ORDER
P.S. Narayana, J.
1. Heard Sri M.V. Suresh, learned Counsel representing petitioner and Ch. Dhanamjaya, learned Counsel representing respondent.
2. The landlady-Laveti Ramayammu aggrieved by the reversing order made in R.C.A.No. 6 of 1995 on the file of the Court of Principal Subordinate Judge-Appellate Authority, Rajahmundry, had preferred the present civil revision petition under Section 22 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter in short referred to as 'the Act' for the purpose of convenience).
3. The parties hereinafter would be referred to as landlady and tenant for the purpose of convenience.
4. The landlady filed R.C.C. No. 55 of 1989 on the file of the Court of Rent Controller-cum-Principal District Munsif, Rajahmundry, praying for eviction of the tenant on the ground of wilful default of payment of rents from April, 1988 and also on the ground of denial of title.
5. The learned Rent Controller recorded the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-6 and Exs.B-1 to B-3 and ultimately, ordered eviction. Aggrieved by the same, the matter was carried by way of appeal in R.C.A. No. 6 of 1995 whereunder the appellate authority reversed the same and aggrieved by the same, the present civil revision petition is preferred.
6. Sri M.V. Suresh, learned Counsel representing the landlady would submit that as between similarly placed persons certain other litigations were fought and the civil revision petitions were allowed. The learned Counsel also placed before this Court an order made by this Court in one such C.R.P. No. 1249 of 1997. Learned Counsel also would contend that for the purpose of falling under the definition of landlord, necessarily one need not always be owner of the premises and who receives rents also can fall within the definition of landlord. Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances, the denial of title was held to be mala fide denial and in the light of the evidence available on record inasmuch as the ground of wilful default also had been established, eviction was ordered by the learned Rent Controller, but however, the same was reversed by the appellate authority on unsustainable grounds.
7. On the other hand, Sri Ch. Dhanamjaya, the learned Counsel representing the tenant, had taken this Court through the findings recorded by the appellate authority and would maintain that in the light of the temple insisting for payment, the payment in fact was made to the temple and hence, there is no wilful default. In the light of the demand made by the temple, the learned Counsel would maintain, the stand taken by the tenant is a justifiable stand and the same would not amount to denial of title.
8. Before proceeding with the further discussion, it may be appropriate to have a look at the respective pleadings of the parties in R.C.C.No. 55 of 1989.
9. The landlady-Laveti Ramayamma pleaded as hereunder:
The petitioner is the owner of the schedule house situated in Shyamalamba temple street, Rajahmundry. The schedule property was orally leased out to the respondent about more than five years ago on a monthly rent of Rs. 40/- payable by the first of every succeeding month. The schedule property was leased out for residential purpose. The respondent paid rents to the petitioner till the end of March, 1988 and he failed to pay the rent from April, 1988 onwards and thereby he committed wilful default in payment of rents. The petitioner demanded the respondent several times to pay the arrears of rent, but there was no response. The petitioner and several others jointly issued a notice dated 21-10-1988 to the respondent and the other tenants demanding the respondent and Ors. to vacate the schedule premises and other houses and deliver possession and pay the entire arrears of rent. The respondent refused to receive the notice. All the tenants including the respondent gave a common reply dated 11-11-1998 with false allegation. In the reply notice, it is mentioned that the property was not given on lease by the petitioner. But the rent was paid upto the end of June, 1988 and subsequently as the Endowment Board issued notice to all the tenants of the various houses in the site of Shyamalamba temple for the payment of rents, the rents were paid to the Board from July, 1988 onwards. The respondent was inducted into the possession of the property by the petitioner and the respondent paid the rents for a long time and admitted the ownership of the petitioner, and therefore, the respondent is estopped from pleading that the endowment board was the owner of the property. The petitioner constructed the house and paid the municipal taxes and let out the premises to the respondent. The respondent used to obtain the receipts from the petitioner for the rents paid. The respondent cannot contend that the petitioner is not the owner of the property.
