ORDER
Immaneni Panduranga Rao, J.
1. This contempt case is filed by the widow of late G. Krupanandam, under Sections 10 - 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 70 of 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') for punishing the respondents for not having complied with the directions issued by this Court in WPMP No. 18938 of 1989 in W.P. No. 14310 of 89 dated 6-10-1989. Originally three respondents were impleaded and later by order dated 30-10-1992 in Contempt Application No. 429/92, the fourth respondent has been impleaded.
2. The petitioner contended that the order dated 6-10-1989 passed in WPMP No. 18938 of 89 has not been implemented by paying the salary due to her deceased husband in the light of the judgment in W.P. No. 4926 of 1986 dated 18-1-1989, which amounts to disobedience of the orders of this Court. The petitioner contended that by virtue of interim directions, she is entitled for payment of half of the salary which was payable to her husband during his life time. She got issued a registered notice dated 21-9-90. Though respondents 1 to 3 received that notice, as no payment was made and no reply was given to the said notice, the petitioner filed this petition on 5-10-1990.
3. The respondents have taken a preliminary objection on the ground of limitation. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the interim direction given by this court is still subsisting; that it affords a continuous cause of action to the petitioner and as such the question of limitation does not arise. The learned counsel for the petitioner, having referred to the decision of Ramaswamy, J (as he then was) reported in A. Ratnamanikyam v. K.S.R. Sarma, 1988 (2)ALT 644, submitted that that decision is no longer a good law in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P., : 1992CriLJ1269 which lays down that the power of the Supreme Court and the High Court to punish for contempt is not restricted or trammelled by ordinary legislations. The learned counsel therefore argued that the power conferred upon the Supreme Court and High Court, being Courts of Record under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India respectively having an inherent power, the jurisdiction vested under the said Act is a special one not derived from any of the Statute and therefore the Supreme Court or High Court in exercising that power under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India, cannot be fettered away with the prescription of limitation. The learned counsel for the petitioner therefore argued that the general power to punish for contempt conferred under the Act cannot over-ride the special power conferred under the specific provisions of the Constitution of India and in the absence of any restriction prescribed in Article 215 of the Constitution of India imposing the limitation in exercising the power to punish for contempt of court, the exercise of power cannot be denied to the petitioner on the ground of limitation. He therefore, reiterated that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Pritam Pal's case (2 supra), the decision in Ratnamanikyam's case (1 supra) is no longer a good law.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, : [1990]3SCR649 argued that the special enactment should prevail over the general enactment and as such the provision in Article 215 of the Constitution of India which is in the nature of a special enactment with regard to the contempt of court must prevail over the general provisions contained in the Act.
5. The Act is enacted to define and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing for contempts of courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. The Act deals with civil contempts as well as criminal contempts. The Act also deals with the power of High Court to punish the offender for contempt of court not only of itself but also for the contempts of courts subordinate to it. It has also got power to try offences committed or offenders found outside the jurisdiction of the Court. But under Section 20 of the Act, it is laid down that no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The scope and ambit of Section 20 of the Act in initiating the proceedings for contempt, has come up for consideration of our High Court in the case of Advocate General, A.P. v. A.V. Koteswara Rao, 1984 (2) An.W.R. 338. Jagannadha Rao, J. (as he then was) held that the word 'Court' in Section 20 of the Act is used in the wider sense as being applicable to cases of Contempt of the High Court and also of the Subordinate Courts, whether initiated suo motu or otherwise. The learned Judge further held that Section 20 of the Act does not intend to 'abrogate' the powers under Article 215 of the Constitution of India either wholly or partially and that the powers can be exercised in all their amplitude within the period of one year. According to the learned Judge, the procedural restrictions regarding the quantum of punishment as made in Section 12 of the Act and regarding the period within which contempt proceedings are to be initiated as made in Section 20 of the Act are not ultra vires Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Thus the learned Judge made it clear that both Sections 12 and 20 apply to cases initiated by the High Court for contempt of itself as well as cases of contempt of the Courts subordinate to it. While dealing with the question of initiation of contempt proceedings, the learned Judge held that intiation of a contempt proceeding is the time when the court applies its mind to the allegations in the petition and decides to direct, under Section 17 of the Act the alleged contemnor to show cause why he should not be punished. That has occurred in this case on 16-3-1992.
