedure was resorted to, the same could and should have been brought to the notice of the respondents by the petitioner or the other option available to him was to raise a dispute regarding the payment of compensation, as available under law, may be, under Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, or the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
20. We are informed by the learned Standing Counsel, appearing for the Corporation, that the amount of compensation has not been disbursed to the identified registered owners and the same is still lying with the Corporation.
21. Therefore, we are of the considered view that since there is a serious question of title involved and since the respondents have followed the procedure, as contemplated under Section 146 of the Act, and as there is no deliberate deviation in issuing notices to the true owner or making an attempt to identify the true owner and obtaining the consent from such person, the action of the respondents does not amount to violation of the order of this Court, either deliberately or wilfully.
22. Furthermore, serious questions of fact regarding title have to be agitated by the petitioner or the person, who gave consent, by approaching the competent authority of the Corporation or any competent civil court.
23. It is needless to mention that it is always open for the respondents to follow the procedure contemplated under Section 147 of the Act or under the Land Acquisition Act, as the case may be, in continuation of the procedure initiated and followed under Section 146 of the Act.
24. Therefore, we are respectfully in disagreement with the conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge of this Court in C.C. No. 849 of 2008, dated 19-6-2009.
25. For the foregoing, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
26. In the result, the Contempt Appeal is allowed, setting aside the impugned order, passed by the learned single Judge, in C.C. No. 839 of 2009. However, there shall be no order as to costs.