ORDER
M.S. Liberhan, C.J.
1. Pristine question referred to the Full Bench is: 'Whether a notice from the Court in the proceedings under Section 30 could be equated with the notice of the Collector under Section 18(2)(b)? The question was posed by the Division Bench in view of the fact that it was not considered by the Division Bench in the light of the mandatory duty cast on the Collector under Section 12(2) to give notice of award.'
2. Land in dispute was acquired on 12-7-1989. Notification dated 13-7-1989, under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was issued. During pendency of the proceedings, respondents-writ petitionersfiled their claim petition for compensation contending that they have purchased the land in dispute from the owners, who denied their claim. The Land Acquisition Collector gave his award number 3/91 dated 8-2-1991, fixing the value and measurement of land. Dispute with respect to title and apportionment was referred to the arbitrator under Section 30 of the Act. Compensation payable to the rightful claimants was deposited in Court. Claim to title was compromised vide 1A 822 of 1992, and compromise decree was passed on 1-7-1992. The petitioners being interested persons, having not accepted the award, by written application dated 1-8-1992 made to the Collector sought the reference to the civil Court for determination of the amount of enhanced compensation. The said application was rejected by the Collector as barred by time. Petitioners have impugned the said order.
3. Learned single Judge set aside the impugned order. Collector was directed to make the reference. It was held that the award was passed at the back of the petitioners. No notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was served on the petitioners. A reference with regard to the tile was pending before the civil Court.
4. On appeal, the Bench, after noticing that Section 18(2) of the Act provides two periods of limitation for seeking reference to civil Court for enhancement or apportionment of compensation, i.e., six weeks from the date of Collector's award in case person seeking reference was present by himself or was represented at the time when the award was made, while in other cases within two months from the date of service of notice under Section 12(2) as amended by the Land Acquisition (A.P. Extension and Amendment) Act No.XX of 1959 considered that the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.1478 of 1994 decided on 7-2-1995 appears to be atvariance with the specific language of Section 18(2)(b) under which the time prescribed is two months from the date of service of the notice from the Collector. It was held in Writ Appeal No.1478 of 1994 that once the passing of the award comes to the knowledge of the claimant he is required to make the application within the statutory period prescribed. It was found as a fact that the claimants had notice of the award. The observations in verbatim run as under:
'It cannot be denied that appellants had a notice of the award made by the land acquisition officer by virtue of service of notice in the reference under Sections 30 of the Act, assuming that notice under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act has not been served on them. Once a claimant comes to know of the passing of the award, he has to make an application within a period prescribed under the Act.'
5. It would be expedient to notice the relevant scheme of the Act and the procedure provided for acquisition. It provides for the rights of the claimants, and the remedies for their enforcement within the stipulated period provided by the Act. Publication of the notification of the intention of the Government to acquire the land is sine quo non for initiating the acquisition proceedings, within 30 days of which claimants can object to acquisition, and the Collector after hearing the objections if any declare the lands to be acquired. Thereafter the Collector is required to serve the notice under Section 9 of the Act on the known interested persons, hold inquiry irrespective of the persons who filed objection i.e., ones served and not served with notice with respect to (i) true area of the land, (ii) the compensation which should be allowed for the land, and (iii) apportionment of such compensation amongst the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, irrespective of the fact whether theyappeared before the Collector or not. The Collector could hold inquiry and give an award within two years period provided by the Act. The award attains finality and is conclusive evidence with respect to area, value of land, apportionment, between the Collector and the person interested on filing of it in the office of the Collector. The Collector is required to service notice of the award upon persons interested who were not present personally or through their representatives when the award was made. The Collector after tender of payment of the compensation to the person interested and found entitled, according to the award, may take possession of the land which shall be deemed to be vested in the Government free from all encumbrances.
6. Reference may be made to Section 18(2)(a) and (b) of the Act.
7. A right was conferred on the claimant or the person interested who may not accept the award, to seek by written application to the Collector a reference to the Court for its determination with respect to the measurement of land, the amount of compensation, to whom it is payable, or the apportionment amongst the persons interested. For doing the same, a statutory period of limitation was provided by Act 1 of 1894-
(i) Six weeks to commence from the date of the award where claimant was present before the Collector at the time of making of the award;
(ii) Six weeks from the date of receipt of the notice under Section 12(2), of the award from the Collector by the claimant;
Within six months from the date of Collector's award,
Whichever period shall expire first.
