Judgment:
ORDER
1. Questioning the action of the State Government and, the Principals of the three medical colleges - Hyderabad, Kurnool and Guntur - in denying admission to first year of the M.B.B.S., course, the petitioner Kumari K. Narmada had filed this writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to admit her to the first scar M.B.B.S. The basis for denial of seat to the petitioner was that she was under- aged.
2. T he petitioner passed S. S. C.. examination from Gujarathi Vidyamandir, Hyderabad in 1984 securing 80.8 per cent and throughout her school career she was a scholarship holder. She passed the Intermediate examination in Mar., 1986 securing 80.3 per cent in the optional subjects- Biology, Physics and Chemistry - and during these two years she was a scholarship holder. Her date of birth as entered in the S.S.C. register was 12-4-1970. When she appeared for the S.S.C. examination, she was under- aged by seven months and twelve days, but the District Educational Officer condoned the short age of age and allowed her to sit for the examination. After passing the Intermediate examination she applied for entrance examination for admission to M.B.B.S., course in Mar., 1986. In the application form she mentioned her date of birth as 12-2-1970 but enclosed a letter stating that her actual date of birth was, 12-4-1969 but in the school records in the S.S.C., the date of birth was wrongly mentioned as 12-4- 1970. Since she could not secure a birth certificate she was not able to get the age altered in the S.S.C. register. She therefore requested :hat her application may be considered and she he allowed to appear for the entrance examination. She was permitted to appear for the entrance examination, and being a brilliant student she was confident of securing admission and, therefore, she did not apply for admission to any other Course. Amongst several thousands of candidates that appeared for the medical entrance examination, the petitioner secured a. very high rank-335-in the entire State. After that result was announced in June 1986, she submitted application forms to respondents 2 to 4, Principals of Medical Colleges, Hyderabad, Kurnool and Guntur seeking admission into first year of the medical course in accordance with the rules issued in G.O.Ms. No. 339, dt./- 29-5-1985. She received replies from the three Principals informing that her application was rejected since she was under- aged. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition she avers that when once she was allowed to take the entrance test, denial of scat, even though she secured a very higher rank, was arbitrary and unjust. It is also pleaded 6y her that the exemption granted at the time of her S.S.C. examination relaxing the condition regarding minimum age, entitles her to secure admission in the M.B.B.S.
3. The stand taken in the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the respondents is that merely because she appeared and passed the entrance test she was not entitled to admission unless the prescribed' requirements are satisfied. Since the minimum age required for admission was 17 years and as she was under-aged her application was rightly rejected. Her requests to three Principals for condoning the shortfall in the age 'cannot he entertained as note to R. 8(2) clearly stated that no request for relaxation of age of candidate shall be entertained.' The exemption secured by her to appear for the S.S.C. examination would not entitle her for the same relaxation for future studies. It also averred in the counter affidavit that this court in W. A.825 of 1985 dt./- 3-10.1985 held that prescribing age limit for admission o medical course was valid.
4. The Rules regulating admissions to the medical colleges were issued in G.O.Ms' No. 339, Medical and Health, dt. 29-5-1985 by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred by S. 3 read with sub-s.(1) of See. 5 of the A. P. Educational Institutions Regulation of Admissions and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983, R. 8 deals with Eligibility' and it reads :
'(1) Candidates seeking admission to medical (M.B.B.S) or Dental (B.D.S.) Course should have passed 2 years Intermediate examination (10 plus 2 pattern) with Physic-chemistry and Biology as optional (subjects) which shall include a practical test in each abject;
OR
any other examination of 10 + 2 pattern recognised by the Universities in Andhra Pradesh or Board of Intermediate Education, Andhra Pradesh, as the case may be as equivalent to the above examination with Physics, Chemistry and Biology as optional objects, which she include a practical test each of these subjects.
