Judgment:
ORDER
K. Ramaswamy, J.
1. The petitioner filed a writ petition assailing the action of the Asstt. Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur, refusing to execute the lease deed in pursuance of the quarry lease granted by the Deputy Director in proceeding No. 363Q/Q1/84 dt. 23-54985. This Court admitted the writ petition on 25-4-1986 and directed the two respondents thus - 'It is further ordered that the respondents herein namely, 1. Dy. Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur 2. Asstt. Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur, be and hereby are directed to execute the lease deed in terms of the sand quarry lease granted in proceedings No. 3630/Ql/84dt. 23-5-85 of the Dy. Director of Mines and Geoglogy, Guntur, pending further orders on this petition.' This order was despatched by the office on the same date and it was received by the respondents on 30-4-1986 No action has been taken by the respondents after receipt thereof. The Government in Memo No. 465 dt. 5-5-1986 directed the respondents thus : 'The attention of the Director of Mines and Geology, Deputy Director, Mines and Geology, Guntur and the Asstt. Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur, is invited to the interim directions issuted by the High Court in W.P.M.P. No. 6932 dt. 25-4-1986 and requested to implement the High Court order pending further orders on the petition. The Dy. Director, Mines and Geology, is requested to send parawise remarks in the case urgently.' The memo was received on 16-5-1986, yet it evokes no response from the respondents.
2. Mr. G. Vedantharao, learned Counsel for the petitioner in his letter dt. 26-6-86 again issued a notice received by them on 27-6-86. Therein in the last para he stated thus 'that in the circumstances if you do not comply with the order of the Hon'ble High Court within a for-night from the date of receipt of this notice, my client will have no other option except to move the court for contempt without further notice.' From the note-file produced before me of the respondents it would appear that the 1st respondent on receipt of the order by letter dt. 1-5-86 requested the Director of Mines and Geology, Hyderabad, to move the matter with the Government Pleader for instructions, regarding filing of the appeal against the orders in WPMP. No. 6932/86 and by letter dt. 20-5-86 he directed the Asstt. Director to submit parawise remarks on WP. No. 5075/86 and later on 29-5-1986 he requested the Director of Mines and Geology, to return the file of the Asstt. Director to prepare the parawise remarks. There is inter-departmental correspondence in the meanwhile. By letter dt. 1-8-86 the Joint Director of Mines and Geology, Hyderabad, again requested the respondents 'to implement the directions of the High Court and furnish compliance report.' Then on 11-8-86 the Deputy Director 1st respondent, directed the 2nd respondent Asst. Director 'to implement the interim directions issued by the court and submit compliance report at an early date.' By letter dt. 3-9-86 the 1st respondent requested the 2nd.respondent to execute the lease deed in terms of the orders passed by this Court and the proceedings of the Deputy Director dt. 23-5-1986. On 1-10-1986 the Asst. Director appears to have addressed a letter to the Director of Mines and Geology, seeking certain clarification, This is the stage af which the matter stands. Thus the fact remains that despite the receipt of the orders of this Court on 30-4-86 when there is a postive direction issued by this Court to comply with the execution of the lease deed as per the orders of the Dy. Director dt. 23-5-86 till date no action has been taken by the respondents.
3. In the counter-affidavit filed by the 1st respondent, the Dy. Director, Mr. T.D.K. Sarma, the 1st respondent, has stated that the Director of Mines and Geology, in his proceedings dt. 1-8-86 requested him to implement the High Court order and in turn he directed the Asstt. Director to execute the leaser deed by his meno dt. 3-9-86. The authority to execute the lease deed is the Asstt. Director. He has already informed the Asstt. Director to implement the High Court order and therefore he requested to drop,the contempt proceedings against him. Mri S. Dhanamjayudu, Asstt. Director, 2nd respondent in his counter-affidavit, admits that the Dy. Director in his proceedings dt. 23-5-1986 has granted a quarry lease for sand for a period of one year in an extent, of 12,000 hectares in the survey numbers mentioned in the counter-affidavit of Gajullar village, Tenali taluk. He also admits that the lease is to be executed within a period of 90 days from the date of the grant. But, the Government issued instructions on 16-7-1985 banning grant of renewals and execution of lease deeds and hence he did not execute the lease deed. He admits that this Court directed the Dy. Director and himself to execute the lease, deed, by interim orders and the Government also issued a memo No. 465/Desk Mines/86-3 dt. 5-5-86, but he puts the date 3s 25-7-86, but the memo is dt 5-5-1986. He states that the Director gave oral instructions during the meeting held at the Head Office on 25-9-1986. But what are the oral instructions issued by the Director has not been stated in the counter-affidavit. Therefore, he sought for, a clarification on 1-10-86 from the Director of Mines and Geology, as to what action should be taken in the matter in view of the proposed notification by the Government to auction the sand in Krishna river. Since he did not receive the clarification he did not execute the lease deed and he kept the matter in abeyance.