8. The State of Andhra Pradesh, by amendment, substituted for Section 18(2)(b)the limitation of two months commencing from the date of service of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2). It would be expedient to reproduce the substituted Section in verbatim, which runs thus:
'(b) In other cases, within two months from the date of service of the notice from the Collector under Section 12 subsection (2).'
9. Procedural mechanism for acquisition, rights of the State or the claimants, remedies, limitation for enforcement of the rights, schedule for completion of acquisition by the Collector are the salient features of the Act. The Collector has been statutorily empowered to refer the dispute with respect to apportionment among the persons to whom the compensation is payable after the payable compensation and the area of the land acquired have been settled, to the decision of the Court. It is incumbent for the Collector to deposit the amount of compensation in Court to be distributed to the persons found entitled to by the Court. Reference may be made to Section 30 of the Act.
10. The main thrust of the argument ofthe Counsel for the State is that the terminus quo for submission of a claim for reference to the civil Court is from the date of the knowledge of the award. In support of his submissions, reliance was placed on : AIR1975Mad303 , : AIR1965Cal638 , 1991 Land Acquisition Cases 26 and : (1996)11SCC213 . The learned Counsel for the respondents refuted the submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant. It was urged that the limitation for seeking the reference under Section 18 of the Act commences from the date of the service of the notice under Section 12 in either case i.e., irrespective of the fact whether the limitation has to be under the A.P. Amendment Act or under the Land Acquisition Act, when the claimant was notpresent before the Collector at the time of making the award. It is two months from the date of service of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) as amended by the State; In the alternative, it is six weeks from the date of service of the notice by the Collector and six months where no notice has been served from the date of the award. The period of six months has been calculated by judicial interpretation to commence from the date of the knowledge of the award. Reliance was placed on Writ Petition No.8415 of 1990 decided on 30-12-1992, Maddela Narsimlu v. Spl. Deputy Collector, : AIR1991AP123 , Laleemma v. Tahsildar, : 1993(3)ALT456 and M. Farhatullah v. Spl. Tahsildar, 1975 ALT 492. A Full Bench of this Court, while answering the question 'the point raised in Writ Appeal No.144 of 1986 is regarding the point of time from which the limitation for reference under Section 18 of the Act would commence' found (i) that service of notice of award under Section 12(2) of the Act is necessary i.e., to serve the copy of the award on the person interested; (ii) the service of notice in Form 9 without serving the reason for the award was considered to be sufficient compliance of Section 12(2) of the Act, While returning the above said finding it was observed that the award made under Section 11 being in the nature of offer if it contains the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, the person to whom it is payable and apportionment thereof, must be treated as complete compliance of notice of the award. Service of a copy of the award is not necessary.
11. It was further observed in the Full Bench, after taking notice of the observations made in Mt. Bhagwati v. Ramkali, ATR 1939 PC 133 to the effect that particulars of the reasons for the objections are not required to be given in an application for reference under Section 18(1) of the Act; consequently, the period of limitationof six months provided for seeking the reference in the eventuality of non-service of notice under Section 12 from the date of the award, it was considered and interpreted as meaning (1) the date of knowledge of the award by the party affected, either actual or constructive. The knowledge of the award was further found to mean not only the knowledge to the effect of the award having been made but also the knowledge of the essential content of the award; (2) due reliance was placed on the observations made in State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604 to the effect
'where no notice whatsoever was served under the first part of the proviso to sub-section (b) of Section 18(2) there is no notice under Section 12(2) served and there is no difficulty in holding that the period of limitation did not start';
(3) the observations in Harish Chandra v. Deputy LA. Officer, : [1962]1SCR676 as well as : [1964]1SCR971 are to the effect that it is incumbent on the part of the Government that knowledge of the award is brought home either actually or constructively.
12. In Jaswant Rai v. Land Acquisition Collector, AIR 1989 P&H; 261, while considering the effect of filing of an application for reference within six months from the date of the award the Punjab and Haryana High Court observed that the law that emerges from the observations of the Supreme Court is to the effect that where no notice under Section 12(2) was served the date of acquiring knowledge of the award is the terminus quo to calculate the period of limitation for seeking a reference within six months.
