Judgment:
K. Bhaskaran, C.J.
1. If the golden use of interpretation that the ordinary meaning of the words used by the statute and he grammatical sense thereof should be adhered to, there could be little doubt that a landlord already in occupation of. a non- residential building of which he is the owner or to the possession of which he is entitled under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (the Act') or otherwise, could not invoke Section S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act for eviction of a tenant n occupation of another non-residential building belonging to him (the landlord) in the same city, town or village, for the purpose of business which he (the landlord) is carrying nor for the purpose of a business which be bona fide proposes to commence. A Division Bench consisting of Basi Reddy, J., and Gopal Rao Ekbote, J., (as he then was), however, took a contrary view in Balaiah's case : AIR1965AP435 . P. A. Choudary, J., before whom this revision petition was posted for hearing earlier, doubted the correctness of the ruling of the said Division Bench; hence, on reference, this is before this Full Bench.
2. Now the facts in brief. The first respondent herein (Shankarlal), hereinafter referred to as 'the landlord', in occupation of non-residential building No.4-5-880, Sultan Bazar, Hyderabad, filed R.C. No. 211 of 1976 on the file of the Rent Controller, Hyderabad to evict Puranmal (hereinafter referred to as the 'tenant) from another non-residential building, Mulgi No. 4-5-879 owned by him (landlord) in the occupation of the tenant situate in the same city,' under See. 10(3)(a)(iii)(b) of the Act, on the ground that it was bona fide required by him for his personal business as his major son Babulal, educated but unemployed, wanted to commence a new business in the said premises. The tenant resisted the claim for eviction contending, inter alia, that the landlord who was in occupation of the non- residential building No. 4-5-880 was not entitled for recover possession of the non- residential building No. 4-5-879 in his (tenant's) occupation in the very same city. The Rent Controller accepting the contention of the tenant, dismissed the application for eviction. The matter was carried in appeal to the Chief Judge, City Small. Cause Court, Hyderabad (R. A.No. 289/79) by the landlord. During the pendency of the appeal, Puramnal (the tenant) died. His legal representatives, his widow and two sons, were impleaded as supplemental respondents 2 to 4. The appellate authority reversed the decision of the Rent Controller, allowed the appeal and directed the tenant to put the landlord back into possession of the premises on two grounds: (i) that the appellant bona fide required the mulgi for commencing the business of his son, Babulal, and (ii) that the supplemental respondents 2 to4 were not entitled to protection under the Act, holding that they were not tenants as defined in See. 2(ix) of the Act. Aggrieved by the decision of the appellate authority, two of the legal representatives of the said Puranmal, viz supplemental respondents 2 and 3 before the 2 appellate authority, have filed this revision under section 22 of the Act; in the revision, the 4th supplemental respondent, one of the sons of the deceased Puranmal, is shown as the second respondent.
3. Before embarking upon the discussion on the main question, we may dispose of the short point whether the widow and sons of Puranmal the original tenant, are entitled to protection from being evicted from the Premises. Section 2(1x) of the Act reads as follows :-
'(ix) 'Tenant' means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son or daughter of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the budding as a member of the tenant's family up to the death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour ' but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building, by its tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in a 'public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been framed out or leased by a local authority.'
In the order of reference, the learned single 1udge has entered a finding that the revision- Petitioners and the second respondent herein tad been living with Puranmal the original tenant, till his death, and as such they were to be treated as 'tenants' of the mulgi in succession to their predecessor-in-interest. Placing reliance on the two decisions of this in Ramanujam's case : AIR1982AP227 and Jeeth Kaur's case : AIR1983AP219 , the learned Judge also found that the tenancy right in terms of See. 2(ix) of the Act was not confined to residential buildings, but would extend to non-residential buildings. We have no reason to differ from the reasons stated id the conclusion reached by the learned single Judge on this point. We therefore, hold that the appellate authority was in error taking the view that as legal heirs of the ceased Puranmal, the revision-petitioners d the second respondent herein, were not be treated as tenants as defined in Sec. 2(i) of the Act in respect of the building No. 4-5-879.
4. What we are more concerned with in ; revision petition is the legal question as to whether a landlord having a non-residential building in Ns occupation is entitled to recover session of another non-residential building ate in the same city, owned by him, in the occupation of a tenant, for the purpose of carrying on his business or for commencing a business in that premises. We would extract below See., 10(3)(a)(iii) and See. 10(3)(c) of the Act, omitting the portions not relevant for the present purpose :
'(3)(a) A landlord may subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building -
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(iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise -
(a) for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application, or
(b) for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the Controller, the landlord bond fide proposes to commence;
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(c) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building whether residential or non- residential, may, notwithstanding anything in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be.'
