Judgment:
1. The unsuccessful defendants are the appellants. The respondent laid action for ejectment of the appellants from the suit premises of 475 Sq. yards situate in Kothapeta area of Guntur Municipal town and for recovery of arrears of rent and future profits. One D. Raghuram was the original owner of the property and the respondent had purchased the demised premises under Ex. A-1 sale deed dt. 4-8-1977, thereby the respondent became the owner of the property. Subsequently a notice Ex. A-4 dt. 26-9-1977 determining the tenancy of the appellants was issued to the appellants to quit the suit premises. It is not in dispute that the Second appellant received the notice and the first appellant evaded receipt of the notice. Since the appellants did not deliver possession. the respondent initiated the action. The defence set up by the appellants is that Ex. A-4 notice is not valid in law in terms of S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (for short 'the Act') and therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed.
2. The plea of the appellants found favour with the trial Court, which resulted in the dismissal of the suit. On appeal the appellate Court reversed the decree of the trial Court and partly decreed the suit. Thus the Second Appeal.
3. The learned counsel for the appellants, Sri Hanumantha Rao, has contended that under Ex. A-4 the respondent had determined the lease under Ex. A-4 itself and called upon the appellants to deliver possession of the suit premises by the end of Oct., 1977. Under S. 106 read with S. 111 of 'the Act' monthly tenancy is terminable by expiry of fifteen days' notice from the date of giving notice. There is no need for calling upon the-tenant t(, deliver possession after the expiry of one month. He further contended that what is needed is determination of the tenancy. In this case, under Ex. A-4, tenancy was determined and the suit notice is not valid in law. The appellate Court has misconstrued the notice. Therefore, there is substantial question of law.
4. Sri S. Venkateswara Rao, the learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand, contended that the intention of, the owner would be to see that the tenancy is terminated as expressed in the notice. A reading of the notice would clearly indicate the intention of the respondent that the tenancy would be terminated on its expiry at the end of Oct. 1977 with which date the tenancy subsisted. Therefore, the notice to quit is perfectly in consonance with the provisions of S. 106 of the Act.
5. In order to appreciate the rival contention it is necessary to look into the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. S. 111 adumbrates determination of lease of immovable property thus 'on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, the property leased, duly given by one Party to the other.' S. 106 of the Act speaks of duration of lease and expiry thereof. It reads 'In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property ........................................... for any other purpose shall be -deemed to be a lease from month to month terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of tenancy.' The second part of S. 106 is not necessary and hence it is omitted. A reading of this provision would manifest that there shall be a notice determining the lease of immovable property other than agricultural or manufacturing shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of tenancy. Therefore, it is legislative animation that in monthly tenancy issue of notice determining the lease by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of tenancy is mandatory. T-he question, therefore, is whether Ex. A-4 notice to quit is in compliance with the statutory requirements. It is necessary to extract the -language used by the respondent in his notice Ex. A-4 material part of which reads thus:
'That my client hereby terminates the tenancy in your favour and requests you to vacate the premises by the end of Oct., 1977 by which date the tenancy expires, fading which my client will be constrained to take appropriate steps against you in a Court of law for eviction.'
