ORDER
P.S. Narayana, J.
1. The unsuccessful landlords in both the Courts below filed the present C.R.P., under Section 22 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act 1960, hereinafter, for short, referred to as 'the Act', for the purpose of convenience.
2. The landlords filed R.C.C.No. 108 of 1999 on the file of the IV Additional Rent Controller for eviction on the following grounds:
1. Wilful default in payment of rent for the period of February 1997 to April 1997.
2. Wilful default in payment of municipal taxes.
3. Bona fide personal requirement of the landlords since the partnership firm does not own any other non-residential premises in the twin cities.
The learned IV Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad after framing points for consideration at para-8, recorded the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, R.Ws.1 to 3, marked Exs.A1 to A53, Ex.B.1 to B.45 and Exs.X1 to X.21 and ultimately came to the conclusion that the respondents herein, the tenant had not committed any wilful default and the landlords are not entitled to the relief of eviction on the ground of even bona fide personal requirement. Aggrieved by the said order dated 24-2-2002, the landlords carried the matter by way of appeal R.A.No. 185 of 2002 on the file of Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad and the appellate authority having framed the point for consideration at para-6 after recording certain reasons confirmed the findings and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the same, the landlords had preferred the present C.R.P., under Section 22 of the Act.
Contentions of Sri Vilas Afzalpurkar:
3. Sri Vilas Afzalpurkar, the learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioners-landlords made the following submissions:
The learned Counsel pointed out that the ground of wilful default is of two parts, one relating to wilful default in payment of rent for the period of February 1997 to April 1997 and the other wilful default in payment of municipal taxes. The learned Counsel had taken this Court through the evidence available on record in general and the evidence of P.W.1 and R.W.1 in particular and had pointed out to the stand taken by R.W.1- the tenant and would comment that in the light of the nature of documents produced and several of the suspicious circumstances as clearly reflected from the said documents, the stand of the tenant cannot be believed. The learned Counsel also would maintain that certain documents were left untouched and certain documents were commented upon, but an erroneous or wrong approach had been adopted and this would amount to the recording of a perverted finding by the Court of first instance, which had been just confirmed without any serious discussion by the appellate authority by framing one sentence as point for consideration. The learned Counsel in all fairness would submit that the rent control proceedings are summary proceedings, but even then the appellate authority being the final Court of fact is expected to appreciate all the facts and record appropriate findings and the findings recorded by the Rent Controller cannot be confirmed in a routine way without independent application of mind. The learned Counsel pointed out to the relevant part in the decision of the appellate authority at Para-13 and would contend that except some stray observations, the ground of bona fide personal requirement in fact had not been discussed at all and the ground of telephone connection had been commented upon which is, in fact, an irrelevant ground. The learned Counsel also pointed out to Exs.B.27 to B.29 and B.45 and would comment that these documents are not corresponding documents and the nexus had not been established and the cheque numbers specified in Ex.B.45 also do not tally and such irrelevant documents had been produced. The learned Counsel also had shown certain tampering and would comment that on such suspicious documents, believing the stand of the tenant is highly unjustified. The learned Counsel also pointed out the vagueness as can be reflected in Exs.B.8, B.9 and B.15 which were produced by the tenant to substantiate the contention that he had not committed wilful default in payment of rents. The learned Counsel had pointed out that the name of the payee was not mentioned and the period was also not mentioned and despite the same recording a finding that the tenant had not committed wilful default for the relevant period also cannot be sustained. While further elaborating his submissions the learned Counsel pointed out to the evidence of P.W.1 and R.W.1 and would comment that even in the chief examination R.W.1 made several admissions inclusive of his liability to pay the property taxes to the Municipal Corporation. The learned Senior Counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to Ex.A48 the Rental Deed entered into between the parties and condition No. 3 which specified the payment of property taxes as well by the tenant. The learned Counsel had taken this Court through the portions of the Cross-examinations of R.W.1 and had pointed out that these admissions made by R.W.1 would clearly go to show that the stand taken by the tenant in relation to any of the grounds cannot be sustained. While further commenting on the aspect of bona fide personal requirement, the learned Counsel would submit that apart from the evidence of P.W.1, the evidence of P.W.2 also is available and the findings recorded that positive proof had not been placed relating to certain aspects by the landlords may not be sustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Even if it is to be taken as the bona fide personal requirement of a partnership firm as such, the mere fact that certain of the partners may be having some premises may not alter the situation in any way. The learned Counsel placed strong reliance on the decision of this Court in Venkayala Veeraraghavulu v. Godavari Metral Rolling Milk Contractors Firm : 1995(2)ALT227 , in this regard. While commenting about the order which had been impugned in the C.R.P., the learned Counsel would comment that the important portions of the oral evidence had been left untouched by the appellate authority and equally important documents had been left untouched and in routine way framing cryptic point for consideration certain findings were recorded and ultimately the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller had been confirmed. This would definitely go to show that there is no proper application of mind on the part of the appellate authority while deciding the matter. While concluding, the learned Senior Counsel would maintain that there is no hard and fast rule that merely perversed concurrent findings had been recorded no interference is called for before the revisional Court under Section 22 of the Act. The learned Counsel no doubt, would comment that normally in ordinary course when concurrent findings relating to factual aspects had been recorded the revisional Court to be slow in disturbing such findings. But, however when the very approach of the Courts below in appreciating the evidence is totally perversed and there is improper consideration or non-consideration of the crucial aspects of both oral and documentary evidence, such findings would definitely amount to preversed findings and such findings definitely can be disturbed by the revisional Court. The learned Counsel also placed reliance on certain decisions to substantiate his stand in this regard.