4. Mr. N.V. Suryanarayana Murthy, the learned Government Pleader, contends that the respondents have no intention to disobey the orders of this Court. They sought for clarification from the Director and they are awaiting the clarification from the Director. The petitioner has no case on merits and therefore the respondents did not commit any contempt and even if there is any contempt there is benefit of doubt and the benefit of doubt should be given to the respondents.
5. I wholly disagree with the learned Government Pleader. A narration to the facts clearly shows that there is a positive direction issued by this Court and it was received by the respondents on 30-4-1986, directing them to execute the lease deed in terms of the order of theDy. Director dt. 23-5-1985. Therefore, they are bound to obey the orders of this Court. The Government immediately on becoming aware of the orders passed by this Court by memo dt. 5-5-86 directed them to implement the orders of this Court and then take action to submit a parawise remarks. The Government also directed the respondents to implement the orders of this Court immediately. Therefore, I do not find any justification in seeking clarification from the Government on the oral instructions alleged to have been issued by the Director. What are the oral instructions issued by the Director has not been a mplif ied in the counter-affidavit. The question therefore is, whether the respondents have wilfully disobeyed the orders of this Court.
6. Section 2(a)of the Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971), (for short 'the Act') defines 'contempt of Court' as civil contempt or criminal contempt. Cl. (b) defines 'civil contempt' as wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. Section 12(1) of the Act imposes punishment for contempt of court thus - 'Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with a simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both. Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the court. Explanation : An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional, if the accused makes it bona fide. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act shows ['Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in Sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it. Sub'sec. (3) shows 'notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the Court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit.'
7. Therefore, a reading of these provisions clearly shows that if any order, direction, decree, writ or other process of a court is wilfully disobeyed it amounts to contempt of court under Section 12(1) of the Act and he is liable for conviction forthe said conduct and be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months and if the explanation offered is not found to be satisfactory and it is not bona fide, where the court thinks that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary, shall, instead of sentencing him; to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for a period not exceeding six months.
8. The Court has got power either to impose sentence of imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand Rupees, or with both.
9. In view of this law, the question is, whether the respondents have committed wilful disobedience of the order of this Court and whether they are liable to be convicted for contempt of Court.