The question involved here directly and substantially is only the interpretation to be given to Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. We have, however, extracted above See. 10(3)(c) of the Act also having noticed that in Balaiah'ss. ease : AIR1965AP435 (supra) the Division Bench has made reference to that sub-section in an attempt to reinforce its conclusion reached on the scope and ambit of See. 10(3)1,a)(iii) of the Act.
5. Let us analyse the essential features of Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. To attract this clause, (1) the application to the Rent Controller should be for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of a non-residential building in his (tenant's) occupation; (ii) the eviction of the non- residential building sought should be to meet be bona fide requirement of the landlord for carrying on or commencing a business; and iii) during the relevant time the landlord is tot in occupation of another non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned, which is his own or to the possession of which is entitied whether under the Act or Otherwise.
6. The Act is a progressive legislative measure to provide social welfare and security, mainly to protect the interests of the tenants while providing certain safeguards or the landlords also. The object of Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is to enable the landlord to recover possession of his non- residential budding in the occupation of a tenant under him if it is required for the purpose of the business which he carries on, or be bona fide proposes to commence. There all the same, a rider attached to this enabling provision; and that is, the landlord seeking recovery of such non-residential building should not be in occupation of another non- residential building in the city, town or village concerned, which is his own or to the Possession of which he is entitled. The intendment of the legislature is crystal clear; o landlord who is in occupation of a non-residential building which is his own or to the possession of which is he is entitled, should be permitted to invoke Section 10(3)(a)(i@) of the Act to recover possession of another non-residential building belonging to him, evicting the tenant thereof. We find absolutely no ambiguity whatsoever in the expressions used in the statutory provision. The legislature has not left any scope for doubting the meaning of the words used. or the object sought to be achieved, the language used being simple and unequivocal. It would be presumptuous n our part to hold that the legislature did not mean what it stated in the statute; or it meant something more or something less than the meaning conveyed by the language used. The maxim is 'a verbia legis non recedemdum est' (from the words of the law there should not be any departure). The legislature's anxiety appears to have been not to disturb the tenant in occupation by his landlord, if he as in occupation of a non-residential building. The very fact that he is in occupation of a non-residential building in which he carries on his business is sufficient reason for depriving him of the right to evict the tenant in occupation of another non-residential building belonging to or owned by him. The process of interpreting the law, as a general rule, it is not open to the Court to read into it t what is not there, or to substitute it or a portion thereof by the opinion of the Court, on equitable or other considerations, so long as the intendment of the Legislature has been expressed categorically and in clear and unambiguous language, unless it is unconstitutional or opposed-to the principles of natural justice. The Court may, in appropriate cases, indicate amendments to the provision which are desirable to make the provision in question more meaningful and equitable; and leave it to the Legislature for its consideration and action; but to go beyond that limit and to give a meaning which runs counter to the expressed will of the Legislature is not permissible. Judicial activism too has its limits; while it permits and requires interpretation of law in its proper perspective, it does not expect, in that process, to import ideas alien to the clear language used in the statutory provision. The Courts are to interpret law, not to make law.
7. We would briefly refer to the facts in Balaiah's case : AIR1965AP435 (supra), and the reasons stated by the learned Judges for the legal propositions sought to be propounded by them. In that case, the landlord filed a petition under See. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act against the tenant on two grounds : firstly, that his son who had attained majority intended to start a new business., and, secondly, that the building required re-construction. The Rent Controller allowed the petition holding that the requirement of the undivided son would be deemed to be the personal requirement of the landlord. The decision of the Rent Controller having been confirmed in appeal, the defeated tenant preferred a revision, which was referred to a Division Bench by Venkateswarn, J., before whom it was posted at the initial stage bearing, in view of the importance of the question of law involved. On a closer examination of the provisions, the Division Bench thought that to attract Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) the Act, four things must exist: (1) it must ,any other non-residential building'; (2) landlord is not occupying a nonresidential aiding (in the city, town or village) which is own or to the possession of which he is entitled; (3) he requires it for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on or which he bona fide proposes to commence; and (4) his claim is bona fide.
8. On the finding recorded by the Rent Controller, the Division Bench held that the first and the last requirements were not in controversy. So far as the third requirement concerned, the discussion by the Division Bench is found in paragraph 9 of the judgment at pp. 436-437). According to the learned Judges:
'It seems now to be beyond any doubt that these expressions need not necessarily be confined to the physical requirement of the landlord himself. These and similar other Expressions ought to be liberally construed and not in a narrow way. They are susceptible of a wide meaning. They include the landlord's 'family and dependants and such -person or persons who may be essential and necessary or occupation'. In order to find out who are such persons
'it is not only permissible but it is proper and desirable for the Court to bear in mind the context of the social order, the habits and ideas of living and the social and religious customs of the community to which the individual concerned belongs'.
