ORDER
1. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 8-12-2000 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No.3357 of 1999 hereby and whereunder the writ petition filed by the appellant herein was dismissed.
2. The long and short of the story made out in the writ application is that despite existence of a renewal clause contained in an agreement dated 10-3-1993 providing for extension thereof for three terms, the notice impugned in the writ application was issued, which is in the following terms:
'The 3 years agreement period of licence of Pop-Corn stall at Guntur bus station will be completed on 28-2-1999 and no provision for further extention.
Therefore, you are advised to vacate the premises on 28-2-1999 A.N. duly payingall the dues if any.'
3. Clause (1) of the agreement dated 10-3-1993, whereupon the entire case of the appellant rests, reads thus:
'1. The period of licence is from 1-3-1993 to 28-2-1996. Licence is given for a period of three years in the initial period. The same will be extended for three terms of three years each on compound enhancement of the existing monthly fee @ 20%, 30% and 30% on 4th, 7th and 10th years of the licence respectively subject to the performance,'
4. Mr. C. Ramachandra Raju, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the action of the respondents is arbitrary and in support thereof took us through the entire judgment of the Apex Court in Ramana v. IA Authority of India, : (1979)IILLJ217SC . The learned Counsel would urge that the action on the part of the respondents herein is contrary to the said agreement, as a result whereof theappellant's legal right has been infringed. The learned Counsel would remind us the dicta of Frankfurter, J, in Vitarelli v. Seaton, (1959) 359 US 535, wherein it wasobserved:
'He that takes the procedure sword shall perish with the sword'.
5. Our attention has also been drawn to several other paragraphs of the said judgment, which, as indicated hereinbefore, was read in extenso by the learned Counsel.
6. The learned Counsel does not dispute that the right of the appellant, if any, flows only out of the aforementioned agreement dated 10-3-1993. It is also not in dispute that although the said agreement was initially for a period of three years, another extension had been granted and as would appear from the notice impugned in the writ petition that the respondents herein refused to extend the said licence. Unfortunate, as though it may seem to be, that the learned Counsel forgot to notice a distinction that the standard set out by the Supreme Court in International Airport Authority (supra) was to be maintained at the threshold of the contract and not for the purpose of enforcing the contract. It is now a well settled principle of law, having regard to several decisions of the Apex Court beginning from M/s. Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1496, that the Court can exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India only in the event the contract is statutory one or the termination thereof is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. By a reason of subsequent decision of the Apex Court, the aforementioned three principles laid down in Radhakrishna Agarwal's case (supra) have been extended only to the extent that the writ petition would also be maintainable if a contract has been terminated on a ground de hors any terms of the contract and which is per se violative of Article 14 of the Constitutionof India. No foundational fact has been stated by the appellant in the writ affidavit so as to show that the action on the part of the respondents herein was either de hors the contract or the same was per se violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Only because there exists a clause of renewal, the same by itself would not clothe any legal right upon the appellant to obtain renewal automatically having regard to several other clauses of the said licence, which need not be referred to in detail. It is also a well settled principle of law that the writ Court shall not convert itself into a civil Court so as to enable it to pass a decree for specific performance of contract. The right claimed by the appellant, as indicated hereinbefore, is only based upon his purported right of renewal contained in clause (1) of the aforementioned agreement.
7. The respondent-Corporation being a statutory authority is merely a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Its administrative action, which is violative of Part III of the Constitution of India may be amenable to writ jurisdiction, but not its activities, which are de hors the Roads Transport Corporations Act, 1950 and/or the statutory regulations framed thereunder. It is one thing to say that a statutory authority fails to perform its statutory duty or acts contrary thereto; it is another thing to say that it does not perform its contractual obligations. While in the former case Part III of Constitution of India would be attracted, in the latter it would not. The rights of the parties arise out of the aforementioned agreement dated 10-3-1993. Such rights arising out of contract, qua contract, are not enforceable in a Court of law.
8. Even assuming for the sake of argument, that there can be judicial review of contractual powers also, but the review may be negated or limited by specific policy factors, rather than continue searching for some 'public law' element to the decisionas a justification for applying public law doctrines to the case before the Court. This Court is bound by the decisions of the Apex Court. An administrative action can be subject matter of a writ petition only in a case if the decision-making process suffers from any illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety as has been pointed out by the Apex Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651. Yet recently, the Apex Court in U.P. Financial Corporation v. M/s. Nayer Oxygen and Acetylene Gas Limited, (1994) 7 SCC 551, laid down the law in the following terms:
'However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the corporation is an independent autonomous statutory body having its own constitution and rules to abide by and functions and obligations to discharge. As such, in the discharge of its functions, it is free to act according to its own light. The views it forms and the decision it takes are on the basis of the information to its own perspective and calculations. Unless its action is mala fide even a wrong decision taken by it is not open to challenge. It is not for the Courts or a third party to substitute its decision, however, not prudent, commercial or business like, it may be, for the decision of the Corporation. Hence, whatever the wisdom (or the lack of it) of the conduct of the Corporation, the same cannot be assailed for making the Corporation liable.'
9. Even at the stage of grant of contract, as is well known, the Court will exercise self-restraint as would be evident from the decisions of the Apex Court in M.P. Oil Extractions v. State of M.P., : (1997)7SCC592 , Common Cause a Registered Society v. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 530, Krishnan Kakkanth v. Government of Kerala, : AIR1997SC128 , Sterling Computers v. M.N.M. Publications, : AIR1996SC51 , and various other cases, including AIR India v. CochinInternational Airport Limited, 2000 (1) Scale 346. Yet recently the Apex Court in Centre far Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, : AIR2001SC80 , reiterated the principles laid down in Tata Cellular's case (supra) and Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. Slate of J & K, : [1980]3SCR1338 .
10. Mr. Raju, learned Counsel very strenuously argued that the arbitrariness of the respondents arise out of the fact that without disposing of the application for renewal, the impugned notice has been passed. The said submission, to say the least, is wholly misconceived. The very fact that a notice of eviction has been passed inter alia on the ground that no further extention is possible is clearly suggestive of the fact that the appellant's application for renewal of the lease has been rejected on one ground or the other. Furthermore, it is accepted that the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation has issued a Circular bearing No.64, dated 10-10-1996, clause (7) whereof reads thus:
'With these new guidelines, all the existing licenses shall be deemed to have been terminated at the end of the their subsisting period of agreement and no extention shall be given and fresh tenders shall be called for.
In other words, all the existing licenses of canteens/dormitories stalls/shops, spaces in bus stations and commercial complexes, etc., allotted in pursuance of instructions issued vide Circulars cited at 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 13 under reference shall be terminated after completion of the present (existing) agreement period, irrespective of completion of maximum period of licence as stipulated in the Circulars governing the allotment.'
11. The vires of the said Circular is not in question. As has been pointed out by the Apex Court that if a policy decision has been taken by the State, the HighCourt in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall not interfere therewith, unless such policy decision is found to be arbitrary. It would bear repetition to state that even such a policy decision has not been questioned in this writ application. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the entire case of the appellant is for enforcement of a contract, qua contract. Even in a case of this nature, the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' cannot be applied. This aspect of the matter has been considered in Santoshkumar Roy v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1997 SC 168, wherein, one of us, upon taking into consideration several decisions inter alia held that contractual rights, normally, would not be enforced through writ proceedings. A matter which is covered by the contractual obligations of the parties, does not, except in some exceptional situations, involve any public law element.
12. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal, which is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs.5,000-00 (Rupees Five thousands) payable to the A.P. State Legal Services Authority. Such costs may be paid within four weeks.