Judgment:
Y. Bhaskara Rao, J.
1. A telegram dated 15-2-1977 sent to the Honourable the Chief Justice of this Court by one Chintakrindi Venkateswarlu, Guntur alleging that his son by name Hemanth, an intermediate student was kidnapped by the Head Constable, VI Town Police Station, Crime Branch, Vijayawada by name Ramesh from his residence and his whereabouts were not known and that he is apprehending danger to his son's life was taken up as Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and notices were issued to the concerned. Pursuant to the notices issued, the Sub-Inspector of Police, VI Town Police Station, Vijayawada produced the alleged detenu Mr. Ch. Hemanth in this Court and this Court recorded his statement. The alleged detenu denied the factum of his kidnapping by the police.
2. The Sub-Inspector of Police, VI Town Police Station, Vijayawada also filed a counter affidavit stating that the alleged detenu Mr. Ch. Hemanth is not wanted in any case nor any case is pending against him in his police station. He also made enquiries with the Head Constable, Mr. Ramesh who was alleged to have kidnapped the alleged detenu and found that the Head Constable had never taken the alleged detenu into custody and that the allegation that the Head Constable had kidnapped the detenu is totally false. After receipt of the notice from the High Court, he went to the house of the alleged detenu on 2-3-1977 and he found him at his residence. He informed him about the Court orders and requested him to accompany him to Hyderabad to enable him (S.I) to produce him before the High Court. The alleged detenu agreed for the same and he accompanied the Sub-Inspector of Police to the High Court.
3. In view of the statement of the alleged detenu that he was not kidnapped by the police, the Sub-Inspector of Police was directed to produce the petitioner. Accordingly, the Sub-Inspector produced the petitioner and this Court recorded the statement of the petitioner who has issued the telegram. From the statement and the demeanour of the petitioner, a Division Bench of this Court came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not speaking truth and therefore, called upon him as to why he should not be punished for committing contempt of the Court by abusing the process of this Court by issuing a false telegram. The petitioner was directed to submit his explanation within three weeks from March 11, 1997 and directed to be present in the Court on 1-4-1997. Pursuant to the directions of this Court, the petitioner appeared before this Court on 1-4-1997 and filed an affidavit averring, inter alia, that he is eking out his livelihood as taxi driver and that he has got three sons. He also stated that he used to stand as surety for petty offenders and that the police used to call him to the police station whenever the offenders did not attend the police station. To secure his presence, the police used to take his sons to the police station and used to enquire about him. On 14-2-1977, his son Ch. Hemanth, the alleged detenu, did not come to home. He waited for one day and as his whereabouts were not known, he gave a telegram to the High Court with a disturbed mind stating that his son might have been kidnapped by the police. His son came on 16-2-1977 and that he was informed that he had been to Mangalagiri. He lastly stated that he had issued the telegram bona fide believing that his son was taken by the police. He, however, prayed that if he had committed any mistake, he may be pardoned and he undertook not to repeat such things in future.
4. The above stated facts will manifest that the telegram issued by the petitioner is false because the petitioner as well as his son both on oath stated before this Court that the petitioner's son Ch. Hemanth was not taken away by the Head Constable, Mr. Ramesh. Thus, it is established that the petitioner has abused the process of the Court by issuing a false telegram.
5. The facts stated supra show that this writ petition was taken up on the basis of the telegram issued by the petitioner as a PIL case. After the development of the innovative strategy of public interest litigation by the Apex Court and the High Courts, it is trying to remove any possible hindrance that can obstruct the process of reaching justice to the poor masses in India. So much so that in order to encourage the vigilant citizens to bring to the notice of the Court the socio-legal problems of the poor and down-trodden, the higher judiciary in India has been treating even 'letters', 'post cards' and 'telegrams' addressed to Judges, the Court or the Legal Aid Committee, as writ petitions. This is, indeed, a unique development that distinguishes Indian judicial system from other judicial systems in the world. By adopting this method, the deprived and needy sections of the Society are not only exempted from legal expenses, but they are also absolved of the cumbersome procedure which is not easily understandable to the poor, illiterate persons who have no idea of law and Court-door at the very outset.
6. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, : [1984]2SCR67 , an organisation dedicated to the cause of release of bonded labour in the country surveyed some of the stone quarries in different States to know about the working conditions of bonded labourers, who were under inhuman and intolerable conditions. The organisation wrote a letter to the Supreme Court pointing all the facts to the notice of the Supreme Court. This letter was treated as a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and after issuing notices, the Supreme Court justified it's treating the letter as a writ petition and observed as follows (at p. 814 of AIR) :
'Where a member of the public acting bona fide moved the Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights on behalf of a person or class of persons, who on account of poverty or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, cannot approach the Court for relief, such member of the public may move the Court even by just writing a letter, because it would not be right or fair to expect a person acting pro bono publico to incur expenses out of his own pocket for going to a lawyer and preparing a regular writ petition.'
