Judgment:
Bhaskaran, C.J.
1. The short point that falls for decision in this appeal at the instance of the management is whether there is any valid ground for interference with the decision of the learned single Judge, who disposed of the writ petition granting substantial reliefs to the 2nd respondent herein.
2. In the course of the discussion, parties will be referred to as they were arrayed in the writ petition. The facts having been narrated in great detail in the judgment appealed against, there appears to be no need for repetition. Suffice it to notice the facts in brief : The 2nd petitioner, a Driller-cum-Blaster in the company placed under suspension pending enquiry on 5th December 1982, was ordered to be dismissed by the disciplinary authority - second respondent (Superintendent of Mines) on 6the March 1983 accepting the enquiry report. The 2nd petitioner had filed O.S. No. 20/83 in the Munsif's Court, Vinukonda against the order of dismissal. The workmen went on strike with effect from 9th 1983 in protest against the dismissal of the 2nd petitioner. Though the Assistant Commissioner (C) of Labour, who conciliated the dispute raised by the 1st petitioner - Union in regard to the dismissal of the 2nd petitioner, submitted a failure report on 18th March 1983, he went over to the company at the request of the management on 25th March 1983 to continue to explore the possibility of a settlement in view of the prevailing strike. The renewed negotiations that day yielded a settlement found on pp. 56-57 of the material papers filed along with the writ appeal, described as 'Minutes of Discussions' (Annexure-II) The terms of that settlement are as follows :-
'1. The Union regretted for what has happened w.e.f. 9th March 1983 and both the Union and Management condemned violence and from any corner.
2. Since Sri M. Venkateswarlu, Driller-cum-Blaster Asst. has not exhausted the provisions of appeal, it is agreed that Mr. Venkateswarlu will appeal to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director which in turn will be forwarded by the Superintendent of Mines, for decision within 15 days. The management has agreed to award punishment other than dismissal, discharge or removal from service.
3. The union will call off the strike which commenced on 8th March 1983 with immediate effect.
4. Such of those employees who have got leave may apply for leave for the period of their absence from 9th March 1983 and management will sanction the same in case if they are entitled for any leave. In all other cases the employees will be treated as on L.W.P.
5. In view of this understanding the employee who filed a case in the court of Munsif Magistrate, Vinukonda and the management which field a suit for vacation of injunction order in the court of Subordinate Judge, Narasaraopet will withdraw the cases.
6. No disciplinary action will be taken against workers who are on strike for their absence.'
This settlement was signed by four representatives of the management and five representatives of the Union. The management representatives included the Superintendent of Mines, the Manager (Mill) and the Senior Engineer (Mining). Though the petitioners implemented their part of the obligations, the fourth respondent-Chairman disposed of the appeal filed by the 2nd petitioner in terms of clause 2 of the settlement, reducing the punishment only to discharge from dismissal though the understanding was that the punishment would not be dismissal, discharge or removal from service. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal communicated on 23rd July 1983, the 2nd petitioner filed WP No. 7820/83. Thereafter, by the order dated 3rd May 1984 the Government of India referred the dispute between the management and the Union, relating to the award of punishment of discharge to the 2nd petitioner, under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('the Act') to the Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad for adjudication. When the writ petition came up of final hearing on 15th November 1984, this Court took the view that the dispute having been referred to the Industrial Tribunal, the proper forum for settling the dispute was that Tribunal before which the dispute was pending. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed. Before the Tribunal, in MP No. 7/85 in ID No. 36/84 the 1st petitioner-Union raised a preliminary objection in regard to the validity of the reference. The Tribunal by the order dated 9th September 1985 upheld that objection and rejected and terminated the reference. On the same day, the Tribunal also passed an award in ID No. 36/84 to the effect that the reference was bad and it stood terminated. The Tribunal held that the arrangement dated 25th March 1983 was a clear settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings and, therefore, the management could not go back; it was not a settlement arrived at as a result of fraud, mis-representation or undue influence; there was no such contention also : hence the reference was bad and was not maintainable, and that the settlement was binding upon the management. The Tribunal observed that it was open to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director (4th respondent) to apply his mind to award a punishment other than dismissal, discharge or removal from service on the 2nd petitioner as per the understanding arrived at on 25th March 1983, and that the order of discharge passed against the 2nd petitioner was illegal. The Management not having implemented its part of the obligations under the settlement even after the Industrial Tribunal passed the order and award dated 9th September 1985 rejecting and terminating the reference, a lawyer notice was issued on behalf of the 1st petitioner - Union on 2nd December 1985 demanding the implementation of the award. To this, a reply dated 14th December 1985 was sent by the management stating that the question of implementing the award did not arise as no award had been passed by the Industrial Tribunal. It is thereafter the petitioners filed the present writ petition seeking the reinstatement of the 2nd petitioner into service with continuity of service and back wages and other allied reliefs. The learned single Judge in an elaborate judgment rejected the technical contentions raised on behalf of the management, and upheld the Industrial Tribunal's view that the minutes of discussions dated 25th March 1983 constituted a valid settlement within the meaning of Section 2(p) of the Act, and that the settlement was clearly binding on the employer and also on the workmen. The Judge set aside the order of the fourth respondent - Chairman dated 23rd July 1983 and directed the reinstatement of the 2nd petitioner into service with entitlement to continuity of service and all consequential benefits, monetary and otherwise, as if he continued to be in service right from the date when he was dismissed from service, within one week from the date of the receipt of the copy of the judgment. The arrears found due on the basis of the above direction was ordered to be ascertained and paid to the 2nd petitioner within two weeks from the date of the receipt of the copy of the judgment. The management was directed to pay to the 2nd petitioner his costs assessed at Rs. 2000/-.