Contentions of Sri Vedula Venkataramana:
4. Sri Vedula Venkataramana, learned Counsel representing respondents-tenants with all emphasis would maintain that inasmuch as concurrent findings had been recorded these findings being factual findings such findings cannot be disturbed by this Court as revisional Court. At any rate, this Court to be slow in disturbing such factual findings. The learned Counsel also had drawn the attention of this Court to the respective pleadings of the parties in general and the counter filed by the tenants in particular and would maintain that the specific stand taken by the tenant had been will established by R.Ws.1 to 3. The learned Counsel also pointed out to Exs.B.1 to B.45 and would comment that neither wilful default relating to payment of rent nor wilful default relating to the payment of property tax had been established in the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned Counsel also would maintain that these landlords, the partners of the firm, are very rich people having several non-residential premises in the twin cities and the requirement is not bona fide personal requirement, but it is just a fanciful requirement and only with a view to throw the tenants out, this had been though of. While further elaborating his submissions, the learned Counsel had pointed out to the relevant portions of the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller and also the findings recorded by the appellate authority and ultimately would conclude that it is not a fit case to be interfered with while exercising revisional jurisdiction by this Court.
5. Heard the Counsel on record. Perused the respective pleadings of the parties, the points for consideration framed by the learned Rent Controller, the findings recorded and also the point for consideration framed by the appellate authority and the findings recorded by the appellate authority in relation thereto and the oral and documentary evidence.
6. The revision petitioners as landlords filed R.C. No. 108 of 1999 on the file of IV Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad praying for eviction on the ground of wilful default of payment of rents, wilful default of payment of municipal taxes and bona fide personal requirement of the landlords. The Court of first instance negatived all the grounds. Aggrieved by the same, the matter was carried by way of appeal in R.A.No. 185 of 2002 wherein the said findings had been confirmed.
7. Before proceeding with the further discussion, it may be appropriate to have a look at the respective pleadings of the parties. In R.C. No. 108 of 1999 the petitioners (hereinafter referred to as landlords, for the purpose of convenience) pleaded as hereunder:
That the petitioner is a registered partnership firm having its registration No. 2042/80, with the Registrar of the Firm. The petitioner Firm came into existence with four partners viz. 1. Syed Ameenuddin 2. Syed Ifteqaruddin, 3. Syed Najeemuddin, 4. Ather Sultana, with effect from 14-4-1979, the firm continued but the partners namely, Syed Iftequaruddin, Syed Najeemuddin and Ather Sultana retired from the firm on 1-4-1995, and three new partners were joined i.e., 1. Syed Nadeemuddin, 2. Syed Ehteshamuddin and 3. Syed Sameemuddin on the same day as such, now the following are the partners of the firm : 1. Syed Ameemuddin, 2. Syed Nadeemuddin, Syed Ehteshamuddin, 4. Syed Sameemuddin.
That the petitioner firm is carrying on the business and dealing in all kinds of electrical goods including supply to all functions, decorations, selling hiring and exhibiting on all occasions. The petitioner is carrying the business in a rented mulgi bearing Municipal No. 3.5.142/9, King Kothi, Hyderabad since 1980 on a monthly rent of Rs. 900/-.