Note : -Candidates possessing qualification the University/Board or an Institution outside the State should produce a certificate equivalence from the Registrar of the University area in which he seeks admission the effect that the qualification possessed equivalent to or higher than intermediate examination conducted by the Board of Intermediate Education of Andhra Pradesh.
(2) Candidates should have completed the age of seventeen years and should not have completed twenty-two years of age as on the 31st Dec. of the year of admission. For the candidate holding B.Sc., Degree with at least two subjects out of the three subjects of Science group (Physics, Chemistry and Biology') and having passed the, remaining subject/subjects, in the Intermediate or its equivalent examination, the maximum age limit shall be extended by 3 years (i.e. should not have completed 25 years of age as on the 31st Dec. of the year of admission). For the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe candidates, the maximum age limit shall be extended by three years.
Note A person born on 1st Jan. of a year will complete one year on 31st Dec. of the same year.
2. Age shall be calculated on the basis of date of birth as indicated in the Secondary School Certificate examination or equivalent examination.
3. No requests for relaxation of age of a candidate shad he entertained.
4. Candidates who are Indian Nationals and have passed in 'EAMCET' conducted for admission of candidates into M.B.B.S./B.D.S. course during the academic year are only eligible to apply for. admission provided that they fulfil other relevant conditions laid down in the rules.'
Candidates are considered for admission by R. 19(4) (a) in the colleges in the local area in which they have applied, and the candidates are required to apply to one of the media colleges in the local area for consideration for selection in that local area. R. 7 deals with local candidates and defines local areas in the State. R. 11 obligates preparation of merit list based on the ranking obtained in the entrance examination. Selection is made, by R.12, by a Selection committee appointed by the Government, it is made local area wise on the basis of the ranks obtained by the candidates in the entrance examination. The selected candidates are allotted to any of the colleges in the local area as per the decision of the Selection Committee under R. 13.Th concerned Principals of medical colleges are required to verify, by Rr. 15 and 15-A the social status certificates and intermediate certificates of the selected candidates. When the Principal of the concerned college verifies the authenticity of the documents and satisfies himself about the genuineness of the documents, he is required, by R. 19, to direct the candidate to pay the college fee. R. 20 deals with powers of the Principal in these terms:
'(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the Principals of the colleges in the State may at any time, either suo motu or on application made by any person, after due and proper enquiry, if he is satisfied that the candidate has furnished incorrect information or enclosed false certificates or fraudulently, obtained admission may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, by order cancel his admission; provided that no such admission be cancelled without giving a reasonable opportunity for showing cause as to why his omission should not be cancelled.
(2) Against any such order of the principal an appeal shall lie with tile Director of Medical Education.'
5. The Government is empowered, by R. 2 1, to call for the records relating to any selection or admission or cancellation thereof in order to satisfy themselves as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such action, but before cancelling any selection or admission of a candidate, the Government are required to issue a show cause notice to the affected person. All selections it made clear by R. 22, 'shall be subject to such directions or orders as may be made by the Government from time to time.
6. Shri Kannabiran, learned counsel for the petitioner his raised two contentions: (I) The exemption, granted by the District Educational Officer in respect of minimum age requirement when the petitioner appeared for the S.S.C. examination must enure to her benefit for all future courses study; and (ii) The principle of promissory estoppel binds the respondents since in her application the petitioner had clearly mentioned about her age which was accepted and she was permitted to sit for the entrance test.
7. For the respondents Shri Ramakrishna the learned Government Pleader submitted that both the contentions should be rejected. According to him the two contentions advanced for the petitioner are fully covered by two judgments of this court viz., W. A.825 of 11485 kit. 3-10-1985 and W. P. 3684 of 1980 dt. 22-'0. He has also argued that merely because the petitioner was successful in the entrance test securing a high rank, she has no right for a seat in any of 1 he medical colleges since she is under-aged.