13. The question determined in Mohanlal v. B.G. Deshmukh, AIR 1985Bom. 188, is to the effect whether the Collector could determine on the application under Section 18 of the Act as to whether the applicant is a person interested or not which is not the question under consideration in hand. Consequently, the citation has only been noticed as it was cited at the Bar.
14. The Gujarat High Court in 1999 (1) Land Acquisition Cases 1 observed, 'date of the Collector's award' to mean that such date must be the date of the award communicated to or is known by a party whether actually or constructively.
15. The observations of : [1962]1SCR676 and : [1964]1SCR971 (supra), were reiterated.
16. The Supreme Court in Tola Ram v. State of U.P., (1997) 6 SCC 280, while considering the provisions of Section 12(2) observed 'that until essential contents of the award were brought home to the party affected by actually communicating the award, there can be no valid notice served as envisaged by Section 12(2)'.
17. In 1991 Land Acquisition Cases 444 it was observed that the service of the notice under Section 12(2) cannot be taken lightly as it is a statutory notice which affects the curtailing of the limitation for making an application for reference. As a necessary corollary it was observed that the limitation would commence from the date of the knowledge of the award for seeking reference under Section 18 of the Act.
18. Writ Petition No.17116 of 1994 decided on 27-9-1994 is noted as it was cited though the Writ Petition was dismissed on the ground of laches only.
19. In Writ Petition 8415 of 1990 it was observed that no limitation period has been prescribed when a reference underSection 30 of the Act was made and compensation was received under protest and the reference was sought for enhancement of the same. Yet it was observed that reference must be sought within a reasonable time from the date of receiving the compensation. A single Judge in : 1993(3)ALT456 (supra) observed that inspite of the fact that no compensation was awarded to the claimants and reference having been made under Section 30 it is mandatory that the Land Acquisition Officer issues a notice to the claimants in terms of Section 12(2) of the Act.
20. In A. Parvathi v. Spl. Tahsildar, Visakhapatnam, : 1994(3)ALT114 , the law has been laid down to the effect that inspite of the pendency of the proceedings under Section 30 for decision, the Land Acquisition Collector has no jurisdiction to withhold the application for reference under Section 18 made to the Collector. In (1996) 6 SCC 216, the application for reference made after three years was dismissed without determining the question of limitation.
21. In : (1996)11SCC213 , it was observed that (i) from a conjoint reading of Sections 11 and 12 of the Act it is clear that notice is only of intimation of the making of the award requiring the owner or person interested to receive compensation awarded under Section 11; (ii) the claimants would be entitled either to inspect the award or seek a certified copy of the award from the Collector and the contents as to the same is final and conclusive between them and the Collector; (iii) the notice of the award need not contain all the details as awarded including the consideration and manner of determination of compensation; (iv) the operation of limitation mentioned in subsection 18(2) does not depend on the ministerial act of communication of notice in any particular form when the same has not been prescribed; (v) the limitation begins to operate from the moment notice underSection 12(2) is received or as envisaged by Section 18(2).
22. Thus the conspectus of law referred to above by the Counsel for the parties emerges thus:
(1) The limitation for seeking reference under Section 18 commences from the date of service of notice in Form 9 on the claimant.
(2) In view of Section 18(2) of the Act the date of knowledge by the affected party, the actual or constructive, would be the date of commencement of limitation.
(3) Knowledge has been defined as meaning that it must relate to the essential content of the award.
(4) When no notice under Section 12(2) was served there is no difficulty in holding that the period of limitation did not start.
(5) It is incumbent on the part of the Government that the knowledge of the award is brought home either actually or constructively.
(6) There can be no valid notice under Section 12(2) until the essential content of the award was brought home to the party affected by actually communicating the award.
(7) Notice under Section 12(2) of the Act is the statutory notice which has the effect of curtailing the limitation for making an application for reference for cases felling under Section 18(2)(b) where no notice was served under Section 12 and the limitation of six months is provided from the date of award.
(8) Pendency of reference under Section 30 does not operate as bar for making reference under Section 18.