That the petitioner firm purchased a double storied mulgi, No. 22-6-169 situated at Pathergatti, Hyderabad, from Sri Mohammed Safdar Hussain under registered sale Deed No. 307/97 dated 30-4-1997 which is under tenancy of respondent on a monthly rent of Rs. 250/-.
The vendor by a letter dated 30-4-1997, attorned the tenancy with actionable claim of arrears of rent due from February 1997 to April 1997, hence, the petitioner by notice dated 13-5-1997, informed the tenant to pay the arrears of rent and also the future rents. The respondent replied to the said notice on 20-5-1997. The contents of the notice are false. The respondent also sent a notice dated 3-6-1997, the said notice was also replied.
The respondents avoiding the available remedies of depositing the rent proceedings sent the rent by Money Order which was received without prejudice and under protest.
The petitioner submit that the respondents being in arrears of rent as stated above and having not complied with the terms of the rental deed with the previous owner such as M.C.H. Tax etc. The respondents is wilful defaulter and liable to be evicted.
That the petitioner requires the suit mulgi No. 22-6-169 with upper portion situated at Pathergatti, Hyderabad for their personal business, use and occupation, the petitioner as well as the partners of the petitioner's firm do not own or possess or entitled to such possession any other non-residential building in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad. The petitioners are carrying on their business in a rented premises. The requirement of the petitioner is for the business under the partnership deed is bona fide, genuine.
That the petitioners are carrying their business in a rented mulgi No. 3-5-142/9, King Kothi, Hyderabad since 1980, the landlord of the said mulgi is pressing for eviction. The respondent was asked for eviction but in vain and finally refused on 10-2-1999, hence the cause of action arose on the above date.
8. The particulars under Section 28(3) of the Act also had been furnished as hereunder:
1. Door Number of the Building and name if any : 22-6-169 with portion
2. Street and Municipal, Ward or Division in
which the building situated : Pathergatti, Hyderabad.
3. Name and address of the landlord : 1. M/s. New Deccan Hall
if the particulars are furnished by the : 2. Md. Omer s/o.Jamal Sharief
tenant and the name of the tenant if the : 3. Md. Rais Sajid, S/o. Md. Omer :
particulars are furnished by the landlords. : 4. Md. Masood Javeed, S/o. Mohd.
Omer.
4. Whether the building is residential or
non-residential. : Non-residential.
5. Whether any furniture is supplied by the
landlord for use in building :--
6. Details of the accommodation available
together with particulars as regard the ground
area, garden and out houses, if any
appurtenant to the building. :--
7. If the building is not occupied by the landlord
whether it is occupied by a single tenant or
by more than one tenant :--
8. Amenities available in regard to lighting,
water sanitation and the like : Electricity
9. Monthly rent paid by the tenant. :Rs. 250/-p.m.
9. Respondent No. 3 filed counter through G.P.A., holder and a memo was filed by the respondents 1, 2 and 4 adopting the counter filed by respondent No. 3. The parties are hereinafter referred to as 'the tenants' for the purpose of convenience. It was pleaded in the counter as hereunder:
As regards para-4 of the petition it is submitted that the petitioner's family owns a palatial function hall styled as Eden Garden worth crores of rupees and the electrical goods including decoration for exhibiting on all occasions is meant mainly for Eden Garden function hall for their own use. There are bout 19 nineteen mulgies in the same line, including mulgi bearing No. 3-5-142/9, King Kothi, Hyderabad, which are owned and possessed by the family of the petitioners. The mulgi bearing No. 3-5-142/9, King Kothi, Hyderabad is for supply of material for decoration and electrification, meant mainly for Eden Garden function hall for their own use. It is for the petitioners to prove the averments made in this para.
As regards para-5 of the petition the respondents are the tenants of mulgi No. 22-6-169, situated a Pathergatti, Hyderabad. The tenancy was attorned in favour of M/s. Delight Electrical works, rep., by authorized Managing partner Sri Syed Ameemuddin only on receipt of the notice dated 13-5-1997 from Sri R.A. Krishna, Advocate on 17-5-1997, when they learnt the transfer of the mulgi in favour of the petition.