8. It is true and there is no doubt in this regard that when the petitioner appeared for the S.S.C. examination she was under-aged and the District Educational Officer granted relaxation which enabled her to take the examination. S.S.C. examination is the gate- way for future courses of study - Courses leading to degrees in Arts and Sciences and Courses leading to professions like Engineering, Medicine, 1-iw, etc. The Indian Medical Council, an expert body, was constituted under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1'956 to control the minimum standards of the medical education and regulate their observance. It is empowered to supervise the qualifications or eligibility standards for admission into medical institutions : : [1979]2SCR974 , State of Kerala v Kumari T. P. Roshana). The regulations 1.vhich the Indian Medical Council is empowered to make may provide for several matters specified therein. CI.(j) of See. 33 covers the courses and period of study, the subjects of examination and the standards of proficiency to be obtained in the Universities or medical institutions for grant of required medical qualifications. The question came up before a Division Bench of this court comprising Alladi Kuppu swamy, acting Chief Justice (as he then was) and Seetaram Reddy, J.-in W. P. No. 3684 of 1980 and batch; whether prescription of minimum age of 17 years for admission into first year of M.B.B.S. Course was arbitrary and whether the Indian Medical Council has no power to make a regulation prescribing minimum age limit for admission into a medical institution? The Division Bench answering the question in the negative held
'In our view the rule can be brought under 'the courses of and period of study and the standards of proficiency therein to be obtained' in cl.(j). Prescribing the age limit for entry into a course of study would also be a matter with reference to the course of study and will have also a bearing on the standard of proficiency to be obtained in the course of study ......'
'we are of the view that the rule can be sustained with reference to the general power to make regulations to carry out the purposes of the Act.'
The Bench had taken judicial notice of the fact that :
he medical course is an extremely strenuous one and it is necessary that the entrants to that course should be physically and mentally fit to go through that course. It is not merely sufficient to determine the capacity or talent of the student at the time of admission. It is also necessary that the entrants should be able to pursue the entire course successfully.'
9. In that view the Bench held that the fixation of minimum age limit of 17 years was neither arbitrary not, capricious. Negativing the contention that in some cases students by getting exemption are able to pass the Intermediate examination and, therefore, in respect of such cases, the prescription of minimum age of 17 years was arbitrary, the Bench held that:
'it is no doubt true that in some cases students who get exemption are able to pass out of the Intermediate examination before they are 16. But the reasonableness of the rule cannot he tested with reference to stray cases of exemption obtained by some of the students.'
10. Bound as I am by the aforesaid view of the Division Bench, I cannot consider this question afresh. I, therefore, reject the contention of Shri Kannabhiran that the exemption granted to the petitioner in respect of minimum age requirement when she appeared for the S.S.C., examination must enure to her benefit for admission into the first year of the M.B.B.S., Course.
11. On the second contention relating to promissory estoppel, it seems to me that the petitioner's case stands on firmer ground. Before discussing the principle of promissory estoppel and its application to the facts of the present case, I must state that neither the Division Bench which has decided W. P. 3684 of 1980 and batch, nor the Division Bench which decided W.A.825 of 1985 has considered this question: the question has neither arisen nor argued. The question that fell for consideration before the Division Bench which decided W.A. 825 of 1985 dated 3.10-85 (Raghuvir, Acting Chief Justice and Rama Rao, J.) was that Prescription of minimum age was discriminatory since R. 4(1) of the 'Admission Rules' provide for relaxation of age restriction in the case of candidates nominated by the Central Government. The Bench set aside the view of the Single Judge and held that there wan no violation of Art. 14 since there was no discrimination by prescribing minimum age for admission. The contention of the learned Government Pleader Sri Ramakrishna, that both these two judgments fully govern the facts of the instant case is therefore not correct.
12. The doctrine of promissory estoppel was clearly expounded for the first time in the celebrated case of Central London Prop' Trust Ltd. v High Trees House 1Ad. (19%) 1 All ER 2%, by Lord Denning. Posing the question whether a representation as to a fue event would be enforceable, he held:
'At common Law, that would not give rise to an estoppel because, as was said in Jorden v. Money (1854) 5 H. L. Cas. ISS, a representation as to the future must be embodied as a contract or be nothing. So at common law it seems to me there would be no answer to the whole claim.
