Bhaskar Rao, J.
1. This is an appeal filed by the respondent - Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, assailing the judgment of the learned single Judge allowing the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner. The facts of the case are that the writ petitioner-respondent herein was appointed by the appellant - Corporation as a Probationary Development Officer with effect from 25-6-1984 in the prescribed scale of pay. He was posted at Ponnur, Guntur District. The order of appointment says that he will be on probation for a period of 12 months, which may be extended for a further period of 12 months. Clauses 3 to 5 in the order of appointment deal with the code of conduct to be followed by the employee; Clauses 6 to 9 deal with tours, advance deposits, record of work and collection of premiums; Clause 10 deals with the minimum buiness that the writ petitioner is expected to do; and Clause 11 deals with confirmation and increments.
2. As per the terms of the appointment order, what is expected of the writ petitioner, as a Development Officer, to achieve confirmation within one year of probation, is that he must complete business of Rs. 15,00,000/- yielding first year's scheduled premium income of not less than Rs. 52,000/-. He is also required to appoint 16 agents during the period of probation, who must get the necessary recognition. He is also expected to ensure mat the minimum business is spread over not less than 120 lives and must undertake a lot of touring to achieve the said targets. The writ petitioner has fallen short of the requirement expected of him by the Corporation. Consequently his probation was extended on 13-6-1985 for a further period of 12 months on the same terms and conditions enumerated in the letter of appointment dated 25-6-1984. The writ petitioner has levelled certain charges of personal nature against the second appellant herein, who is the Senior Branch Manager, Baptla, but the same were denied by him. It is further alleged that an amount of Rs. 65,000/-, which he has insured, was not taken into consideration. It is the contention of the writ petitioner that he covered business to the tune of Rs. 13,42,500/- during the period from 1st April, 1985 to 31st March, 1986 which was ignored by the second appellant herein.
3. On 9-5-1986 a notice was issued by the second appellant herein enclosing the termination order, dated 13-5-1986, addressed to the writ petitioner and asking him to surrender his T.A. Book and other relevant papers. It is also contended by the writ petitioner that in fact the termination order was not served on him.
4. Counter was filed by the first appellant herein stating that the writ petitioner was appointed as a Probationary Development Officer and that as per the terms of the appointment order the writ petitioner has to do a minimum business of Rs. 15,00,000/- yielding premium of not less than Rs. 52,000/- and cover about 120 lives. As the writ petitioner has not achieved the minimum target, his probation was extended by one year. Even during the extended period of probation, the writ petitioner has not fulfilled the target nor he appointed any agent. Therefore, a letter was addressed to the writ petitioner on 16-7-1984 by the Senior Branch Manager during the first year of probation. Even during the extended period of probation the writ petitioner admitted in his letter, dated 15-7-1985, that he was not able to complete the target due to ill- health. Again a letter, dated 11-2-1986 was addressed to the writ petitioner by the first appellant herein, which is in the following terms:
'Re: Your performance as at the end of Dec. 1985.
You are aware that you probation has been extended as you are not able to fulfil the norms fixed to earn confirmation during the first year of probation. Even during the current year, your performance is not upto the mark as you earned a premium income of Rs. 20,476/- only sofar. Further, we understand from our Sr. Branch Manager that your tour results are far from satisfactory. You have been already advised by our Sr. Branch Manager, Bapatla, to recruit agents around Ponnur. You have not bestowed adequate attention on recruitment of agents. At this pace of progress, it may not be possible for you to earn confirmation. You have to plan your work and work out the plan. We advise you to apply yourself to the job in all earnestness and see that you earn confirmation.'
Similarly, another letter, dated 5-4-1986, was addressed by the first appellant herein to the writ petitioner. The letter reads as under:
'Re: Your probationary period.
As you failed to fulfil the norms prescribed to earn confirmation, your probation has been extended upto 22-5-1986. Even during the extended probationary period you are not applying to the job in all earnestness. We are giving you a final opportunity to show your mettle and come up to our expectations. In case you do not show substantial improvement before the end of the month, your services are likely to be terminated.'
5. Thus, the writ petitioner has not completed the target even during the extended period of probation. He, however, appointed only one agent during the extended period of probation. The allegation that the business of Rs. 65,000/- done by the writ petitioner was not taken into consideration, was denied. It is further stated that as the writ petitioner has not fulfilled the target or work allotted to him even during the extended period, his probation was terminated, that the same is legal and valid and that there are no merits in the writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.