6. The above view of the learned Judge has been confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kishan Singh v. Hon. Mr. T. Anjaiah, 1985 Crl.L.J. 1428 (A.P.) where in it was held that the proceedings under the Act can be said to be initiated when the Court applies its mind to the allegations in the petition and decides to direct the alleged contemnor to show case why he should not be punished. In that case the petitioner alleged violation of the Order of the High Court dated 5-7-1981 whereas the petition came up for admission in August, 1984. It was held that the said petition was barred under Section 20 of the Act. Inasmuch as there was no initiation of action under Section 17 of the Act within one year of the violation, the Division Bench held that the petition is barred by timeunder Section 20 of the Act.
7. The above view of the Division Bench is further re-affirmed by a recent decision of another Division Bench of this Court reported in C.V.L. Subrahmanyam v. K. Venkateswarlu, : 1993(1)ALT430 holding that mere filing of the application for contempt will not save the limitation and the initiation of the contempt proceedings is the time when the Court applies its mind and decides under Section 17 of the Act to direct the alleged contemnor to show cause why he should not be punished.
8. In the present case the order of the court in respect of which the contempt proceedings are initiated is dated 6-10-1989. The petitioner issued a notice dated 21-9-1990 demanding compliance of the said order. The contempt petition was filed on 5-10-90 whereas notice for admission was ordered on 16-3-1992. The contempt petition was admitted by this Court on 15-9-1992 long after the expiry of one year from the date of order, in the case of Ratnamanikyam (1 supra), Ramaswamy, J. (as he then was) laid down that in case of the Court fixing a date for compliance of its order, one year has to be computed from the next day and in the case where no date is fixed, the time should be computed excluding the reasonable time required due to administrative exigencies. The learned Judge held that what is reasonable time is always a matter for consideration depending on the circumstances. In this case the petitioner has given a registered notice on 21-9-1990 demanding compliance within eight days from the date of receipt of the said notice. It is stated that the said registered notice was served on the respondents on 24-9-1990. Therefore even excluding the reasonable time for compliance with the demand made by the petitioner after receipt of the registered notice, inasmuch as the court has not taken up the contempt case for admission within the period of one year thereafter, it is clearly barred by limitation.
9. Article 215 of the Constitution of India lays down that every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. The Constitution thus recognises the inherent powers of the High Court as the Court of Record to punish for contempt. In the absence of any separate Rules framed under the Constitution of India, which vary or alter the limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Act for initiating the proceedings for contempt, it cannot be said that the limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Act has no application. That apart, as submitted by the learned counsel for the third respondent, the ambit of Article 215 of the Constitution of India is different from the exercise of power under Section 12 of the Act. In the case of Pritam Pal (2 supra) the Advocate practising in the High Court made libellous allegations against the sitting Judge. That conduct of the Advocate has resulted in initiating suo motu proceedings for contempt. Thus the act complained of, which is the subject matter of contempt, is not what was required to be done by the contemnor by virtue of the orders of the High Court. It is the offending liabellous allegation that prompted the initiation of action under Article 215 of the Constitution of India.
10. In the present case the act complained of is entirely different. The cause of action for the petitioner to seek contempt has arisen by reason of the respondents not complying with the order of this court dated 6-10-1989. When the respondents are required to do or refrain from doing a particular act by virtue of the order of the High Court and violation of that order amounts to contempt, the provisions of Sections 10 - 12 of the Act are attracted. On the other hand the contempt of court committed by a person otherwise than by way of violating the court's order brings the case within the provisions of Article 215 of the Constitution of India. It is only the violation of the order complained of against the respondents, that gives jurisdiction to the High Court to punish the respondents for contempt of Court under the Act. That being the case, the limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Act applies to the facts of the case on hand and inasmuch as the contempt case has not been considered for issuance of notice under Section 17 of the Act within one year after the expiry of reasonable period even after issuance of the registered notice dated 21-9-1990 by the petitioner, I hold that the petition is barred by limitation under Section 20 of the Act.
11. Neither the learned counsel for the petitioner nor the learned counsel for the respondents have submitted their arguments on merits of the case because the main writ petition W.P. No. 14310 of 1989 is still pending and the arguments were addressed only on the question of contempt. Hence the case is left open for decision on merits in the main writ petition.
12. The Contempt Case is accordingly dismissed.