Whether the need of a particular person is' the need of the landlord will naturally have to be decided in view of the circumstances of each case.
Broadly stated, however, these phrases not only include the members of the landlord's family but also all those persons who are socially or economically dependent on him and whose responsibilities he has accepted. This is based on the necessity of realising that the family in India whether joint or separate is the social unit of Indian civilisation and it is greater public importance to keep it together .....'
We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that when the major son, a coparcener In a joint Hindu family, intends to start a business, the third requirement of the said provision would be deemed to have been satisfied, as this requirement would be the requirement of the landlord. Such a case, therefore, plainly falls within S. 10(3)(a)(iii).'
The second requirement formulated is dealt with in paragraph 10 onwards. The learned Judges felt that if the construction placed by the learned Advocate for the tenant on Sec. 10 that the landlord should not have in his occupation in the city a non-residential building for the purpose of the business which he was carrying on or which he proposed to commence; and in case he was in occupation of a non-residential building, he could take advantage of 5. 10 only in a case where the said non-residential building was not his own or he was not entitled to its possession; it would create absurd results which the Courts must try to avoid. The learned Judges thought that it was impossible to think that the Legislature wanted to make a provision as contended for by the counsel for the tenant. Towards the end of paragraph 11, what is stated reads as follows:
'Consequently a landlord who is carrying on the business in the city in a non-residential building whether of his own or which he has taken on rent, will in no case be entitled to claim another non-residential building of his for the purpose of expansion of his business or for the purpose of commencing a new business. We do not think that is the situation which the Legislature wanted to create. That this is not so would be clear from the object with which S. 10 appears to have been enacted.'
In paragraph 12 of the judgment at p. 138, the learned Judges said :
'It is evident from S. 10(3)(c) that a landlord can claim a portion of the same building given on rent whatever may be the nature of his requirement, viz., residential or non- residential subject of course to the satisfaction of other requirements of that provision. When a landlord can thus get a tenant evicted under S. 10(3)(c) in this manner, we fail to see why the landlord in an earlier clause would have been given altogether a different and diametrically opposite treatment. It is., therefore, impossible to construe S.10(3)(a)(iii) to mean that the landlord cannot in any case evict a tenant from another of his non-residential building if he is in occupation of a non-residential building in the same city either for his business which he is carrying on or for a new business.
We would, therefore, naturally prefer to so construe this provision which would be consistent with the legislative intent apparent from the subsequent clause, viz. S. 10(3)(c). That is another reason why we do not find any substance in the interpretation tried to be placed by the learned Advocate for the petitioner.'
According to the learned Judges, the correct position in law is as summed up in paragraph 13 of that judgment (at p. 438), which we reproduce below:
'We are, therefore, of the clear opinion that what the said provision means is this: when a landlord, who is in occupation of a non-residential building in a city, town or village requires another non-residential building of his own in the same city, town or village, as the case may be, from his tenant, for the purpose of the business which he is carrying on - which can mean shifting or expansion of the business which he is carrying on or for commencing a new business - can successfully claim eviction of his tenant if he is able to satisfy the Rent Controller that the non-residential building which he is occupying is not sufficient or suitable for the purpose of expansion off his business for the purpose of a new business which he bona fide proposes to commence, or that the shifting of his business has, in the circumstances of the case, become inevitable. It would be open to him to prove that the non-residential building which he is occupying is not exclusively his own or that he is not entitled to its exclusive possession. Any one of the above mentioned cases falls, in our view, within the ambit of Sec.10(3)(a)(iii).'
9. With respect to the learned Judges, we find ourselves not persuaded to accept their reasoning behind the decision, which, according to us, is manifestly contrary to the legislative intent as could be gathered from the clear expressions used in See. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. We wonder why and how the learned Judges concluded that it was impossible to construe See. 10(3)(a)(iii) to mean that the landlord could not in any case evict a tenant from another of his non- residential building if he was in occupation of a non-residential building in the same city for carrying on or commencing a new business, when the clause in unequivocal terms stated so.