3. Before us, Sri K. Sreenivasa Murthy, learned counsel for the management, contended that the so called settlement dated 25th March 1983 was no settlement of the dispute arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings within the meaning of Section 12(3) of the Act. It was also submitted that it did not amount to a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings so as to bind the parties to the agreement in terms of sub-section (1) and (3) of Section 18 of the Act. It was the submission of the learned counsel that what was recorded on 25th March 1983 was only the minutes of discussions, not a settlement; those who signed that document were not officers who could enter into any settlement; and that the settlement not having been in the form prescribed in Rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, it was not binding on the management. He had also a contention that in view of the failure report submitted by the conciliation officer on 18th March 1983 the settlement dated 25th March 1983 could not be deemed to be a settlement u/s. 12(3) of the Act. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Limited (1972-I-LLJ-99), Jhagrakhan Collieries case 1975 Lab. I.C. 137 and Brooke Bond India Limited (1972-I-LLJ-184) and a decision of the Bombay High Court in Air India's case (1981-II-LLJ-306) were cited before us. We have carefully gone through these decisions, and are of the opinion that the facts and circumstances leading to the decision in those cases are quite different from those present in the instant case. This is a clear case where the management is guilty of dishonoring its commitments under a settlement, whether it is called the 'understanding' or the 'minutes of discussions'. The management took full advantage of the terms of the settlement, in implementation of which, the workmen on their part called off the strike. The settlement was signed by responsible officers holding high ranks in the company, and it is too much for us to swallow the contention of the management that the officers who represented the management at the conciliation proceeding on 25th March 1983 had acted either without authorisation or in excess of the authorisation given to them. Are we to believe that the Chairman and the management were not apprised of the terms of the agreement pursuant to which the strike was called off by the Union We have absolutely no hesitation in rejecting the contention that it was without due authorisation that the management's representatives agreed to the terms of settlement, or that the Chairman and the management were not aware of the terms of the agreement. The truth, on the other hand, is that after having trapped the Union into an agreement and after having taken advantage of that agreement, the management acted vindictively and dishonestly against the terms of agreement on the pretext that the settlement was not binding on the management. Moreover, on 9th September 1985 the Industrial Tribunal has passed on the award stating that the agreement dated 25th March 1983 was a settlement binding on the management. The award of the Tribunal, not having been appealed against, has become final. This arrogant and arbitrary attitude of the management it not certainly praiseworthy, and is not conducive for the promotion and maintenance of industrial peace and harmony. The Union and the management are not equal in withstanding prolonged litigation; and other things being equal, to further the ends of justice, the court should normally lean towards the weak, namely, the workman. Both the Industrial Tribunal and the learned single Judge have on careful consideration of the facts and the circumstances of the case, entered the findings that the agreement dated 25th March 1983 was a settlement within the meaning of Section 2(p) of the Act, and that it is binding on the management. The direction given by the learned single Judge is without prejudice to the right of the 1st respondent - management to pass a fresh order within two weeks from the date of the receipt of the copy of the judgment in terms of settlement arrived at on 25th March 1983.
4. We have not been shown any authority to the effect that a settlement arrived at, whether in the course of a conciliation proceeding or otherwise, subsequent to the submission of the failure report by the conciliation officer, is not binding on the parties. It is precisely for this reason the learned single Judge upheld the finding of the Industrial Tribunal that, in view of the settlement arrived at on 25th March 1983, though it was after the Conciliation Officer submitted the failure report on 18th March 1983, there was, as on 3rd May 1984, only a settlement to be implemented, not dispute surviving to be referred by the Central Government to the Tribunal for adjudication. The order and award dated 9th September 1985 passed by the Tribunal that the reference was not valid and was liable to be rejected and terminated were accordingly upheld by the learned single Judge.
5. In paragraph 18 of the judgment appealed against (1988-I-LLJ-207 at 218), the learned single Judge has stated; 'it is for the Labour Commissioner to take such action as he may consider appropriate under Section 29 read with Section 32 of the Act', expressing the opinion that the management had committed breach of the settlement arrived at on 25th March 1983. When the matter came up for hearing, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent - writ petitioner submitted that the writ petitioner was not interested in any penal action being taken against any of the appellants. Recording this submission, we delete the direction to the Labour Commissioner for action u/s 29 read with Section 32 of the Act contained in paragraph 18 of the learned Single Judge's judgment (1988-I-LLJ-207).
6. We would dispose of this writ appeal directing the 4th appellant, the Chairman, Hindustan Zinc Ltd., to consider the appeal dated 25th March 1983 filed by the 2nd respondent - writ petitioner in terms of clause (2) of the agreement dated 25th March 1983 and pass appropriate orders within two weeks from the date of of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The learned single Judge has already set aside the impugned order of the 4th appellant dated 23rd July 1983 imposing penalty of discharge instead of dismissal from service. The order of the learned single Judge, so far as the setting aside of the order is concerned, would stand. In as much as, in terms of clause (2) of the agreement dated 25th March 1983, the management is entitled to impose only punishment other than dismissal, discharge or removal from service, the 2nd respondent - writ petitioner, as directed by the learned single Judge, shall be reinstated into service, which ought to have been done long ago. But if it has not been done till now, it should be done within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this Judgment. As held by the learned Single Judge, the 2nd respondent - writ petitioner shall be entitled to claim continuity of service and all consequential benefits, monetary or otherwise as if he continued to be in service right from the date when he was dismissed from service.
7. The writ appeal is dismissed of in the above terms.
8. No costs.