It is now well settled law that a notice to quit must he construed broadly not with a desire to filed faults with it which would render it defective, but it must be construed ut res magis valeas quam pereat 'The validity of a notice to quit. From the language used, it must be endeavoured to ascertain the intention of the parties and the effect thereof. It should be co-jointly read not with an intention to split up a straw or in a hyper critical manner or by pedagogic pedanticism or over refined subtlety but. it must be construed in a common sense way. While construing the language used in Bhagwandas v. Bagvandas : [1977]3SCR75 it was held :
'It is indisputable that under S. 106 of the T. P. Act the notice to quit must expire with the end of the month of the tenancy, or in other words, it must terminate the tenant with effect from the expiration of the month of the tenancy. If it terminates the tenancy with effect from an earlier date it would be clear in way. Now, here the notice to quit required the respondents to vacate the premises within the month of Oct., 1962' and intimated to them that otherwise day would be 'treated as trespassers from 1st Nov.' in respect of the premises. The question is: what is the meaning and effect of the words 'within the mouth of Oct., 1962' in the context in which they are used in the notice to quit? Do these words mean that the tenancy of the respondents was sought to be terminated at a date earlier than the expiration of the month of Oct., 1962 and they were required to be the premises before such expiration? We do not think so, when the notice to quit required the respondents to vacate 'within the month of Oct., 1962', what it meant was that the respondents could vacate at any time within the month of Oct., 1962 but not later than the expiration of that month, The last moment up to which the respondents could, according to the notice to quit, lawfully continue to remain in possession of the premises was the midnight of 31st Oct., 1962. We fad to see any difference between a notice asking a tenant to vacate 'within the month of Oct., 1962' and a notice requiring a tenant to vacate latest by the mid-night of 31st Oct., 1962 because in both cases the tenant would be entitled to occupy the premises up to the expiration of 31st Oct.,.1962 but not beyond it. This position would seem to follow logically and Incontestably as a matter of plain natural construction from the use of the words 'within the month of Oct., 196T' without anything more, but here it is placed beyond doubt or controversy by the notice to quit proceeding to add that otherwise the respondents would he treated as trespassers from lst Nov., 1962. This makes the intention of the authors of the notice clear that they are terminating the tenancy only with effect from the end of the month of Oct., 1962 and not with effect from any earlier point of time during the currency of that month. If the respondents do not vacate the premises within the month of Oct., 1962 they would be treated as trespassers from 1st Nov., 1962 and not from any earlier date, clearly implying that they would lawfully continue as tenants the expiration of the month of Oct., l962. The tenancy was therefore sought to be determined on the expiration of the month of Oct., 1962 and not earlier and the notice to quit expired with the end of the month of tenancy as required by S. 106 of the T. P. Act. It was in the circumstances a valid notice which effectively determined the tenancy of the respondents with effect from the mid-night of 31st Oct., 1962.'
6. Their Lordships laid down that the notice to quit the tenant must expire with the end of the month of the tenancy. If it terminates the tenancy with effect from an earlier date it would be clearly invalid as soon under S. 106 of the Act. The notice determining the lease must be of fifteen days notice expiring with the end of the month of the lease. It is now admitted that the lease in question is of calendar month and it is monthly tenancy. In Ex. A-4 notice the language used as extracted earlier is 'hereby terminates the tenancy in your favour.' The question is whether the tenancy was determined under that notice or on the expiry of fifteen days from the date of bare of that notice. Sri Venkateswara Rao, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that since the respondent has, expressed that the tenancy expires by the end of Oct., 1977 it would indicate that it is the notice giving fifteen days and the tenancy Was not determined under the notice itself but to intimate to the respondent that the tenancy expires by the end of Oct., 1977. In support thereof the refers to Chambers'20th Century Dictionary at page 493 according to which hereby means not far off and seeks to contend that by this notice the respondent has intimated that the tenancy has been determined. Therefore, it is not invalid in law.
7. I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. A reading of notice Ex. A-4 would appear to manifest that the intention of the respondent is that he determined the lease of the appellants under Ex. A-4 itself forthwith from that date and cars upon the appellants to vacate the premises by the end of Oct., 1977 till which date under law that lease subsisted. The words 'hereby terminates' would indicate that the respondent intended to determine the lease by that notice from that date itself and has given one month time to the appellants to vacate the premises. As rightly contended by Sri A. Hanumantha Rao, the learned counsel for the appellants, delivery of possession after the expiry of one month is not a mandatory requirement. It is only a voluntary act beneficial to the tenants to avoid damages for use or occupation. Therefore. the material question is as to when the lease was determined? As stated earlier, a fair reading of the notice itself clearly mentions that the respondent intended that lease stool determined by the issue of the notice itself and thus the respondent used the words 'hereby terminates'. It is normal practice that in a notice determining the monthly tenancy we would come acrow3 with the language with expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of this notice.' But that is not the language used in the notice and moreover he knows that he intends tenancy and the effect thereof. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that Ex. A-4 notice which determines the lease of the appellants is invalid. It is common knowledge the only effective defence the tenant can have in an action for ejectment is the one under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, on a fair construction of the notice have no hesitation to conclude that the notice Ex. A-4 which determines the lease is not according to law and on the other hand it is in contravention of the provisions of s. 106 read with S. 111 of the Act. Therefore, the suit is rightly dismissed by the trial Court.
8. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is allowed, the decree of the appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored, but in the circumstances each party is directed to Near its own costs throughout.
9. Appeal allowed.