6. The second appellant herein also filed a counter denying the allegations of mala fide alleged against him. He further stated that the contention of the writ petitioner that the amount of Rs. 65,000/- insured by him was not taken into consideration, is not correct and that the said policy proposal papers were received in the office on 15-5-1986 - one week after the termination of the writ petitioner. Similarly, he denied the allegation that the writ petitioner had introduced new insurance policy for Rs. 8,40,000/- on 10-5-1986 and further stated mat the policy proposal papers were not received in the office even by the end of May, 1986. Therefore, there is no truth in the contentions of the writ petitioner and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
7. After considering the rival contentions of the parties, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition on the ground that the conditions laid down in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') have not been complied with. Against that, the present appeal is filed by the Corporation.
8. Mr. J.V. Suryanarayana Rao, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that as the writ petitioner was appointed only as a 'probationer', Section 25F of the Act is not applicable at all. It is submitted that as per Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, if a person appointed as probationer with a condition that his probation will be terminated if he has not satisfactorily done his duties, is terminated from service, it does not amount to retrenchment. In the instant case the termination of the probation of the writ petitioner is under Section 2(oo)(bb) Part II and therefore, it cannot be said to be retrenchment as defined in the main Section 2(oo). Once the termination is under Section 2(oo)(bb) Part II, Section 25-F of the Act is not attracted. Therefore, there is no obligation on the part of the appellants to follow the procedure laid down under Section 25-F.
9. He further contended that the writ petitioner, in the first year of his probation, has not completed the target fixed for him. Therefore, further extension of one year was given to him. Even during the extended period he has not completed the target. The Corporation felt that he has not completed his probation satisfactorily and achieved the set target and, therefore, terminated his probation. So, there is no violation on the part of the Corporation. It is further submitted that the order of termination was sent to the writ petitioner through registered post. It was also sent to the second appellant herein. Once the order is sent under registered post, it cannot be said that the writ petitioner has not received the same. However, the writ petitioner has filed the writ petition only after he came to know about the order. Therefore, that aspect has little importance. There are no merits in the writ petition and the writ appeal has to be allowed.
10. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner-respondent herein contended that the termination of the writ petitioner is bad as the procedure contemplated under Section 25-F of the Act is not followed. Secondly, as no notice was given before termination of probation, the termination is bad. He further contended that the appellant Corporation have not taken into consideration the insurance policy amounts of Rs. 65,000/- and Rs. 8,40,000/-. Therefore, the appellant-Corporationhad not applied its mind while terminating the probation of the writ petitioner. It is further contended that the learned single Judge has rightly allowed the writ petition. There are no merits in this appeal and the same has to be dismissed.
11. In view of the above rival contentions, the question that arises for consideration is - whether the termination of the writ petitioner's probation is bad, as the procedure laid down under Section 25-F of the Act was not followed. To appreciate this contention effectively, it is relevant to read Section 2(oo) in its entirety, which is as follows:
(oo) 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include-
(a) voluntary retirement of (the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or
'(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non- renewal of the contract of the employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or '(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health;'
12. Earlier to the introduction of Clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) by Amendment Act No. 49 of 1984, which came into force on 18-8-1984, every workman whether probationer or temporary man or appointed for a limited period on contract basis, was deemed to be retrenched and when he was terminated from service the provisions of Industrial Disputes Art were applicable. The newly introduced Clause (bb) says that the termination of .service of the workman as a resul of the non-renewal of the contract of the employment bet ween the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of suuch contract being terminated undo' a stipulation in that behalf contained in the contract of employment, cannot be termed as retrenchment The writ petitioner was admittedly appointed as a Probationer. Appointment as a probationer means that during the period of probation the person appointed must do his duties to the satisfaction of the employer and complete the target fixed from him. Suppose his services are not satisfactory and the employer feels that he has not the capacity of discharging the duties of the post to which he was appointed on probation, they can terminate. If he renders his servics satisfactors services satisfactory and completes the entire target allotted to him , he is eligible for confirmation. Clause 11 of the appointment order specifically says as under:
'11. Confirmation and increments:
'(i) On your satisfactorily completing the period of probation and, your observance and compliance with all conditions set out in this letter of appointment, you will be confirmed in the services of the Corporation in Clause II. Your confirmation will depend inter alia upon the fulfilment, of the minimum business guarantee set out in para 10 above and upon your record of post-sales service to the Corporation's policy holders and other functions performed by you in the area allotted to you to the satisfaction of the competent authority.'
