ORDER
1. The petitioner in this writ petition is the Municipal Council, Eluru, represented by its Chairman Sri Nandi Satyanarayana. It challenges G.O.Ms. No. 46, Municipal Administration dt. 28-1-1986. By means of G.O.Ms. No. 46 the Government had in purported exercise of its power under S. 62(I), Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965, directed dissolution of the Municipal Council, Eluru with effect from 30-1-86 and also directed its reconstitution with effect from 30-1-1988. The Eluru Municipality was constituted under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965. Elections to the Municipal Council were last held in August 1981, and the term of that elected body would expire on July, 1986. The life of this body was always turbulent. On 6-5-1985, the then Chairman of the Municipal Council was removed from Office through a resolution of no-confidence motion passed by the requisite majority of the Eluru Municipality. Thereafter, on 21-5-1985, the present Chairman was elected. This was followed by complaints made in June, 1985 against the maladministration of the municipal Council. On receipt of those complaints by the Government, an Officer of the rank of Joint Director of Municipal Administration was deputed to inquire into those allegations made against the Municipal Council. The Joint Director, Municipal Administration held inquiry into those complaints from 22-6-1985 to 26-6-1985 and submitted his report to the Government on 29-6-1985. Acting on the basis of the report submitted by the Joint Director, Municipal Administration, the Government had issued a show cause notice to the Municipal Council, Eluru on 4-9-1985. That notice was issued under S. 62(4) of the A.P. Municipalities Act, 1965. The notice frankly stated that the Government has received complaints about the abuse of power and position by the Eluru Municipal Council and that those complaints were got inquired into by the Joint Director, Municipal Administration and that the Joint Director reported that out of the 9 allegations levelled against the Council only 4 allegations were proved and that there were cases of abuse of power made out and disobedience and disregard to the instructions issued and provisions made in the Act and the Rules proved and also display of financial disinterestedness by the Municipal Council established. On that basis, the Government called upon the Municipal Council, Eluru to show cause within one month as to why action of dissolution should not be taken against the Municipal Council. Along with the show cause notice a copy of the inquiry report submitted by the Joint Director of the Municipal Administration was enclosed to enable the Municipal Council to peruse the same. The Municipal Council submitted its explanation on 4-10-85. The Government on a consideration of that Explanation passed G.O.Ms. No. 46, M.A. dt. 28-1-1986 dissolving the Municipal Council, Eluru with effect from 30-1-1986 and reconstituting it with effect from 30-1-1988. It is this order of the Government of Andhra Pradesh dissolving the Eluru Municipal Council that has been challenged in this writ petition.
2. The first ground on which the impugned order has been questioned was that the order is vitiated by mala fides. The allegations made in the writ petition are that the present Chairman of the Municipal Council belongs to Congress (I) Party, whereas the previous Chairman after the removal from Office by the abovementioned no-confidence motion joined the Telugu Desam Party and that the latter with the active co-operation of the local T.D.P., M.L.A. Sri M. Ranga Rao on the Government got the Council itself dissolved with the idea of putting an end to the Chairmanship of the present incumbent. It was also alleged that the local M.L.A. had a special grievance against the present Chairman as the present Chairman contested against him in the 1985 Assembly elections. It is alleged that the local M.L.A. and the previous Chairman were closely connected politically and the local M.L.A. had been crestfallen with the passing of the no-confidence motion against the previous Chairman and that, therefore, they engineered the issuance of the show cause notice and the dissolution of the Municipal Council.
3. Charges of mala fides if proved would invalidate an order passed by a public functionary no matter whether that functionary is a Minister or a permanent Government servant. Exercise of public power is a sacred trust. That can be discharged only honestly and uprightly and without being influenced by party considerations. It was said of the great statesman, Sri C. Rajagopala Chary, that when he was approached by his partymen to order the dissolution of the Cuddapah Dist. Board then under the control of the Justice Party the great Chief Minister of Madras bluntly refused to accede to the request of his partymen and showed them the exit way of his chambers. Whatever may be the importance of the role that ethical standards would play in one's own private life, it is clear that public democratic life cannot survive except by strict observance of higher ethical standards. That is why in law it is stated... '....No judgment of a Court on order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud....' (See Lord Denning in Lazarus Estates Limited v. Beasley, (1956) 1 All ER 341 at p. 345).