(9) The acquisition of land by the State is the exercise of police powers or sovereign powers depriving the person of his property against his will. Constitution provides only one protection to the person interested in the property, that the same can be acquired for public purpose in accordance with law established subject to payment of compensation. The statutory provision needs to be strictly construed. Acquisition can only be made in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Land Acquisition Act subject to the rights conferred by the Act on the person interested.
(10) It is well established that legal fiction should be taken to a logical end. Plain meaning of the Legislation has to be adopted irrespective of the consequences specially the provisions of limitation provided by the Act as it curtails the remedy and does not obliterate the right.
23. Though we would answer the pristine question of law referred to the Full Bench in the latter part of the judgment yet we are of the considered view that the pith and substance of the question raised by the State is, 'what is the date of terminus quo of the date of commencement of the limitation against the person interested when no notice under Section 12(2) of the Act has been served.'
24. Various High Courts as well the Hon'ble Supreme Court as noticed in the earlier part of the judgment, while interpreting Section 18(2) providing for the limitation for seeking the reference to the civil Court under Section 18 envisaged that the provisions provide for three contingencies for the commencement of the limitation:
(1) Six weeks from the date of Collector's award where the person interested was present before the Collector;
(2) Six weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2);
(3) Within six months from the date of the Collector's award.
25. It is true the third eventuality where the period of limitation has been provided as six months from the date of Collector's award that the period of limitation was considered to commence from the date of knowledge of the award irrespective of the service of the notice of the award on the claimant. The mode of service and knowledge were determined as a question of fact which were required to be determined in the facts and circumstances of each individual case.
26. Section 30 of the Act only authorises the civil Court on suo motu reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer to determine the title of the claimant or the person interested or the question of apportionment. Neither the Collector has jurisdiction to refer the question of area and the rate of compensation or the amount of compensation to be determined by the civil Court under Section 30 of the Act. The civil Court has a limited jurisdiction to determine the title or the apportionment of compensation. Thus the claimant has no right conferred under Section 30 of the Act to seek any reference of the dispute to be determined by the civil Court.
27. In pith and substance the right of a claimant to get his right determined - be it with respect to the area, amount of compensation payable, question of title or apportionment or the person to whom it is payable has been conferred by Section 18 of the Act by seeking a reference to the civil Court within the limitation prescribed and it is only on the reference by the Collector of the application seeking a reference to the civil Court that thecivil Court gets jurisdiction to determine the above questions. Thus, we have no doubts in our minds that Sections 18 and 30 operate in two difference contingencies and right has been conferred on two different situations and circumstances - one is the claimant can seek an reference to determine his rights and the other is the Collector where he is unable to determine the question of title or apportionment that he can refer the question for determination to the civil Court.
28. Dealing firstly with the first question referred to by the Division Bench the notice from the Court in a proceedings under Section 30 could not be raised to the pedestal of the notice under Section 12(2) of the Act for the purpose of commencement of the limitation under Section 18(2)(b) for the reason : (1) that Section 30 notice is not from the Collector but is a notice envisaged from the Court as no statutory provision envisages service of any notice on any person making a reference to civil Court for settlement of a dispute with respect to the ascertainment of the same or any part thereof and as to the person to whom the same or any part of the same is payable after the amount of compensation is settled under Section 11. It is the Collector's sole prerogative to refer such a dispute to the decision of the civil Court or determine the same. If he determines the same the award becomes full and final in itself and becomes conclusive evidence between the parties on the same being filed before the Collector under Section 12; (2) in exercise of Section 30 the civil Court has no jurisdiction to determine the amount of compensation which stands settled under Section 11 and became conclusive so far the Collector and the claimants are concerned as well as area as envisaged by Section 12(1) of the Act; (3) the civil Court has no jurisdiction on a reference under Section 30 to determine the amount of compensation; (4) it can only determine thequestion of apportionment or the persons to whom it is payable.
29. It is only Section 18 which confers a right on a person interested to seek a reference to determine (1) the compensation, (2) enhancement of compensation, (3) area, (4) measurement of the land, (5) amount of compensation and (6) the person to whom it is payable or the apportionment of compensation. Thus Section 18 covers the whole gamut of rights required to be determined and not the limited question. It further envisages that the claimant would state the grounds on which he has taken objections to the award. In order to settle the matters and not to keep them in indeterminate situation as the land vested in the State free from all encumbrances, statutory period has been provided within which the claimant could seek reference.