As regards para-6 of the petition a detailed reply notice dated 20-5-1997, was given on behalf of the respondents. It is clearly stated in the reply notice that the respondents were not aware of the transfer in favour of the petitioners and for the first time that the respondents learnt of the so called transfer on 17-5-1997 when they received the notice dated 13-5-1997 from Sri R.A. Krishna, Advocate. In the reply notice all the details of payments are expressly stated and every one of the averments in that reply notice are true and correct. Again on 30-6-1997, on behalf of the respondent No. 1, herein represented by the respondent No. 4, a notice was given to the petitioner No. 1 showing the remittances made from time to time and the petitioner was called upon to specify the bank account to which rents may be deposited from time to time. This notice having been received no reply was sent to the same. The copy of the notice issued on behalf of M/s. New Deccan Hall/respondent No. 1 dated 30-6-1997, is filed herewith for kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court. There was absolutely no default in payment of rent much less wilfull default.
The averments made in para Nos.7 and 8 of the petition are false and are denied. The respondents never defaulted in payment of rents and there is no question of default and muchless wilful default. The so called lease deed in favour of Sri Mohd. Safdar Hussain expired by afflux of time by 31-12-1995 and so the petitioner cannot invoke the said lease deed. In fact the previous owner Sri Mohd. Safdar Hussain who is none else than the own brother of Sri Syed Ameemuddin's mother-in-law was avoiding to receive the rents and the respondents were pursuing in payment of rents as per details in the notices issued for the respondents.
The averments made in paras-9 and 10 of the petition are false and are denied. It is for the petitioners to prove strictly that they do not own or possess any non-residential building. The claim that the petitioners are carrying on business in rented building is false. The mulgi bearing Door No. 3-5-142/9, King Kothi, Hyderabad is not a rented one and in fact it is jointly owned by Sri Syed Kaleemuddin, Advocate, the elder brother of Sri Syed Ameemuddin petitioner No. 1 and petitioner Nos.2 to 4 Sri Syed Kaleemuddin the paternal uncle of the petitioners 2 to 4. The palatial Eden Garden, King Kothi owned and possessed by Sri Syed Kaleemuddin, Sri Syed Ameemuddin, the petitioner No. 1 and other brothers. The firm is styled by Modern New Enterprises. All the members of the family own all these extensive properties jointly including double stories (3) mulgies at Pathergatti and a number of mulgies at Siddiamber Bazar and there is no division. There is no question of obtaining the mulgi on rent. It is all fictitious. In fact the father of Sri Syed Ameemuddin and grandfather of petitioners 2 to 4 namely Sri Syed Azeemuddin, Advocate and the petitioners are jointly owning and are having various extensive properties both residential and non-residential and they are some of the richest persons of the Hyderabad. The first notice was given on 13-5-1997, which was suitably replied. The firm said to have been constituted on 14-5-1979, and then it is said to have been reconstituted on 1-4-1995. The petition for eviction was field in the month of March, 1999 with all manipulations with oblique motive to get exorbitant rent from respondents or in the alternative to get huge pagadi amount either from the respondents or from other persons. There is actually no bona fide requirement of the petitioners. The petition is filed to harass the respondents who have been carrying on cloth business for the last 50 years and have got a good will worth several lakhs of rupees having invested huge amounts. The respondents are agreeable to enhance the rent suitably but the petitioners have refused and filed this false eviction petition on untenable grounds.
10. The learned Rent Controller framed the following points for consideration:
1. Whether the respondents committed wilful default in payment of monthly rents ?
2. Whether the respondents committed wilful default in payment of property tax ?
3. Whether the petitioner has got any bona fide requirement for the sake of its business ?
11. As already referred to supra P.Ws.1 and 2, RWs.1 to 3 were examined, Exs.A1 to A53, Exs.B1 to B.45 and Exs.X1 to X.21 were marked. Inasmuch as the eviction petition was dismissed, the matter was carried by way of appeal R.A.No. 185 of 2002 on the file of Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad. The appellate authority, at para-6, framed the following point for consideration:
Now the point for consideration is whether the order of the Rent Controller is liable to be set aside?
The appellate authority recorded certain reasons and ultimately dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present C.R.P.
12. The specific grounds raised are as hereunder:
1. Wilful default in payment of rent for the period of February 1997 to April 1997.
2. Wilful default in payment of municipal taxes.
3. Bona fide personal requirement of the landlords.
Ground No. 1:
13. The respective pleadings of the parties, the points for consideration, which had been framed by the Court of first instance and also the appellate authority and the oral and documentary evidence available on record had been already referred to supra in brief. As can be seen from the findings recorded by both the Courts below, no doubt positive concurrent findings had been recorded that no such wilful default for the period of February 1997 to April 1997 had been committed. P.W.1 had deposed on this aspect in detail. No doubt, R.W.1 had taken a stand of his own, it is true that this is oath against oath.
