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Andhra Provincial Village Officers Association and ors. Etc. Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and anr. Etc. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citation
SubjectService;Constitution
CourtAndhra Pradesh High Court
Decided On
Case NumberWrit Petn. No. 15280, 13208, 16573 and 13360 of 1987. and W.A. No. 1464 of 1987
Judge
Reported inAIR1988AP180
ActsConstitution of India - Article 226 and 371-D(7); Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal Order, 1975
AppellantAndhra Provincial Village Officers Association and ors. Etc.
RespondentGovernment of Andhra Pradesh and anr. Etc.
Appellant AdvocateS. Ramachandra Rao, ;M.S.K. Sastry and ;P. Venkata Ramana Sarma, Advs.
Respondent AdvocateAdvocate General
Excerpt:
.....tribunal order, 1975 - petitioners sought issuance of writ directing all qualified erstwhile part-time village officers to be absorbed in post of village assistants - supreme court already gave its decision directing respondents to absorb all part-time village officers as village assistants - high court does not have authority to transgress supreme court's decision - supreme court's decision binding on all subordinate courts - high court cannot review supreme court's decision. - all india services act, 1951.sections 8 & 11 & a.p. buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control rules, 1961, rule 5: [v.v.s. rao, g. yethirajulu & g. bhavani prasad, jj] refusal by landlord to receive rent - deposit of rent in court - held, a tenant has the option to take recourse to section 8 in case of..........by the orders of that court dated 11-8-1987 by absorbing all the qualified erstwhile part-time village officers, in the post of village assistants. one of the writ petitions (w.p. no. 13515/87) wherein similar relief was sought having been dismissed by the judgment dated 24-9-1987 : reported in (1987) 2 aplj (hc) 351 the writ appeal has been preferred. the point for decision being the same in all these writ petitions and the writ appeal, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. as a result of the coming into force of the andhra pradesh abolition of part-time village officers ordinance (ordinance no. 1 of 1984), all the part-time village officers in the state of andhra pradesh lost their employment with effect from january 6, 1984. this.....
Judgment:

K. Bhaskaran, C.J.

1. These writ petitions are for the issue of a writ of Mandamus directing the respondents (the Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by its Revenue Secretary, and the Commissioner of Land Revenue, Government of Andhra Pradesh) to forthwith implement the direction given by the Supreme Court in the judgment in SLP Nos. 846 and 1804 of 1987 dated 8-5-,1987 (reported in : (1987)IILLJ438SC ) as reiterated by the orders of that Court dated 11-8-1987 by absorbing all the qualified erstwhile part-time village officers, in the post of village assistants. One of the writ petitions (W.P. No. 13515/87) wherein similar relief was sought having been dismissed by the judgment dated 24-9-1987 : reported in (1987) 2 APLJ (HC) 351 the writ appeal has been preferred. The point for decision being the same in all these writ petitions and the Writ appeal, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

2. As a result of the coming into force of the Andhra Pradesh Abolition of Part-time Village Officers Ordinance (Ordinance No. 1

of 1984), all the part-time village officers in the State of Andhra Pradesh lost their employment with effect from January 6, 1984. This Ordinance was followed by a series of Ordinances., and was ultimately replaced by the Andhra Pradesh Abolition of Posts of Village Officers Act (Act 8 oi 1985) (the

Abolition Act'). The Ordinance and the Act werechagenged in this court and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by the judgment dated 27-3-1985 in T. Venkata Reddy's case : [1985]3SCR509 upheld the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Act abolishing the posts of the part-time Village officers. Thereafter, the Government in exercise of the powers under sub-section. (5) of See. 4 of the Abolition Act sanctioned bv C.O.Ms. No. 1048 (Revenue H) Department dated 1 I- 9-85 the creation of 4,800 posts of village assistants in the Revenue Department for a period of one year from the date of appointment. This was followed bv G.O.Ms. No. 1056, Revenue @(H) Department, dated 12-9-1985, framing Ad hoe Rules for making appointments created in that G.O. (dated 1 I- 9-19851). The Commissioner of Land Reveiaue issued notification dated 25-10-1985 in newspapers inviting applications to a competitive examination of S.S.C ' standard to be conducted on 25-2-1986 for drawing up the lists of candidates for appointment to the posts of village assistants. W.P.No. 5786/85 and batch were filed in this Court for the issue of a writ of niandam-tis directing the