30. In view of the law laid down as culled out in the earlier part of the judgment there being no notice from the Collector as required by Section 12(2) issued by the Collector and served on the claimant the notice under Section 30 of the Act from the Court cannot be raised to the pedestal of a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act though we may hasten to add that the notice may in some of the circumstances which can be taken into consideration while determining whether notice in pith and substance has been duly served with respect to the award as envisaged by Section 12(2) of the Act be attributable to knowledge of the claimant for the commencement of the limitation for seeking reference within six months from the date of the award in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court referred to in the earlier part of the judgment.
31. In view of A.P. State amendment to Section 18(2)(b) of the Act and the state substituting the provision for Section 18(2)(b)it is categorically discernible that the limitation of six months from the date of the award as well as six weeks from the date of receipt of the notice of the award from the Collector provided under Section 18(2)(b) stood obliterated and substituted the period of six months from the date of Collector's award by two months from the date of service of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2). Thus the quint essential that emerges from a reading of Section 18(2)(b) for seeking a reference is (1) that the period of limitation for seeking the reference is two months and neither six weeks nor six months as envisaged by Section 18(2) proviso (a) and (b); (2) the limitation would commence from the date of the service of the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2); (3) the Collector would serve the notice of the award and would, not only give notice of the award i.e., service of the notice by the Collector of his award it is statutorily incumbent before the limitation commences depriving the claimant of his remedy of seeking a reference.
32. Mere knowledge of the award cannot commence the period of limitation or set the period of limitation to run against the claimant depriving of his right to seek the reference. It is well known that the legal provisions of limitation are artificial and would not always satisfy the test of either logic or equality. The provisions are being enacted with an object in a civilised society that the sword of Damocles should not be kept hanging for all times to come. It does not obliterate the right but only bars the remedy. As a necessary corollary the limitation cannot commence on the knowledge of an award when statute provides that it would commence from the date of service of the notice. The commencement of the limitation has been provided by the Legislation by legal fiction, which should be taken to a logical end. Neither the limitation can be extended nor we can read into the statutory provisions especially whenthey are not capable of two interpretations at all. In our considered view since the period of limitation provided is six months from the date of award, interpreted to be the date of knowledge, the commencement of six months would not be attracted to the specific statutory provisions providing for the commencement of the limitation of two months from the date of service of the award. The limitation cannot run against the claimant. Inspite of no form of notice or mode of service of the award having been provided yet service of notice has been specifically provided for. Service of notice can safely be considered to mean tender of the notice to the claimant and not his mere knowledge acquired through various means.
33. We find support in our observation made above from AIR 1963 SC 1604 (supra), as referred to above wherein it has been specifically observed that where no notice under Section 12(2) of the Act has been served there is no difficulty in holding that the period of limitation did not start. We cannot add to the said observations of the Supreme Court.
34. In view of the observations made above we are of the considered view that:
(1) In Andhra Pradesh the limitation for seeking the reference under Section 18 is two months statutorily provided from the date of service of the notice by the Collector of the award;
(2) The notice under Section 30 by the Court even if served by the Collector cannot be equated with the notice under Section 12(2) required to be served for the purpose of commencement of the limitation under Section 18(2)(b);
(3) Since the mode of service of notice has not been provided for, thequestion of service of notice as a fact can be found in the facts and circumstances of each individual case.
(4) The burden of alleging and proving of the service of notice either actually or constructively, is on the State when the State intends to take advantage contending that the application seeking reference under Section 18 is barred by limitation. It is for the State to show the date on which the claimant acquired actually or constructively the knowledge of the award from which the period of limitation would commence.
35. The law laid down contrary to the law on the question answered would be deemed to have been overruled.
36. We need not refer back the case to the learned single Judge after determining the question referred to the Full Bench as the facts arc not in dispute. There is no plea of the State when the respondents acquired the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the award, which would amount to service of notice as envisaged under Section 12(2) of the Act. Thus, no period of limitation having been commenced as concedediy no notice having been served the application seeking reference under Section 18 would be within limitation. Thus, the order of the learned single Judge is affirmed. The appellants are directed to refer the matter to the Collector for decision on the objections under Section 18 to the civil Court. No other point has been raised. The appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.