What, then, is the position in view of developments in the law in recent years? The law has not been standing still ever since Jorden v. Money. There has been a series of decisions over the last fifty years which although said to be cases of estoppel, are not really such. They are cases of promises which were intended to create legal relations and which, in the knowledge of the person making the promise, were going to be acted on by the party to whom the promise was made, and have in fact been so acted on. In such cases the courts have said these promises must be honoured.'
13. After referring to certain rulings concerned with promises which were claimed to be binding, Lord Denning observed: 'In each case the court held the promise to be binding on the party making it, even though under the old common law it might be said to be difficult to find any consideration for it. The courts have not gone so -far as to give a cause of action in damages for breach of such promise but they have refused to allow the party making them to act inconsistently with them. It is in that sense and in that sense only that such a promise gives rise to an estoppel. The cases are a natural result of the fusion of law and equity, for the cases of Hughes v Metropolitan Ry.Co. (1877) 2 AC 439, Birmingham & District Land Co. v. London & North Western Rly. Co. (1888) 40 Ch. D. 268, and Salisbury v. Gilmore (1942) 1 All ER 457, show that a party will not be allowed in equity to go back on such a promise. The time has now come for the validity of such a promise to be recognised.'
14. Reiterating the principle, Lord Denning held in Wills v. Minister of Housing and Local Government, (1967) 2 All ER 1041 at page 1044.
'Now I know that a public authority cannot be estopped from doing its public duty, but 1 do think that it can be estopped from relying on technicalities; and this is a technicality, to be sure .... I take the law to be that a defect in procedure can be cured, and an irregularity can be waived, even by a public authority, so as to render valid that which would otherwise be invalid.'
15. The legal position stated in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions (1948) 2 All ER 767 and the aforesaid Wills v. Minister of Housing and Local Government (1967) 2 All ER 1041 at 1044 case was reiterated in this case by Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal. Where the statutory procedure laid down in the Children Act, 1948 regarding child care had not been followed, the procedure being that a written objection to the resolution passed by the Municipal Corporation should be received within the statutory limit from the mother of the child, but the Corporation led the mother and her solicitor to believe that ii was unnecessary.'
The Chancery Division in the case of Re L.(AC) (An Infant) (1971) 3 All ER 742 following the principle of estoppel enunciated by Lord Denning in the aforesaid cases, held that :
'the Corporation is estopped from taking the plea that there was non-compliance with the statutory procedure.'
16. It will thus appear that in England, the principle of promissory estoppel has been accepted as a valid one in Public Law. Even in cases where a promise was held out by public authority, the legal position is that the authority is bound by that promise when it was acted upon by the person to whom it was made, although the promise was in contravention of the relevant statutory position.
17. The law in India 'has gone far ahead of the narrow position adopted in England,' as observed by his Lordship Bhagwati, C.J., in Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. : [1986]158ITR574(SC) . After referring to Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., : [1979]118ITR326(SC) his Lordship held that:
'it is now well settled that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not limited in its application only to defence but it can also found a cause of action.'
18. The doctrine the learned Chief Justice ruled, has no application in respect of legislative functions nor can a public authority be debarred from enforcing the statutory prohibition. Nothing which is contrary to law falls within the ambit of doctrine. It being an equitable doctrine it must yield to equity. Whether the cost of packing material was liable to excise duty under Sec. 4(4) of the Central Excises and Salt Act on the ground that the cost represents the value of the goods was the question that came up for consideration in the aforesaid Godfrey Phlips India Limited case. That question was answered in the affirmative by the Supreme Court. But the plea of the respondent Company as to non-liability to tax was accepted on the principle of promissory estoppel. The Central Board of Excise and Customs after considering a representation of the Cigarette Manufacturers' Association made on 19th Mail 1970 claiming exemption in respect of the value of corrugated fibre board Containers, intimated the Association by its letter dt. 24-5-76 that
'Instructions have been issued to the Collectors of Central Excise that the cost of corrugated fibre board containers in question does not form part of the value of cigarettes for the purpose of excise duty.'