4. Public power can be exercised only for the public good and as dictated by the Statute. It follows that if these charges of mala fides made by the writ petitioner are true, this Court without a second thought should quash the impugned order. But, what are the mala fides? In order to find out whether there was any substance in these charges of mala fides. I have carefully examined each one of the four charges levelled against the Eluru Municipal Council and the material which was there on record in support of each one of the charges and found that each one of these charges was made out. Of the four charges, the first charge levelled against the Municipal Council alleged that works were split to bring the estimated cost of each work within Rs. 10,000/- limit and less and that such works were entrusted on nomination basis to a tune of Rs. 24,39 lakhs to the contractors of the choice of the Councillors knowing pretty well that the Municipal Council, could save a lot of money, by calling tenders instead of works executed on nomination basis. In support of this charge, I found in the inquiry report that the Municipal Council had split up the construction of open masonry drain in front of Gadey Paidaiah house in 20th Ward and the construction of open masonry drain in front of one G. Apparao house in 20th Ward so that each work would not exceed Rs. 9,000/-. Similarly I have found from the inquiry report that there were splitting up of the works of construction of open masonry drain in front of the house of Marrapu Rangarao in 20th ward and also construction of open masonry drain in front of M. Yanadaiah's house in 20th ward. Similarly the construction of masonry drain to the road in front of Veera Venkataswaraiah and the construction of masonry drain in front of G. Kanakaiah, both of them are in 20th ward were split up into two contracts. These contracts were awarded to the nominees of the Municipal Council without ever inviting tenders. The Municipal Council by its resolutions Nos. 236, dt. 11-10-1982, 269 dt. 18-10-1982, 238 dt. 30-9-1982, 273 dt. 11-10-1982, 270 dt. 11-10-1982 and 285 dt. 11-10-1982 had approved not only the splitting up of these contracts, but also awarding of the contracts without tenders. Awarding of such contracts on nomination basis is clearly contrary to the A.P. Municipalities (Tender) Rules 1967 made under the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965, R. 3 requires (that) the Commissioner shall invite tenders for every contract for the execution of a work the estimated cost of which exceeds Rs. 2,000/-. I, therefore, hold that in levelling charge No. 1, mala fides had played no part. The objective facts completely established the guilt of the Municipal Council. The explanation of the Municipal Council does not appear to me to be in any way convincing. The explanation is rather vague and general and does not meet the objections.
5. Similarly the second charge levelled against the Municipal Council is that the sanction of NMR posts on daily wage basis to attend to regular Municipal work is contrary to the instructions issued by the Director of Municipal Administration dt. 25-4-1983. These NMR appointments have been made first by the Chairman and later ratified by the Municipal Council. The charge is that about 221 NMRs who are either relatives or known to the Councillors were engaged without obtaining the names of the candidates through the media of Employment Exchange. In support of this charge I was shown some slips written by some of the Councillors asking appointments of their nominees. It is not in doubt that these NMR appointments were ratified by the Municipal Council in its resolutions Nos. 981 D/- 30-11-1984 and 194 D/- 24-6-1985. Thus the Municipal Council have assumed the responsibility for these appointments. It is equally clear that these NMR appointments costing the Municipal Council above Rs. 3 lakhs per year were made contrary to the instructions issued by the Municipal authorities. This is a case of clear abuse of power and authority by the Municipal Council. That is the reason why the audit report for the year 1984-85 has objected to this NMR appointments. But what is even more objectionable is the role played by the Municipal Council in ratifying these appointments. The resolutions speak as if the appointments were required in public interest whereas the slips would clearly show that these appointments were being made on an ad hoc basis, from time to time to satisfy one Councillor or the other. The abovementioned instructions which are binding on the council permit NMR appointments only to meet the cases of urgency such as the natural calamities or epidemics. The Municipal Council in utter disregard of the above instructions had ratified these appointments made for the benefit of the Councillors. These facts would also show that there was no basis for the charge of mala fides.
6. The third charge against the Municipal Council was that the works were given to the contractors at rendered prices but payments were made at full rates on the plea of deviations of the works. The material on record would substantiate even this charge.
7. The last and the fourth charge levelled against the Municipal Council was that the Municipal Council had sanctioned payments to the contractors at the contracted rate to fill up Ac. 4.00 of low lying area with sand but they have filled up only with the earth. This charge was also borne out by the record and the explanation of the Municipal Council that it would not make any difference whether the low lying area was filled up either by sand or by earth is not acceptable.
8. In view of the above findings of facts, I hold that whatever may be the political predilections of the persons involved the charges levelled against the Municipal Council and the findings recorded thereon are not tainted by any extraneous considerations or political influences. It must, therefore, be taken that the Municipal Council had in terms of S. 62(I), Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965, abused its position and power.
