Judgment:
Sriramulu, J.
1. O.S. No. 59 of 1968 on the file of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, out of which this Civil Revision Petition arises was filed for partition of Plaint B Schedule properties claiming 1/6th share therein and also claiming 1/6th share in the compensation amount with regard to certain lands which were acquired by the Government and also for a declaration that the registration of some of the suit lands as endowed properties in the Register of Endowments by defendant 13, the Director of Endowments, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, is illegal, void and without jurisdiction. The plaintiff pleaded that late Raja Raghunatharam was the common ancestor of the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 11. He owned considerable properties movable and immovable including plaint B Schedule lands comprised of crown grants, Atiyat, etc. After his death the said crown grants were re-granted to his heirs and ultimately the succession was sanctioned by the competent authority in favour of the plaintiff, defendants 1, 2, 10 and 11 and Raja Tirambaklal, the predecessor-in-interest of defendants 3 to 9. There are thus said to be three branches namely, plaintiff and defendant 11 together entitled to 1/3rd share; defendant 10 is entitled to 1/3rd share and the remaining 1/3rd share is said to be belonging to defendants 1 and 2 and 3 to 9 who are the heirs of Raja Tirambaklal, who died in the year 1963. It was further pleaded that after the abolition of the Jagirs, the parties are receiving their respective shares in the commutation amounts as regards the plaint B Schedule properties. According to the plaintiffs, the non-Atiyat properties of the family were the subject matter of O.S.No. 2/1343-F, a partition suit, and as per the decree in the said suit those properties were partitioned among the members of the family. Finally, the decree was confirmed by the Supreme Court. The plaintiff would have it (sic) that only Atiyat properties, the subject matter of the suit, were not divided and hence the suit for partition.
2. The defendants resisted the plaintiff's suit and contended inter alia that the claim of the plaintiff that the Civil Court has jurisdiction is not correct. In para 7 of the written statement filed by defendants 1 to 4, it was contended that the Hyderabad Enfranchised Inams Act is no longer in force after the coming into force of the Inams Abolition Act and that the Atiyat and Inam properties are not liable to be partitioned. It was further contended that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction in respect of the suit properties.
3. Thus, there is no specific denial on the part of the defendants that the plaint B Schedule lands are not Inam lands. What all they contended in para 7 of the written statement was the Atiyat and Inam properties, which are the subject matter of the suit, are not liable to be partitioned. The grievance of the defendants, as expressed in para 8 of their written statement is that the plaintiff has not described the nature of the suit properties and that he has not referred to the properties, in respect of which succession was granted by the Atiyat authorities. In para 13 of the written statement, the defendants 1 to 4 have traced out the nature of the suit properties and claimed them to be the temple properties. Their defence in para 13 runs as follows :
'The real facts which the plaintiff fully knows but purposely conceals are that the properties shown in S. Nos. 1 to 5 and 8 in Schedule 'B' attached to the plaint are the properties held by and for the benefit of the Shri Krishna Murli Manohar Swamy and other allied temples at Attapur - Bahadurpura in taluka West, Hyderabad district. They are all temple properties. No one is entitled to any share in it. They are possessed and managed by defendant 3 exclusively as 'Mutawalli' of the said temples after his father's death. So far as the lands shown in S. Nos. 6 and 7 of the said Schedule 'B' are concerned, it is submitted that late Raja Trimbaklal was the Pattadar and in exclusive possession of the same. Even otherwise, they have vested in the State being Inam lands by virtue of the provisions of the Hyderabad Abolition of Inams Act. No one has a share in these properties as well.'
The defence of the defendants is further elaborated in para 14 of the written statement, which reads as under :
'According to the plaint allegations the suit lands are Inam and Inam lands and the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 11 are the joint inamdars in possession of the same. These defendants do not admit it as already stated. However, under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act 1967 which came into force in October, 1967, the Tahsildar alone is the competent authority to decide whether the suit lands are Inam lands and whether they are held by the temple or Inamdar or Khabiz-e-Khadim or other person. Further, the Tahsildar is competent to grant Ryotwari pattas. The Act overrides other laws, contracts and any decree or order of a Court, etc. This Honourable Court, therefore, has no jurisdiction to try this suit. The suit is, therefore, liable to be dismissed.'