19. The Supreme Court ruled that the Union of India was bound by this promise and therefore the respondent-Company was not liable to tax.
20. In the present case there is little doubt that the requirement of the minimum age of 17 years is a valid requirement. But in her application to appear for the entrance test, the petitioner had mentioned her date of birth as it was entered in the S.S.C. register, She also enclosed a letter-clearly stating that her actual date of birth was 12-2-1969 but in the school records and S.S.C. register it was wrongly mentioned as 12-4-70. She tried to get it corrected but could not succeed since she did not have the birth certificate. She therefore pleaded that she may be permitted to take the examination. She fairly and honestly complied with what in such circumstances called the 'duty of candour'. When that application was accepted and she was permitted to sit for the examination, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the plea of the petitioner that her age was not correctly entered in the S.S.C. register was accepted; no other reason could be inferred in the circumstances of the case. It is true that Note 2 to R. 8(2) says that the age shall be calculated as entered in the S.S.C. certificate. It is for this reason the petitioner claimed that the age entered in the S.S.C., register was net correct and by accepting her application, the authorities waived the method of calculation of age specified in Note 2 to R. 8(2). The petitioner being a brilliant student with outstanding scholastic 'record and enjoying the privilege of merit scholarship throughout her academic career, strained hard to secure a high rank in the entrance examination. She was so confident of success that she did not apply for any other course. It is not as though she was an average student with fingering doubts about her capacity to succeed in the competitive examination for admission into medical course. All this trouble she had undergone to prepare for the examination because of the acceptance of her application form which in the circumstances, I am of the clear view, amounts to a promise intended to be acted upon. She thus suffered a detriment and, therefore, the respondents should not now be allowed to plead that she was not entitled to a seat in the medical course. The respondents 2 to 4, the Principals of the medical colleges halve certain duties to perform as specified in Rr. 15, 15A and 19 and they relate to verification of social status certificate, intermediate certificate and other documents. Under R. 20, the Principal of a medical college is empowered after proper enquiry to cancel any admission if any candidate had furnished :
'incorrect information or enclosed false certificate or fraudulently obtained admission.'
21. None of these factors is present in the instant case. It is not as if the admission rules are rigid and inflexible. All selections, by R. 22 are subject to such directions or orders that may be made by the Government from time to time. 1, therefore, find it hard to agree with the learned Government Pleader that there is rigorous statutory prohibition to admit the petitioner.
22. Ordinance 10 of the Kurukshetra University provided that a student should attend the prescribed course of lectures before he is entitled to sit for the examination; the Supreme Court in Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University, : AIR1976SC376 held:
'that the University could withdraw the certificate if the applicant had failed to attend the prescribed course of lectures. But this could be done only before the examination. It is, therefore, manifest that once the appellant was allowed to take the examination rightly or wrongly then the statute which empowers the University to withdraw the candidature of the applicant has worked itself out and the applicant cannot be refused admission subsequently for any infirmity which should have been looked into before giving the applicant permission to appear.'
23. Assuming that there was any infirmity in the application. submitted by the petitioner, the respondents have no power to deny her a seat after she passed the examination securing a high rank.
24. Under R. 12(2) of the Rules, selection has to be made local area-wise and on the basis of the ranks obtained by the candidates in the common entrance examination. It is clear from the counter of the respondents that the only reason for denying admission to the petitioner is that she is under-aged. When once the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applied, this objection falls to the ground.
25. For the foregoing reasons, I would allow the writ petition with costs. The respondents are directed forthwith to admit the petitioner into first year M.B.B.S. in one of the medical colleges in the local area in which she has applied and condone the loss of attendance.
Advocate's fee Rs.250/-.
26. Petition allowed.