9. Then the only question that remains is whether in arriving at these findings the procedure which the Government had followed was proper, fair and according to the requirements of law. Before a Municipal Council is dissolved S. 62(4) of the Act requires a show cause notice to be given to the Municipal Council. Such a notice has been given in this case and, in fact, the Municipal Council has submitted its explanation. After the Municipal Council submitted its explanation and (sic) issued the impugned notification. The only condition for the issuance of such notification mentioned in S. 62(I) is that the Government should be of the opinion that the Municipal Council has exceeded or abused its position or powers. In law, the formation of such an opinion will be treated as a condition precedent for the issuance of notification and Courts will not condone the exercise of the extreme power of dissolving a duly elected body like Municipal Council unless formation of the requisite opinion is real in the sense that it has substantial evidentiary support. If these conditions are satisfied there can be no complaint made on the basis of the language of S. 62(I) of the Act. We have seen that there is more than abundant material on record on the basis of which it would be reasonable for the Government to conclude that the Municipal Council had abused its position and power. Ratifying every one of these illegal acts committed by the Chairman is a grave act of sin committed by an elected body like the Municipal Council. NMR appointments, excess payments, nomination of contracts instead of calling for tenders are all too serious lapses of public minded functionaries which a Court cannot ignore. I, therefore do not find any serious procedural infirmity in the various steps taken by the Government in dissolving the Municipal Council. At one stage I had myself thought that the Council is being maligned for the acts of its Chairman but on verification, I satisfied myself that the council by its acts of ratification had shown its willingness to flout the law and thus sanctioned abuse of power. It is only right that the Council should pay for what it has done. But Sri Anantha Babu said that the report of the Joint Director, Municipal Administration was based on an ex parte enquiry and that the Council did not have enough opportunity to put forth its case to that officer. This argument of the learned counsel presupposes without, in my opinion, any legal basis that even a fact finding enquiry should be preceded by a notice and hearing. That is not the scheme of the Act nor can such a method which can only lead to the classical dilemma of reductio absurdum, be approved by a Court of law. The facts which have been gathered by that officer are only for the purpose of determining whether there was a prima facie case against the Municipal Council for the Government to proceed against it under S. 62 of the Act. At that stage the enquiry is wholly administrative in character and affects no rights of the Council and is subject to no limitations of principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court in its decision reported in Champaklal v. Union of India, : (1964)ILLJ752SC held to that effect. I accordingly reject this argument of the learned counsel. It is also argued by Sri Anantha Babu that the Government had not applied its mind and considered the matter. This customary objection cannot have much of application in a case like this where the Council has been found to be guilty of acts of misfeasance mentioned above. It is not a case where it is possible to take a different view of those acts from the one which has been taken by the Govt. If the Municipal Council has failed to call for tenders contrary to the rules and awarded contracts on nomination contrary to rules and ratified NMR appointments again contrary to law how can anyone say that the Municipal Council has not abused its position or power. Further in the case, the Government did consider every item of the explanation before rejecting. The charge of non-application of mind cannot be examined in abstract. The charge of non-application of mind can only be relevant in the context of omission to consider the material facts. As that was not the case here. I reject this contention of the learned council. Sri Anantha Babu also argued that there was a duty on the part of the Government to give reasons before taking the extreme step of dissolving the Council under S. 62 of the Act. He has cited the cases reported in Chowgule & Co. v. Union of India, : AIR1971SC2021 , Ranganath v. Daulatrao, : [1975]3SCR99 , Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. v. Union of India, : AIR1976SC1785 and M/s. Neelam Wines v. Police Commr., Hyderabad, : AIR1981AP191 , etc. Although giving of reasons is a salutary safeguard against abuse of power by public functionaries and should, therefore, be insisted upon in every conceivable case, I am of the opinion that that principle cannot be applied without reference to the requirements of statutory scheme. It _nment dissolves a Council by a notification. Now that section does not expressly require reasons for the dissolution to be given in the notification. Notification is normally an order of the Government and does not contain statement of reasons. There is no other provision under which the requirement of giving reasons can be accommodated within the scope of S. 62 of the Act. For that reason I hold that the theory that reasons shall be given in all cases cannot apply to the scheme of S. 62(I) of the Act. Of course Mr. Suryanarayana Murthy, the learned Government Pleader had cited a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Tara Chand v. Delhi Municipality, : (1977)ILLJ331SC where it has been held that there is no legal obligation for a statutory Tribunal to give reasons for its decision unless such an obligation is one arising under the statute. Tara Chand case (mentioned supra) had distinguished the decisions reported in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India, : [1967]3SCR302 , Travancore Rayons Ltd. v. Union of India, : 1978(2)ELT378(SC) and the Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. v. Union of India (mentioned supra) and reiterated the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 0044/1965 : [1966]1SCR466 which held that every order appealable under Art. 136 of the Constitution need not be a speaking order and that omission to give reasons for the decision is itself not a sufficient ground for quashing it. In view of my finding that the scheme of S. 62 would not admit of any argument that makes the giving of reasons an inexorable necessity for the validity of a quasi-judicial order, I do not think it necessary to attempt to reconcile these somewhat irreconcilable views expressed by the Supreme Court from time to time. Accordingly I hold that the impugned order in this case is not vitiated in any way, for the reason that statement of reasons is not appended to the Notification. This, of course, does not mean that an order would be upheld even in a case where there are no reasons at all. Existence of reasons is a condition precedent for the exercise of the powers under S. 62 of the Act. But making a statement of reasons is no part of the scheme under S. 62 of the Act. For those reasons, I reject this argument of the learned counsel.