10. The tenant had taken the stand as specified in Para 3 as under:
The respondent is the tenant of the petition schedule property on a monthly rent of Rs. 65/- but not on Rs. 60/- as alleged by the petitioner in his petition. The initial rent of the schedule premises was at Rs. 6/- per month and it was enhanced from time to time and the present rent is Rs. 65/-. The rent was paid to the petitioner upto June, 1988. While the things stood thus, the endowment department claiming that the schedule site along with other properties belongs to Shyamalamba Temple as a superior owner, threatened the respondent and Ors. with punitive action and demanded the payment of rents to the temple and under these circumstances the respondent and Ors. have been paying the rentals to the Shyamalamba Temple since July, 1988 under receipts. The action of the respondent is justified and it is bona fide in the circumstances of the threatening given by the Endowments Department. Therefore, the respondent did not commit any wilful default in payment of rents. There is no question of denial of the title of the petitioner to the schedule property as the superior owner demanded the respondent and Ors. to pay the rents to them. The denial of the title by the respondent is bona fide and it is not wilful. The petitioner never issued any receipts and the respondent never obtained any receipt. The petitioner got issued a notice dated 21-10-1988 to the respondent and Ors. and for that a consolidated reply was issmed on 11-11-1988. Prior to the notice dated 21-10-1988, there was no demand for payment of arrears of the rent and for eviction of the property and she is necessary party to the proceedings for effective adjudication of the matter.
11. The learned Rent Controller framed the following points:
1. Whether the respondent committed wilful default in payment of rents from April, 1988 onwards ?
2. Whether the respondent denied the title of the petitioner and whether it is wilful or bona fide?
12. P.W.1 was examined and Exs.A-1 to A-6 were marked. Likewise, R.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-3 were marked. It is brought to the notice of this Court that a batch of RCCs were disposed of and similar contentions had been raised by similarly placed persons. However, the learned Rent Controller recorded reasons commencing from Para 6 and ultimately allowed the RCC. The matter was carried by way of appeal in R.C.A.No. 6 of 1995 on the file of the appellate authority and the appellate authority at Para 6 framed the following point for consideration:
Whether there are any grounds to set aside the orders of the Rent Controller?
13. The appellate authority commenced the discussion from Para 7 to Para 12 and ultimately, came to the conclusion that in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances, the stoppage of payment of rents cannot be said to be wilful and also the denial of title also cannot be found fault. Aggrieved by the same, the present civil revision petition is preferred.
14. Several of the evidentiary details are not in controversy. P.W.1 deposed in detail about the wilful default committed and also about the ground of denial of title. R.W.1, no doubt, explained the stand taken by him and the reason for taking the stand. It may be that the temple might have insisted for the payment of rents, but that itself may not be a justifiable ground to stop payment of rents to the original landlady and merely because some demand was made by the temple the tenant also is not justified in denying the title of the landlady as such.
15. Section 2(vi) of the Act defines landlord as hereunder:
Landlord' means the owner of a building and includes a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another person or on behalf of himself and Ors. or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant;
Explanation :A tenant who sub-lets a building shall be deemed to be a land-lord within the meaning of this Act in relation to the sub-tenant;
16. From the reading of the said definition, it is clear that it is not only a wide definition but also an inclusive one and the same is not confined to the owner only. It is not in serious controversy that this landlady had been receiving rents from the tenant and despite the question of ownership this landlady would fall within the definition of Section 2(vi) of the Act aforesaid and hence, she is entitled to receive the rents. Hence, the explanation or the stand taken by R.W.1-the tenant cannot be accepted in this regard. It may be that there may be some dispute between the landlady and the temple. That is a different question altogether and merely because the temple made some demand, the title of the landlady cannot be denied by the tenant. As far as the relationship of landlady and tenant, this aspect is concerned, the status of the tenant continues to be that of a tenant and hence, in the light of the stand taken by the tenant the learned Rent Controller arrived at a correct conclusion that the denial of title is a mala fide denial of title and on that ground also eviction to be ordered. Hence, viewed from any angle, the learned Rent Controller arrived at the correct conclusion but however, the same was reversed by the appellate authority on unsustainable grounds. The same view was expressed in almost a similar matter in C.R.P.No. 1249 of 1997.
17. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned order made by the appellate authority is hereby set aside and the order made by the learned Rent Controller in R.C.C. No. 55 of 1989 is hereby restored. Accordingly, the civil revision petition is allowed. No order as to costs. The tenant is however, given three months time for vacating the premises on condition of the tenant depositing entire arrears of rent, failing which the tenant would forfeit the time granted by this Court for vacating the premises.