4. On the basis of the averments in the plaint and the written statement and also the oral contentions raised by the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues :-
1) Whether the suit properties are Atiyat properties belonging to the joint family of the parties?
2) Is the suit property liable to be partitioned?
3) Whether the present suit is barred under O. 2, R. 2, C.P.C. as contained in para 5 of the written statement?
4) Whether the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit?
5) Whether the suit is properly valued and Court-fee paid is correct?
6) To what relief?
Additional Issue :
Whether in view of Ss. 4 and 5 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1967 this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit?'
5. Before the commencement of the trial the defendants filed I.A.No. 2847 of 1975 and sought the determination of the additional issue as a preliminary issue. That petition having been allowed, the trial Court tried the additional issue as preliminary issue and held by the impugned order that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit filed by the plaintiff. This Civil Revision is filed against that order of the trial Court.
6. When this revision came up for hearing before our learned brother Jayachandra Reddy, J., the learned counsel appearing for both sides have submitted that a question of considerable importance has been raised and it requires to be decided by a Division Bench. According to them, the question to be determined is : 'In view of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit'. Having regard to the submissions made by learned counsel, the learned single Judge has decided to refer the case to a Division Bench. That is how, this revision has come up before us for hearing.
7. Sri M. L. Ramakrishna Rao, who appeared for the petitioners on the first day of hearing, argued at length but when the matter was again taken up yesterday Sri M. L. Ramakrishna Rao and Sri H. S. Gururaja Rao, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, sought permission of the Court to withdraw their Vakalats and that was permitted by the Court. Consequently, Mr. Tejrai Kapoor, who appears for respondent 10 and admittedly sails with the Revision Petitioners, argued at length in support of the revision. He raised contentions more or less similar to those raised by Sri M. L. Ramakrishna Rao, the counsel for the revision petitioners.
8. Sri Tejrai Kapoor, the learned counsel argued in support of the case of the revision petitioners that, under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the question whether the suit property is an Inam land and whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for share in the suit property. He relied upon an unreported decision of the Bench of this Court to which one of us (Raghuvir, J.) is a party in S.A.No. 459 of 1977 dt. 27-12-1983 : (reported in AIR 1984 NOC 180) (Andh Pra) and contended that the Tahsildar under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the question whether the suit property is an Inam land or not and whether the Civil Court is barred from determining that question. We do not, however, think that this decision provides any analogy to the present case. That case arose out of a suit for declaration of title, declaring the suit properties as Inam lands, and also for delivery of possession thereof and for mesne profits or damages for use and occupation at a specified date. The question that arose in that case was whether in view of S. 11 of Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 26 of 1948, it was open to the Civil Court to determine the nature and history of a land in respect of which the landholder claims a ryotwari patta. Taking into consideration the provisions of the said Act and the various decisions rendered by this Court and the Supreme Court, it came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer under S. 56(1)(c) of the said Act is exclusive and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the rival claims, as to who is the lawful ryot. Further it was held that the Andhra Pradesh Estates Abolition Act is a self-contained Code in which provision was also made for the adjudication of various types of disputes arising after an estate is notified by specifically constituted Tribunals. Thus, the said case is distinguishable on facts from the present case. In that case, a declaration was sought that the plaint schedule properties are Inam lands. Evidently, the question relating to the nature and tenure of the land cannot be decided by the Civil Court under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act and it has to be decided by a Special Tribunal constituted under the Act. Taking into consideration, the relief sought for in the plaint, which could be determined exclusively by the Special Tribunal and thereby excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, this Court was justified in holding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to determine the question of the tenure of the suit land.