10. The facts are eloquent. When the orders are clear and explicit to obey the orders of the Court, the respondents are bound to obey the orders so long as the order is not reversed or varied or set aside on their filing a counter-affidavit and satisfying the Court that the petitioner has ho case, or on appeal, the respondents are bound to obtain the; direction. The attempt of Mr. Suryanarayana Murthy, learned Government Pleader,' therefore, that the order on merits is not/ sustainable, cannot be given any countenance to. The implication arising from this argument leads to disastrous consequences impinging upon the efficacy of rule of law arming a litigant to assume the role of a Judge and assume for himself the merits of his.case and disregard the order or direction with obstinacy. True, that the party may have a good case and we can assume an excellent case as the petitioner may not be expected to paint the other side of the coin. But as an honest litigant, he must swing into action immediately on receipt of the orders from the Court even without waiting for the minimum time allowed by law, place the entire material and his case and take a decision on merits. If there is any reasonable, explicable and acceptable delay the Court may be requested to condone. But the conduct must be such that it would inspire the court with confidence to accept.; Otherwise, it is open to the party to keep the orders or direction of the Court in his desk or file and make the petitioner to feel that the orders of the Court are of no avail and the respondents' waggery will prevail. The petitioner is seeking to implement the direction issued by the/first respondent. The first respondent has been directed to execute the lease deed for a period of one year. When that is not obeyed, then the writ petition was filed and this Court has given a direction to implement the direction issued by the Deputy Director on 23-5-1985. Thereafter, there is no justification in the argument that there are no merits in the case and the petitioner is not justified in seeking the relief. Be that as it mays the only thing that the respondents have to do is to implement the order of the Court. The question is whether there is any compliance of orders of this Court and if not whether it amounts to wilful disobedience of the orders of this Court. When the respondents are bound to obey the orders of this Court, there is no justification for them not to implement the order after receipt of the order on April 30, 1986. In addition to that, the Government itself has issued direction immediately on May 5, 1986, received on 16-5-1986 to implement the order of this Court and send parawise remarks There is no choice' left to the respondents except to implement the order and yet the order has not been implemented From the record it would appear that as far as the first respondent is concerned, in the first instance he directed to file a counter-affidavit and three months have elapsed in -the interregnum and on 1-8-1986 when the Joint Director issued directions to implement the order, then the first respondent directed the 2nd respondent-Asst. Director to; implement the order. Therefore, there is some ' semblence of justification as far as the first respondent is concerned, though his conduct is unworthy of acceptance, being a responsible officer he has to see that the order of the Court is implemented. But as I said he has shown some semblence of compliance of the order, though unjustifiable, and directed the first respondent to implement the order. But as far as the second respondent is concerned, there is no doubt that his attitude establishes in no unmistakable terms, his callous disregard for the directions of the Court. The reasons for non-compliance are locked up in his mind The repeated reminders by Government Joint Director and first respondent evoked no response. His Writing a letter for alleged clarification on 1-10-1986 is nothing short of an ablibi to postpone implementation of the order of the court, for his own reasons,
Whether the order, or direction of a Court is wilfully disobeyed is an inferential fact to be deduced from attending facts and circumstances. For these reasons, the only conclusion is that the second respondent wilfully disobeyed the direction of this Court dt. April 24, 1986.
11. Under these circumstances, the first respondent is let off with a warning not to act in irresponsible manner hearafter.
12. Though the explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 12 postulates that an apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional and may give rise to an indication that it may be mandatory, but on a true reading of it in its proper perspective, it would be only directory but not mandatory as repeatedly held by the Supreme Court. The word 'bona fide' qualifies the effect of the explanation appended to Sub-section (1) of Section 12. Apology tendered must be angulated in the proper perspective taking into account the conduct of the contemner, the facts and circumstances. If the Court accepts it to be bona fide, certainly a discretion has been left to the Court either to drop the proceedings or to impose fine or sentence to simple imprisonment. The non-obstante clause engrafted in Sub-section (3) thereof, makes the intention of the legislature more explicit saying that the apology does not bind the Court and in an appropriate case, depending upon the gravity of the situation and the contumacious conduct, a sentence of detaining the contemner in civil prison also could be imposed
13. As far as the second respondent is concerned, I do not find any justification to let him off. His conduct is unwort/hy of acceptance, and nothing short of contumacious conduct. His explanation is only just to avoid the conviction for contempt. His tendering apology is not bona fide nor contrite. Therefore I reject his request for acceptance of the, apology and I also consider that a fine will; not meet the ends of justice. The attitude of absolute disregard to the direction of this Court undermines the efficacy of the orders of this Court shaking public confidence in rule of law. Therefore, the tendency must be put down and public confidence restored Under the circumstances, I hold that Mr. S. Dhanamjayudu son of Pitchaiah, Assistant Director, Mines and Geology, Guntur the second respondent has committed contempt of this Court and accordingly he is punished under S.12 of the Act and sentenced under j Section 12 that he shall be detained in a civil prison for a period of two months.
14. The contempt case is accordingly; ordered. No costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 350/-.