t,,, Government to act upon the undertaking given by it before the Supreme Court in Venkata Reddy's case (supra), and to fill up the posts of village Assistants by educationally qualified persons having passed Matriculation or its equivalent, allowing such of those village officers who had not attained the age of superannuation to continue in service till they attained the age of 58 years. By the judgment dated 4-2-1986 (reported in 1986 Lab IC 1046), a Division Bench of this Court disposed of the writ Petitions granting substantial relief

v. Govt. of A. P, (FB) A,. P. 191

to the petitioners; though the right to have @he pos of village assistants to be absorbed @y the erstwhile part-time village officers was apheld, that right was restricted to those who .fad the educational and age qualifications xho were found physically fit and who had iot incurred any punishment during the time :hey were in office. The Special Leave ?etitions Nos. 4417 to 4447/86 filed by the ;tate against that judgment (dated 4-2-1986) ,Yere dismissed by the Supreme Court by the )rder dated 29-4-1986. Thereafter, on October 7, 1986, the Government amended Rule 3 of he Ad hoe Rules adding a proviso thereto vhich reads as follows

'Provided that the initial recruitment to

he posts shall be made from the erstwhile folders of the posts of part-time village officers vho have the requisite age and educational lualifications as prescribed in the Andhra 'radesh Abolition of Posts of Part-time Village )fficers Act, 1985 (Act 8 of 1985) and in bese Rules and who are physically fit and cave not incurred a'ny punishment during heir service as village offi-,ers'.

Aggrieved by the condition in the proviso to he Rule that for being absorbed into the post )f village assistants the erstwhile. part-time @illage officers should have the requisite age Qualification as prescribed in the Abolition kct and the Ad hoe Rules, W.P. No, 139891'86

hatch of writ petitions were filed in this -ourt. In the judgment dated 13-11-1986 a )ivision Bench of this Court held that the Government was bound to call for interview hose erstwhile village officers who had not s on 25-10-1985 crossed the age of 14 years i the case of other communities, and the age ,f 39 vears in the case of Scheduled Cas'les, @cheduled Tribes and Backward Classes, also howls,, the erstwhile village officers. while omputing their age, to deduct the length ef @eir service as part-time village officer subject D a maximum of 5 years, treating theni as ersons already in service of the State Government in terms of Rule 12(gl, of the tate and Subordinate Service Rules. In other cords, the contention of the petitioners that ,ie erstwhile part-time village officers who ad the requisite educational qualification hould be considered for absorption in the osts of village assistants irrespective of their

182 A. P. A. P. Village Offi&i;@'Assi

age, provided that they had not attained thf- age of 58 years, was rejected by this Court. The order of the Supreme Court referred to in the relief portion of the present writ petitions was rendered by that Court on 8-5- 1987 in S.L.P. Nos. 846 and 1804/87 (R. K. Rama Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh : (1987)IILLJ438SC , against the judgment of this Court dated 13-11-1986. The operative portion of that decision of the Supreme Court, relied on by the petitioners (at page 1469 of the. report) reads as follows :

'We have, therefore, no option but to allow the appeals and direct the respondents to absorb as villare assistants all erstwhile pa

time village officers who have not attained cypmwssthe-minimum

educational qualification and are otherwise suitable for the appointment irrespective of their age'.