9. The plaintiffs in the present suit sought the relief for partition of plaint 'B' schedule properties claiming 1/6th share therein and also claiming 1/6th share in the compensation amount with regard to certain lands which were acquired by the Government and for declaration that the registration of some of the suit lands as endowed properties in the register of Endowments by defendant 13, the Director of Endowments, is illegal, void and without jurisdiction. Further it was claimed that the plaint B schedule properties were 'Atiyat' lands and that there was grant in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendants 1, 2, 10, 11 and Raja Tirambaklal, after the death of their common ancestor late Raja Raghunatha Ram. The defendants in their written statement pleaded that the 'Atiyat' and Inam properties, which are the subject matter of the suit, are not liable for partition. Though the grievance of the defendants was that the plaintiff have not described the nature of the properties, but they specifically pleaded that the plaint B schedule properties are the temple Inam properties and they are possessed and managed by the third defendant exclusively as 'Muthavalli' of the said temple after his father's death and that those lands are not liable for partition. In view of the provisions of Act 29 of 1985, amending Ss. 1 and 3 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act 1955, the suit lands which are admitted by both the parties to have been registered as Inam lands held by and for the benefit of the temple and religious institutions also fall within the definition of 'Inam' as defined in S. 2(1)(e) of the said Act. Thus, there does not appear to be any controversy between the parties on the question whether the plaint B schedule properties are Inam lands or not. Therefore, it becomes an admitted fact that the plaint B schedule lands are Inam lands and no further finding is required by the Tahsildar concerned as to the nature or tenure of the land under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1967.
10. In view of the admitted case of the parties that the suit land is an Inam land, the net principal question that falls for consideration in the suit is whether the suit for partition of an Inam land, which has been vested with the State by virtue of the operation of S. 3 of the Act, is liable for partition and whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try such a suit. This very question was considered by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Govind Reddy v. Lakshminarayan Reddy, (1959) 2 Andh WR 201. That was a suit for partition of joint family properties in which the plaintiff claimed 1/3rd share being the son of one of the three members of the joint family. The suit was resisted in that case mainly on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in regard to the properties, which were 'Inam and Atiyat' lands. As in the present case, the jurisdictional question was arrayed in that case as a preliminary issue. The trial Court, after hearing the arguments of both sides, came to the conclusion that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. On appeal preferred by the aggrieved party to this Court, a Division Bench of this Court happened to consider the very same question which the learned counsel Sri Tejrai Kapoor urged before us, namely, whether the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to entertain a suit in respect of 'Inam' and 'Atiyat' lands. This Court repelled that contention and held that all the Inams consequent upon the enforcement of the Hyderabad Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, were abolished and vested in the State. They became liable to payment of land revenue, which they were exempted before enfranchisement. These Inams were shed of the peculiar characteristics, which belonged to them before the said abolition. These consequences followed notwithstanding the existence of any law to the contrary. The learned counsel in that case relied upon the provisions of Ss. 4 and 10 of the Act. Meeting the learned counsel's objection, this Court held that, as S. 10 reads, the enquiry by the Collector is confined to determining the claims of an Inamdar, Khabis-e-Kadim, permanent tenant and protected tenant or non-protected tenant, to being registered as occupant under Ss. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Act. As to in what cases an Inamdar is entitled to be registered as an occupant is provided in S.4. Similarly, as to in what circumstances a Khabis-e-Kadim would be entitled to get himself registered as occupant is mentioned in S.5. Ss. 6 and 7 deal with cases of rights of permanent tenants and protected tenants in such Inams, to be recognised and registered as occupants, while S. 8 deals with the registration of non-protected tenants as occupants. It is the enquiry into those matters and the final determination thereof that is entrusted to the Collector under S. 10 of the Act. The Inams ceased to exist and they vested in the Government. That result is not lost by reason of the provisions of S. 10 of the Act. It was further held it is futile to contend that, because an enquiry is to be made by a revenue authority in regard to certain matters relating to those lands, the Civil Court must be deemed to have no jurisdiction in those matters. The Civil Court is not going to declare as to who is going to be declared the occupant. That is left to the revenue Courts alone. The Civil court would merely declare as to who are all entitled to the property. There can be no question of the revenue Court having exclusive jurisdiction in this matter because what was once the Inam has ceased to be such and the land is to be treated as any patta land. The trial Court relying upon this decision of this Court held the additional issue in favour of the plaintiff holding that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit.