14. Ex.A.32 is notice of attornment dated 13-5-1997 issued by the prior landlord which specifies that the tenant had committed default in payment of rent from February 1997 to April 1997. The stand taken by the tenant in Ex.B.33 is that he had tendered rent but the previous landlord refused to receive and he had sent the same by Money order in February 1997, March 1997 and April 1997. Yet another reply in Ex.B.34. Subsequent thereto also there appears to be some correspondence. Exs.B8 to Ex.B.12 and Ex.B.15 are strongly relied upon. On a careful scrutiny of these documents, prima facie, this Court is satisfied that the name of the payee had not been specified and the period also had not been specified.
15. Be that as it may, much comment had been made on the aspect that inasmuch as these are concurrent factual findings, this Court cannot disturb such findings. When several suspicious features are pointed out a duty is caste upon the Courts below to record positive findings in this regard and it is needless to say that it is for the tenant to explain all these aspects and satisfy the Court that in fact such payment had been made during the said period. It is one thing to say that such payment, in fact, was made and it is yet another thing to say that in the peculiar facts and circumstances, this may not constitute wilful default at all. This Court had given the anxious consideration to the findings, which had been recorded by the Courts below in this discretion. But however, specific findings had not been recorded.
Ground No. 2:
16. Ex.A.48 is the rental deed between the parties. Exs.B.27, B.29 and B.45 were relied upon for the purpose of showing that no such default relating to payment of property tax had been committed by the tenants. Condition No. 3 in the Rental Deed-Ex.A48 reads as hereunder:
That, apart from the agreed rent, the lessees shall pay the M.C.H. property tax, water and electricity consumption charges to the concerned authorities regularly and handover all such payment receipts as and when demanded by the lessor.
On a careful scrutiny of Exs.B.27, B.29 and B.45 there appears to be no nexus to the cheques specified in Ex.B.45 with what had been shown in Exs.B.27 and B.29. It is needless to say that in the light of the stand taken by R.W.1 it is for R.W.1 to explain his stand in this regard especially in the light of the stand taken by P.W.1. R.W.1 in chief-examination deposed as hereunder:
I am liable to pay the property tax apart from the monthly rent. I am not due to pay any property tax.
R.W.1 also deposed as hereunder:
The tenancy with P1 is continuing on the same terms and conditions of Ex.A48.
P.W.1 deposed as follows:
I enquired with the M.C.H. and came to know that property tax is due from prior to my purchase. My vendor also informed. I came to know that one year property tax was due from respondent, preceding Ex.A.45. Even after we became the owner, respondent did not pay the tax for about one year. I do not remember if the actionable claim included for the property tax arrears also. I do not remember the yearly tax for the suit building.
It is needless to say that in the light of the stand taken by P.W.1, it is for R.W.1 to explain his stand. It is however, stated that despite contradictory version taken by R.W.1, the stand of the tenant had been believed and the ground was negatived.
Ground No. 3:
17. So far as the bona fide personal requirement is concerned, in the eviction petition itself specific stand was taken that the petitioner's firm was registered and has been running business. The learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that as far as this ground is concerned except a vague finding recorded at Para-13, the appellate authority had not dealt with both the oral and documentary evidence available on record while dealing with the said ground. It may be appropriate to have a look at Para 13 recorded by the appellate authority and it was observed as hereunder:
It is the case of the landlords that they are running the business in rented premises. Therefore, for their personal requirement, the demised premises is required and eviction is to be ordered on this ground. On perusal of the order of the Rent Controller in Para 22 onwards, she has discussed the point and in page 18 it is observed by the Rent Controller that P.W.1 admitted that there is no telephone connection in the name of M/s. Delight Electrical Works or any office and that the said telephone is not owned by any of the petitioners and the landlords could not carry on the so called business in the petition schedule mulgi without telephone and the presence of the telephone No. 4759924 is only a public telephone booth. As per Exs.B.5 to B.7 the shutter for the petition schedule bear the name of Joy Icecream is mentioned. Therefore, the appellants received a letter has not adduced any clinching and convincing material either oral or by documentary to get the tenants evicted from the premises. The learned Rent Controller after evaluating the evidence on record both oral and documentary rightly came to the conclusion holding that the tenants are not at fault and there is no wilful default committed by the tenants both rent as well as the property tax and I do see no reason to interfere with the orders passed by the Rent Controller as she thoroughly discussed the factual aspects and also followed the legal principles while discussing the material on record.