(underlining ours)

3.The petitioners are resisted by the respondents mainly on two grounds: (1) the post of village assistant being a civil post governed by the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, in view of the bar under Article 371D of the Constitution and the Presidential Order issued under clauses' (3) and (4) thereof, the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution is completely ousted; and (2) inasmuch as the Government in G.O.Ms.No. 1048, Revenue, dated 11-9- 1985 sanctioned only the creation of 4,800 posts of Y!Uge assistants, the case of erstwhile part-time village officers Who possessed the minimum educational qualification and who have not attained the age of 58 years has to be considered against those 4,&)0 posts only. IvVe have heard the learned Advocate General on behalf of the respondents.

4. W.A.No.1464/87whichwearecalled @ipon to decide along with the batch of writ petitions L-, against the dismissal of the writ i3etitioxt (W.P. No. 13513/87) (reported in (198,/') 2 APLJ HC) 351) by a learned single judge of this Court, who had earlier dismissed another writ petition on the ground that the post of village assistant was a civil pent wb(jse recruitment was covered by the rules f ramed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India; and the writ petition by the erstwhile part-

@n. v. Govt. of A. P. (FB) A. rT.' 'C village officers for their absorption into he posts of village assistant could not be Entertained by this Court in view of the bar inder Art. 371D of the Constitution andthe 'residential Order made thereunder. The Correctness of the view expressed by the earned single judge, which has been ubsequently affirmed by the decision of a )ivision Bench of this court, is canvassed in his batch of writ petitions and the writ appeal. Phis necessitated the reference of the inatter o a Full Bench.

5. Sri 5. Ramachandra Rao, the learned ,ounsel for the petitioners, who led the arguments on behalf of the petiti'ers, @ubmitted that the Andbra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal Order, 1975 made )y the President of India under Article 371D )f the Constitutiondid notoust thejurisdiction )f this Court to pass appropriate orders for .he implementation of the direction.given by 'he Supreme Court or this Court. He sought lo draw a distinction between an application ;eeking relief in the first instance with respect @o service matters, on the one hand, and an Application for the enforcement of the right :)f implementation of the directions given or :)rders passed by the Supreme Court or this @-ourt, on the other.

6. Clause (7) of Article 371D of the Constitution provides : 1

'The High Court for the State shall not have any powers of superintendence over the Administrative Tribunal and no Court :other than the Supreme Court) or Tribunal ;hall exercise any.jurisdiction, power or authority in respect of any matter sub@lect to the jurisdiction, power or authority of or in relation to Administrative Tribunal'.

Dne should not fail to notice that the above Clause in Article of the Constitution Dusts the jurisdiction of the High Court only with reference to matters which are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction, power or authority of the Administrative Tribunal.

7. We must refer with approval to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Syed Mobd. Ghouse v. State of A.Fl. (1987) 1 APLJ (HC) 412 holding that this Court had the power for issuing creations to implement

1988 A. P. Village Officers' Assoc

the orders of the Administrative Tribuna@ consideringthespecificterrmofelause(7)of Art. 371D, and the nature of jurisdiction, power or authority conferred by the Presidential Order on it (the Administrative Tribunal). It has been further held in that decision that as a consequence of the amendment of sub-@aragraph (5) of Paragraph 8 of the Presidential Order, by GSR No. SOS(E) dated 22-5-1986, on the basis of the certificate issued by the Tribuna@ it is open to the parties to approach the Civil Court to have the orders of the Tribunal executed; in cases where the Civil Court is not competent to grant the rerief, it shall be open to the parties to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to have the orders in their favour passed by the Tribunal executed. In that judgment, after having referred to the relevant provisions of Article 371D and the Presidential Order, it has been held that no jurisdiction, power or authority has been conferred on the Administrative Tribunal to direct execution or implementation of its own orders. If the Tribunal has no jurisdiction, power or authority to direct the c nforeement or implementation of its own orders or directions, much less would be its jurisdiction to direct the execution or-implementation of an orderpassedby this Courtor the Supreme Court. This Court, therefore, would not be justified in directing the petitioners and the appellant either to the Tribunal or even to a Civil Court,. because the relief sought l., nothing other than the enforcement ox implementation of the orders passed an@ directions given by this Court as modified b3 the Supreme Court. According to us, thi! Court has both the right and the duty to grant the relief without driving the petitioners an( the appellant from pillar to post and post t( pillar. If this Courtdeclines togrant the relief the petitioners and the appellant would tx left high and dry in spite of their havinj secured orders or directions in their favou: fror.ithisCourtandtheSupremeCourt.Afte all, procedure is meant not to frustrate, bu to advance the ends of justice.