11. Sri Tejrai Kapoor then relied upon a decision of a learned single Judge reported in Seethal Singh v. Mahmood Shariff, (1984) 1 Andh WR 406 and contended that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree for partition in respect of Inam lands which got vested in the Government under S. 3 of the said Act. The learned single Judge has not taken into consideration in that case the decision in Govind Reddy v. Lakshminarayan Reddy, (1959 (2) Andh WR 201) (supra) which was binding on him. Hence, it is not a good law and as such it is overruled.
12. Sri Tejrai Kapoor has further relied upon a case reported in Bhubheshwar Prasad Narain Singh v. Sidheshwar Mukherjee, : [1971]3SCR639 . In our view, that case does not in any way render assistance to the case of the petitioners. In that case, the point for consideration was as to what would be the effect of vesting of an estate when decrees passed in partition suits which had not become final on the date when the estate was notified to have vested in the State. The suit out of which the appeal went to the Supreme Court in the case of Bhubneshwar Prasad was also a suit for partition of four annas milkiat interest of one of the co-sharer landlords of the tauzis in question. The preliminary decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs in that suit was modified by the Patna High Court in appeal, and the matter having ultimately been taken to the Supreme Court, the preliminary decree as passed by the trial Court was restored. Subsequent thereto proceedings for preparation of final decree were started. An objection was taken that the preliminary decree had become infructuous and, therefore, no final decree would be passed on the basis thereof. While dealing with that question, the Patna High Court in Sidheshwar Mukherji v. Bhubneshwar Prasad Narain Singh, 1965 BLJR 452 held that a co-sharer's possession was in law possession on behalf of all the co-sharers. If only one co-sharer was in possession of any of the joint properties, it would not amount to his exclusive possession but such a possession would enure to the benefit of all the co-sharers. The point, canvassed before the Supreme Court, was that the judgment of the Patna High Court, giving a direction that the partition suit launched in 1943 should be allowed to proceed in view of the provisions of S. 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 was not correct in law. That contention was repelled by the Supreme Court and it was held that as possession of one co-sharer was possession of all the co-sharers, the deeming provision of S. 6 of that Act enures for the benefit of all, who were in possession in the eye of law; the non-possessing co-sharer did not lose his share in the bakast lands and had right to them as raiyat though not as proprietor or a tenure-holder because no party in the partition suit was claiming either to oust a trespasser or any title by adverse possession. Consequently, the Supreme Court sustained the direction given by the Patna High Court to the effect that the trial Court should proceed with the proceedings for preparation of the final decree in the partition suit in respect of lands deemed to be settled with the proprietors or tenure-holders.
13. The learned counsel Sri Tejrai Kapoor next relied upon the case reported in Brij Bihari Dubey v. Chandra Shekhar Tewary, : AIR1975Pat164 , in support of his contention that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction in view of the vesting of the property with the Government by operation of S. 3 of the said Act. In this case, a Bench of the Patna High Court has relied upon the said judgment of the Supreme Court and held that where in a partition suit during the pendency of the proceedings for preparation of final decree, the estate, which is the subject matter of the suit, vested in the State under a notification issued in pursuance of S. 3-A of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, a partition suit in respect of the lands deemed to be settled with them under the provisions of S. 6 of the Act or may choose to proceed for preparation of fresh final decree whichever course may be open to them under law._
14. After dealing with the Supreme Court case in Bhubneshwar Prasad, : [1971]3SCR639 . Justice S.K. Jha observed :-
'It must, in view of the aforesaid decisions, be held that the final decree for partition of the proprietary interest in an estate which already stands vested in the State of Bihar has become infructuous. It is a different matter that the parties may be at liberty either to institute a fresh partition suit in respect of the lands deemed to be settled with them under the provisions of S. 6 of the Act, or may choose to proceed for preparation of fresh final decree. As they may be advised and whichever course may be open to them under the law, the fact remains that the estate having vested, the subject matter of the partition suit, which, I repeat was merely the proprietary interest, was obliterated by force of statute and a decree in respect of such property which is non est in the eye of law cannot be held to be executable........... be that as it may the judgment and order of the Court below holding that final decree in the partition suit had become infructuous and the execution case was not maintainable cannot be said to be erroneous in law.'