7. The process of approaching the Courts by way of letters, telegrams and post-cards started continuing and in number of cases, for instance, People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, : (1982)IILLJ454SC ; Upendra Baxi v. State of U.P., (1981) 3 SCALE 113; Olga Tellis v. State of Maharashtra, : AIR1986SC180 ; Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, : AIR1981SC939 ; Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, : 1983CriLJ642 ; Ghanshyam Pardes v. State of Tamil Nadu (W.P. No. 2261 of 1980); Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar, : 1983CriLJ675 ; Katheeja Bi v. Superintendent Engineer : (1986)ILLJ314SC ; Salal Hydro-Electric Project v. State of J & K : (1984)3SCC538 ; Ram Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar : [1983]3SCR1011 ' Neerja Chaudhary v. State of M.P., : AIR1984SC1099 ; Lakshmi Kant Pande v. Union of India : [1984]2SCR795 ; Janki v. Sardar Nagar Municipality, : AIR1986Guj49 ; Pratul Kumar Sinha v. State of Orissa : AIR1989SC1783 and Matter of Complaint Received From Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi (1989) 2 SCALE 654, the Supreme Court entertained telegrams, letters and post cards as PIL cases. Procedural objections as regards to treating letters etc. as writ petitions were raised and the Supreme Court in S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, : [1982]2SCR365 held as follows :
'It must not be forgotten that procedure is but a hand maiden of justice and cause of justice can never be allowed to be thwarted by any procedural technicalities. This Court, would, therefore, unhesitantly and without any qualm of conscience cast aside the technical rules of procedure in the exercise of a dispensing power and treat the letter of public minded individual as writ petition and act upon it'.
Thus, the Supreme Court has dispelled all the objections regarding the procedural objections to treating letters etc. as writ petitions as PIL cases and the same are followed by the High Courts while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the letters etc. are treated as writ petitions and the relief is being given to the needy in proper cases. The principle laid down in the above judgment is that either letters or telegrams addressed moving the Court must be bona fide act bringing the correct facts to the notice of the Court. Of late, experience is showing that a number of false telegrams and letters are being received and in some of the cases in respect of persons who are involved in criminal cases, arrested and produced before the Court, telegrams are being sent requesting the Court for their release treating them as if they were taken into illegal custody. Thus, the benefit or opportunity given to redress the grievances of the weaker sections or down-trodden sections of the society on account of poverty, disability etc. must be utilised properly and in the cases like the present one, the persons are approaching the Court with all false allegations and are abusing the process of the Court. Therefore, there is any amount of requirement to check that the jurisdiction of the constitutional Court is utilised for the purpose of redressing the grievances of the PIL litigants in bona fide cases bringing the true and correct facts before the Courts. If the Courts are moved purposefully by giving false information and the time and process of the Court is abused, then proper action to curb such proceedings and to punish such persons is one of the vital requirements of the day, so that any person who approaches the Court in the name of public interest comes with clean hands and with true facts.
8. The facts of the present case as stated supra, show that the petitioner sent a telegram stating that his son was taken away by the Head Constable Mr. Ramesh of the VI Town Police Station on 16-2-1997, and this Court treated the telegram as a writ petition and gave a direction for production of the alleged detenu. Accordingly, the alleged detenu was produced. He has given a sworn statement before this Court that he was not taken into custody by the police on 16-2-1997 or on any subsequent date and that he went to Mangalagiri. Thereafter, notice for production of the petitioner was given. The petitioner appeared in the Court and his statement was recorded. He stated on oath that as his son did not return to his home, he thought that the police might have taken him into custody. Thus, the facts stated in the telegram sent by the petitioner couple with the two sworn statements of the alleged detenu and his father, the petitioner herein make it clear that the telegram was issued without verifying the facts whether the alleged detenu was actually taken into illegal custody by the police on 16-2-1977. Thus, the petitioner not only abused the due process of the Court, but also committed criminal contempt of Court. This Court has got power to punish for contempt of Court u/S. 215 of the Constitution of India as well as under Contempt of Courts Act. It is apt here to extract the meaning of 'criminal contempt'. Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines 'criminal contempt'. It means, inter alia, as the doing of any act whatsoever which prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings; or interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. In Ram Autar Shukla v. Arvind Shukla, 1995 Supp(2) SCC 130, the Apex Court, speaking through K. Ramaswamy, J., referred to various classic definitions of Contempt of Court and Criminal Contempt. C. J. Miller's Contempt of Court states that a criminal contempt may be committed by 'indulging in conduct which creates a serious risk or prejudice to the fair trial of particular criminal or civil proceedings, whether through an effect upon the parties, the witness, or the Tribunal itself.'. In the words of Anthony Arlidge and David Eady in their treatise on the law of 'Contempt of Court' means 'any conduct calculated to interfere with the administration of justice. Calculated means no more than tending to. The House of Lords in Attorney General v. Times Newspaper (1974) AC 273 held that 'any act which raised a real albeit small likelihood of interference with the administration of justice amounts to contempt of Court. In Ram Autar Shukla's case, the Supreme Court held as follows :
'Due course of justice means not only any particular proceeding but broad stream of administration of justice. Therefore, due course of justice used in Section 2(c) or Section 13 of the Act are of wide import and are not limited to any particular judicial proceeding. Much more wider when this Court exercises suo motu power under Article 129 of the Constitution. Due process of law is blinkered by acts or conduct of the parties to the litigation or witnesses which generate tendency to impede or undermine the free flow of the unsullied stream of justice by blatantly resorting, with impunity, to fabricate Court proceedings to thwart fair adjudication of dispute and its resultant end. If the act complained of substantially interferes with or tends to interfere with the broad stream of administration of justice, it would be punishable under the Act. If the act complained of undermines the prestige of the Court or causes hindrance in the discharge of due course of justice or tends to obstruct the course of justice or interfere with due course of justice, it is sufficient that the conduct complained of constitutes contempt of Court and liable to be dealt with in accordance with the Act.'