13. Thus, only after fulfilling all the conditions laid down in Clause 11 of the appointment order, the writ petitioner will be entitled for confirmation. In case he is not able to fulfil the conditions prescribed, he is not entitled for confirmation, that is, his probation can be terminated or discharged. Thus, it is implicit in the appointment order itself that in case the writ petitioner is not able to fulfil the conditions laid down therein, he will not be confirmed and ultimately he will be discharged or terminated as a probationer. This appointment order consequently comes within the ambit of Section 2(oo)(bb) Part II of the Act. When once the appointment of the writ petitioner is on contract basis with a condition that he will be terminated, if he has not fulfilled the conditions laid down in the appointment order during the probation, it cannot be said that his termination will amount to retrenchment as contemplated under Section 2(oo). When once his appointment comes under Section 2(oo)(bb) Part II, Section 25-F is not attracted at all. Therefore, we hold that the termination of the petitioner's probation, without following the procedure contemplated under Section 25-F of the Act, is not bad nor illegal. In this respect it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Karnataka High Court in CM. jitendra Kumar v. Management, B.E. Movers Ltd, 1985 Lab. I.C. 1833. , where in it is held as under:
'In view of sub-clause (bb) inserted into Section 2(oo) by the aforesaid amendment, if termination of service is brought about as a consequence of the expiry of the period for which the workman was employed or if the termination is brought about in pursuance of the stipulation made in the contract of appointment, such termination of service of the workman, does not amount to 'retrenchment' for purposes of the Act.'
14. Now, we will deal with the other contentions raised by the learned counsel for the respondent - writ petitioner. He contended that the termination of probation without notice and without enquiry is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Even on this ground the termination order is liable to be set aside, which the learned single Judge has rightly done. It must be noted here that it is an admitted fact that the writ petitioner was appointed only as a probationer and his confirmation is subject to fulfilment of the conditions laid down in the appointment order. According to the appellant - Corporation, the writ petitioner has not done the business, nor appointed the agents as required in the appointment order and the rules. Therefore, his probation was terminated. In this respect it is necessary to note that when a probationer has not completed the set target, and his services are found to be unsatisfactory, it would result in termination of probation. For such termination, as laid down by the Supreme Court and various High Courts, it is not necessary to give any notice. Such termination is not bad, as it is only in the nature of ad hoc or temporary appointment. Here, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, : [1991]1SCR29 . , wherein it is held:
'A temporary government sevant has no right to hold the post. Whenever, the competent authority is satisfied that the work and conduct of a temporary servant is not satisfactory or that his continuance in service is not in public interest on account of his unsuitability, misconduct or inefficiency, it may either terminate his services in accordance with the terms and conditions of the service or the relevant rules or it may decide to take punitive action against the temporary government servant. If the services of a temporary government servant is terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions of service, it will not visit him with any evil consequences.'
15. The proposition laid down in (2 supra) was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Triveni Shankar Sexena v. State of U.P. and Ors. : (1992)IILLJ23SC ., and in Kidwai Memorial Institute v. P. Godwalkar, 1992 (2) SCALE 861. From the above decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that where the probationer has not put in satisfactory service and the Department, after satisfying itself, simpliciter terminates his services, no notice is required and the said termination cannot be said to be in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. In view of the above rulings of the Supreme Court, we hold that the termination of probation of the writ petitioner is valid and not in any way hit by Article 14 of the Constitution.
16. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner next contended that the Development Officer in the Life Insurance Corporation is a 'workman' as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, the procedure laid down under Section 25-F has to be followed in the present case. As noted earlier the said procedure was not followed. For the proposition that the L.I.C. Development Officer is a workman, the learned counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in S. K. Venna v. Mahesh Chandra, : (1983)IILLJ429SC . There is no dispute that the Development Officer of L.I.C. is a workman. But, the question is applicability of Section 25-F. Earlier we have dealt with this aspect of the matter in detail and held that Section 25-F is not applicable. The judgment of the Supreme Court in (5 supra), relied on by the writ petitioner was earlier to the introduction of clause (bb) to Section 2(oo) in the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, that judgment is not applicable at all.
17. The learned Counsel relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India : (1964)ILLJ418SC . In this case a temporary servant was discharged from service on the ground he is undesirable to be retained in the government service. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court held that it amounts to dismissal and the same is in violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. The facts of the present case are quite different. In the present case the order of appointment itself provides that the writ petitioner has to fulfil the target fixed for him. On completion of the said target only, he will be confirmed. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court is not applicable to the present case.
18. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner further relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Govindaraju v. K.S.R.T.C. and Anr. 1986 (II) L.L.J. 351, wherein, when the services of a regularly selected employee were sought to be terminated without notice, the Supreme Court held that even though the Rules and Regulations do not provide any notice, the principles of natural justice require giving of such notice. In the present case the writ petitioner was only appointed as a probationer and his confirmation is subject to fulfilment of certain conditions laid down in the appointment order itself. The facts of the present case are quite different. Therefore, the judgment of the Supreme Court will not apply to the facts of the present case.
19. The learned counsel then referred to a decision of this Court in S.K. Khuddus v. A.P. State Warehousing Corporation, : (1993)ILLJ13AP ., wherein the dismissal of a daily wage employee with a stigma, was considered. In those circumstances, it was held that the said dismissal was bad. The facts of that case are quite different from the facts of the present case and therefore, it is not applicable.
20. The learned counsel then referred to a decision of this Court in D. Chenniah v. Divisional Manager, A.P.S.R.T. Corporation 1987 Lab.I.C. 1259. In this case the service of a Conductor was terminated before the contract period was over. In those circumstances, the Court while interpreting the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, held that termination simpliciter was bad. In that case the said Conductor was not on probation as in the present case. Therefore, the said case does not apply to the facts of the present case.
21. Similarly, the judgments in R. Sreenivasa Rao v. Lab. Court, Hyderabad and Anr., 1990 (ii) L.L.J. 577., and DM. Shirke and Ors. v. Zilla Parishad, Yavatmal and Ors., 1990 (I) L.L.J. 445., relied on by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner, also are not applicable to the case on hand as the facts of those cases are different from the present case.
22. Therefore, we see no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner that notice is required to be given before probation is terminated. As laid down by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla (2 supra) referred to earlier, if a probationer is terminated because his services are not satisfactory during the period of probation, no notice is necessary. Apart from that, it is a decided principle that when a preliminary enquiry is held to find out whether a temporary employee is suitable or not, no notice is required to be given as laid down in P.L. Dhingra v. Union of India : (1958)ILLJ544SC ., State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das, : (1961)ILLJ552SC ., Champaklal v. Union of India : (1964)ILLJ752SC ., Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India (6 supra) and A.G. Benjamin v. Union of India , : (1964)ILLJ752SC .
23. In view of the catena of case law on the proposition, no notice is required to be given where the probationer is terminated on the ground that he has not rendered satisfactory service during the probation and has not completed the target fixed for him.
24. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner next contended that the writ petitioner had insured Rs. 65,000/- and Rs. 8,40,000/- that he had also submitted the policy proposal papers to the second appellant, and that, if the same are taken into consideration, it will show that the writ petitioner had completed his target. But, in the counter affidavit filed by the second appellant herein it is categorically stated that the papers in respect of the policy of Rs. 65,000/'- were received only on 15-5-1986 i.e., one week after his termination; and so far as the papers relating to policy of Rs. 8,40,000/- are concerned, they were not received even by the end of May, 1986. Thus, there is any amount of dispute regarding these amounts. Therefore, we do not want to express any opinion on this aspect because these are papers which were received by the appellant - Insurance Company after the writ petitioner was terminated.
25. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner further contended that the termination order was not served on the writ petitioner at all. But, the learned counsel for the appellants produced before us the file in which there is an endorsement that the termination order was sent through registered post. Though, it was not with acknowledgment due, but it was sent by registered post. A copy of that order, which was sent to the second appellant herein, was received by him. However, the writ petitioner, after coming to know about it, filed the writ petitioner. Therefore, non-receipt of termination order will have little or no effect. Therefore, we see no force in this contention.
26. It is next contended by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner that in the termination order no reasons were given. In the case of termination of probation, no reasons need to be given. Even taking that reasons are required to be given, the material placed by the appellant - Insurance Company clearly show that there is sufficient material to come to that conclusion. Therefore, we see no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner.
27. For all the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the order of the learned Single Judge.
28. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner lastly contended that the writ petitioner is a young man, that he was on probation for two years, that when he is about to complete the target in the extended period, his probation was terminated. Therefore, he may be permitted to make a representation to the appellant - Insurance Company and if opportunity's given he is ready to join as a fresh recruit and work to the satisfaction of the appellant. In view of the above stated circumstances, we think it just and proper to give liberty to the writ petitioner to make a representation to the appellants and the same may be considered by the appellants according to law, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the said representation.
29. The writ appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.