15. In S. Venkataramiah v. K. Venkataswamy, : AIR1976AP402 Full Bench of this Court happened to deal with the case where the plaintiff filed the suit for redemption of mortgage and for possession against the mortgagee defendants. The subject matter of the mortgage, which was an estate, was later taken over under the provisions of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act. The plaintiff was one of the Shortriumdars of the village. The defendants pleaded that they and their predecessors had occupancy rights in the land and that the occupancy rights possessed by them could not be extinguished by the mortgage. The defendants also pleaded that they had also been granted patta by the competent authority under S. 11 of the Estates Abolition Act. The learned Judges after dealing with the object and scheme of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act and the various decision rendered by this Court, Madras High Court and the Supreme Court, Chinnappa Reddy, J. (as he then was) observed that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of a Civil Court from entertaining a suit of a Civil nature may be expressed or implied. Where a Special Tribunal is created by an Act of Legislature for the purpose of determining the rights created by the statute and finality is given to the orders of the Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must be considered to be excluded with regard to those matters. But, where the subject matter of the suit falls outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal or where the relief sought in the suit is one which the special Tribunal is incapable of granting, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted merely because the question which has to be incidentally but necessarily decided is a question within the competence of the Special Tribunal. Therefore, a suit for a relief which the Settlement Officer cannot grant is not barred merely because it incidentally involves the adjudication of questions within the competence of the Settlement Officer and the Estates Abolition Tribunal. It was further observed that if, however, the relief claimed in the suit is a mere camouflage for obtaining a determination of the rights, which are required to be decided by the Settlement Officer and the Estates Abolition Tribunal, the suit must be held to be barred. The plaint must determine the forum. But, the defendant may show that the plaint is a mere camouflage to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal. If the Court is satisfied that the allegations in the plaint and the reliefs sought do not bring the action within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal and if the defendant is unable to show that the action is a mere camouflage, there is no reason why the jurisdiction of the Civil Court should be excluded merely because the defence raised involves the adjudication of matters within the competence of the Special Tribunal.
16. The other decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel Sri Tejrai Kapoor are not of any practical assistance for determination of the question whether the suit for partition which is a case of purely civil nature and which is within the competence of a Civil Court to try a suit and which does not seek any relief which can be provided by the Special Tribunal under the provisions of the Inam Abolition Act is without (sic) jurisdiction to try the suit.
17. As already observed above these decisions cited by the learned counsel deal with the provisions of various enactments of various States and they do not provide any analogies to the present case. In view of the decision of the Bench of this Court in (1959) 2 Andh WR 201 (supra) and also the decision of the Supreme Court in : [1971]3SCR639 (supra) we hold that the relief for partition of suit properties is purely of a civil nature and it is within the competence of Civil Court to try the case. None of the provisions contained in the Inam Abolition Act provided any relief, which is sought for in the suit. As already observed above, the defendants do not dispute that the suit lands are Inam lands held by or for the benefit of the temple and religious institutions. It is only the Civil Court which is competent to pass a decree for partition and also determine the shares of the co-sharers of the joint family property.
18. For these reasons, we hold that the trial Court was perfectly justified in holding that the Civil Court has alone got jurisdiction to deal with the suit filed by the plaintiffs.
19. For these reasons, the Revision Petition is dismissed. We pass no orders as to costs.
20. Petition dismissed.