10. We would, giving a liberal interpretation, assume that the landlord's bona fide requirement might include the bona fide requirement of any other member of his family including himself. This might enable the landlord to claim the eviction of the non- residential building owned by him in the occupation of the tenant, even when the bona fide requirement is not that of himself personally, but is that of any other member or some members of his family; that is all. The more important and relevant question however, is whether this would in any way change the nature and extent of his right to claim eviction of the tenant occupying a non- residential building belonging to him, situate in the same city, when he himself is in occupation of another non-residential building. One cannot blow hot and cold at the same time. If the bona fide requirement of the landlord should be deemed to include that of any other member of the applicant's family, by the application of the same reasoning and logic, the occupation of a non- residential building in the same city should be deemed to be occupation of every other member of the applicant's family also; and, therefore, the members of the family severally or jointly cannot ask for the recovery of another non-residential building in the occupation of a tenant as long as the applicant, any other member or some of the members of his family are occupying a non-residential building for carrying on a business or commencing a new business. In other words, the landlord could not be heard to say that the non-residential building already in his occupation was occupied exclusively by him, not by any other member of his family, and, therefore, on behalf of every other member of his family, who bona fide required to carry on or to commence a business, he was entitled to recover a non-residential building, In the occupation of his tenant. This argument is destructive of the very character of the joint family conception, and this would definitely defeat the object and purpose of the legislation to protect the tenant from being evicted from the premises arbitrarily. For the view we expressed, we find support in Thanappa's Case : AIR1952Mad553 ; Vemana Veerabhadrudu's case (1958).2 Andh WR 575 and Ramaswamy Naidu's case (1961) 1 Andh WR 400.
10A. We notice that the decisions in Seshasayana Rao's case : AIR1954Mad531 , Nagamanickam Chettiar's case (195-i) 1 Mad LJ 182 and Kolandaivelu Chettiar's case(1961)1 Mad LJ 184,construing identical provisions in See. 7(3)(c)(iii) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control', Act of 1949) were relied on in Balaiah's case ( : AIR1965AP435 (supra). It is not necessary for us to express any opinion an the correctness of the reasoning of the learned Judges in those decisions, inasmuch as virtually all those decisions stand overruled by the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court itself in Laswaran Chettiar's case : AIR1971Mad163 which incidentally also dissented from the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Balaiah's case (supra).
11. With due respect again, we, are Constrained to Add that in Balaiah's case (supra) the Division Bench erred in drawing an inference that because the landlord in Occupation of a portion of a building was entitled to seek recovery of another portion of the building, to meet his bona fide requirement in terms of Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act, it must be deemed that a person invoking Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) also should be entitled to recover possession of a non-residential building from his tenant, when he was occupying another non-residential building in the same city. We fail to understand the rationale behind the conclusion. The two provisions are independent, not complementary to one another. In one case, it is a case of a person in occupation of only a portion of the building seeking to recover another portion of the same building to meet the bona fide requirement; in the other, it is a case of one who is already in occupation of the entire building seeking to recover possession of another building. The two situations ace not comparable as equal or similar; and the fallacy of the Division Bench ruling lies in having drawn an inference on a comparison of what are not comparable as equal or similar things.
12. Recently in Pandu's case : AIR1987SC857 , the Supreme Court had occasion to construe the provisions of See. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. The decision of our Division Bench in Balaiah's case : AIR1965AP435 (supra) was also cited before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, did not pronounce anything in regard to the right of the Landlord to recover possession of a non- residential building of his in the occupation of a tenant when he was already in occupation of another non-residential building, in the same city, town or village, in which he carried on business inasmuch as, on facts, it was found : 'the malgis have ceased to be non- residential premises from 1970 onwards and hence their mere ownership cannot preclude he respondent from seeking the eviction of he appellant under See. 10(3)(a)(iii)'. The decision of the Supreme Court was based on he facts peculiar to that case.
13. It is our considered opinion that under Sec. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, a landlord in occupation of a non-residential building is entitled, for carrying on his business or for commencing a business, to get back on of another non-residential building the occupation of a tenant; the bar under c Section against securing eviction of the ant of such non-residential building is absolute; suitability, convenience and efficiency of the non-residential building in the occupation of the landlord for carrying on the business of the applicant landlord) or to-,meet the bona fide need of other member of the family of the applicant (landlord.), independent of and over above the need of the applicant (landlord), also in our view, irrelevant considerations the context of construing the provisions in S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act which, in clear interdicts the landlord, in absolute from seeking recovery of the non- residential budding belonging to him in the occupation of the tenant. We, therefore, hold the ruling given by the Division Bench to contrary in Balaiah's case : AIR1965AP435 (supra) does not represent the correct legal position. For the, same reasons, the observations made by the learned Judges who decided M. Venkata Reddy's case (IW>6) 2 Andh LT 352 K. Venkaiah's case : AIR1972AP123 and C. Manikya Rao's case (1976) 1 Andh WR 100, following Baliah's case : AIR1965AP435 (supra) also could not be upheld. Karachi Stores' case : AIR1982AP470 is distinguishable as the same is one failing under See. 10(3)(c) of the Act. So also is the decision in Madala Chinna Subba Rao's case (1983) 1 APLJ (HC) 125.
14. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the revision, setting aside the judgment of the Chief Judge. City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, and restoring the order of the Rent Controller. There would however, be no order as to costs, in the circumstances of the case.
15. Revision allowed.