& lthasalsotobeborneinmindthattho Presidential Order itself has taken care to se, that the Tribunal should not assuni,

@jurisdiction, power or authority in respect c

v. Govt. of A. P. (FB) A. P. 183

,natterswhichhadaireadybeen dealtwithbyl @he Supreme Court or this Court. Paragraph

8. 14(2) of the Presidential Order reads as [Ollows : 'Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- paragraph (1) of this paragraph: (i) The High Court of A@dbre Pradesh shall have and this Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to entertain. hear or dispose of appeals, applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme CouM Applications for review and other proceedings where any such proceedings seek any relief in respect of any order passed by that High Court. This is yet another reason why tNs Court should take a positive attitude towards the relief sought by the petitioners. Even when, in the strict legal sense, the order of this court had already got merged with the decision of the Supreme Court, that fact would not stand in the way of this Court granting the relief to the petitioners and the appellant in an original petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for the enforcement of a right accrued to them by the orders of the Court for the enforcement of which they could not approach any other forum. It appears to us thatthelearnedsinglejudgeandtheDivision Bench, which confirmed the decision of the learned single judge, which gave rise to the referenecof theniattertothe FullBench, did not take due note of the legal position that clause(7) of Article 371D of the Constitution does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with matters which do not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction, power or authority of the Administrative Tribunal: and that paragraph 14(2) of the presidential Order exlcudes f tom the purview of the 'urisdicii,)n, power and authority of the Tribunal, proceedings in relation to matters already dealt with by the High Court or the Supreme Court. With due respect to the learnedsingle judge and the Division Bench, we are constrained to hold that the view taken by them that the High Court would have no jurisdiction to direct the implementation of an order passed by this Court or the Supreme Court does not represent the correct position in law. 9. We have already referred to the

operative portion of the judgment of the

184 A. P. Vidya Bai v. S

9. Supreme Court dated 8-5-1987 for the implementation of which the present series of writ petitions have been f fled. The Supreme Court's direction to the respondents is to absorb as village assistants all erstwhile part- time village officers who have not attained the age of 58 years if they possessed the Minimum educational qualification and are otherwise.found suitable for appointment irrespective of their age. It is not for this Court either to add to or subtract from the direction of the Supreme Court. It would not be appropriate for us either to read it down or read anything into it. This is so particularly in view of the fact that a review petition (No. 736-37/87) filed by the State was dismissed by the Supreme Court by the order dated 11-8-1987 with the following observations :

'There are no grounds for Review. The Application is rejected.

It is a great pity that though months have passed since our last order was made, the order has notyet been implemented. Ailthat appears to have been done is that a Review Application has been filed without even an application for stay. The Government of Andhra Pradesh appears to have granted a stay itself. We do not think it was right for the Government to do so. The Government of Andhra Pradesh is directed to implement the order dated May 8, 1987 within 4 weeks from today.'

This being the position, there is no question of our attempting to dilute the. contents of the order passed by the Supreme Court which has become final. The. State Government will do well to see that the order of the Supreme Court is implemented in toto and .Without any reservation whatsoever, instead of delaying it by raising highly technical and hair-splitting contentions with respect to the maintainability of the writ petitions or the scope of the order passed by the Supreme Court.

10. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the writ petitions; the writ appeal also is allowed setting aside the judgment of the learned single judge appealed against and allowing the writ petition. The respondents are directed to comply with the direction in the orde@ of the Supreme Court dated 8-5-

nkerial (FB) A. 1. R.

987 within 4 weeks from today. There would c no order as to costs. Advocate's fee Is. 1 SO/- in each case.

11. Order accordingly.


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