10. Now the only argument that remains to be considered is that the notification is liable to be quashed for the reason to direct the reconstitution of Eluru Municipal Council with effect from 30th January, 1988. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the term of Eluru Municipal Council would expire by 31st August, 1986 and under S. 62 of the Act, the date of reconstitution of the Municipal Council cannot be postponed beyond the day when the term of the Municipal Council expires. In other words reconstitution can be postponed only up to 31st August, 1986. According to this argument the impugned notification which postpones the reconstitution beyond 31st August, 1986 is liable to be set aside. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is supported by a judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court reported in Shankarappa v. State of Bombay, : AIR1957Bom55 . In that case a panchayat was superseded under the Bombay Village Panchayat Act for a period exceeding the period of normal existence of that panchayat. The learned Judges held that such an order cannot be made. I am in respectful agreement with that conclusion. The act of dissolution of a council is a disciplinary measure taken by the Government. One can discipline even an artificial legal person like the Municipal Council only during its lifetime. After its lifetime had expired the council goes out of office. The question of disciplining such a dead body would not arise. In law, it is clear that an artificial legal person will not have a soul surviving after its death. The above judgment was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 58 of 1967. Following those decisions, I hold that the order of the Government directing the reconstitution of the Eluru Municipal Council from 30-1-1988 which is beyond 31st August, 1986 is illegal and ultra vires of the powers of the Government under S. 62, A.P. Municipalities Act, 1965.
11. Now the question arises whether the above finding would lead to the invalidation of the entire notification. The relevant part of the notification reads thus :
'Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s. (I) of S. 62, Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965 (Act No. 6 of 1965), the Governor of Andhra Pradesh hereby directs that the Municipal Council, Eluru, be dissolved with effect on and from the 30th January, 1986 and reconstituted with effect on and from the 30th January, 1988'.
I am of the opinion that the invalidation of the latter portion of the notification fixing 30-1-1988 as the date of reconstitution would lead to the invalidation of the earlier part also because the earlier part relating to the dissolution of the Municipal Council is inextricably connected by the conjunctive 'and' to the latter part of the notification relating to the reconstitution. One is inseparable from the other. There is even a greater reason why I should hold that the entire notification including that part of the order relating to the dissolution of the Municipal Council should also be held invalid. Under S. 62(I), A.P. Municipalities Act, 1965, the power of the Government is to dissolve the Municipal Council and also to reconstitute that Municipal Council. Both acts must be done by a single notification. It follows that the Government cannot dissolve the Municipal Council by one notification and reconstitute it by another notification. In view of this composite nature of the power conferred on the Government I should hold that the invalidation of the latter portion of the order relating to the reconstitution must necessarily lead to the invalidation of the earlier portion of the order relating to dissolution. This argument has nothing to do with the question of severability of the statute or the separability of its effect. This is the result of my interpretation of S. 62(I) of the Act. Mr. Suryanarayana Murthy said that the abovementioned Bombay judgment in Shankarappa Ramappa's case (mentioned supra) did not quash the entire notification even after its finding that the power of supersession has been exercised and that our Bench decision did not also invalidate the entire notification. I find that in the judgment of our Division Bench in W.P. No. 58 of 1967 : (reported in ILR (1972) Andh Pra 1) the question what would be the effect of finding that the date of reconstitution was illegally postponed on the earlier part of the order dissolving the Municipal council was not considered. However in the above judgment of Chagla, C.J. in Shankarappa Ramappa's case, : AIR1957Bom55 (mentioned supra) the point was considered but was disposed of on the ground of severability of the offending portion from the valid portion of the order. As I am holding that it is a part of the requirement of the exercise of power under S. 62(I) that dissolution and reconstitution should be simultaneous, the judgment of the Bombay High Court would not be applicable to the reasoning of this judgment. I accordingly set aside the notification issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in G.O.Ms. No. 46 M. A. dated the 28th January, 1986. I, however, make it clear that it would be open for the Government to issue a fresh notification dissolving the Eluru Municipal Council and fixing a date for its reconstitution under S. 62(I) of the Act according to the law declared above. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. In view of the fact that the petitioner had failed substantially in his main contentions, I make no order as to costs. I, however, fix Rs. 1,500/- as the Government Pleaders fees in appreciation of the special efforts made by Sri Suryanarayana Murthy to prepare and present this case.
12. Order accordingly.