9. In Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma, : 1994ECR636(SC) , B. L. Hansaria, J. speaking for the Supreme Court, observed as follows (paras 2, 8 and 9 of AIR SCW) :
'Any one who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings; or if anything is done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the administration of justice.
To enable the Courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehoods have to be appropriately dealt with, without which it would not be possible for any court to administer justice in the true sense and to the satisfaction of those who approach it in the hope that truth would ultimately prevail. .... The word 'interfere' means in the context of the subject, any action which checks or hampers the functioning or hinders or tends to prevent the performance of duty .... obstruction of justice is to interpose obstacles or impediments, or to hinder, impede or in any manner interrupt or prevent the administration of justice.'
As regards swearing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings, in Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana, : [1995]3SCR964 Dr. A. S. Anand, J. held as follows (at p. 1806 of AIR) :
'The swearing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings not only has the tendency of causing obstruction in the due course of judicial proceedings but has also the tendency to impede, obstruct and interfere with the administration of justice. The filing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings in any court of law exposes the intention of the party concerned in perverting the course of justice. The due process of law cannot be permitted to be slighted nor the majesty of law be made a mockery of by such acts or conduct on the part of the parties to the litigation or even while appearing as witnesses. Anyone who makes an attempt to impede or undermine or obstruct the free flow of the unsoiled stream of justice by resorting to the filing of false evidence, commits criminal contempt of the Court and renders himself liable to be dealt with in accordance with the act.'
In Afzal v. State of Haryana, : 1996CriLJ1679 , the Supreme Court has held that 'a false or a misleading or a wrong statement deliberately and wilfully made by a party to the proceedings to obtain a favourable order would prejudice or interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings.'
10. Letters, telegrams or postcards are entertained whenever human rights or fundamental rights are violated and persons are taken into illegal custody by the police or any authority. To safeguard the fundamental rights of the citizens as to life and liberty as envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is the prime concern of the Court as the Constitutional Courts are the guardians of the fundamental rights of the citizens.
11. The principles laid down in the above judgments make it clear that where a false statement is made before the Court on oath or any act, which causes hinderance in the process of administration of justice, is done, it amounts to a criminal contempt. In the present case, the petitioner issued a telegram with false allegations though his son went to Mangalagiri without verifying the said fact. The said statement has been found to be false according to the sworn statements given by the alleged detenu and his father, the petitioner. Issuing of the telegram with false allegations amounts to causing obstruction in the due course of judicial proceedings and has the tendency to impede, obstruct and interfere with the administration of justice. The due process of law cannot be permitted to be slighted nor the majesty of law be made a mockery by such acts or conduct on the part of the parties to the litigation. The act of the petitioner to use the jurisdiction of this Court with false telegram amounts to an attempt to impede or undermine or obstruct the free flow of the unsoiled stream of justice. Therefore, the petitioner has committed criminal contempt, within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act.
12. In the affidavit filed by the petitioner, he stated that he is a poor taxi driver getting Rs. 1,500/- per month. He requested that he may be pardoned and undertook that he will not repeat such things in future.
13. The petitioner was represented by Sri G. Dasaradha Rami Reddy, who was appointed as a Legal Aid counsel. The learned counsel pleaded that a lenient view may be taken having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and also the fact that the petitioner is a poor taxi driver, having three children and earning Rs. 1500/- per month.
14. The petitioner is a resident of Vijayawada and a taxi driver. He is not a rustic villager. According to his own affidavit he was standing surety for the persons who committed petty offences and he knew the police. Therefore if he was not able to find his son he ought to have verified with the police before issuing the Telegram. The act of the petitioner in issuing a false telegram to this Court amounts to gross abuse of process of the Court. This Court has to take the facts and circumstances into consideration particularly the conduct of the petitioner to see whether he has abused the process of the Court. As stated above, the petitioner herein has grossly abused the process of the Court. Therefore, it is not a proper case to absolve the petitioner by giving a pardon.
15. Therefore, we think it just and proper to convict the petitioner u/S. 12 of Contempt of Courts Act and sentence him to suffer one week simple imprisonment.
16. The Writ Petition is dismissed.
17. Petition dismissed.