18. Submissions at length were made that not only that specific points for consideration were not framed by the appellate authority, apart from the said aspect, the aspect of bona fide personal requirement had not been appreciated in proper perspective.
19. In Vankayala Veeraraghavulu's case (supra), a learned Judge of this Court at para-8 observed:
The learned Counsel for the petitioner next contends that the eviction petition should be treated also as one under Section 10(2)(v) of the Act, i.e., on the ground that the tenant secured alternative building. He submits that though it was clearly alleged in the eviction petition that the respondent purchased recently another big building which could be used by him for godowns, that was not denied by the respondent in its counter. He contends that, therefore it should be treated as an admission on the part of the respondent that it secured alternative building. He also submits that mere non-mention of Section 10(2)(v) of the Act or that the eviction is being sought also under that provision will not disentitle the petitioner from seeking eviction on that basis also. The learned Counsel relies on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court Abdul Raheem v. Srinivasa Dyeing Works : 1993(1)ALT232 Even assuming that such a contention can be raised though not expressly pleaded by the petitioner in his eviction petition, the appellate authority has answered that by pointing out that the respondent-firm itself is not owning or possessing any non-residential building in Rajahmundry and that merely because some of its partners are owning non-residential buildings that could not be the basis for holding that the respondent firm owned or possessed alternative accommodation. I do not find any basis for taking a different view.
20. The Counsel on record had also placed reliance on Alma S. Berar v. Mukhtiar Singh : [2002]SUPP5SCR47 , Pratap Rai Tanwani and Anr. v. Uttam Chand and Anr. : (2004)8SCC490 Mohinder Singh v. Madan Lal Sharma and Anr. : AIR2002SC2624 and Teegala Satyanarayana v. G.S. Bhagwan 1996 (1) AIRCJ SC 27.
21. As can be seen from the documentary evidence available on record apart from Exs.A1 to A53 and Exs.B1 to B45, Exs.X1 to X21 also is available on record. Strong reliance was placed on Exs.X5 to X.21 the challans for payment of tax, the statement of Income Tax, Income Tax returns and other receipts. The non-consideration of these documents was made a serious ground of attack. Incidentally the other evidence available on record, the evidence of P.W.2, R.Ws.2 and 3 also had been referred to.
22. On over all appreciation of facts and circumstances of the case and also in the light of the findings which had been recorded, it may be that, apart from P.W.2 the landlords could have let in further evidence to substantiate their stand especially in relation to bonafide personal requirement. Though in the light of the several of the circumstances, it is for the tenant to satisfy the other two grounds, wilful default relating to payment of rent and wilful default relating to payment of property tax, for reasons best known the tenant also was not successful in proving the stand taken by him in the counter. This appears to be the actual situation in which the parties are placed. However, on over all appreciation of the findings recorded by the appellate authority, this Court is thoroughly satisfied that the appellate authority had not independently applied the mind and appreciated the whole evidence available on record in proper perspective. It is needless to say that it is for the parties to let in further evidence, if any, if they are advised. For the purpose of proving a particular ground some more evidence is essential in the facts and circumstances. Several of the admissions made by R.W.1 and several of the admitted documents and several of the suspicious features which had been pointed out and the inconsistencies in the evidence of R.W.1 despite the specific stand taken by P.W.1 had not been properly appreciated by both the Courts below and hence, this Court is thoroughly satisfied that the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below cannot be said to be findings recorded in accordance with law. This Court is not inclined to express any further opinion, for the reason that in the peculiar facts of the case this Court is inclined to give opportunity to both the parties to let in further evidence also if they are advised to do so.
23. In the light of the findings recorded above, the impugned order made by the appellate authority cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be set aside and accordingly, it is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded to the appellate authority to give opportunity to both the parties to let in further evidence, if the parties choose to do so especially in the light of the observations made by this Court supra and decide the matter afresh in accordance with law within a period of four months from the date of receipt of this order.
24. C.R.P. is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above. Inasmuch as an order of remand is being made by this Court as revisional Court, no order as to costs.